

INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a manuscript sent to us for publication and microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted. Pages in any manuscript may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. Manuscripts may not always be complete. When it is not possible to obtain missing pages, a note appears to indicate this.
2. When copyrighted materials are removed from the manuscript, a note appears to indicate this.
3. Oversize materials (maps, drawings, and charts) are photographed by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is also filmed as one exposure and is available, for an additional charge, as a standard 35mm slide or in black and white paper format.*
4. Most photographs reproduce acceptably on positive microfilm or microfiche but lack clarity on xerographic copies made from the microfilm. For an additional charge, all photographs are available in black and white standard 35mm slide format.*

***For more information about black and white slides or enlarged paper reproductions, please contact the Dissertations Customer Services Department.**

U·M·I Dissertation
Information Service

University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

8627240

Chehabi, Houchang Esfandiar

MODERNIST SHI'ISM AND POLITICS: THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF
IRAN. (VOLUMES I AND II)

Yale University

PH.D. 1986

**University
Microfilms
International** 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Copyright 1986

by

Chehabi, Houchang Esfandiar

All Rights Reserved

MODERNIST SHI'ISM AND POLITICS: THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN

Volume I

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of
Yale University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by

Houchang Esfandiar Chehabi

May 1986

© Copyright Houchang Esfandiar Chehabi 1986
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ABSTRACT

MODERNIST SHI'ISM AND POLITICS:
THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN

Houchang Esfandiar Chehabi

Yale University

1986

This is a study of the Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran (Liberation Movement of Iran), a moderate nationalist party whose ideology is based on Islamic modernism.

Part I situates religious modernism in the context of Iranian history, politics, and society, and critically analyzes the thought of the LMI's leading figures: Mehdi Bazargan, Ayatollah S. Mahmud Taleqani, and Ali Shariati.

Parts II and III focus on Iranian politics, and the interaction of the LMI (and its precursor, the National Resistance Movement) with the various Iranian governments since 1953 as well as with other oppositional forces, both secular and religious.

Successive chapters deal with the party founders' early activities, the founding of the party in the context of the liberalization of the early 1960's, the Hoseiniyeh Ershad Institute, the activities of the LMI's exile branch, the emergence of the Mojahedin, the LMI's role in the Islamic revolution, the Provisional Government, and finally the party's role as the only tolerated opposition in the Islamic republic.

The study illustrates the difficulty of moderates to be effective in a polarized polity, and chronicles the gradual transformation over the last thirty years of Iran's political culture from a predominantly secular one to one infused with religious values and symbols.

Für meine Eltern

ABBREVIATIONS

Ay.:	Ayatollah
CR:	Council of the Revolution
Eng.:	Engineer
H.:	Haji
Ho.:	Hojjat ol-eslam
ICDFHR:	Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights
IP:	Iran Party
IRP:	Islamic Republican Party
ISA:	Islamic Student Association
LMI:	Liberation Movement of Iran
LMI(a):	Liberation Movement of Iran (abroad)
MPRP:	Muslim People's Republican Party
NDF:	National Democratic Front
NF:	National Front
NF (II):	Second National Front
NF (III):	Third National Front
NRM:	National Resistance Movement
PG:	Provisional Government
PIN:	Party of the Iranian Nation
PIP:	Party of the Iranian People
PMOI:	People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran
S.:	Seyyed

GLOSSARY

aref: a person with mystic leanings
akhund: derogatory term for a mulla
ayatollah: lit. "sign of God," title of distinguished mujtahids
bast: sanctuary, or place of sanctuary
chaquesh: knife-wielding thug, often in the service of a politician
emam-e jama'at: the mulla appointed to lead prayers at a mosque
fatva: an authoritative opinion issued by a mujtahid
feqh: Islamic jurisprudence
hezbollah: "party of God"
hezbollahi: club-wielding Islamic thugs
hojjat ol-Eslam: clerical title one rank below ayatollah
howzeh-ye elmiyeh: center of religious learning and teaching
ijazah: diploma enabling a clergyman to exercise ijtihad
ijtihad: independent judgment in the interpretation of Islamic law
madrasah: a traditional school of Islamic sciences
Majles: the Iranian parliament
majles-e tarhim: mourning ceremony for a recently deceased
maktab: a traditional elementary school
marja': "source of emulation," highest rank among Shi'i clergy
maraje': plural of marja'
moballegh: missionary, one who spreads religion
mujtahid: a clergyman entitled to exercise ijtihad
mulla: lower-ranking clergyman, also generic term for clergyman
pishnamaz: leader of prayers in a mosque
rowhani: a member of the religious institution
rowzehkhani: the ritual mourning ceremonies for major martyrs
talabeh, pl. tollab: students at a howzeh

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many are the individuals who in one form or the other helped me plan, research, and write this study.

Mehdi Noorbakhsh over a period of four years provided me with most of my printed primary sources. I could not have undertaken my task had it not been for his constant assistance.

Much of the information for this study I gathered in the course of extensive interviews that I conducted during four research trips to Europe in the summers of 1981, 1982, 1984, and 1985. The second trip was funded by a grant from the Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies.

In Paris Ali Amini, Shapur Bakhtiar, Abolhasan Banisadr, Jalal Ganjeh'i, Ali-Asghar Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, Hushang Keshavarz Sadr, Moloud Khanlari, Abdolkarim Lahiji, H. Lebaschi, Mehdi Mozafari, Hasan Nazih, and Mohammad Shanehchi, in alphabetical order, patiently answered my questions. In Germany Ahmad Alibaba'i in Cologne was most generous with his time and shared his insights and experiences as an "insider." Shapur Ansari in Bad Homburg made his collection of private letters and exile publications available to me. On this side of the Atlantic Ambassador William Sullivan in New York City clarified crucial points about his mission to Iran.

I owe a special debt to Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, who, in the course of many long and fascinating conversations, put his encyclopaedic knowledge of Iranian political history at my disposal.

Mariam Salour and Dominique Menu in Paris, and Edith Haag, Schapur Ansari, and Bijan Nokiani in Germany granted me gracious hospitality on my European trips.

From the moment I decided on my topic, Ervand Abrahamian in New York City was a most helpful advisor. His pep talks kept me going when I had doubts, he generously made primary sources available to me, and he regularly commented in great detail on everything I wrote.

David Apter, Farhad Atai, Abbas Amanat, and Gerhart Bowering read portions of the dissertation; their comments helped me avoid many glaring errors. Amy Colin and Michel Chaouli took time to edit parts of it.

To all of the above I express my heart-felt thanks.

Customary academic acknowledgments do not adequately capture the extent of my intellectual and personal indebtedness to Juan Linz. From the very beginning of my graduate studies at Yale he was teacher, guide, critic, mentor, and advisor to me. A genuine Doktorvater, he also let me be myself. To Juan and Rocío Linz goes my deepest gratitude for all that they have given me.

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND REFERENCES

The frequent use of primary sources in this work warrants some explanatory remarks. All Persian words and names have been transliterated according to a simplified system that avoids diacritical marks. In a direct quote, however, the author's transliteration is respected.

Toponyms that have an accepted English form are not transliterated, e.g. Qum, Teheran, and Isfahan, instead of Qom, Tehran, and Esfahan. Personal names are transliterated according to the same system, even when the person used a different form himself: hence Mosaddeq instead of Mossadeqh. Iranian double family names are not hyphenated.

When a Persian work is quoted, the translation is my own. Where English translations of Persian primary sources exist, these have been used. All Qoranic quotes are taken from Arthur J. Arberry's translation.¹

In the second and third parts of this study, the dates of important events are often given both in the Christian, and in the Iranian (solar Muslim) calendar. Where warranted, the Islamic (A.H.) date is given too. I seek the Western reader's indulgence for this encumbrance of the text.

¹ The Koran Interpreted (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS	iv
GLOSSARY	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND REFERENCES	viii
INTRODUCTION	1

PART I -- Religious Modernism and Nationalism in a Dual Society

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>page</u>
1. THE IRANIAN POLITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE	8
Old Polities of the Developing World: The Case of Iran	10
Crisis of Sovereignty	10
Iran's Fragile Sovereignty	16
Xenocracy and Conspiracy Theory	22
Legitimacy in Iran	24
The Monarchy	25
Religion	30
The Aborted Emergence of Legal-Rational Authority	37
The Emergence of Charismatic Authority	43
A Dual Society	46
The Genesis of the Dual Society	46
Excursus on Kairos and Chronos	52
The Widening Gap between the Two Segments	60
2. NATIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS MODERNISM AS OPPOSITION	66
Societal Responses to an Unresolved Crisis of Sovereignty	66
Nationalism in the Old Polities of the Developing	
World	66
Religious Modernism	70
Nationalism and Religious Modernism	77
Nationalists and Religious Modernists as Opposition	81
Oppositions in Authoritarian Settings	81
Crises of Participation in Non-Democratic Polities	85
The Dynamics of Regime Change in Iran	90

3.	SHI'ITE MODERNISM: THE INTELLECTUAL CONTENT	98
	Precursors and Sources of Inspiration	100
	Precursors	100
	Ay. Mirza Mohammad-Hosein Na'ini (1860-1936)	101
	S. Jamaleddin Asadabadi, "al-Afghani" (1838-1897)	103
	S. Hasan Modarres (1858-1938)	104
	External Influences	106
	Alexis Carrel (1873-1944)	108
	Pierre Lecomte de Noüy (1883-1947)	110
	Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931)	112
	Interpretative Principles	113
	Return to the Sources of the Faith	113
	Science	115
	Major Themes	117
	Political Aspects	117
	Iran's and Islam's Position in the World	117
	The Need for Political Action	121
	Islamic Government	123
	The Means of Political Action	124
	Economic Aspects	128
	The Ideology of the LMI	135
	From Religious Ideology to the Ideologization of Religion	138
	Shariati	139
	The Rhetoric of Apologetic Thought	147
	"Neither-norism"	149
	Quotations	153
	Historicism	154
	Tautology	156
	Repetition	157
	Irony	160
	Modernism's Legacy to Fundamentalism	161
	The Parallel with Christian Democracy	163
4.	SOCIAL BASES OF THE LMI	166
	Social Background of the LMI leadership	166
	The Bazaar	176
	The Bazaar as a Social Force	176
	The Bazaar in Pahlavi Iran	178
	The LMI and the Bazaar	182
	Social Bases of LMI Support	185

PART II -- The LMI under the Shah

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>page</u>
5.	ON THE SIDELINES: THE EARLY YEARS
	Formative Years
	Ay. S. Mahmud Taleqani
	Engineer Mehdi Bazargan
	Dr. Yadollah Sahabi
	193
	194
	194
	199
	205

Years of Turmoil: 1941-1953	206
Political Forces	207
The Religious Community	213
Early Activities	218
The Islamic Society	221
The Engineers Association	223
The Islamic Student Associations	225
Religious Activities	228
Political Activities	230
The National Resistance Movement	236
The Composition of the NRM	237
Organization	241
Activities	242
6. THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE EARLY 1960'S	250
American Dissatisfaction	253
Economic Mismanagement	253
The 'Qarani coup'	255
The Second National Front	261
The NRM's Role in the Revival of the National Front	262
The Summer Elections of 1960	265
Internal Conflict in the NF (II)	267
The Winter Elections of 1961	278
Political Action under the Sign of the Qoran	282
The LMI and its Activities	286
Amini's Premiership	286
The Founding of the LMI	291
The LMI as a Party	298
The LMI, the National Movement, and Amini	306
The LMI at the Congress of the National Front	316
The Religious Reform Movement of the Early 1960's	320
The Monthly Talks Society	321
The Discussions on Marja'iyat	326
Excursus on "Weststruckness"	331
The End of Traditional Politics	334
The LMI after the Arrest of Its Leaders	335
The Rise of the Clerical Opposition and the Riots of June 1963	338
The End of the NF(II) and the Third National Front	344
The Trials	348
7. CROSSING THE DESERT: 1963-1977	354
The LMI's Second Generation	355
Ali Shariati	355
Ebrahim Yazdi	360
Mostafa Chamran	361
Abbas Amir-Entezam	363
Sadeq Qotbzadeh	364
LMI activities outside Iran	366
The Opposition in exile prior to 1960	366
Nationalist Opposition Abroad after 1960	370
The LMI (abroad)	375

The Hoseiniyeh Ershad Institute	384
The Founding of the Institute	384
Shariati Takes Over	388
The End of the Hoseiniyeh Ershad and Shariati's Last Years	394
The Mojahedin	400
The Guerrilla Option	400
The LMI and the Mojahedin	401
From Religious Modernism to the Triumph of Traditionalism .	406

PART III -- The LMI and the Islamic Revolution

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>page</u>
8. THE LMI AND THE LIBERALIZATION OF 1977-78	421
Iran in Carter's Human Rights Policy	422
Iranian Reactions to Carter's Human Rights Policies	428
The Shah's Response to Carter's Human Rights Campaign .	428
The Opposition and Carter's Human Rights Campaign . . .	433
The Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights	440
Formation of the ICDFHR	440
Activities of the ICDFHR	443
The ICDFHR in Post-Revolutionary Iran	446
Aborted Transition and Revolution	447
The Religious Mass-Movement of 1978	448
The LMI and the Transition to a New Order	454
"Bastion by Bastion"	455
Neauphle-le-Château	461
Negotiating the Transition	468
9. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT	482
Composition	485
The Tasks of the Provisional Government	489
Getting the Country Going	490
The PG's Relations with Other Groups	493
The Institutional Question	499
Policy Dilemmas	502
The Press	503
Trouble in the Periphery	506
Foreign Relations	507
The LMI in 1979	512
10. THE LMI AS LOYAL OPPOSITION	518
The LMI between the Hostage Crisis and Banisadr's Ouster .	519
Dissention in the LMI	520
The LMI and the Elections of 1980	522
The Presidential Elections	522
The Parliamentary Elections	525
The LMI during the Banisadr Presidency	530

Transition to Opposition	531
The LMI in Parliament	533
Party Activities	537
<u>Mizan</u>	540
The LMI since 1981	543
CONCLUSION	551
 <u>Appendix</u>	 <u>page</u>
A. THE PARTY PROGRAM OF THE LMI IN 1961	555
B. THE LMI PROGRAM OF JULY 1980	559
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 562

INTRODUCTION

The Iranian revolution of 1979 has focussed attention on Iran and the interaction between religion and politics, both in Iran itself and elsewhere. It has produced a wealth of scholarly works that try to analyze and explain the events and their underlying causes.

As valuable as these contributions are individually, a total picture of the Iranian problematique can only emerge after more monographs on more restricted topics have been written. Exclusive concentration on the revolution and the Shi'ite ulema can make events look inevitable in retrospect, which entails the danger of seeing the past in terms of the present. Historians call this the fallacy of nunc pro tunc, which consists of "the mistaken idea that the proper way to do history is to prune away the dead branches of the past, and to preserve the green buds and twigs which have gone into the dark forest of our contemporary world."¹ Social scientists, by paying attention exclusively to movements, currents of thought, institutions, and ideas that seem important at the time, also risk creating a reductionist and incomplete picture of the world. Just as a full understanding of the Bolshevik revolution and subsequent developments in the Soviet Union must take into account the Mensheviks, the Social Revolutionaries, and even the Kadets, recent political developments in Iran can be analyzed satisfactorily only if the

¹ David Hackett Fisher, Historians' Fallacies: Towards a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 135.

apparent failure of moderate, secular, leftist, and regionalist groups is analyzed in some depth.

This study aims at filling one of the gaps in our understanding of Iranian politics by focussing on the Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran, or 'Liberation Movement of Iran,' as party members like to call it in English.² Choosing the LMI can be justified for a number of reasons. With the exception of the communist Tudeh Party, about which we already have excellent monographs, there have been very few true political parties in Iran. Even the LMI is more a group of people who have always aspired to form a political party than a political party. Nevertheless, its role in recent Iranian history warrants a study, for the following reasons:

First, next to the Tudeh, the LMI is the oldest continuously functioning political grouping in Iran. Its leaders were active in the opposition against the Shah after 1953, carried out para-political oppositional activities during the most repressive years of the Shah's dictatorship 1963-1977, took a leading role in the attempted liberalization of 1977-1978, negotiated the transition to the Islamic Republic, staffed the ephemeral Provisional Government of 1979, and have led the only tolerated opposition in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Analyzing the interaction of such a group with successive regimes adds to our knowledge of political development in Iran. Beyond the case of Iran, a monograph of an oppositional party in non-democratic settings throws considerable light on our understanding of the transitions between re-

² The actual translation of the Persian words is "Iranian Freedom Movement," which is what many scholarly publications call it. Paraphrasing Howard Cosell, I believe that a party has a right to a name, and therefore I have respected the party members' preference.

gimes, peaceful or revolutionary.

A second reason why the LMI is interesting is related to this. Most studies of non-democratic countries neglect oppositional groups and concentrate on the institutions, policies, and social bases of the ruling regimes. The opposition groups that have escaped this scholarly neglect are either those with whose goals a sizable portion of academia agrees, or those that pose a clear threat to the international status quo. Leftist and more recently fundamentalist political movements have thus received much more attention than moderate groups. This over-all neglect of oppositional activity in non-democratic regimes can easily lead to an over-estimation of these regimes' stability.

The third reason for choosing the LMI has to do with the changing role of religion in Iranian society. The sudden eruption of the Islamic Republic on the world scene in the penultimate decade of the twentieth century may lead one to declare Religion the independent variable in Iranian history and comb it for hitherto overlooked events and developments that support such a view. A close look at the LMI can help avoid this pitfall. The beginnings of the LMI fall into a period when secularism dominated political life in Iran. The party was then led by moderately religious laymen and based its appeal among other things on religion. In the span of less than two decades society as such became so much infused with religious values and sentiments, that the selfsame men who had looked like religious fanatics to some in the early 1960's now are the most secular members of Iran's political class.³ The evolution

³ This excludes all the secular forces, who are either silenced, or in the underground, or exiled.

of the LMI is at the same time a reflection of, and a contributor to this development. By studying the party's interaction with both the secular political groups and the ulema, we gain insights into how the momentous shift came about.

As already mentioned, the LMI is not really a political party in the common sense of the word, largely because conditions in Iran have seldom allowed for the constitution of parties. It is above all a group of men around one politician who has put his mark both on Iran's political life and on its intellectual history: Engineer Mehdi Bazargan.⁴ Many other figures who gained temporary or permanent prominence in recent Iranian history have also been associated with the party to varying degrees: The late Ay. S. Mahmud Taleqani, Ali Shariati, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, and Ebrahim Yazdi, to name the best known. Given the absence of true party structures, the individual activities of these men constitute LMI activity over long periods of time. An emphasis on these personal activities, therefore, is not an expression of a "Great Men" conception of history, but quite simply a recognition of the fact that, to quote Guenther Lewy, "where genuine alternatives exist, the presence or absence of a great man may be crucial."⁵

It is the social scientist's aim to discover wider patterns, to generalize from the particular. Monographic studies can easily lose sight of this goal, for as Sidney Verba remarked, they do not "easily add

⁴ The use of academic titles, including the professional designation 'engineer,' is widespread in Iran. In this study they will be indicated only at the first occurrence of a person's name.

⁵ "Historical Data in Comparative Political Analysis," in Comparative Politics, 1 (October 1968), p. 105.

up."⁶ In order to avoid this danger, I have tried to adopt Verba's remedy, the "disciplined configurative approach."⁷ This study's structure reflects this choice: Part One (especially the first two chapters) sets up the "configurations" and by the same token puts the case study in comparative perspective, while Parts Two and Three analyze the LMI in depth using the analytical tools developed in Part One. Part Two deals with the development of religious modernism as a political force under the Shah regime, while Part Three focuses on the LMI's role in the Islamic revolution. Comparativists might find Parts Two and Three marred by longueurs, but I would like to remind them that the development of social science theory is an inductive process, and as Joseph LaPalombara rightly noted, we know very little about the actual politics of many countries.⁸ Moreover, there are people who are interested in a country for its own sake rather than as a generator of abstractions, and it would be a waste to define a book's audience so narrowly as to exclude them.

⁶ "Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research," in World Politics, 20 (October 1967), p. 112.

⁷ Ibid., p. 114.

⁸ "Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics," in Comparative Politics, 1 (October 1968), pp. 62-65.

PART I

RELIGIOUS MODERNISM AND NATIONALISM IN A DUAL SOCIETY

Part One of this study is designed to set the stage for the case study contained in Parts Two and Three. Chapter 1 examines some salient features of Iranian politics and society and puts them in comparative and historical perspective. Chapter 2 narrows the focus and examines the role of the opposition in the previously defined polity; chapter 3 discusses the ideology of religious modernism and its main carrier, the LMI; and chapter 4 introduces the case study by analyzing the social bases of the Liberation Movement of Iran.

Chapter 1

THE IRANIAN POLITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Every intellectual discipline is concerned with taxonomies. Comparative politics divides the world's nation-states in a variety of ways, among which the dichotomy between Western, advanced, and non-Western, under-developed is one often used. The vast majority of today's non-Western countries owe their existence as states to European colonialism, which divided the extra-European world into administrative units that later gained independence. Hence the tendency to use the terms "under-developed" (or "developing"), "non-Western," and "new nations" almost interchangeably.

Few dichotomies are ever neat. Europe has its share of "new nations" (Iceland became independent in 1944, Malta in 1964), and in the developing, non-Western world there are a few countries which can look back on long histories as established polities. The most important of these are China, Thailand, Nepal, Cambodia, Tonga, Egypt, Turkey, Yemen, Ethiopia, Morocco, Afghanistan, and Iran.

Some would maintain that Iran has had a continuous existence as a nation-state for as much as 27 centuries, interrupted only by the conquests of Alexander, the Muslims, and the Mongols. Few would dispute that, as it exists now, the country was founded in the early sixteenth century; whatever else Iran may have in common with other Third World

countries, it is certainly not "new." This means that in its historical sweep, Iranian political development occupies an intermediary position between the countries of the West and the new nations of the Third World. While Iran's political development certainly lagged behind that of Western Europe, it can still be analyzed in terms of a time-frame roughly similar to that of most European nations. To give one example, Iran had its constitutional revolution in 1906 -- only one year later than Russia, the European "late-developer" par excellence. It also means that we can analyze the persistent problems of Iranian politics, or its agenda, with tools developed for the study of Western politics, provided this is done critically and not mechanically.¹

Nations do not develop in a vacuum, and the influence of the international environment is perhaps most significant in the case of these old states of the non-Western world. After suggesting a scheme which permits us to combine in a coherent way the problematic foreign relations of these states with their domestic politics, we will turn to the characteristics of the Iranian polity.

¹ Of course one can always quibble that in the context of Iranian society and history concepts grown out of the European experience will not signify the same realities, that although the signifiers may be the same (because our comparative analysis demands that), the signifieds are essentially different. It would then be wrong or misleading to analyze the relationship between temporal and religious authorities in terms of "Church" and "State," because "Church" and "State" connote all sorts of structures that do not necessarily correspond to Iranian reality. Any comparative endeavor has to live with this criticism: As we climb the ladder of abstraction the terms we use gain in "extension" (denotation) and lose in "intention" (connotation). See Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," in The American Political Science Review, 64 (December 1970), p. 1041.

1.1 OLD POLITIES OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD: THE CASE OF IRAN

We will first examine some common features of these countries and then concentrate on the case of Iran.

1.1.1 Crisis of Sovereignty

Samuel Huntington has recognized the existence of an "intermediary" category of nation-states between the new states of the Third World and the old nations of the West, and attempted to analyze their politics systematically.² Huntington saw these countries' differentia specifica in their having ruling monarchies, which he interpreted as a "traditional" feature. However, it is only partially correct to call these regimes "traditional monarchies," since the monarchies (and indeed the very statehood) of such referents as Greece, Libya, and Saudi Arabia were quite recent. As we shall see, even Iran's pre-1979 monarchy was only pseudo-traditional. Although Huntington's analysis is in many ways brilliant, he tends to minimize one very important fact: the foreign influence on these nations' internal politics.

The sovereignty of these polities was forever threatened:

In late nineteenth century parlance many of these countries became "sick men." Egypt, Morocco, Afghanistan, Turkey, Persia, China -- all were areas where the indigenous regimes hovered on the verge of collapse. The governments of all these countries were weakened by internal unrest, by contact with European commerce and finance, by involvement with European politics, or by ignorance and administrative inefficiency which left them helpless in the modern world. At one time or another either European control was imposed upon these areas, or else the powers of Europe came to arbitrary agreements as to their destiny.³

² Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), chapter 3, pp. 140-191.

Lenin, who had a clear appreciation of the unequal nature of these countries' relations with the West, called them "semi-colonies" as early as 1915.⁴

Iran, the Ottoman Empire in its last stage, and Thailand were able to maintain their independence because it suited European powers that they do⁵; Morocco, Afghanistan, and the two Central Asian states of Bukhara and Khiva became protectorates of France, England, and Russia, respectively.⁶ Whether as more or less formally independent buffer-states or protectorates, these countries' internal politics were deeply affected by European imperialism. This means that we have to integrate the external factor into any general scheme as might be used to systematize their political life.

³ David McLean, Britain and her Buffer State: The collapse of the Persian empire, 1890-1914 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1979), p. 1.

⁴ V.I. Lenin, "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe," first published in Sotsial-Demokrat, no. 44, August 23, 1915. Collected Works, vol. 21, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), pp. 339-343.

⁵ On Thailand see Chandran Jeshurun, The Contest for Siam 1889-1902: A Study in Diplomatic History (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1977). On Iran the most exhaustive study is Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). On the Ottoman Empire see Matthew Smith Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (London: MacMillan, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966).

⁶ On Afghanistan see Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 91-128 and 158-160; and Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University Press of California, 1967). On Morocco see Frederick V. Parsons, The Origins of the Morocco Question (London: Duckworth, 1976) and Charles-André Julien, Le Maroc face aux impérialismes (Paris: Editions J.A., 1978). On Central Asia see Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924,

The politics of developing countries in general are often viewed in terms of "modernization." The most widely used models of modernization are unilinear, but as David Apter has shown,⁷ such unilinear models of development and modernization have an ideological bias in that they consider development, and then a very particular type of development, inevitable.⁸ A better and more ideologically neutral model was developed by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. It focuses on concrete issues and problems, classifies them, and evaluates their immediate and general significances. Five general types of political issues, called "crises" or, in a formulation preferred by this author, "problem areas," were defined: "Identity," "Legitimacy," "Participation," "Penetration," and "Distribution."⁹ They are at least latently present in all societies and may erupt at any stage of a society's development and become crises. There is no a priori order to their occurrence (although closer examination might yield more or less general patterns), in which fact lies their superiority as concep-

Russian Research Center Studies No. 54 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). As for such cases, mentioned by Huntington in his analysis, as Greece, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Libya, their "traditional monarchies" were established with sometimes decisive help from the West, and since these countries do not have a long history as continuous polities, they fall outside the realm of our analysis.

⁷ David E. Apter, Introduction to Political Analysis, (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1977), pp. 468-474.

⁸ This eschatological optimism is surprising, especially when "secularization" is presented as an inevitable outcome of "modernization." The enthusiasts of secularization are obviously not quite secularized themselves, for otherwise it would be difficult to explain their certainty that things are, in the long run, likely to get better.

⁹ See Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner, Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

tual tools compared to the assumptions of unilinear models.

In the classic work on nation-building in Europe an application of these five crises to concrete history threw light on some basic differences between Western and non-Western countries, especially as regards Legitimacy:

[In Western nations] nearly all of the authors describe legitimacy as being derived from a profound sense of deference to Christian religious authorities; a situation in sharp contrast to that found in present-day developing countries, where few or no prior authorities existed who had comparable claims to legitimacy. On the crisis of "penetration," the authors generally point to the path-breaking role of the church in the West, an institution with no counterpart in Asia and Africa, and where greater reliance therefore had to be placed upon the second best Western institution, the army, to achieve the function of penetration.¹⁰


Polities do not survive for centuries without "authorities with claims to legitimacy," and this statement therefore corroborates our contention that the "old nations" of the non-Western world occupy an intermediary position between the two sets of countries defined.

However, since the SSRC model was formulated on the basis of the European experience, it fails to take into account the strong external impact on the old polities of the developing world; we therefore propose to complete it by incorporating into it a "crisis of sovereignty."¹¹

¹⁰ Lucian W. Pye's Foreword to Raymond Grew, ed., Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. vii.

¹¹ The term is Raymond Grew's, who noted that some contributors had deemed such a category necessary in general. Raymond Grew, "Crises and Sequences", in Grew, Crises, p. 10.

If we try to integrate this sixth problem area with the other five, building on Grew's scheme, the following diagram suggests itself:



Sovereignty is most closely related to Legitimacy, as any authority that becomes too subservient to foreign interests is likely to see its legitimacy undermined. The precarious international situation of the weak country may also mean that foreign powers encourage or even foment separatist stirrings, contributing to a crisis of identity. Conversely, Identity may also be fortified by the perception of a foreign threat equally affecting everybody. External factors may block or encourage (or nullify the results of) participation. And finally, a crisis of sovereignty may precipitate crises of penetration in the peripheral areas of the weak state.¹²

One important consequence of this important role played by exogenous forces in the political development of the old polities is the fact that modernization was not only a societal process, as in the West, but a policy goal of the rulers. These rulers could either be foreign, as in the case of colonies (Sri Lanka, Burma, Algeria), or local. In the lat-

¹² For the other relationships, see *ibid.*, pp. 25-28.

ter case modernization was more often than not a response to Western challenges. If the integrity of the non-Western polities was to be maintained, they had to become as strong as the Western powers, so as to stand up to them. Since there was no other model, modernization was also ineluctably westernization. The West affected these societies therefore not only by its own agents, diplomatic or military, but also through the actions of indigenous elites. Since modernization was thus not only a societal process but also a policy goal, the latter most often did not produce the former, as Huntington has noted.¹³

Modernization from above affected societies selectively, producing what has been called "post-traditional" societies:

There has been growing recognition of what may be called the systemic viability of so-called "transitional" systems, those being neither modern nor traditional. Indeed partial "modernization" or development -- that is, development of some institutional or organizational frameworks sharing many characteristics of modern organizations -- may take place in segregated parts of a still "traditional" social structure, and their infusion may even reinforce those traditional systems... The term "post-traditional" was coined...in order to point out some new ways of looking at these problems. Modern and contemporary settings, it is assumed, have specific characteristics and create specific problems that distinguish their patterns of development from the changes that had continuously taken place in these societies in their traditional, historical settings. At the same time, contemporary responses to these problems may diverge greatly from the initial "Western" model of modernization. And, in the shaping of these responses, many forces that develop from within a society's traditions may indeed be of crucial importance.¹⁴

¹³ Huntington, Political Order, pp. 32-37.

¹⁴ S.N. Eisenstadt, "Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition," in S.N. Eisenstadt, Post-Traditional Societies (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974), pp. 3-4.

Let us now take a closer look at Iran and the various instances of foreign meddling in its domestic politics.

1.1.2 Iran's Fragile Sovereignty

Iran owed its persistent independence to its strategic position between the expanding Russian empire (to which it had lost Caucasian territories in the early nineteenth century), and the British Empire in India (to England Iran only lost the island of Abu Musa in 1910, but gained it back in 1971). Russian and English borders with Iran were separated by two states with which Iran had (and has) a lot in common: to the west the Ottoman Empire, to the east Afghanistan, which gained full sovereignty in 1921. Iran is with Thailand the only Third World nation that never lost its independence; comparisons between the two countries can therefore be illuminating.

Unlike Thailand, which in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries knew a period of internal stability and relatively peaceful modernization under King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) and thus avoided becoming a "sick man," in Iran the administrative reforms undertaken in the second half of the nineteenth century on the model of the Ottoman Tanzimat were half-hearted and brought only partial and disappointing results.¹⁵ Iran's decline accelerated after the assassination of Nasereddin Shah in 1896 and internally the country disintegrated as the authority of the central government weakened. This contrasts sharply

¹⁵ On the early reform attempt in Iran see Shaul Bakhash, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy & Reform under the Qajars: 1858-1896, St. Antony's Middle East Monographs No. 8 (London: Ithaca Press, 1978); and Guity Nashat, The Origins of Modern Reform in Iran, 1870-1880 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982).

with Thailand, which, faced with French and English encroachments on its border areas, strengthened central government authority in its peripheral provinces.¹⁶ Since Iran was much closer to the European heartland than Thailand, Western ideas found their way into the country more readily, often via Russia. When the latter was defeated by a non-Western power, Japan, in 1905, modernizers received a tremendous moral boost, and in alliance with the ulema and the Bazaar wrested a constitution from the monarchy as early as 1906/07; Thailand's only came as late as 1932, and then as a result of a military coup d'etat.

During these years of instability Russia and England intervened more or less openly in Iranian politics, backing conservative and liberal factions who were vying for power in Teheran, and provincial governors whose subordination to Teheran was only nominal. The division of Iran was made official in 1907, when the two powers divided Iran into "zones of influence," with the lion's share (including the capital) going to Russia.

During World War I, although Iran had proclaimed its neutrality, the Allies and the Ottomans fought on Iranian territory, large parts of which they occupied, and caused much hardship to the population.¹⁷ Iran therefore became a passive victim of the war, in contrast to Thailand, which actually participated on the Allied side and sent troops to Europe in 1917. Consequently Thailand participated at the Paris Peace Confer-

¹⁶ See Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892-1915: The Ministry of the Interior and Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, East Asian Historical Monographs, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).

¹⁷ For details see Peter Avery, Modern Iran (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 179-210.

ences, whereas Iran's participation was blocked by Lord Curzon, who feared that "a Persian delegation, let loose [!] in Paris, would play off the powers one against the other."¹⁸ However, both states became founding members of the League of Nations.

In 1917 the outbreak of the Russian revolution was felt strongly in Iran and its most tangible repercussion was the proclamation of an ephemeral "Soviet Republic of Gilan" in Iran's fertile northern coastal area,¹⁹ and a partial occupation of Iran by English forces to contain the Communist danger.

In 1919, England, war-weary but frightened by the prospect of Bolshevik advances in the Middle East, attempted to force a treaty on Iran. It was the first in a series of what has been called "unequal treaties of independence," and ultimately failed to get the Iranian parliament's consent. Although its first point guaranteed Iran's independence, it was in fact meant to establish an informal British protectorate over Iran.²⁰ This was not lost on public opinion in Iran,²¹ which eventually brought it down, and the government that had signed it.²²

¹⁸ Quoted in John Darwin, Britain, Egypt, and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the aftermath of war 1918-1922 (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 157.

¹⁹ For a detailed history of this enterprise from a sympathetic Marxist point of view see Schapour Ravasani, Sowjetrepublik Gilan (Berlin: Basis Verlag, n.d.), pp. 279-356.

²⁰ Darwin, Britain, Egypt, ..., p. 167.

²¹ The treaty's opponents argued that if Iran was independent, it did not need a bilateral treaty with England to confirm that independence.

²² For an exhaustive account of this episode and the events leading up to it, see Werner Zuerrer, Persien zwischen England und Russland,

The years after the war saw the gradual rise of a Cossack officer, who led a successful coup and became Minister of War in 1921, Prime Minister in 1923, and Shah in 1925. Coming at the heel of the aborted 1919 agreement, Reza Khan's rise was seen by many people in Iran as due to English machinations. Reza Shah created the modern centralized Iranian state as it exists now, but for a significant sector of the Iranian people he was but a British tool, and his reforms were therefore perceived as foreign imposed.²³

In World War II Iran again proclaimed its neutrality, and again the Allies needed Iranian territory for their war effort. In 1941 they invaded Iran and forced Reza Shah to abdicate. His departure was greeted with public rejoicing in the streets and the country's political life opened up.²⁴ The twelve years of relative political freedom that followed were thus the direct outcome of foreign intervention. "The West giveth and the West taketh away," one is tempted to say, for the period of open politics was also ended by foreign intervention, when in 1953 the CIA gave decisive backing to a coup that ousted prime minister Mo-

1918-1925: Grossmachteinflüsse und nationaler Wiederaufstieg am Beispiel des Iran (Bern: Peter Lang, 1978), pp. 27-257. See also Darwin, Britain, Egypt, ..., pp. 184-191.

²³ Historical evidence does not corroborate this thesis. English foreign policy was above all interested in a stable Iran, and since Reza Khan was seen as the person most likely to achieve that, England abandoned its allies inside Iran, A. Zia'eddin Tabataba'i and Sheikh Khaz'al, and backed Reza Khan. The congruity of interests between Reza Khan and English foreign policy gave rise to the suspicion that he was an English tool.

²⁴ For the immediate effects see F. Eshraghi, "The Immediate Aftermath of Anglo-Soviet Occupation in Iran in August 1941," in Middle Eastern Studies, 20 (July 1984). For the effect on political life see chapter 5, section 2 and the references therein.

saddeq. Mosaddeq was the only Iranian leader in history with any claim to democratic legitimacy, but this presumably mattered less in Western eyes than the fact that he had nationalized Iran's main natural resource, oil.²⁵ In terms of our scheme, both interventions are cases of Sovereignty affecting, one positively and one negatively, Participation. But the Allied occupation of Iran also had an impact on Identity: In 1945 two of the Soviet occupied provinces, inhabited by ethnic minorities, proclaimed their autonomy and created a major crisis of identity. Although the Soviets did not create the peripheral nationalisms in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, the separatist enterprise would not have gone as far as it did if Soviet troops had not prevented the Iranian army from entering the two provinces. The two autonomist states collapsed mainly because the Soviet Union sacrificed local Iranian communists to its own foreign policy interests.²⁶

After the coup of 1953 the United States replaced England and Russia/USSR as the main "interested outside power" in Iranian politics. The reasons were succinctly analyzed by Samuel Huntington:

As a result of the historical conditions associated with their continued independence, many traditional monarchies occupied strategic geographical positions. At one time or another, Greece, Iran, Afghanistan, Thailand and Laos, were all the focus of Cold War struggles. Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and Thailand were sites of important American overseas bases. In addition, most of the traditional monarchies were on the Western side in the Cold War. The United States, consequently, had a significant interest in their future political development. The replacement of their political sys-

²⁵ See chapter 5, section 2, and the references therein.

²⁶ For details see Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "The Autonomous Republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan: Their Rise and Fall," in Thomas T. Hammond, ed., The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

tems by revolution, chaos, instability, or radically nationalist regimes presumably would be less in the American national interest than the peaceful evolution of those political systems. Finally, while the traditional monarchies are, in general, no richer and no poorer in natural resources than other developing states, they have played a key role in the production of one of the crucial essentials of a modern economy. Between one fifth and one quarter of the world's oil comes from countries where the king rules as well as reigns.²⁷

Faced with growing discontent and social unrest in Iran, America in the early 1960's forced a reform program on the Shah. The instability in Iran was (at least in part) due to the very nature of the regime that had come to power in 1953 and to the circumstances surrounding its installation. What the country was going through were therefore crises of legitimacy and participation as well as a crisis of distribution; the non-resolution of the crisis of legitimacy, due to a continuing crisis of sovereignty, prevented a resolution of the crisis of participation. In Washington, however, Iran's travails were interpreted as a crisis of distribution only, and subsequently in 1960 a new Democratic administration began exerting pressures not for democratization but for social reform from above.²⁸ A similar situation obtained again in 1977, when another Democratic administration again urged the Shah to change his ways, leading Iranian cynics to say that the only elections that mattered for Iran were the elections in the U.S. By now, however, the Shah's legitimacy was at its nadir, and as a result the liberalization led to revolution.²⁹ This long history of foreign intervention in Iranian affairs helps explain the immense popularity in the Iranian population of the

²⁷ Huntington, Political Order, p. 153.

²⁸ See chapter 6, especially sections 1 and 3, and the references therein.

²⁹ See chapter 8 and the references therein.

androlepsia³⁰ of November 1979: A symbolic ending to almost a century of foreign meddling, it produced a catharsis that consecrated the success of the revolution.³¹

It is not my aim here to analyze Iran's political development in terms of the six crises mentioned earlier; that would demand a book by itself. The above list of events is only meant to illustrate the close connection between foreign intervention and domestic politics in the case of Iran: any case study in Iranian politics has to take it into account.³²

1.1.3 Xenocracy and Conspiracy Theory

Beyond punctual interventions, what are the wider implications of this close connection for Iranian politics? Paradoxically, the fact that Iran maintained its formal sovereignty throughout this century aggravated the nefarious results of foreign intervention. In protectorates, such as Morocco, the foreign presence was only the result of an unequal

³⁰ Androlepsia: The seizure by one nation of the citizens or subjects of another to compel the latter to do justice to the former, or to enforce some right claimed by the former against the latter. Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd ed.

³¹ See chapter 9 and the references therein.

³² The external influences are not limited to the direct or indirect actions of foreign governments. Among the non-governmental actors academic experts are particularly relevant. Edward Said, in Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), passim, has criticized the close connection between area-specialists (and their forerunners, the orientalist) and imperialism. In the case of Iran the fact is, however, that Western experts cover as wide a political spectrum as political forces inside the country, and we find among them advocates of the Shah, the Nationalists, the Left, and the religious fundamentalists, although not all had equal access to foreign policy makers. Naturally considerations of academic comity preclude any further elaboration.

power-constellation. Therefore the indigenous elites still unequivocally identified with the cause of national independence. In Ethiopia, the Emperor became a symbol of national independence after the Italian attack. The same can be said of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia.

In Iran, by contrast, foreign powers operated as much directly as through their friends in the political class. The occult character of this foreign influence as opposed to its directness elsewhere, meant that in the perception of many politically articulate Iranians the country's political system was, above all else, a xenocracy, with various sets of pro-English, pro-American, and pro-Russian politicians vying to exercise power for the benefit of their masters. This contributed to a general atmosphere of distrust in which the natural give and take of politics was impossible. The normal cleavage lines that condition politics elsewhere were replaced by one overriding issue, Iran's international status as a sovereign nation. Consequently Iranian politics became highly polarized, as politicians were either patriots or traitors, absolute terms that preclude compromise, the essence of civilized politics.³³ This division also affected society, as those strata that resembled the foreigners most came to be regarded by many as something one might call "cultural compradors."

Intellectually, one result that affected politics was that under the analyzed conditions conspiracy theory reigned supreme as a universal explanation for everything. It stands to reason that for foreign powers to intervene so easily and consistently in Iranian affairs, Iranian so-

³³ It is symptomatic that in Persian the word for "compromise," sazesh, has come to connote sell-out.

ciety must have suffered from inherent weaknesses. However, the (real or assumed) ubiquity of foreign interests distracted many well-meaning and progressive Iranians from an analysis of these weaknesses. 'Blaming foreigners for all ills all too often became a comfortable (and not very irresponsible, given the extent of foreign meddling in Iranian affairs) way to evade critical confrontation with domestic problems. This attitude brings with it the same risks as an over-emphasis on Dependency Theory in scholarly works on Latin America.

1.2 LEGITIMACY IN IRAN

Let us now turn to the legitimation formulae as they have developed over the centuries in Iran. Legitimacy, of course, is in the eyes of the beholder, and a certain type of authority may be legitimate in the eyes of some and illegitimate in the eyes of others. Iran in the twentieth century is an example of competing claims to legitimacy, which, simplifying somewhat, could be summarized as follows: At the starting point two types of traditional authority (monarchy and religion) cohabiting more or less easily, then their corrosion (but not disappearance) by ideas and social forces favoring legal-rational authority, increased conflict between the two types of traditional authority, a stalemate between traditional and legal-rational authority, and the consequent emergence of charismatic authority.³⁴

³⁴ The terms are taken from Max Weber, Economy and Society, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 215-216.

As Max Weber has pointed out, conflicts between religious and temporal authorities are endemic in all societies. In view of the often heard assertion that Islam does not distinguish between religion and politics, it is important to probe this question in some depth and go back in history to see whether it corresponds to historical reality.

1.2.1 The Monarchy

Compared to the continuity of European monarchies, whose basic legitimation formulae were not substantially changed after the Carolingians, the monarchy in Iran has undergone a surprising number of mutations. S.J. Tambiah's exordial remarks to his essay on Thailand also apply to Iran:

Tradition...is used most of the time in an uncritical "ahistorical" sense to denote some kind of collective heritage that has supposedly been transmitted relatively unchanged from the past. By conceiving of tradition in this way, two things tend to be forgotten: that the past was, perhaps, as open and dynamic to the actors of that time as our own age appears to us; and that the norms, rules, and orientations of the past were not necessarily as consistent, unified, and coherent as we tend to imagine.³⁵

In Iran, the bases of the claims to legitimate authority of pre-Islamic shahanshahs, Islamic amirs and sultans, and post-Mongol shahs and vakils were not identical. And yet, whatever these variations, Reinhard Bendix's observation that "... royal authority has endured for the greater part of human history. This would not have been the case if kings, officials, and the mass of the people had not to some degree believed the authority of kings to be inviolate"³⁶ is also true for Iran. Although

³⁵ S.J. Tambiah, "The Persistence and Transformation of Tradition in Southeast Asia, With Special Reference to Thailand," in Eisenstadt, ed., Post-Traditional Societies, p. 55.

³⁶ Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), p.

the authority of monarchs was never justified in terms of itself until this century, it stands to reason that that authority's legitimacy was at least implicitly uncontested throughout most of Iranian history, which justifies an attempt to define it.

As Otto Hintze has shown, monarchies in the West were from the outset limited by three sets of institutions: the old Germanic principle of reciprocity of obligations between the ruler and ruled, representative bodies of the Roman Empire, as transmitted and modified by the Church (principally the provincial diets, or conciliae), and the "exemption of certain persons or groups from the direct effects of public authority, and the transfer of public, legal powers to these very persons or groups, the upshot being isolated self-government."³⁷ Out of these institutions grew the Estates, the forerunners of modern parliaments. Royal absolutism in Europe was therefore only a more or less long interlude between a monarchy limited by Estates and one limited by a modern parliament. Such representative, limiting institutions were lacking in the monarchies of the Middle East. To quote Hintze again:

[In the Orient there] was the excessively strong development of the office of ruler through its alliance with religion... The whole of Oriental civilization, ancient and modern, is permeated with this. The ruler is either a god walking on earth, as in ancient Egypt or among the Accadian Assyrians or in China and Japan; or he is at least the special protege and agent of the gods, as the Kings of Babylon protected by the Marduk, as the Achemenids by Ahura Mazda, or by the other local gods of the regions they had conquered, or as the Caliphs of the Islamic states were as successors to the Prophet... The

21.

³⁷ In his essay "The Preconditions of Representative Government in the Context of World History," in The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, Felix Gilbert, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 309-311.

result everywhere is enormous strengthening of the temporal authority by the spiritual, or even the idea of the unity of Church and State, as in the Roman Empire after Constantine and in the Islamic Empires.³⁸

In the Christian Orient this led to the caesaro-papism of the Byzantine Empire, which had a lasting influence on the monarchy in Russia. Under Islam, the original Caliphate, as exercised by the first four "righteous" and subsequent Umayyad Caliphs, had contained elements of reciprocity between ruler and ruled, continuations of pre-Islamic Arab tribal practices.³⁹ These practices, however, weakened and eventually disappeared under the influence of Persian secretaries, steeped in the traditions of the Sasanian Empire, who took over the administration of the Islamic Empire after the Abbasid revolution.⁴⁰ The Islamic Empire was too large to be governed centrally, and the result was a growing movement of provincial governors, theoretically named by the Caliph, becoming de facto independent rulers of their provinces. The first post-Islamic Iranian dynasties were part of this general trend. The office of Caliph became increasingly religious, until it lost all temporal power by the mid tenth century A.D. At least in theory, these locally independent amirs derived their legitimacy from their nomination by the Caliph. Later on, invading Turkish warlords from Central Asia also became rulers recognized by the Caliph in Baghdad. This discrepancy between the powerless Caliph, legitimate successor to the Prophet, and the

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 315-316.

³⁹ Bendix, Kings or People, p. 40.

⁴⁰ For details on how the Persian imperial tradition came to modify the Caliphate see W.M. Watt, Islamic Political Thought, Islamic Surveys 6 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968, paperback edition 1980), pp. 78-85.

effective rulers led to a continued dichotomy in Islamic political thinking, as practice routinely disagreed with theory. However, the weight of continued practice led most Muslim legal scholars more and more to regard rule seized by force as legitimate. In Iran, this connected with the pre-Islamic tradition of considering the reigning monarch to be endowed with God's special grace (fareh). The result was a de facto separation of temporal and religious authority. By the fourteenth century Ibn Khaldun could write:

Royal authority is an institution that is natural to mankind... People...cannot persist in a state of anarchy and without a ruler who keeps them apart. Therefore, they need a person to restrain them. He is the ruler. As is required by human nature, he must be a forceful ruler, one who exercises authority... Anything (done by royal authority) that is dictated by force, superiority, or the free play of the power of wrathfulness, is tyranny and injustice and considered reprehensible by (the religious law), as it is also considered reprehensible by the requirements of political wisdom... Political laws consider only worldly interests... (On the other hand,) the intention the Lawgiver has concerning mankind is their welfare in the other world. Therefore, it is necessary, as required by the religious law, to cause the mass to act in accordance with the religious laws in all their affairs touching both this and the other world. The authority to do so was possessed by the representatives of the religious law, the prophets; [then] by those who took their place, the caliphs.

This makes it clear what the caliphate means. (To exercise) natural royal authority means to cause the masses to act as required by purpose and desire. (To exercise) political (royal authority) means to cause the masses to act as required by intellectual (rational) insight into the means of furthering their worldly interests and avoiding anything that is harmful (in that respect). (And to exercise) the caliphate means to cause the masses to act as required by religious insight into their interests in the other world as well as in this world.⁴¹

⁴¹ Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, translated, and with an introduction by Franz Rosenthal, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), vol. 1, pp. 380 and 385-387.

It should be noted, however, that the two authorities were more closely interwoven than in the West. Moreover, the amirs and sultans were defenders of the faith, which was an additional claim to legitimate authority. The legitimacy of the rulers was thus never discussed in terms of itself, but always in terms of other goods: the defense of the faith, and the need for a strong government.⁴²

The emerging patterns of government and legitimacy were disrupted in Iran by the Mongol invasion, followed by the ravages of Tamerlane. The last years of the fifteenth century saw the rise, in Iran, of a new dynasty, the Safavids.⁴³ It triumphed over its rivals under the leadership of Isma'il, who established the new Iranian state. The Safavids were Shi'ites, and based their claim to legitimate authority on their supposed descent from the Prophet, rather like the Abbasids had done before them. The early Safavid state had clear caesaro-papistic features (Isma'il declared himself first Imam, then Shah), but by the seventeenth century an independent hierocracy⁴⁴ came into being alongside the monarchy.⁴⁵ After the fall of the Safavids and the interregnum of the eight-

⁴² This may explain why changes of dynasties are more frequent in the East than in the West, as the notion of usurpation is quite foreign to this set of ideas. When the last Samanid rulers of Transoxiana turned to the population of Bukhara for help against the invading Qarakhanid Turks, the people turned to the ulema, who counselled against such a mobilization, arguing that the Turkish Khan was as good a Muslim as the Samanid Amir, and that Muslims should therefore not spill their blood in a purely wordly conflict. See Richard N. Frye, Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), p. 147.

⁴³ On this period see Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

⁴⁴ As defined by Weber, Economy and Society, p. 54.

⁴⁵ See Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Relig-

eenth century, the Qajar dynasty began its long rule in 1785. Unlike the Safavids, the Qajars could not claim direct descent from the Prophet as the basis of their legitimacy. The Church had emerged from the troubles of the eighteenth century stronger and more independent, and the new Qajar Shahs had to turn to it for confirmation of their legitimacy, rather as the Carolingians had done after they had replaced the Merovingians. As we shall soon see, throughout the nineteenth century monarchy and hierocracy cohabited independently one from the other, with one always attempting to curry favor with the other.

The outstanding feature of the monarch's role in Iran was the arbitrariness of his power. This does not mean that it was absolute, as he had to contend with organized groups such as the guilds, the clergy, tribal chieftains etc., but what checks and balances existed resulted from power relationships and had no legal and institutional basis. The ruler answered only to God.

Let us now turn to Religion, the other source of traditional legitimate authority in Iran.

1.2.2 Religion

Few countries have given the world as many religions as Iran: Zoroastrianism, arguably the world's first monotheistic faith; Mithraism, which almost became the official religion of the Roman Empire; Manichaeism, whose echos haunted the West until the Middle Ages; Mazdakism, perhaps

ion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginnings to 1890 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984), pp. 122-155.

the world's first communism; Twelver Shi'ism's classic formulation; and Baha'ism, the last of the great world religions, all originated on the Iranian Plateau.⁴⁶ Although to this day half a dozen religions are represented in Iran, the over-all picture of the country is one of religious homogeneity. Shi'ites constitute about 90 per cent of the total population, Muslims more than 98 per cent: Iran is therefore as much the "national" state of Shi'ites as that of Iranians.⁴⁷

The origins of Shi'ism are well known and cannot be retold here. Originally Shi'ism was not a unified body of beliefs and institutions, and comprised a multitude of more or less heterodox sects.⁴⁸ Some of these had numerous adepts in Iran, but the major centers of Shi'ism were Iraq and what is now Southern Lebanon, while a majority of Iranians were Sunnis.

⁴⁶ The most comprehensive study of Iranian religions is Alessandro Bausani, Persia religiosa da Zaratustra a Baha'u'llah (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1959).

⁴⁷ The fact that the Shi'ites of Iran speak a variety of languages and dialects could be adduced as evidence for an interpretation of Iran as a state based on common religion rather than on common nationality. The fact that the only serious separatist movements with a popular base have come from Sunni populations (Kurds and Beluchis), would corroborate this view. This argument should not be carried too far: in Iran ethnic identity has so far not led to national consciousness, and the national consciousness of Iranians is based more on a distinct cultural heritage than on language or religion. This cultural heritage in turn includes Shi'ism, the Persian language (but not exclusively: Turkish, spoken by a good third of the population, lost its status as a language endowed with social prestige only at the beginning of this century; the Qajar Court was bilingual), and a long tradition of statehood. What really constitutes Iranian nationhood is a tricky question, and most writings on it are ideologically tainted.

⁴⁸ To this day there are the Zaidi ("Fourer"), Isma'ilite ("Sevener"), and Ja'faris ("Twelver") Shi'ites, to which one must add the Alawites of Syria and Turkey. A discussion of the differences between them is

The original rift between Sunnites and Shi'ites having occurred over the Prophet's succession, the Caliphs always remained illegitimate in the eyes of the Shi'ites. It is a Shi'ite tradition that the first eleven rightful successors to the Prophet, the Imams, all died violent deaths at the hands of the Sunni caliphs. The Twelfth Imam, however, disappeared as a child and will come back at the end of time and reestablish righteous government and justice. This messianic streak is a key element of Shi'ism. Sunnis believe in a Mahdi as well, but only in Shi'ism is the belief in him part of orthodox and canonic religion,⁴⁹ a result of the historic circumstance that in the early centuries of Islam Shi'ites were in a minority.

Shah Isma'il's rise in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century was an instance of this messianic component of Shi'ism. His personal religion was not orthodox by Shi'ite standards of orthodoxy, well developed by then. However, against his main adversaries, the Sunni Ottomans, he used Shi'ism as an ideological weapon and established it as the official religion of his empire.⁵⁰ To do so, he had to take recourse to

beyond the scope of this book, and henceforth by Shi'ism we mean the official Twelver Shi'ism of modern Iran.

⁴⁹ For an interesting discussion of Sunni conceptions of the Mahdi, and a refutation of Shi'ite notions thereof, see Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, vol. 2, pp. 186-200.

⁵⁰ On the use of religion in the Ottoman-Safavid conflict see Elke Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safaviden im 16. Jahrhundert nach arabischen Handschriften (Freiburg im Breisgau: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970). Older studies saw the rise of the Safavids as an early example of nation building, for instance Walther Hinz, Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im fünfzehnten Jahrhundert (Berlin and Leipzig, 1936). Recent research disputes this transposition of European concepts. See Jean Aubin, "La politique religieuse des Safavides," in Le Shi'isme Imamite: Colloque de Strasbourg (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1970), pp. 235-244.

the Shi'ite ulema of the orthodox Shi'ite areas, many of whom he invited to settle in Iran. Thus "orthodox" Ja'fari Shi'ism became the official religion of Iran, not the more messianic variety of Shah Isma'il.⁵¹ The religious institution was endowed with great wealth, and that allowed it little by little to become independent from the Safavi kings. Concomitantly, the religious charisma of the Safavi Shahs, based on Isma'il's charismatic leadership and their descendance from the Prophet, weakened, until the Shahs became secular rulers. Of course the Shahs and the ulema needed each other: The ulema needed the secular rulers to maintain religious orthodoxy, and the rulers needed the ulema to solidify Shi'ism in their empire and also to sanction their right to rule. This the ulema did, for the old caliphal title Zellollah, Shadow of God, was applied to Safavi shahs. Shah and ulema were thus not in opposition to each other, but the rulers stood outside the formal religious institutions. From the seventeenth century onwards the ulema had their own sources of income and were thus less dependent on the State than in such Sunni countries as Egypt or the Ottoman Empire. The caesaropapistic tendencies of the late Ottoman Empire (after the Sultan called himself Caliph) were thus lacking in Iran, and the country became unique in the Muslim world for having an independent hierocracy alongside the monarchy, rather like the Catholic countries of Europe. With the fall of the Safavids and the long period of political turmoil that followed, the Shi'ite Church became the only authority that maintained some kind of continuity and penetration in Iran. Attempts by Nader Shah (1736-1747) to curb the power of the Church failed, and as a result by the end of the eighteenth

⁵¹ On the shift see Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God, pp. 109-121.

century the Shi'ite Church was strong, financially independent, and well organized. The political turmoil had therefore had the same effect on it as the fall of the Roman Empire in the West had had on the Christian Church in Western Europe. By the time the Qajars began their rule in Iran in 1785, the two centers of traditional authority, ruler and Church, existed independently from one another.⁵²

The Church derived additional strength from the fact that its main centers after the fall of the Safavids, Najaf and Kerbala, lay on Ottoman territory out of reach of the government's hand. In case of conflict with the state, individual ulema could always retreat to ultraperian Iraq.

What were the characteristics of this official state Shi'ism compared to Sunnism?⁵³ One aspect often mentioned is the Shi'ite emphasis on hidden, or esoteric knowledge, transmitted through the Imams.⁵⁴ This aspect easily connected with the strong messianic element that we have already

⁵² For Church-State relations during the Qajar period see Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969). This book tends to overstress the conflicts between the two and to neglect the instances of cooperation.

⁵³ Here we are not concerned with religious definitions of Shi'ism. For an authoritative exposition of Shi'ite beliefs written by a respected member of the ulema for a Western audience see Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i, Shi'ite Islam, Translated from the Persian and Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975).

⁵⁴ Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Ideals and Reality of Islam (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 147-178, interprets Shi'ism and Sunnism as two equally orthodox sensibilities within Islam. While it is true that the esoteric interpretation of Islam was stressed more in Shi'ism and the exoteric more in Sunnism, it would be historically incorrect to reduce the differences between the two to this aspect.

noted. A third peculiarity of Shi'ism is that it maintained a tradition of philosophical enquiry. While philosophy in Sunni areas died in the Middle Ages under the attacks of the maintainers of religious orthodoxy, in Iran Islamic philosophy remained alive and came to a flowering in the seventeenth century with such figures as Mir Damad and Molla Sadra, who, like other theosophers before them, attempted to reconcile faith, mysticism, and reason.⁵⁵ The theosophers always remained on the margins of the Church, and their rationalism was regarded with suspicion by the hierarchy.

These three elements, a tradition of hidden knowledge not accessible to the masses, a messianic component, and the continued vitality of philosophy, interacted closely and were in at least latent opposition to the orthodoxy as represented by the ulema. The seed of dissention and the challenge to orthodoxy were thus implanted inside religion, and would ultimately give rise to rebellions.

The other major difference between Shi'ism and Sunnism was that Shi'ism maintained a tradition of independent interpretation of religious laws, or ijtihad. In Sunnism the "Gates of ijtihad" were closed in the ninth century, and the four major schools of jurisprudence that had developed by then gained authority. However, in Shi'ism only certain learned individuals were authorized to exercise this independent interpretation of laws, the mujtahids. In fact, although not in theory, the

⁵⁵ The remarkable intellectual accomplishments of these theosophers only beginning to be more widely known. See Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975). For a short discussion see Mangol Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), pp. 28-35.

Shi'ite hierocracy are thus intermediaries between the common believer and revelation, they thus assume some of the functions of a clergy. This perhaps accounts for the common use of that term to designate the ulema in Iran, in spite of the fact that they are no "priests" in the technical sense of the word.⁵⁶ This distinction of the Shi'ite ulema confers upon them great authority.

The last socially significant difference between Shi'ism and Sunnism is that, because so many of the Imams are believed to have perished unjustly, Shi'ism is, like Christianity, a religion of lament.⁵⁷ The focus of the Shi'ites' lament is Husein, the third Imam, whose unjust death is commemorated annually in ways that bear a certain resemblance to Easter. (We will come back to this)

Finally, a few words should be said about the various styles or methods of religious experience in Shi'ite Islam. For Allamah Tabataba'i:

There are three methods of religious thought in Islam. The Holy Quran in its teachings points to three paths for Muslims to follow in order to comprehend the purposes of religion and the Islamic sciences: (1) the path of the external and formal aspect of religion (the Shari'ah); (2) the path of intellectual understanding; and (3) the path of spiritual comprehension achieved through sincerity (ikhlas) in obeying God.⁵⁸

The first is the method espoused by the orthodox ulema, the second constitutes the philosophic tradition, and the third is the gnostic tradition of esoteric knowledge (sufism). A modern anthropologist, proceeding empirically, identified eleven religious settings, catering to a variety

⁵⁶ See Weber, Economy and Society, p. 440.

⁵⁷ As defined by Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power, tr. Carol Stewart, (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), pp. 143-145.

⁵⁸ Tabataba'i, Shi'ite Islam, p. 89.

of social needs. Of these eleven settings only four or five normally involve the ulema.⁵⁹ This points to the popular modes of religious expression, of which some are frowned upon by the clergy; and to the anti-clerical, more ethically oriented religious discourse found among westernized Iranians. We will come back to the social bases of the various religious styles when we consider Iran's dual class structure.

1.2.3 The Aborted Emergence of Legal-Rational Authority

In the Christian West, the emergence of strong urban centers and the continued conflicts between temporal and religious authorities led to the gradual emergence of a legal-rational order. In Iran such a development did not take place, perhaps because the intermediate institutions and the system of immunities that obtained in the West were lacking.

By and large State and Church cohabited harmoniously until the end of the nineteenth century. The Qajar Shahs needed the continued blessing of the hierocracy, and the latter needed the secular rulers to maintain religious orthodoxy, as for instance against the Babi rebellions of 1844-1852.⁶⁰ The alliance first showed cracks in 1892, when Nasereddin Shah granted the "Tobacco Concession" to foreign interests. The reaction came in the form of an alliance between merchants, who resented the intrusion of foreigners on their traditional turf, and the clergy, who

⁵⁹ Michael M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 136-137.

⁶⁰ The rebellion of the Bab brought together the messianic, theosophic, and gnostic strands in Shi'ism and was repressed with much bloodshed. See Bayat, Mysticis and Dissent, pp. 87-131; and Abbas Amanat, The Early Years of the Babi Movement (tentative title) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).

were weary of infidel infiltration. The Shah had to cancel the concession, but the prestige of the monarchy was tainted.⁶¹ Under the influence of Western ideas a constitutional movement grew in Iran, borne by an alliance of the ulema with the emerging middle classes.⁶² This alliance finally triumphed in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1906.⁶³ The primary aim of this coalition was not, however, the establishment of popular rule, but rather putting an end to the arbitrariness of the monarch's powers, which had created intolerable insecurity.⁶⁴ Thus the function of the representative assembly, Majles, that the constitutionalists demanded was in the early stages not to legislate, but rather to ensure that the old laws not be broken by the monarch, which, after all, was the original function of European parliaments. It is interesting to note in this context that for the purpose of representation Iranian subjects were divided into six classes during the first Majles, as if Iranian history wanted to start with Estates before moving to modern parliaments elected by universal suffrage.⁶⁵

⁶¹ See Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: the Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 (London: Frank Cass, 1966).

⁶² See Nikki R. Keddie, "The origins of the religious-radical alliance in Iran," in Past and Present, 34 (1966), pp. 70-80.

⁶³ The best account of that revolution remains Edward Browne The Persian Revolution 1905-1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910).

⁶⁴ For examples see Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979. (New York: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 24-25; and A. Ashraf and H. Hekmat, "Merchants and Artisans in the Developmental Processes of Nineteenth-Century Iran," in A.L. Udovitch, The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900: Studies in Economic and Social History (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1981), pp. 727-730.

⁶⁵ Ahmad Ashraf, "The Roots of Emerging Dual Class Structure in Nineteenth-Century Iran," in Iranian Studies, 14 (winter-spring 1981), pp. 9-11.

After a few years most of the constitutionalist ulema withdrew active support from the constitutionalist movement. The monarchy as an institution survived the minority of the last Qajar ruler, Ahmad Shah, and his subsequent long absence from Iran, but it was not a ruling monarchy. When Reza Khan wanted to abolish it and declare a republic, on the Turkish model, the ulema, fearing that outright secularization would follow, agitated against this step and as a result Reza Khan crowned himself Shah and founded a new dynasty.

The rule of Reza Shah and his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, was not a continuation of the Qajar monarchy. To consolidate their rule and enact the kind of societal reforms they thought were necessary for Iran's progress, both Pahlavis dealt mercilessly with the Church, especially Reza Shah.⁶⁶ Under the Pahlavis the equilibrium that had existed between Church and State was radically altered in favor of the latter. The Shahs could therefore not turn to the hierocracy for legitimation, and consequently turned to Iran's pre-Islamic past to legitimize their rule. Iran's monarchical traditions were evoked, and the Pahlavi Shahs presented themselves as heirs to the Achaemenids and Sasanians, rather like Napoleon who said that he was not the successor of Louis XVI but of Charlemagne. It should be noted, however, that this rediscovery of Iran's past was not the work of the Pahlavis and had started in the late nineteenth century. Although it was popular with some sectors of the Iranian intelligentsia, its ideological content did not constitute a "tradition," and was more of an innovation. Thus, paradoxically, the

⁶⁶ For a sympathetic account of Reza Shah's reforms see Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961).

more the Pahlavis emphasized the non-Islamic basis of their kingship, the more they corroded their traditional legitimacy. As early as 1960 Leonard Binder wrote:

It must be noted...that kingship has usually been justified on the basis of some other good in Iran, and that only now is it justified tautologically. Emphasis upon its traditional basis has meaning only when tradition is passing.⁶⁷

By 1975 the monarchy was self-consciously justified in terms reminiscent of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric in the program of the Shah's Rastakhiz Party.

Reza Shah is often compared to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey. The similarities between the reforms they imposed on their societies divert attention from one fundamental difference between them: Ataturk had saved Turkey from disintegration by driving out foreign occupiers, whereas Reza Khan unified Iran by neutralizing internal competitors, some of whom had nationalist credentials at least as good as his own.⁶⁸ Kemal's nationalist credentials were therefore much better grounded, which explains why he could get away with far more than Reza Shah, and why (so far at least) his reforms have been more lasting. Also, by abolishing the Caliphate and proclaiming a secular republic Ataturk had removed a symbol of subserviance to the West, whereas Reza Shah attacked a hierocracy that had led the fight against foreign intervention.

⁶⁷ Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964) p. 65.

⁶⁸ See Avery, Modern Iran, pp. 210-244.

Since both men saw modernization essentially as westernization, one also has to keep in mind that in the case of Turkey closer contact with the West as compared to Iran had created a larger domestic constituency for westernization to begin with. In Iran, however, even that limited potential constituency was not fully behind Reza Shah, because his nationalist legitimacy was in doubt. Reza Shah managed to maintain himself in power by force, but in Afghanistan, where this native constituency for westernization was even smaller than in Iran, the westernizing King Amanullah was overthrown by a popular revolt (in which religious leaders played a leading role) as early as 1928.⁶⁹ Ataturk, Reza Shah, and King Amanullah all worked against religion in their countries, and in an extremely tactless way to boot; whereas in Thailand Kings Chulalongkorn and Vajiravudh tried to reform religion as part of their modernization policies.⁷⁰ Admittedly, their task was easier than the Islamic rulers' would have been, had they chosen the path of religious reform, because of Buddhism's nature as a religion of exemplary prophecy, in contrast to Islam's basis in ethical prophecy.⁷¹

Reza Shah's initial popularity with Iran's intelligentsia also diminished under the impact of his extremely ruthless and despotic political style. Although he consolidated the contemporary Iranian State, Reza

⁶⁹ See Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, pp. 227-275; and Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1973).

⁷⁰ See Heinz Bechert, Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravada Buddhismus (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1967), pp. 181-218.

⁷¹ For a definition of ethical and exemplary prophecy see Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 447-450.

Shah failed to create a state of law, and under his rule the arbitrariness of political power continued and alienated many sectors of the bourgeoisie, even those which had initially supported him. The patrimonial state, when superficially modernized, became increasingly sultanistic.⁷² This is another major difference with Ataturk, who was a far more skillful politician and who did in the end create a state of law in Turkey.

The monarchy in Iran was also weakened by the close association between the last Shah and foreign powers. In spite of all its pseudo-traditional trappings by the early 1970's it resembled more the interwar Balkan monarchies of the Saxe-Coburg-Gothas, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringens, and Glücksburgs, than the pre-1925 Iranian monarchy. At first this applied only to the articulate, westernized segment of society, but in due course awareness of this link trickled down to the entire population. An intrinsic element of the State's legitimation formula was thus eroded by the continuing crisis of sovereignty.

The anti-religious policies of the Pahlavi Shahs, carried out with utter disregard for the sensibilities of the majority of the population, at first hit the hierarchy severely.⁷³ After Reza Shah's abdication the clergy regained some of its lost prerogatives in society, but came under

⁷² As defined in Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Nelson Polsby and Fred Greenstein, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. III, (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Press, 1975), pp. 259-263.

⁷³ See Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 23-60.

renewd attack after 1963.⁷⁴ In the defensive, it gained new strength, as it was not discredited by unacceptable exercise of its authority. The ulema's resilience and their ability to resist the government and maintain their institutional integrity and independence was due to the fact that, unlike the Ottoman ulema, who had lost their independence to the state before the secularist reforms of Ataturk,⁷⁵ in Iran the undermining of the ulema went hand in hand with secularist reforms.

Theoretically an office's legitimacy does not suffer from the unacceptable behavior of any one incumbent of that office. In the long run, however, the illegitimacy of office-holders taints the legitimacy of the office. In Iran the despotic rule of the Pahlavi monarchs undermined the legitimacy of the monarchy itself.

1.2.4 The Emergence of Charismatic Authority

An important outcome of this struggle between State and Church, especially after 1963, was the reformulation of the political doctrine of Shi'ism. We saw that before the establishment of the Shi'ite state by the Safavids, Shi'ites had considered political authority illegitimate, because it was exercised by Sunnis. From this basis a new doctrine developed, which extended the illegitimacy of the Sunni governments to all secular governments.⁷⁶ Sovereignty belonged only to the twelfth Imam,

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 91-159.

⁷⁵ See Richard L. Chambers, "The Ottoman Ulema and the Tanzimat," in Nikki R. Keddie, Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972).

⁷⁶ There is a whole body of literature by Western scholars which attempts to demonstrate the basic illegitimacy of all secular govern-

and in his absence to the ulema. As Amir Arjomand has argued, the very separation of temporal and religious authority in Iran created the possibility of the latter's total rejection of the former.⁷⁷ At first a minoritarian view, its popularity grew with that of the major mujtahid who espoused and formulated it, Ay. Ruhollah Khomeini. But Khomeini's rise was not a symptom of the revival of traditional authority, as represented by the ulema. Khomeini had been quite marginal to the religious establishment of Qum, Iran's main religious center, largely because he was a teacher of hekmat, or traditional Islamic theosophy. In his gradual rise after 1963⁷⁸ we again find a reassertion of the messianic and philosophic elements in Shi'ism, as Khomeini's political theory of the "Dominion of the Jurisprudent," Valayat-e Faqih,⁷⁹ is grounded in Plato's philosopher-king, as reinterpreted by such Muslim philosophers as al-Farabi, Ibn Arabi, and Mulla Sadra. The latter, especially, gave an account of the ideal spiritual development of a leader and his relation to the community, which Khomeini studied, taught, and then attempted to execute.⁸⁰ The consequence of the erosion of the two types of traditional

ments in Shi'ism. Another, "revisionist," school has disputed this allegation, arguing that the new Shi'ite intransigence is in fact an innovation. For details of this scholarly dispute see Joseph Eliash, "Misconceptions Regarding the Juridical Status of the Iranian 'Ulama," in International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10 (1979), pp. 9-25.

⁷⁷ Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God, p. 264.

⁷⁸ See chapter 6, section 5.

⁷⁹ See Hamid Enayat, "Iran: Khomeini's Concept of the Guardianship of the Jurisconsult," in James P. Piscatori, ed. Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

⁸⁰ See Michael M.J. Fischer, "Becoming Mollah: Reflections on Iranian Clerics in a Revolutionary Age," in Iranian Studies, 13 (1980), pp. 86.

authority in Iran was therefore not a strengthening of legal-rational authority, but rather the birth of a new charismatic authority. How this happened will be related at the end of the chapter. The problem we have to address here is why legal-rational authority did not fare better in Iran.

The carrier of this type of authority is the bureaucracy. The continued sultanistic rule in Iran meant, however, that the country retained a patrimonial bureaucracy. Liberalism and democracy can best grow on the basis of a legal-rational order. Even if we accepted that the two (the state of law and liberalism) could come into being simultaneously, we have to note that in Iran the bourgeoisie, which in the West led the fight for liberalism, could not do so for a variety of reasons. Great emphasis is usually put on the peripheral, dependent character of Iran's economy to explain the weakness of the bourgeoisie.⁸¹ The semicolonial situation of Iran did indeed constitute a serious obstacle to the development of a vigorous and self-confident bourgeoisie, a situation which is not peculiar to Iran. But one should also note that the foreign impact was not only economical but also political: Iran's domination by outside powers meant that the national bourgeoisie sought above all to restore Iran's sovereignty internationally. Iran's non-dependent bourgeoisie was above all nationalist, not liberal. And national independence can be achieved without liberalism.

⁸¹ See A. Ashraf and H. Hekmat, "Merchants and Artisans...", pp. 732-739; and Ahmad Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Bourgeoisie in Iran," in M.A. Cook, ed., Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the rise of Islam to the present day (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970, 1978), pp. 321-328.

The other fact to remember is that foreign powers did not favor those elements in Iranian society that would have been the natural carriers of liberal ideas. As we have seen earlier, the institutions and structures that facilitated the emergence of legal-rational authority in the West did not exist in the East. They could have been successfully implanted only by elite consensus. In countries without such prior structures the safest way for the implantation of constitutional government is for charismatic leaders to foresake the age-old traditions of arbitrary rule. In Iran, such a leader, Mosaddeq, had to confront not only his internal enemies, but also the superpowers.

Let us now turn to Iran's peculiar social structure.

1.3 A DUAL SOCIETY

As a result of the close contacts which the Iranian elite maintained with the West, and the implicit belief that modernization equalled westernization, beginning in the late nineteenth century, the country's ruling strata became more and more distant psychologically and in the patterns of daily behavior from the vast majority of the population. The persistence of two segments of society and the lack of integration between the two segments led to a build-up of tension that culminated in the Islamic revolution of 1978.

1.3.1 The Genesis of the Dual Society

It is not unusual for a country developing on the periphery of world capitalism to have a dualistic class structure. As elsewhere, economic factors are often used to define this dual class structure. Iran's leading sociologist has put it thusly:

The dynamics of the growing world economy and the development of a semicolonial situation in the late nineteenth century put enough pressure on the state to force adjustments in the agricultural, commercial, industrial, and administrative institutions. From the beginning, these alterations had the effect of giving rise to a form of capitalism -- but it was a distorted hybrid which evolved, differing from the course and nature of development of capitalism in the West. The experience of semicolonialism had, among its other consequences, a crucial impact upon the nature and direction of changes that occurred in the country's traditional hierarchical orders...

The [resulting] class structure was marked from its birth by a dualistic course of development, i.e., the emergence and sustained growth of modernizing social forces that developed side by side with the survival and reproduction of traditional strata. The newly emerging strata were composed of the patrimonial-bureaucratic staff, the mercantile and industrial entrepreneurs, and the industrial working class. The traditional strata comprised peasants and tribesmen in the rural and tribal communities and the clergy and members of the bazaar community in the urban areas.

A definition of social strata solely on the basis of the organization of production is not satisfactory however. The author is aware of the insufficiency of the Marxian paradigm when he writes:

Coming from the traditional labor force situated either in the bazaar or in the village and tribal communities, and living together with the religio-bazaari strata in the city quarters, the emerging industrial working class, too, showed an affinity toward the life style and the religiosity of these traditional strata. The affinity seems to have persisted in spite of the differences in the organization of production between these two sectors.⁸²

Instead of the organization of production, I propose a different cleavage line to separate the traditional and the modern parts of society. The intervening factor for us is religion, or rather the particular forms taken by traditional religion. Following Mircea Eliade, we consider the religious mode of existence an original one which cannot be

⁸² A. Ashraf, "The Roots...", pp. 18 and 23.

explained in purely secular, or "profane," terms.⁸³ Since the forms of the organization of production, and the resulting economically defined sectors of society may have explanative value in other realms of analysis,⁸⁴ we call the traditional and modern sections of Iranian society segments.⁸⁵

Until the end of the nineteenth century all Iranians were united by a common world-view, and this traditional Islamic ontology, although not monolithic, held society together. At that time, under the impact of contacts with the West (economic, political, intellectual), the ontology of the ruling strata of society began to change. Western secularist ideas connected with heterodox traditions (like Sufism) within Iran, to alienate substantial sectors of the ruling classes from traditional religion. For these strata nationalism became a more important binding force than religion, and under the influence of Western ideas of enlightenment, religion, at least as practiced in Iran at the time, was deemed responsible for the country's backwardness. The peculiar form modernization has taken in Iran has been analyzed elsewhere and we cannot repeat it here.⁸⁶ The carriers of this new ontology were the ruling

⁸³ Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane (New York: Harcourt, Brace, World, 1959), especially pp. 162-165.

⁸⁴ For a discussion of Iran's economic development in terms of a modern and a traditional sector see Jahangir Amuzegar and M. Ali Fekrat, Iran: Economic Development under Dualistic Conditions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).


⁸⁵ My use of the term is derived from V.R. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies," in Comparative Politics, 3 (January 1971), pp. 141-175. The difference in the case of Iran is that the two segments were not formally organized, unlike the cases Lorwin studied.

⁸⁶ See Katouzian, Political Economy, pp. 101-107.

circles of the capital, the intellectuals, and after Reza Shah's seizure of power increasingly members of the government bureaucracy, the army, and entrepreneurs of the modern sector of the economy. It should be pointed out that this modern segment of society included not only supporters of the Pahlavis but also leftists, Nationalists, liberals, fascists, regionalists, etc. The majority of the population, however, was not touched by this ontological shift and continued adhering to the old ways.

The division of Iranian society into two segments, one modern the other traditional, should not be construed as meaning that the two segments were internally homogeneous; within each segment there were different strata with contradictions and tensions between them. In the modern segment at the top there were the entrepreneurs of the modern sector, in close contact with international capitalism and often closely interconnected with the Court; the upper echelons of the government apparatus; and the top leadership of the army. The middle stratum consisted of government employees, professionals, academics. Most members of Iran's religious minorities (Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Baha'is) belonged here too. One cannot really talk about a "lower class" among the members of this segment, but teachers, and intellectuals returning from Europe or America in the 1970's and finding that with their salaries they could hardly pay the rent of a small apartment, were an economically disadvantaged group, especially since their desired patterns of consumption reflected their status membership in the modern segment. Perhaps one could also include in this segment the oil-workers of southern Iran, among whom the Tudeh has been implanted for many years.

The traditional segment of society included various strata as well. At the top there were the richest Bazaar merchants. Below these, one had other tradesmen and lesser members of the Bazaar community, and the lowest end of the social spectrum within the traditional segment was formed by peasants as well as urban workers, many of whom indeed worked in the modern sector of the economy while retaining their traditional outlook. Iran's dual social structure as described above can be graphically represented as follows:



What separated the two segments of Iranian society? Outward appearance for one thing, at least in the case of the female half of the population. Under Reza Shah the government had attempted to impose Western dress on the population.⁸⁷ After Reza Shah's abdication in 1941 the controls were relaxed, but the support that the policy had enjoyed among the modern segment led to a situation where wearing Western dress came naturally to the women of the modern segment, while women of traditional background equally naturally continued wearing the veil. It is therefore wrong, as ideologues of both sides are wont to do, to ascribe the sartorial preferences of the Other to "alienation."

⁸⁷ For details see Katouzian, Political Economy, pp. 125-127.

Onomastic preferences were another dividing line. With the birth of modern nationalism in Iran old, Persian names, hitherto reserved for Zoroastrians and slaves, became ever more popular in the modern segment. At the same time the traditional segment steadfastly clung to the common Islamo-Arabic names.

Most important, perhaps, is the place religious practice played in the lives of the two segments' members. Modern Iranians were not necessarily atheists or agnostics, rather to the extent that they were religious, their religiosity had an ethical and/or mystical coloring while rituals were played down and regarded as signs of backwardness. For traditional Iranians, however, religion gave meaning to all everyday experience, and quotidian acts were carried out in accordance with religious rules. A gap exists between the two:

Religious feeling among [the westernized classes] remains quite strong, nonetheless, and oftentimes is expressed through the language of Sufism and Islamic modernism. What these upper-class and Westernized Muslims have to say about the beauty, value, and truth in Islam, however, is often angrily rejected by the more traditional classes, especially the madrasah students and religious high school and university students.⁸⁸

It would be wrong to divide Iran into an areligious upper class and a deeply religious populace. One should also note that just as the ruling elite always contained deeply pious individuals, religious practice was quite weak among certain non-elite groups, for instance the nomadic tribes. What is important is the form of religious expression, the place of religious practice in individuals' daily lives. One important aspect of this is the way the two segments experienced Time, for that

⁸⁸ Fischer, Iran, p. 139.

had important consequences for Iranian politics. During the Islamic revolution it became clear how major events often coincided with religious holidays. In the following an attempt is made to explain the roots of this use of religious celebrations for political purposes, and why it was so effective in the case of Iran.

1.3.2 Excursus on Kairos and Chronos

For Iranians of the modern segment the main events of the year are the Iranian New Year, Nowruz (March 21), and the various commemorations of significant events in recent history: Constitution Day (Mordad 14), the Popular Uprising against the Shah (Tir 30), the Popular Uprising against Mosaddeq (28 Mordad), the Liberation of Azerbaijan (Azar 21), and the killing of three students in 1953 (Azar 16), to name the most important. The Iranian New Year, occurring on the equinox of spring, has of course ancient and pre-Islamic religious significance as a festival of renewal,⁸⁹ and some of its symbolism was appropriated by Islam after the conversion of Iranians; but Nowruz also became a symbol of Iran's revived ties with its pre-Islamic past, which went hand in hand with the official playing down of Islam. It appealed to all secularists, be they monarchists, nationalists, or communists.

In contrast, the life of the traditional masses was governed more by celebrations of Islamic, and in particular Shi'ite, events: the births and martyrdoms of the various Imams. The birth of the twelfth Imam is celebrated more joyously than Nowruz by many traditional Iranians, while

⁸⁹ See Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 63-66.

the martyrdom of Imam Husein at Kerbala is the central event of the Islamic, lunar, year: "the Shi'ite calendar invests the entire year with meaning in terms of Kerbala-related stories."⁹⁰ Husein, according to Shi'ites the third legitimate successor to the Prophet and his grandson, faced the army of the usurper Umayyad Caliph, Yazid, with only seventy-two of his followers in the sun-drenched and dry desert of Kerbala and was killed with all his followers and relatives, even little babies. These events, the "Kerbala Paradigm," stand as the symbol for righteous struggle against injustice and illegitimate government.⁹¹

The martyrdom of Imam Husein is one of the central myths of Iranian culture, one that is especially important in times of trouble. To preempt misunderstanding it should be made clear that we use the word "myth" in this context not as meaning "fable," "invention," "fiction," but rather as defined by Eliade:

Myth narrates a sacred history; it relates an event that took place in primordial Time, the fabled time of the "beginnings." In other words, myth tells how, through the deeds of Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence, be it the whole of

⁹⁰ Fischer, Iran, p. 172.

⁹¹ As might be imagined, the Karbala events have spawned a vast literature, first by travellers to Shi'ite lands, and later by social scientists. A good overview of Western sources is given in Hans G. Kippenberg, "Jeder Tag ein 'Ashura, jedes Grab Kerbala: Zur Ritualisierung der Strassenkämpfe im Iran," in Kurt Greussing, ed. Religion und Politik im Iran (Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat, 1981), pp. 220-242. For a good description in English of the events, the annual rituals associated with them, and their significance in terms of Iranians' social life see Fischer, Iran, pp. 13-27, 170-180, and 260-263; and Gustav Thaiss, "Religious Symbolism and Social Change: The Drama of Husain," in Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints, and Sufis. An interesting anthropological account of the ceremonies in an Iranian village can be found in Mary Hegland, "Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village," in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 218-235.

reality, the Cosmos, or only a fragment of reality -- an island, a species of plant, a particular kind of human behavior, an institution. (Emphasis added)⁹²

Myths, thusly defined, are the central elements in rituals:

The apodictic value of myth is periodically reconfirmed by the rituals. Recollection and re-enactment of the primordial event help "primitive" man to distinguish and hold to the real. By virtue of the continual repetition of a paradigmatic act, something shows itself to be fixed and enduring in the universal flux. This periodic reiteration of what was done in illo tempore makes it inescapably certain that something exists absolutely. This "something" is "sacred," that is, transhuman and transmundane, but it is accessible to human experience. "Reality" unveils itself and admits of being constructed from a "transcendent" level, but this "transcendence" can be ritually experienced and finally becomes an integral part of human life.

The "transcendent" world of Gods, the Heroes, and the mythical Ancestors is accessible because archaic man does not accept the irreversibility of Time... Ritual abolishes profane, chronological Time and recovers the sacred Time of myth. Man becomes contemporary with the exploits that the Gods performed in illo tempore. On the one hand, this revolt against the irreversibility of Time helps man to "construct reality"; on the other it frees him from the weight of dead Time, assures him that he is able to abolish the past, to begin his life anew, and to re-create his World.⁹³

What Eliade has primarily in mind is of course archaic religion. But something of the archaic function of ritual is present in popular practices of higher religions:

In proclaiming the Incarnation, Resurrection, and Ascension of the Word, the Christians were sure that they were not putting forth a new myth. Actually, they were employing the categories of mythical thought... It is clear that for Christians of all creeds the center of religious life is constituted by the drama of Jesus Christ. Although played out in History, this drama first established the possibility of salvation; hence there is only one way to gain salvation -- to reiterate this exemplary drama ritually and to imitate the supreme model revealed by the life and teaching of Jesus. Now, this type of

⁹² Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality tr. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 1 and 5-6.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 139-140.

religious behavior is integral with genuine mythical thought.

It must at once be added that, by the very fact that it is a religion, Christianity had to keep at least one mythical aspect -- liturgical time, that is the periodical recovery of the illud tempus of the "beginnings." "The religious experience of the Christian is based upon an imitation of the Christ as exemplary pattern, upon the liturgical repetition of the life, death, and resurrection of the Lord, and upon the contemporaneity of the Christian with illud tempus which begins with the Nativity at Bethlehem and ends, provisionally, with the Ascension." Now, as we have seen, "the imitation of a transhuman model, the repetition of an exemplary scenario and the breakaway from the profane time through a moment which opens out into the Great Time, are the essential marks of 'mythical behavior' -- that is, the behavior of the man of the archaic societies, who finds the very source of his existence in the myth."⁹⁴

Shi'ites celebrate the martyrdom of Husein in a variety of ways in the month of Muharram, celebrations that culminate in the two days of Tasu'a and Ashura, the ninth and tenth days of the month. Traditionally the clergy have discouraged some of the popular practices, but without much success. Reza Shah tried to outlaw them, but they were revived after his departure. During the processions the believers beat and flagellate themselves, often drawing blood. Sometimes fighting breaks out between some of the organized groups, or hei'ats, and it was believed that such fighting recreated the fighting at Kerbala and that believers killed during these skirmishes would go straight to Heaven, just as Husein and his followers had done.⁹⁵ The Kerbala myth has also engendered a form of theater, the Ta'ziyeh, whose resemblance to Medieval Christian passion plays has been noted by scholars.⁹⁶ Among Iranian Shi'ites the Kerbala

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 168-169.

⁹⁵ See Kippenberg, "Jeder Tag...", in Greussing, ed., Religion und Politik im Iran, p. 221.

⁹⁶ Enrico Fulchignoni, "Quelques Considérations Comparatives entre les Rituels du Ta'ziyeh Iranien et les "Spectacles de la Passion" du Moy-

myth and the rituals associated with them connected with an older, pre-Islamic myth, the killing of the just hero Siavush.⁹⁷

It is clear that the Muharram rituals fit Eliade's definition of the function of reencatments of myths: In the month of Muharram, particularly in its first decade, believers reenact a "particular kind of human behavior," namely Husein's resistance to unjust government, his unfailing adherence to principles in the face of overwhelming odds. In normal times this does not go beyond ritual processions, but in times of woe concrete problems of the day intrude upon the celebrations as their exemplary character comes to the fore and acquires concrete significance. Here the behavior of believers departs from that observed in archaic religions, the reason being that Husein's drama, just as that of Jesus, was played out in history, not in mythical times, and that Islam, like Judaism and Christianity before it, sets a value on history as a direct manifestation of God in the world.

The believers' awareness of the concrete, topical problems of the day during the rituals adds a second layer of significance to the reencated myth, therefore the distinction between liturgical and profane time, neat in the case of archaic rituals, is no longer absolute: Ritual does not "abolish profane, chronological Time." We call these periodic moments of heightened sensibility, of increased readiness for sacrifice,

en-Age Chrétien en Occident," in Peter Chelkowski, ed., Ta'ziyeh: Ritual and Drama in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1979), pp. 131-136.

⁹⁷ See Ehsan Yarshater, "Ta'ziyeh and Pre-Islamic Mourning Rites in Iran," in Chelkowski, ed., Ta'zieh, pp. 88-95.

struggle, and martyrdom, kairos.⁹⁸

In contradistinction to kairos, we call "chronos" the homogeneous, linear, formal time: Eliade's "profane" time.⁹⁹ Kairoi can exert their influence on a spectrum ranging from more or less spontaneous "combustion" of the masses to their adroit manipulation by religious and/or political leaders. While political leaders may try to use them, religious authorities have higher chances of success.

Kairoi are also at work in the lands of the world's other important religion of lament, Christianity. Easter has often acquired socio-political significance or has been manipulated for political purposes. It is well known that in the Middle Ages anti-Jewish pogroms would often start (more or less) spontaneously out of Easter processions. In our own century one can adduce two examples of the use of Easter by nationalist politicians of Catholic nations seeking emancipation from foreign rule.

⁹⁸ Our use of the word is therefore more specific than in ancient Greek, where it merely meant "the right time," or "good in the category of time," as Aristotle defined it in the Nicomachean Ethics. It is, however, more general than the sense given to it by the protestant theologian Paul Tillich, elaborating on its meaning in the New Testament:

"Kairos," the "fulness of time," according to the New Testament use of the word, describes the moment in which the eternal breaks into the temporal, and the temporal is prepared to receive it. What happened in the one unique kairos, the appearance of Jesus as the Christ, i.e., as the center of history, may happen in a derived form again and again in the process of time, creating centers of lesser importance on which the periodization of history is dependent.

Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, James Luther Adams, tr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. xix.

⁹⁹ For a brief discussion of kairos and chronos see Elliott Jaques, The Form of Time (New York: Crane Russak, 1982), pp. 14-16.

In Holy Week 1911 Patrick Pearse staged a passion play in Dublin in which he adapted the dialogue of the Gospels to an Irish social ethos.¹⁰⁰ Five years later he led a desperate attempt to wrest Irish independence from a British government engaged in war. The declaration Pearse issued on Easter Monday, 1916, concluded:

We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, Whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline, and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.¹⁰¹

The next day Pearse issued another statement, in which he claimed that "Ireland's honor has already been redeemed."¹⁰² The religious overtones of Pearse's choice of words is apparent.

In 1941 Easter furnished a kairos to Croatian separatists, when on April 10 the Ustashi declared that on "this day of the resurrection of the Son of God our Croatian State will also be resurrected."¹⁰³

If we have dwelt at length on these two different ways of experiencing time, it is not only out of an interest in the phenomenology of religious practice: the dichotomy has profound implications for political activity in Iran. It should be clear that kairoi exist only for the

¹⁰⁰ Ruth Dudley Edwards, Patrick Pearse: The Triumph of Failure (London: Victor Gollancz, 1977), p. 140.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 281.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 291.

¹⁰³ Fabijan Trgo, ed., Cetrdeset trva: Ustanak naroda Jugoslavije (Forty-one: The Rebellion of the Peoples of Yugoslavia) (Belgrade: Nlado pokolenge, 1961), pp. 122-123.

traditional segment of society. The re-actualizing of myths by the traditional segment of society is different from the commemoration by the modern segment of such secular events as for instance the Constitutional Revolution.¹⁰⁴ If adroitly manipulated, these kairoi can unleash awesome energies. The Muharram rituals in Iran regularly create and give shape to huge crowds.¹⁰⁵ Gustave Le Bon has attempted to demonstrate that the convictions of crowds have a (quasi)-religious character.¹⁰⁶ Whatever we may think of that assertion, it is clear that religiously inspired crowds in the service of political causes are a powerful weapon.¹⁰⁷ Iran's political elite before the Islamic revolution, whether pro- or anti-Shah, belonged to the modern segment of society, they thus operated exclusively in *chronos*. The politicized crowds of the kairoi were therefore beyond their control, and thus, on the one hand, an important constraint on the actions of more prudent actors, and on the other hand, a welcome ally for those actors inclined to rapid change. It would be interesting to probe Iranian history diachronically, juxtaposing the Islamic calendar with its kairoi and the formal chronology of events as recorded in modern history books; perhaps this would throw new light on some of the crises of which recent Iranian history has so many. In the case-study part of this book we have attempted to establish correspon-

¹⁰⁴ Mircea Eliade, The Myths of the Modern World: The Encounter between Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Realities, Philip Mairet, tr. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 31.

¹⁰⁵ See Canetti, Crowds, pp. 143-154.

¹⁰⁶ Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 72-78.

¹⁰⁷ For a stimulating discussion of this process see Daryush Shayegan, Qu'est-ce qu'une révolution religieuse? (Paris: Les presses d'aujourd'hui, 1982), pp. 231-238.

dences between kairois and chronos for two important contemporary episodes: the religious riots of 1963 and the Islamic revolution of 1978.¹⁰⁸

1.3.3 The Widening Gap between the Two Segments

Naturally the two segments of society did not live in total isolation one from the other, and there was some dynamic interaction between them. Proportionally the modern segment grew constantly at the expense of the traditional one. As a result of a rising oil-income the modern sector of the economy and the state bureaucracy grew in the 1960's and 1970's, and had privileged access to the fruits of economic growth. The two segments grew more and more apart -- even geographically:

The emergence of urban dualism -- of a complete sociological division within the urban population -- is a product of this period: formerly, the old residential quarters had included families of all ranks... This ensured social contact between different classes: the rich were in daily contact with the ordinary, the poor and even the beggars. But all this began to change when new wealth led, in the case of Teheran, to an entirely unplanned movement towards the northern parts of the city, into new houses the building of which was facilitated by the state's free grants of urban land to army officers and the higher civil servants... The sense of community which, in spite of class differentiation, had always been present in Iranian cities was lost -- perhaps for ever.¹⁰⁹

The contradictions within the modern segment of Iranian society were such that the regime of the Shah did not have its wholehearted support, but the ruling circles of the regime were all recruited in the modern

¹⁰⁸ See chapter 6, section 5, and chapter 8, sections 3 and 4.

¹⁰⁹ Katouzian, Political Economy, p. 208. See also Martin Seger, Teheran: Eine stadtgeographische Studie (Vienna and New York: Springer Verlag, 1978), pp. 204-211, for an interesting conceptualization of urban development under dualistic conditions.

segment. As long as traditional Iranians were not politically articulate, the main opposition to the Shah came from the modern segments, and until 1963 the Shah's most important opponents were the Nationalists of the National Front and the communist Tudeh. Among traditional Iranians the Shah's authority was still largely perceived as legitimate, whatever shortcomings there were being blamed on those who surround him.

With the rapid improvement of education and the move of many millions of peasants to the cities, the discrepancy between traditional belief and actual fact became more and more glaring. These newly articulate city-dwellers could not be socialized into modernity by the leading forces of the political opposition against the Shah; because on the one hand this opposition was not allowed to function, and on the other, its members had nothing tangible to offer to the masses. The Nationalists' main demand was always that the Shah "reign and not rule," and that is quite an abstract concept, as already Bagehot noted.¹¹⁰ Unlike Victorian England, therefore, where the monarchy was accepted on traditional grounds by the masses and on pragmatic grounds by the politically more articulate elites and thus became the "dignified" part of government, in Iran the monarchy became illegitimate among many members of the elite because its failure to conform to modern notions of government by law, and among the traditional segment of society because of its more and more visible disregard for the very traditions in which it was supposed to be grounded. For both segments its legitimacy was tainted because of its close association with foreign powers.

¹¹⁰ Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 241.

For the millions of new city-dwellers, religious activities became the main form of socialization. These religious activities were of a new kind, and it was in their course that Ay. Khomeini's name was often invoked.¹¹¹ It would be a mistake to construe the division of Iranian society into two segments and the total domination of the minoritarian segment over the state as the only source of tension in Iranian society. Although this vertical cleavage was important, it was also the case that the "have's" were found mostly in the modern segment, and the "have-not's" mainly in the traditional segment. It is true that the upper strata of the traditional society benefitted from the oil-boom. But although they fared well materially in the 1960's and 1970's, Bazaar merchants by and large lost the privileged status in society that they had enjoyed in pre-Pahlavi Iran.¹¹²

The enormous enrichment of the modern segment and the ostentatious life-styles affected by its more nouveau-riche strata led to tremendous resentment in the traditional segment.¹¹³ As we have tried to show, this resentment had different motivations, depending on what stratum of traditional society we look at. During the late 1960's and early 1970's the resentment of the traditional segment of society overtook the legal, constitutionalist objections of nationalists, leftists, and liberals, all members of the modern segment, as the main center of opposition against

¹¹¹ For details see chapter 7, section 5.

¹¹² See Ashraf, "The Roots...", pp. 11-18. For a more detailed discussion of the Bazaar, see chapter 4, section 2.

¹¹³ For an elaboration on the notion of resentment see Max Scheler, *Resentment*, edited, with an introduction, by Lewis A. Coser, tr. William W. Holdheim (New York: The Free Press, 1961).

the Shah.

The newly articulate masses turned to religion, at least partly because that was the only avenue open to social organizations. But it was a new type of religion, borne out of resentment. As Max Weber has written:

Resentment is a concomitant of that particular religious ethic of the disprivileged which...teaches that the unequal distribution of mundane goods is caused by the sinfulness and the illegality of the privileged, and that sooner or later God's wrath will overtake them. In this theodicy of the disprivileged, the moralistic quest serves as a device for compensating a conscious or unconscious desire for vengeance. This is connected in its origin with the faith in compensation, since once a religious conception of compensation has arisen, suffering may take on the quality of the religiously meritorious, in view of the belief that it brings in its wake great hopes of future compensation.¹¹⁴

Ay. Khomeini was the cynosure of this new direction, and in this resentment we find the origin of the charismatic legitimacy he enjoys in the eyes of the masses.¹¹⁵ Khomeini's asceticism contrasted favorably with the unrestrained life-styles of the modern segment, whose daily behavior was a constant insult to the masses' sensibilities. In the earlier period, until the early 1960's, the Shah's government had been a xenocracy for many members of the modern segment who did not accept the Pahlavis' claims to traditional authority, and a traditionally legitimate regime in the eyes of the masses. In the mid-1960's this began to change, as the traditional segment increasingly came to regard the regime as a pornocracy. This resentment created a fertile ground for the

¹¹⁴ Max Weber, Economy and Society, p. 494.

¹¹⁵ For an account of how Khomeini's personal characteristics predisposed him for his role as articulator of the masses' resentment see Fischer, "Becoming Mollah," pp. 106-113; and Bruce Mazlish, "The Hidden Khomeini," in New York Magazine, December 24, 1979.

reception of revolutionary ideas, but in itself it does not explain the revolution. There had to be triggers, and these will be discussed in chapter 2.

Rhomeini's role is not unique in world history, as this brief summary of the role of Savonarola in Renaissance Florence shows:

Savonarola...was adviser to those citizens who shared his religious and moral outlook... The friar had criticized the Medici for destroying the traditional liberties of the Florentines; he supported regime which was broadly representative of the community, convinced that a popular (but not a democratic) government would be more stable and more just than one controlled by an oligarchy... many of his most fervent supporters came from the ranks of artisans and shopkeepers... Savonarola's main goal [was] the moral and spiritual regeneration of Florence. (Emphasis added)¹¹⁶

All revolutions contain a strong ascetic element,¹¹⁷ and in the case of Iran this ascetic dimension had a clear religious and class basis, confirming Oscar Wilde's aphorism that "morality is simply the attitude we adopt towards people whom we personally dislike."

This also explains the direction the Iranian revolution has taken, which has puzzled liberals and leftists alike, but has engendered considerable enthusiasm among politically non-dominant Muslims from Yugoslavia to Indonesia. The Islamic revolution in Iran was not only class-based, but also a reversal in the hierarchical order between the two segments of Iranian society.

¹¹⁶ Gene Brucker, Renaissance Florence, (New York: John Wiley & Son, 1969), pp. 269-270. For more detail see Donald Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence: Prophecy and Patriotism in the Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

¹¹⁷ See Bruce Mazlish, The Revolutionary Ascetic: Evolution of a Political Type, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976).

In this chapter I have attempted to define the parameters of the Iranian polity. As an old polity on the periphery of world economic development, its sovereignty has been fragile for over a century. The unresolved crisis of sovereignty affected the traditional structures of legitimacy on which the state was based. During our century Iranian society lost its consensus as to what constitutes legitimate authority. This lack of consensus in Iran's post-traditional society was at the same time a contributor and a consequence of the division of Iranian society into two segments, one traditional, one modern. Together, all these factors contributed to a continuing crisis of participation.

In all these years Iran very rarely experienced a regime which tolerated political opposition. It is to the role of the opposition under these circumstances that we now must turn our attention.

Chapter 2

NATIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS MODERNISM AS OPPOSITION

Ongoing crises of sovereignty affect both a country's political and its religious life. After reviewing the societal responses this issue elicits, we will turn to the problem of their articulation under non-democratic conditions.

2.1 SOCIETAL RESPONSES TO AN UNRESOLVED CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY

We will first examine the political response, Nationalism, then the religious response, religious modernism, and then show the affinities between the two.

2.1.1 Nationalism in the Old Polities of the Developing World

In countries with continuously unresolved crises of sovereignty the constellation of political forces reflects this fundamental uncertainty.¹ Some political figures and parties inevitably become identified with one or another of outside powers, while others strive for complete independence. In those countries of Africa and Asia that gained their independence as a result of decolonization, in most cases political power was transferred to nationalist leaders with an anticolonial past; sovereign-

¹ A European example for this is Ireland, where the party systems of both the North and Eire result from disagreements on the issue of relations with Britain. The extreme case of a party system based on the issue of sovereignty is Puerto Rico, whose three major parties are distinguished by their position on the island's ties to the USA.

ty is therefore not a pressing issue, whatever other problems these countries may face. In Europe, only the countries of the Soviet Bloc face an ongoing sovereignty problem, and there political forces cannot develop freely anyway. If we look at those countries I called "old polities of the developing world," Thailand never faced a prolonged sovereignty crisis, while Turkey and Morocco solved theirs in a manner that satisfied most citizens. In three countries did the sovereignty crisis drag on for long periods of time: China, Egypt, and Iran. Here the cleavage lines that in Europe gave rise to the party systems² were superseded by the issue of sovereignty, and those who stood for the unequivocal establishment of sovereignty became known as 'Nationalists': the Kuomintang in China, the Wafd in Egypt,³ and the more amorphous 'National Movement' in Iran.⁴ The paramouncy of the sovereignty issue means that within the Nationalist movement people of varying, and sometimes opposing, ideologies and outlooks had to work together, which diminished the potential effectiveness of these movements.⁵ This is also true of Iran.

² See Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.

³ See Janice J. Terry, The Wafd, 1919-1952: cornerstone of Egyptian political power (London: Third World Centre for Research and Publication, 1982).

⁴ In Europe the Balkan countries of the inter-war period are the closest parallel to these countries. Venizelos in Greece is a good example of a Nationalist leader who strove to overcome his country's xenocracy.

⁵ The most dramatic example can be found in China, where after the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 the leftists, the rightists, and the communists (who had formed a "bloc within") of the Kuomintang fought bitterly among themselves.

As in all other Third World countries, nobody in Iran can politically afford not to be a nationalist, in the widest sense of the word. The term 'nationalism,' however, covers a wide variety of attitudes, especially when applied to a Third World country.

It may denote the desire of a cultural, linguistic, or religious minority to gain acceptance for its distinctiveness. The empirical referent for this category in the case of Iran is Azerbaijani or Kurdish nationalism.

'Nationalism' may also refer to a certain belief in one's own country's inherent superiority as compared to one's neighbors, an exaltation of more or less mythical past periods of glory, and, often coupled with the above, a desire to assimilate cultural minorities, shameful remnants of foreign domination, into the mainstream culture. Here, the empirical referent in the case of Iran would be Pahlavi nationalism, with its anti-Arab, even anti-Turkish, undercurrents and the new emphasis on Iran's pre-Islamic past. Of course this is not to say that this kind of nationalism was invented by Reza Shah. It pre-existed the installation of the Pahlavis, but it was they who incorporated it into their state-legitimation system.⁶ In this category we can also include the chauvinism of the Pan-Iranists and the 'integral nationalism' of Ahmad Kasravi.⁷ Thus, a common conception of what constitutes Iranian nationhood may lead to diverging political stands.

⁶ See Katouzian, Political Economy, pp. 82-85.

⁷ See chapter 5, footnote 52.

A third, and in view of what was said earlier, most typical acceptance of 'nationalism' concerns what might be called 'anti-imperialism,' namely the widespread desire to free one's country from the bonds of colonialism, or, in case one's country is already independent, foreign domination of the country's political elite, economy, and, in more recent times, culture. This feeling may or may not coincide with the other types of nationalism described.

In Iran this last type of nationalism is identified with the figure of Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 'National Movement' (Nehzat-e Melli) he came to lead. Those sectors of Iranian society that subscribe to this view are usually referred to as 'Nationalists' (Melliyyun).⁸ It can be defined as the political movement that strives to establish Iran's unequivocal sovereignty within and without, which concretely means rule of law within, and political independence coupled with full control over natural resources without.

The origins of the National Movement in Iran go back to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-07. In the years of relative political freedom 1941-1953 it crystallized around the person of Mosaddeq, who led it to a brief triumph as Prime Minister 1951-53. Being a coalition, it was internally heterogeneous.

After 1961 the National Movement also had a strong religious component, led by personalities who had been the vanguard of religious modernism in Iran. Thither we now turn our attention.

⁸ The classic study on the various forms of nationalism in Iran is Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1978, second edition).

2.1.2 Religious Modernism

Religious modernism can be defined as an attempt to reestablish harmony between religion and a changing cultural socio-political environment in which the forces of change regard religion as dysfunctional to the process of development. It is essentially an intellectual endeavor to reinterpret religion so that it will no longer contradict the dominant spirit of the times in the more successful societies, and accepted notions of individual rights. Religious modernism always arises when religion is in a position of (perhaps momentary) weakness, for when religion exercises an intellectual and political hegemony over society, it can define the norms that rule society.

Religious modernism is thus a reactive movement. Typically, it is espoused by individuals who are committed to religion, but are also aware of science and the social problems resulting from technological and economic change. Religious modernists consider the contradiction between religion and science only apparent, and try to prove that true religion is by no means opposed or irrelevant to the modern world, that it need not furnish a justification for the maintenance of the social status quo. In 1829 Lamennais wrote:

Les sciences physiques mêmes, par leur progrès, et en particulier la géologie et la physiologie, ne cessent de mettre de nouvelles armes entre les mains des défenseurs de la Religion, pour combattre les hypothèses anti-mosaïques et le matérialisme.⁹

⁹ Felicité de La Mennais, Des progrès de la révolution et de la guerre contre l'Eglise (Paris, 1829), p. 279. For his views on freedom see his essay "De l'absolutisme et la liberté," in Felicité de Lamennais, De l'absolutisme et de la liberté et autres essais (Paris: Ramsey, 1978).

Religious modernists are not content to accept a fundamental dichotomy between faith and reason; within the multiple constraints under which they operate, they still try to achieve intellectual coherence. This is done by emphasizing the rational and this-worldly aspects of religious traditions and by denouncing popular, "irrational," practices as accretions that are not consubstantial with religion. The modernity with which modernists want to reconcile their religion is of course modernity as interpreted by them, through the filters of their religious beliefs. That explains why, as far as the content of their thought is concerned, we find great variety among religious modernists. Therefore religious modernism can perhaps best be defined as an attitude, rather than as a body of inter-connected principles and beliefs. In Theodor Geiger's terms, modernism is a "mentality" rather than an ideology.¹⁰

Modernism may overlap with religious reformism, but it should not be confounded with it. Modernism is the province of people who are close to the religious establishment but outside it, and its motivating force comes from outside. Reformism, by contrast, is an attitude encountered more often among the members of the religious hierarchies, and it is motivated by internal processes of the religion. Its goals are to return to the original meaning of the dominant norms and values, to do away with corruption, and to strengthen the discipline of the religious hierarchy.

¹⁰ As defined in his Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1932), pp. 77-82.

Of course modernism is not the only way to confront modernity. While religious modernism tries to come to terms with modernity, another path consists in rejecting it. Arnold Toynbee called the two reactions "Herodian" and "Zealot," defining the former as "[acting] on the principle that the most effective way to guard against the danger of the unknown is to master its secret," and the latter as "[taking] refuge from the unknown in the familiar."¹¹ For the purpose of this book I call the second attitude 'fundamentalist' or 'traditionalist.'¹²

Religious modernists then face the potential hostility both of non-religious intellectuals and of the religious authorities themselves. The non-religious intellectuals are suspicious of the modernists' ulterior motives, sometimes upholding their positivism with more fanaticism than that of which they accuse the religious intellectuals. On a more sophisticated level they accuse the religious modernists of misunderstanding both modernity and religion, and hence of intellectual incoherence. To the extent that these critics accept a role of religion in the modern world that goes beyond ethical generalities, it is often an individual, private mode of religious experience. To the extent that they admit the intrinsic validity of any religious experience, it is often a mystic one.

¹¹ Arnold Toynbee, "Islam, the West, and the Future," in Civilization on Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 193 and 188.

¹² There is no scholarly agreement whether the radical Islamic movement should be termed 'fundamentalist' or 'traditionalist.' I call 'fundamentalist' those groups that self-consciously give themselves an ideology deriving from Islam that negates the validity of much Islamic history, and reserve the term 'traditionalist' for those groups that ideologize tradition by deriving normative values from past experience. The former are often founded and led by lay believers, whereas the latter are often created by members of the ulema.

The religious authorities, on the other hand, resent the implied criticism levelled against them for not keeping up with the times, and as guardians of a corpus of orthodoxy criticize the intellectuals for their selective use of religious tenets and sources. At the worst, religious modernists are accused of being instrumentalists who want to make use of religion for non-religious purposes.

There is a major difference between religious modernism in the Western and non-Western worlds. In Western Christianity modernism was a reaction to internal developments. Perhaps for this reason the temptation for a "Zealot" reaction was smaller: it was unfeasible to close the doors to modernity, and it was less easy to depict modernity as a foreign aberration. In the colonial and semicolonial world, on the other hand, technology, science, and ideas of representative government and individual rights came from the outside, often accompanied by Christian missionaries who had the backing of imperial powers.

Within the non-Western world, the preconditions for a successful reformulation and "updating" of religion vary greatly. Modernists face bigger obstacles in Islam,¹³ a religion of ethical prophecy, than in Buddhism,¹⁴ which is based on exemplary prophecy:

it is precisely because Islam legislates on matters social, familial, and jural that reformers feel the need to blast it away when it opposes their remedies, whereas it is precisely because Buddhism is imprecise and scarcely legislates on mat-

¹³ The fundamental work on Islamic modernism is H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (New York: Octagon Books, 1972). See also Islāh, in The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), pp. 141-171.

¹⁴ On Theravada Buddhist modernism the best work is Heinz Bechert, Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in der Ländern des Theravada Buddhismus, vol. 1, (Frankfurt: Alfred Metzner, 1966), pp. 37-195.

ters of social ethics that it can act as an umbrella of political identity at the widest level without fear of creating internal cleavages among the believers.¹⁵

The unambiguous statements and concrete formulations of the sacred texts mean that Islamic modernists can do little substantive intellectual work. They can try to awaken the believers and urge them to adopt a this-worldly outlook; but when it comes to giving content to their action, most of their work consists in affirming that Islam is not opposed to the modern age, and urging the ulema to do some rethinking. Thus many Sunni modernists have rediscovered the principle of ijtihad and have been demanding its application,¹⁶ while Shi'ite modernists point to it as proof that Islam already possesses the necessary instruments for adaptation.

The defensive response character of religious modernism is thus more pronounced in the non-Western world. Religious modernism thus has an affinity both with Nationalism and with fundamentalism, and so long as foreign domination is still present, the three forces usually cooperate. This defensive nature means that religious modernism can easily assume an "'anti' character." Juan Linz has enumerated the 'anti' dimensions of fascism,¹⁷ many of these are of course also present as motivations in religious modernism. The first generation of religious modernists in the Islamic world believed in political democracy, perhaps because they

¹⁵ Tambiah, "The Persistence," p. 59.

¹⁶ Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 74-76, 82-101.

¹⁷ Juan J. Linz, "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," in Walter Laqueur, ed., Fascism: A Reader's Guide (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 15-17.

were operating under non-democratic conditions, and because in the Western countries to be emulated progress and democracy had gone hand in hand. In later generations this commitment to democracy weakened, largely because other models became available: communism for Islamic socialists, and zionism for a new kind of fundamentalists. The 'anti' dimension as motivation became an 'anti' dimension of content.

Another difference between the European setting and the non-European setting is that in Europe far wider sectors of the population were affected by modernity and had assimilated it, a result of the fact that, by and large, modernization was a societal process rather than a policy carried out by elites. The Church thus had to save what could be saved: while the Syllabus of 1864 still condemned the principles underlying contemporary conceptions of democracy, freedom of speech and the press, and the separation of Church and State that the Church saw incompatible with its rule, the election of Leo XIII to the papacy in 1878 allowed the Thomistic element to become dominant in Catholic thinking, a factor that ultimately allowed the emergence of Christian Democracy and the reconciliation of the Church with the modern world.¹⁸

¹⁸ See Pierre Letamendia, *La démocratie chrétienne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), pp. 11-33. It is interesting to point out that while in the Western tradition political thinking contained simultaneously (and in tension with each other) both Platonic and Aristotelian elements, as exemplified by St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas (cf. Apter, *Introduction*, pp. 72-74), theoretical political thinking in the Islamic world was much more dominated by the heritage of Plato. So much so that in anthologies of Arabic translations of Aristotle, Plato's *Republic* was inserted in the place of the *Politics*. Cf. *Aristutalis, in Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1913), p. 433. This may explain to some degree why in Islam's confrontation with modernity monistic forces seem to outweigh pluralist elements.

Islamic modernism displays a certain paradox in Iran. The man usually considered the founder of Islamic modernism, Seyyed Jamaleddin Asadabadi (Al-Afghani) was an Iranian, but he did his best to hide his origins¹⁹ and had a more lasting impact on Egypt and the Ottoman Empire than on the country of his birth.²⁰ From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century the Shi'ite hierocracy were the most politically active ulema in the Islamic world,²¹ the independence of the hierocracy from the state enabling them to play that role (vide supra). However, with few exceptions it would be wrong to call the ulema who were active in the Constitutional Movement 'modernists': They were above all concerned with establishing the rule of law, of Islamic law, not with harmonizing Islam and the prevailing spirit of the times. Modernist tendencies, as defined earlier, appeared relatively late among Iranian Muslims, probably because, compared to India and the Arab Middle East, the foreign impact was less dramatic in Iran. Also, religious modernists in Iran have tended to be of lay background. In a country and religion where the religious establishment plays a quasi-clerical role and has a monopoly on the definition of religious truths, this fact has limited their effectiveness. Let us not forget that in Egypt a Muhammad Abduh became Grand Mufti and head of the al-Azhar establishment; he thus had the means and the authority to apply at least some of his ideas. In Iran, by contrast, even the clerical members of the modernist movement

¹⁹ Probably so that his Shi'ite background would not affect his effectiveness in the Sunni world.

²⁰ For references see chapter 3, section 1.

²¹ For that they were admired even by Sunni modernists who were doctrinally critical of Shi'ism: Cf. Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, p. 77.

were regarded with considerable suspicion by the ulema. In response the modernists became quite anti-clericalist, some of them going so far as wistfully to evoke the Reformation. The existence of a powerful clergy in Iran also explains why the most important modernist movement of the nineteenth century, Babism, when faced with the hostility of the ulema, came to reject certain fundamental tenets of Islam and became in effect first a reformist movement and then evolved into a separate religion, the Bahai Faith.

The most important representatives of Shi'ite modernism in Iran are H.S. Mahmud Taleqani (1912-1979), Eng. Mehdi Bazargan (born in 1907), and Ay. S. Morteza Motahhari (d. 1979).²² Their first activities consisted in the founding of associations for Muslims, a pattern congruent with religious modernists elsewhere.²³ Only in 1961 did Bazargan and Taleqani found the Liberation Movement of Iran, a party with an ideology and program explicitly based on Islam.²⁴

2.1.3 Nationalism and Religious Modernism

From what has been said, it is clear that in the old polities of the non-Western world Nationalism and religious modernism share many affinities. Both strive to make the country and its culture an equal among equals: the one in the political sphere, the second in the spiritual sphere. Religious modernists typically perceive themselves as providing

²² For an overview see William G. Millward, "Aspects of Modernism in Shi'a Islam," in Studia Islamica, 1973, pp. 111-128.

²³ Cf. Gibb, Modern Trends, p. 55, and Bechert, Buddhismus, pp. 47-58.

²⁴ Since this movement is the object of our detailed study in Parts Two and Three we give only the briefest outline here.

a spiritual dimension to Nationalism, especially in countries whose religion constitutes the basis of national identity.

In Sri Lanka the target of this fusion of religious modernism and Nationalism after independence was achieved was the anglicized elite as represented by the UNP; the ideas championed by religious modernism were then skilfully championed by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who integrated them into a basically democratic political system, albeit at the price of antagonizing the Tamil minority. In Thailand religious modernism and Nationalism worked harmoniously and were not in opposition to the State, a circumstance that explains their relative conservatism. The King's traditional position as protector of the Sangha allowed him to modernize the religious establishment and the State concomitantly. One should also remember that the target of Thai nationalism was not only foreign domination of the country but also the Chinese minority within it. As for religious modernism, since the State did not pursue aggressively secularizing policies, it directed its thrust mostly inward and towards peripheral regions hitherto less penetrated by Buddhism.²⁵

In Iran, it is perhaps precisely because of the separation between Church and State that the modernizing elites of the early twentieth century chose the path of secularization, unlike for instance Thailand or Japan. In Egypt modernizers worked together with Abduh, and from the outset modernization included the modernization of the religious establishment. When religious modernism first appeared on the Iranian scene in the early 1940's, it was a reaction against forces that were believed

²⁵ Tambiah, "The Persistence," pp. 62-65 and 69-74.

to be subverting Iranian youth: Communism and Bahaism. Muslim intellectuals felt that they had to provide young Iranians with a vision of "true" Islam, so that they would no longer respond favorably to the lure of Communism and Bahaism. Iranian communists were of course identified with the Soviet Union, while Bahais, although adherents of a faith that had grown from Iranian soil, were presented successively as Russian, British, American, and lastly Israeli ("Zionist") agents.²⁶ The 'anti' dimension of Iranian Nationalism and religious modernism also extended to Freemasonry, which was seen as an English force. Given the elite character and secrecy of Iranian Masonry, the struggle against them was, however, devoid of any ideological content.

The religious modernists were thus confronting ideologically the real or imagined local representatives of powers against which all Nationalists were striving: Communism, Bahaism, Freemasonry, Zionism. Linz's observation that the 'anti' dimensions of fascism can best be understood as anti-international and anti-cosmopolitan²⁷ also applies to Iranian Nationalism and religious modernism. These movements were seen as elements of the ongoing crisis of sovereignty that characterized the Iranian polity. To the extent that they carried out their activities discreetly and benefitted from official toleration (Masonry, Bahaism), they became the target of conspiracy-theorizing, which, as we noted in chapter one, was an outcome of the peculiar forms the crisis of sovereignty took in Iran.

²⁶ For an brief discussion of the historical roots of these accusations see Firuz Kazemzadeh, "The terror facing the Bahais," in The New York Review of Books, May 13, 1982, pp. 43-44.

²⁷ Linz, "Some Notes," p. 16.

Politically, however, the religious modernists were late-comers to the Iranian scene. It was the coup of 1953 that triggered their entry into Iranian politics as they founded the underground National Resistance Movement. By that time Iran already had parties identifying with communism, socialism, fascism, racial nationalism, and liberalism. The communists were excluded from the National Movement on account of their close ties with the Soviet Union, but the National Movement did comprise socialists, liberals, conservatives, and extreme nationalists. The LMI became a new component of this coalition.

Earlier on we noted that religious modernists, and to some extent also Nationalists, were characterized by a certain 'anti' dimension. Perhaps what kept them from degenerating immediately into forms and styles of political action akin to fascism was the fact that they were also reacting against a regime that was itself non-democratic, and whose founder, Reza Shah, had been to some extent influenced by fascist models. Moreover, most of the leaders had been educated in the France of the Third Republic, a fact which also accounts for the absence of an anti-parliamentary and anti-liberal component in the 'anti' dimension. The original 'anti' dimension did, however, contribute to the weakening of the commitment to democracy in the anti-Pahlavi opposition.

Nationalism in Iran enjoyed a brief period of ascendancy in 1951-53, and religious modernists formed a government for a few months in 1979. Other than that, both forces have always been in opposition to whatever order existed.

2.2 NATIONALISTS AND RELIGIOUS MODERNISTS AS OPPOSITION

Before we show the Iranian Nationalists' and religious modernists' interaction with the various non-democratic regimes in Iran, we need to raise a few theoretical questions about the role of oppositions in non-democratic regimes.

2.2.1 Oppositions in Authoritarian Settings

For obvious reasons, oppositions in non-democratic systems have received little attention. Non-democratic regimes vary in their degree of repression, and often oppositional tendencies in monistic systems manifest themselves inside the regime.²⁸ Few such systems allow structured oppositional movements to emerge, and it is therefore understandable that most studies of oppositions in non-democratic polities center on functional, or interest-based oppositions, rather than would-be opposition parties.²⁹ In authoritarian regimes with limited pluralism, there may also appear "semi-oppositions," which Linz defines as "those groups that are not dominant or represented in the governing group but that are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the system."³⁰ Such truly oppositional movements as try to maintain a societal presence in the face of oppression get relatively little attention, unless they espouse ideologies that are dramatic enough to capture the attention of social scientists: communist, fascist, and more recently

²⁸ For a classification see Juan J. Linz, "Opposition in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Robert Dahl, ed., Regimes and Oppositions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 184-199.

²⁹ See for instance the articles by Barghoorn, Skilling and Foltz in the Dahl volume quoted above.

³⁰ Linz, "Opposition," p. 191.

fundamentalist religious movements come to mind. Moreover, most of these opposition movements become active only in periods of transition, when an authoritarian system is in a period of internal reformulation or even breakdown.

Existing studies of oppositions in non-democratic systems also tend to concentrate on explicitly non-democratic systems, systems that make no claim to be democratic (in the Western sense of the word). In countries that have a constitutionally anchored one-party system, oppositions are likely to emerge either within the party or from interest groups.

Not all authoritarian systems are institutionalized to such a degree. Many of these systems are closely allied to the West, and in the wake of fascism's decisive defeat in World War II the Western, pluralistic model is the only legitimate one for emulation. Hence the proliferation of dictatorships that at regular intervals organize "elections" at which pseudo-oppositions take part and regularly lose. Central America, Paraguay, South Korea, the Philippines under Marcos, and Iran are examples of such systems. These tend to be post-traditional systems in which the traditional forms of government were overthrown in the name of democratic principles, but where these democratic principles did not take hold. In many cases such regimes also display strong sultanistic tendencies. The existence of pseudo-oppositions reflects a degree of cynical manipulation by the government of the whole political process which lessens the likelihood of the appearance of any semi-opposition. We can affirm that the stronger sultanistic tendencies are, the less likely is there going to be a semi-opposition.

The problematique of oppositions in non-democratic systems leads logically to the question of democratization. This means that we have to address the fundamental distinction between democratic and non-democratic oppositions to non-democratic systems. Given that the opposition to non-democratic regimes needs the goodwill of world public opinion, most oppositions to non-democratic regimes base their public appeal on their promise to reestablish democracy if they succeed in overthrowing the existing regime. Even political movements which orient themselves ideologically on established non-democratic regimes (e.g. pro-Soviet communist parties) tend publicly to advocate the installation of democracy. In fact we find, however, that the breakdown of non-democratic regimes leads more often than not to the establishment of another non-democratic regime rather than to a transition to democracy.

Any group claiming to fight for democracy against an authoritarian or totalitarian regime can count on a considerable reservoir of goodwill and sympathy from outside observers who, in borderline cases, are often willing to give them the benefit of the doubt: not to do so would be tantamount to supporting the existing regime. How then is one to ascertain whether a certain opposition movement's claims to be democratic are sincere?

One obvious way which is unfortunately overlooked very often by social scientists is to read the programmatic statements and ideological writings of the movements one studies. The contents of such texts should be accorded at least as much importance as pronouncements made for the consumption of foreign correspondents. Closely related to this

is the question of foreign models. If the programmatic and ideological texts, even newsletters or leaflets, praise non-democratic regimes and reserve their criticism for established democracies, it stands to reason that the group's commitment to democracy is not very deep.

Another method is to study the internal workings and decision making processes of the movements. Presumably, if the leaders practice democracy and toleration in their dealings with each other, they are more likely to opt for democracy once they come to power. As Lenin convincingly argued, however, the objective conditions under which the oppositional movement has to operate may not allow inner-party democracy to be practiced.³¹

Yet another indicator of opposition movements' commitment to democracy consists in their attitudes towards each other. If they spend more time criticizing and slandering each other than working and cooperating for the overthrow of the non-democratic regime, the prospects for democracy would seem to be bleak. Such internecine disputes often center around the issue of representativity, as various groups claim to speak for "the people" and deny that others might do so too. The trouble is that there is no unequivocal indicator for the representativeness of any one group. Any group can claim to be the most popular one, since there are neither elections nor polls. Perhaps there is no clear answer to this problem, and outside observers may indeed have to rely on intuition, "gut-feeling," and above all a good knowledge and understanding of the way the studied society works.

³¹ V.I. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done," in Collected Works, vol. 5, pp. 459-460.

Matters are further complicated by exile politics. They often receive a lot of attention abroad but have only a limited audience at home. Moreover, the leadership of the opposition in exile often ends up at odds with the internal leadership. Frequently the external leadership ages while there is generational renewal inside the country. In Iran, however, because of the considerable numbers of students abroad, the leadership of the external opposition has tended to be younger.³²

As we noted earlier, opposition movements to non-democratic regimes tend to become prominent in times of crisis, when the non-democratic regime is not able to maintain its repressive rule, or when the price for doing so is perceived as being too high. It is then that a non-democratic regime faces a crisis of participation.

2.2.2 Crises of Participation in Non-Democratic Polities

Crises of participation have different effects on politics depending on whether they occur in a developing society in which a growing number of people are becoming politically articulate, or in more or less institutionalized non-democratic regimes. The first case is that of the countries of Western Europe, where recurring crises of participation accompanied the emergence of constitutional and later liberal governments, resulted in an ever widening suffrage, and ultimately led to the emergence of modern democracy. In the second case the situation is more explosive, especially if the society has little previous experience with democracy. The idea of "rule by the people" is sufficiently rooted nowadays that oppositional forces in non-democratic systems will never ask

³² See chapter 7, section 2.

for a simple extension of the demos. Individuals may be co-opted into a ruling group, but if they have any followers, these are unlikely to follow. Crises of participation in non-democratic systems are therefore the borderline case of Robert Dahl's model of democratization: a massive increase in the demand for participation without previous increase in contestation.³³ The longer a non-democratic regime has been in power, and the more distant the memory of democracy is, the less likely it becomes that a crisis of participation will result in a democratization. Mass-mobilization by the opposition is a mixed blessing for the cause of democracy: on the one hand a non-democratic regime is unlikely to relinquish its authoritarian methods of governance if there is no mass-mobilization,³⁴ but on the other hand too much mass-mobilization by the opposition may result in either bloody repression or a total victory of the opposition that diminishes the chances for the introduction of democratic procedures. When "people" have voted with their feet, there is no overwhelming incentive to make citizens vote with their heads. The breakdown of a non-democratic regime is only likely to lead to democratization if the regime change is transacted by "transfer of power" rather than "seizure of power."³⁵

³³ See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 7.

³⁴ Except in the case of "commissary dictatorships" that have been established to save a country from disintegration.

³⁵ My translation of Rainer Lepsius' machtübergabe and machtübernahme, as used in his "Zur Strategie des Regimewechsels," in Hans Albert, ed., Sozialtheorie und soziale Praxis. Eduard Baumgarten zum 70. Geburtstag (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1971), pp. 156-173.

There can be no democratization without liberalization, but it is in the nature of liberalization that it will be looked upon with suspicion by the opposition. At this point we should define the two terms: Following Alfred Stepan we define "liberalization" as "a mix of policy and social changes such as less censorship of the media, somewhat greater room for the organization of autonomous working class activities, the reintroduction of some legal safeguards for individuals such as habeas corpus, the releasing of most political prisoners, the return of political exiles, possibly measures for improving the distribution of income and most importantly, the toleration of political opposition." "Democratization," goes beyond liberalization and is a more specifically political concept: It "requires open contestation for the right to win control of the government and this in turn requires free elections, the result of which determines who governs."³⁶

The problem of democratization is particularly thorny in regimes that maintain a façade parliamentarism. Established one-party systems can open up politically by allowing one or more opposition parties to take part in real elections. That was the path chosen by Turkey in 1948,³⁷ Senegal in 1976,³⁸ and, at least to some extent, Egypt in 1984.³⁹ In

³⁶ Alfred Stepan, "Authoritarianism and Redemocratization," (Unpublished typescript, Yale University, n.d.) pp. 4-5.

³⁷ Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transformation to a Multiparty System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

³⁸ Seydou Madani Sy, "La démocratie multipartisane au Sénégal à la lumière de la révision constitutionnelle de 1976," in Annales Africaines, 1976, pp. 9-24.

³⁹ Thomas Koszinowski, "Der Demokratisierungsprozess in Ägypten: Die Politik Mubarak im Lichte der Parlamentswahlen vom Mai 1984," in Orient, 3, 1984, pp. 335-360.

Spain, while the single party of the Franco era was dissolved, the transition to democracy was carried out in an orderly fashion that allowed politicians associated with the previous non-democratic regime to participate in the competitive politics of the new democracy.⁴⁰ In all these cases there was no crisis of sovereignty involved, and whatever the opposition thought of the previous political establishment, it did not accuse it of treason. In terms of Alfred Stepan's classification of paths to redemocratization, there was "transformation led by the authoritarian regime."⁴¹ Regimes that maintain parliamentary institutions as window-dressing, presumably to assuage the guilty conscience of their outside allies, are in a more difficult position. Sometimes the party-system can during a liberalization acquire a life of its own and become the embryo of a real multi-party system. Brazil in the late 1970s and early 1980s is a case in point. But where these pseudo-parliamentary regimes display strong sultanistic tendencies (pre-revolutionary Iran and Nicaragua, the Philippines, Paraguay), the very existence of these "party-systems" makes democratization more difficult. Opposition leaders may accept a liberalization offered by the regime which later turns out to have been insincere, resulting in a loss of face that prevents them from going along with a later liberalization that is sincere. "Free elections" are no longer a clear break with the authoritarian past, as the government that holds the elections will claim that elections have always been free, while any group that loses in these

⁴⁰ See Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, Spain: dictatorship to democracy (London and Boston: G. Allen & Unwin, 1981).

⁴¹ Alfred Stepan, "Paths Towards Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," (Unpublished typescript, Yale University, 1982), pp. 13-16.

elections will maintain that they have been as farcical as previous ones. Also, the opposition might allege that the entire State apparatus is too corrupt to be able to oversee free elections. The close interwovenness between ruling clique, government, and State bode ill for democratization.⁴²

This manipulation of democratic institutions and procedures by the authoritarian regime (often in the form of holding referendums⁴³) allows the non-democratic opposition to equate the democratic opposition with the pseudo-opposition and thus gnaw away on its credibility. In response the democratic opposition has to become more and more radical or become irrelevant. This is particularly important if the crisis of participation is accompanied by mass-mobilization: the non-democratic opposition is almost by its very nature more apt at bringing out the people into the streets than its democratic counterpart. Even if the democratic leadership radicalizes its positions as the crisis drags on, it tends to lose the initiative and merely follow events. All of this lessens the likelihood of a democratization.

⁴² The incompetence and corruption of the State apparatus can be revealed on the occasion of natural catastrophes: it may be just a coincidence, but it is worth pointing out that both the Iranian crises of 1963 and 1978 and the Nicaraguan revolution were preceded by earthquakes in which the human casualties were counted in thousands. In all three cases the opposition used the events to lay bare the regimes' inability and disinclination to come to the help of the victims.

⁴³ These are a favorite of these kinds of regimes, perhaps because the results are more easy to falsify. Iran has had four referendums, of which one was organized by Mosaddeq, one by the Shah, and two under Khomeini. All were plebiscites to legitimize the existing rule, and in none did the opposition have a real opportunity to campaign. For the function of referendums in Third World countries, including Iran, see Alvaro Marques and Thomas B. Smith, "Referendums in the Third World," in Electoral Studies 3 (1984), pp. 85-105.

Pressure for liberalization often comes from outside and is often the direct result of policy changes in outside powers which have a certain leverage on the smaller country. This is also true of the Soviet Union's relations with its satellites, as the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956, which came after Khrushchev's secret speech, illustrate. If the pressured non-democratic regime has a popular base, it is likely to use the external pressure for shoring up its legitimacy by arousing its followers' patriotism. The foreign pressure also means that those oppositional elements that try to take advantage of it by lessening the outside power's commitment to the non-democratic regime are liable to lose some of their legitimacy by associating too closely with outsiders.

2.2.3 The Dynamics of Regime Change in Iran

Given the extent of foreign meddling in Iranian affairs, the links between crises of sovereignty, of legitimacy, and of participation are very close. The usual pattern is that political pressure from without delegitimizes the existing regime or allows doubts about the regime's legitimacy to be aired openly. This is the liberalization phase. As a result of this oppositional forces are moved to become active, challenging the regime to prove its legitimacy by allowing free elections: where the regime wanted to weather the storm by granting a liberalization, the opposition outside the regime demands a full democratization. The semi-opposition might have gone along with a liberalization, but the intransigence of the opposition limits the scope of its actions.

In 1941 the Allies invaded Iran. Reza Shah left his country and political life opened up, creating a system often called "incomplete de-

mocracy." In terms of Alfred Stepan's classification the process came close to an "externally monitored installation."⁴⁴ During this period of open politics the National Movement under the charismatic leadership of Mosaddeq came into being. The National Movement's ascendancy over Iran was cut short by the coup of 1953, which established the Shah's personal rule. The coup of 1953 put an end to the open political activity of Nationalists and communists, but provoked others to enter the political arena. The National Resistance Movement was an attempt to carry on the struggle of Nationalism when the new political situation did not allow the established parties of the National Front to be active. In the NRM religious modernists played a dominant role; it is therefore fair to say that the political activism of the religious modernists was a direct outcome of the 1953 crisis of sovereignty.⁴⁵

In 1960 the new Democratic administration of president Kennedy pressured the Shah to be more responsive to societal discontent. This provided an opportunity for the semi-opposition to raise its head. By definition the semi-opposition was more acceptable to the United States than the Nationalist opposition, and the result was the reformist administration of Dr. Amini. The liberalization of 1960 also allowed the Nationalists to resurface. Partly because of the Shah's unwillingness to share power, and partly because the general climate of suspicion reigning in Iran,⁴⁶ the Amini experiment failed, and with it the liberalization. In January 1963 the entire leadership of the National Movement

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 11.

⁴⁵ This stage is analyzed in chapter 5, section 3.

⁴⁶ As analyzed in chapter 1, section 1.

once again went to prison. This liberalization thus ended abruptly and the Shah regime reconsolidated itself.

Every reaffirmation of absolutist rule and consequent neutralization of the opposition results in the emergence of more radical opposition forces which, at least implicitly, put some of the blame for the opposition's lack of success on the shoulders of previous, more moderate leaders: a phenomenon not unlike Duverger's notion of sinistrisme, inadequately translated as Leftism.⁴⁷ In 1953 the coup and jailing of the National Front leadership had resulted in the birth of the more radical NRM. Ten years later, the failure of the Nationalists, both of the National Front and of the LMI, to wrest a democratization from the Shah, brought Ayatollah Khomeini to the foreground of politics. The reconsolidation of the Pahlavi regime thus twice resulted in a radicalization of the opposition. The second time it meant a radical reformulation of the opposition's demands, as new social strata were mobilized by the opposition.⁴⁸ True to its principles, the moderate opposition, both secular and religious, demanded above all the establishment of the rule of law, and during both liberalizations it tried as far as possible to operate legally and use existing laws. These were rejected by the new radical opposition in 1978-79.

The years 1963-1977 are characterized by an increase in sultanistic characteristics of the regime, facilitated by the enormous oil-income

⁴⁷ Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, tr. by Barbara and Robert North (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 235.

⁴⁸ For details see chapter 5.

the Shah had at his disposal.⁴⁹ At the outset of this period the Shah tried to create a new power-base for himself by relying on young, presumably progressive, technocrats. The assassination of the Prime Minister who embodied this policy, Hasan-Ali Mansur in 1965 put an end to this and heralded increased sultanism. The evolution of the rule of the Shah here parallels that of his father, who in the first phase of his rule had enjoyed the support of Iran's progressive forces, but increasingly dispensed with them after the assassination in 1933 of Abdolhosein Teimurtash, the energetic Minister of the Court.⁵⁰

Up to 1974 Iran was nominally a two-party system, with the Iran-Novin (New Iran) Party as "government party" and the Mardom (People's) Party as "opposition."⁵¹ In terms of our scheme, the Mardom was a pseudo-opposition. We have to look very hard to find any evidence for a semi-opposition in that period. The closest case was the ultranationalist Pan-Iranist party, whose existence allowed the Shah to depict his ethno-nationalism as moderate. When in 1974 the leader of the Mardom Party began playing the role of an opposition leader and stepped up his attacks on the Prime Minister, whom he accused of not carrying out the Shah's policies forcefully enough, he was first demoted from the party leadership and then died when his jeep collided with a cow. A few years

⁴⁹ Homa Katouzian has called this regime "petrolic despotism." Political Economy, pp. 234-274.

⁵⁰ Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 118-165.

⁵¹ On this period see A.-H. Banisadr, A. Ghazanfarpour, S. Ghazanfarpour, and P. Vieille, "Les élections et leurs fonctions en Iran," in Revue française de science politique, 27 (1), February 1977, pp. 34-63.

earlier, in 1971, the leadership of the Pan-Iranist Party had been jailed for opposing the Iranian government's assent to the independence of Bahrein.

These very limited outbursts of activity by the pseudo- and the semi-opposition may have been a factor in the Shah's sudden announcement in 1974 that Iran would have a single party, membership in which was obligatory. Like King Carol of Romania before him, he called it the "Resurgence Party," Rastakhiz. As Huntington has pointed out, a single party only fulfills a purpose if membership in it is selective and offers rewards to the members.⁵² This was not the case with the Resurgence Party, and the nature of the Shah regime was not seriously affected by it. The Shah's early announcements that membership in the party would be compulsory were not followed up, although for a while the prospect of such a membership drive created a lot of resentment on the part of those citizens who had wished to stay out of politics. Moreover, the lure of the Western two-party model was still so strong that the Rastakhiz Party was almost immediately divided in two wings, a "constructive" and a "progressive." There is, however, little evidence for any emulation between the two, and the only grouping that might qualify as semi-opposition in the remaining years of the Shah regime was the "Association for the Study of the Problems of Iran," led by Hushang Nahavandi, a former rector of Teheran University and later private secretary to Empress Farah.

⁵² Samuel Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in S.P. Huntington and C.H. Moore, Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

In 1977 the Carter administration put some pressure on the Shah, this time in the name of human rights. The liberalization with which the Shah responded was greeted with more scepticism than the previous attempt in 1960, and for reasons that are likely to be discussed for a long time hence, led to a revolutionary overthrow of his regime. A "transfer of power" was prevented in extremis and instead a provisional government was established by "seizure of power."⁵³

This provisional government consisted of Nationalists and religious modernists. In the face of attacks from religious fundamentalists and leftists the government disintegrated. First the Nationalists left, then, in the wake of the hostage crisis, the religious modernists. The "rule of the moderates," to use Brinton's terminology, was over.⁵⁴

The elements that came to power and created the Islamic government of Iran are internally too heterogeneous to form a monolithic regime. This regime is dominated by the "Islamic Republican Party" (IRP), but there are semi-oppositions, groups identified with more or less government interference in economic life, more or less land reform, to name but two examples. The Nationalists were excluded from any political activity by 1981, whereas the LMI has tried to play the role of a loyal opposition.⁵⁵

⁵³ See chapter 8.

⁵⁴ Crane Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 121-147.

⁵⁵ See chapter 10.

Linz has shown how in such countries as Belgium and the Netherlands the existence of strong Christian parties made it more difficult for fascist parties to gain great popularity.⁵⁶ Had the LMI been allowed to represent religious sensibilities on the Iranian political scene, chances are that the fundamentalists would not have gained such vast a following. The comparison with Shi'ite politics in Lebanon is instructive here: in that country's open, and recently chaotic, political system, the Amal movement, which ideologically is very close to the LMI,⁵⁷ occupied the space of Shi'ite activism on the political scene. Consequently Shi'ite fundamentalists, backed by the revolutionary Iranian regime, find it more difficult to gain a monopoly over Shi'ite political activism. Since the LMI was not allowed under Iran's authoritarian regime to occupy this space effectively, the struggle between modernists and fundamentalists, or between Herodians and Zealots, has so far been much more unequal than in Lebanon.

In this chapter I have described the characteristics of Nationalism and religious modernism in Iran, explained why the two forces have been in opposition to successive regimes, and analyzed the conditions under which that opposition has had to operate. Nationalism and religious modernism come together in the Liberation Movement of Iran, whose founders and "animators," as the French would say, were both supporters of Mosaddeq and pioneers of religious modernism in Iran. We now must turn our attention to the intellectual content of this synthesis, to the

⁵⁶ Linz, "Some notes," p. 85.

⁵⁷ See chapter 7, section 2 for the links between Amal and the LMI.

ideology of the LMI.

Chapter 3

SHI'ITE MODERNISM: THE INTELLECTUAL CONTENT

It is not easy to give a coherent account of the LMI's ideology. The background of that ideology is Islamic modernism in its Iranian, Shi'ite variety, yet not all Shi'ite modernists have been members or sympathizers of the LMI. Since this study's focus is that party, it excludes the intellectual contributions of such important figures as Ay. S. Morteza Motahhari (d. 1979) and Abolhasan Banisadr (b. 1933).¹

Another difficulty lies in the occasional discrepancies between what LMI figures have written qua religious activists, and what they have said qua politicians representing a political force in the political arena. The former pronouncements belong to the corpus of religious modernism, whereas the latter constitute the LMI's ideology strictu sensu. We will try to differentiate between the two. Given our primary interest in politics rather than religious life, our discussion of religious modernism will concentrate on those ideas that have a direct bearing on politics.

The final difficulty concerns the problematic place of Ali Shariati within the LMI. His heritage is claimed by many political groupings in Iran, therefore his inclusion in a study of the LMI may be questioned.

¹ For a summary of Banisadr's thought see Yann Richard's section in Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 202-230.

The fact is that his years of greatest intellectual output fell into the period in which no political parties were allowed to function in Iran, and he died before they reappeared on the scene. The links between Shariati and the LMI seem to me to be important enough to include him in this study.² What is certain is that he came out of the tradition created by Bazargan and Taleqani, although his ideas then developed along lines that diverged considerably from those of his predecessors. Rather than attempt an artificial synthesis, I have opted to concentrate on the thought of Bazargan and Taleqani, while analyzing some of Shariati's modifications of the modernist canon. This deemphasis of Shariati is further justified for two reasons: the greater relevance of Bazargan and Taleqani for the LMI, and the considerable secondary literature that has already been devoted to Shariati.

Given the above mentioned constraints, we will proceed as follows: After studying the intellectual ancestry of the ideology, we will examine some of the major political aspects of Shi'ite modernism. After that, we will turn our attention to the "ideologization" of that tradition, as personified by Shariati. Some critical remarks about the rhetoric of modernism will conclude this chapter.

² In chapter 7, section 1, this is justified in greater detail.

3.1 PRECURSORS AND SOURCES OF INSPIRATION

One of the distinguishing traits of religious modernists is that they are eclectic in what they incorporate into their thinking. Analyzing the origins of their ideas, I propose three main elements: immediate precursors in Iran, Western thinkers, and general principles that are applied to the reinterpretation and reformulation of Islam.

To Jorge Luis Borges we owe the insight that writers create their own precursors.³ The same is true for ideologues: The intellectual lineages that come together in the work of one thinker do not necessarily cohere with each other. In this section we will attempt to untangle the skein of ideas, intellectual movements, sources of inspiration, and influences that have come together to produce the thought, and beyond that, the distinct forma mentis of the LMI's major producers of ideology. Our task is complicated considerably by the differences between Bazargan, Taleqani, and Shariati.

3.1.1 Precursors

The historical antecedents for the LMI in Iran have to be sought in the action of the constitutionalist clergy in the early years of our century. After the Iranian revolution of 1906-07 had resulted in the election of a parliament, secular liberals came to dominate the assembly at the expense of the clergy, whose mobilizing capacity had been a crucial factor in the success of the revolutionary movement.

³ See his essay "Kafka and his Precursors," in Other Inquisitions (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1965), pp. 106-108.

As a result of the liberals' domination a split occurred in the ranks of the ulema. An important faction, led by Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, parted ways with the Constitutionalists and henceforth agitated against it, declaring the Constitution to be incompatible with Islam.⁴ Another faction, however, was ready to compromise with the Liberals. For them, Article 2 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law, providing for a number of ulema to be members of the Majles so as to oversee legislation, was sufficient to insure the Islamic character of Iran's post-revolutionary political system. The most prominent leaders of this section were S. Mohammad Tabataba'i, S. Abdollah Behbahani, and Ay. Mirza Mohammad-Hosein Na'ini. Only the last left a coherent exposition of his ideas.

3.1.1.1 Ay. Mirza Mohammad-Hosein Na'ini (1860-1936)

Na'ini was one of the major mujtahids of the early twentieth century. He lived in Najaf, Iraq, until 1920, when he was expelled by the British and came to Qum. Na'ini called his treatise on constitutionalism Tanbih ul-ummah wa tanzih ul-millah, or "The Admonition of the Community and the Refinement of the Nation." This book was a systematic refutation of Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri's theses and in due course became very popular among Muslim liberals.⁵ Na'ini was above all concerned with bringing

⁴ On Nuri's opposition to reform see Abdul-Hadi Hairi, "Shaykh Fazl Allah Nuri's Refutation of the Idea of Constitutionalism," in Middle Eastern Studies, 13 (October 1977), pp. 327-339; and Said Amir Arjomand, "The Ulama's Traditionalist Opposition to Parliamentarism 1907-1909," in Middle Eastern Studies, 17 (April 1981), pp. 174-190.

⁵ On Na'ini and his book see: Abdul-Hadi Hairi, Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977). An English translation of the book's central thesis can be found in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 287-291.

about an end to the despotism of the Qajar shahs. He was heavily inspired by S. Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi, who in turn had directly borrowed his arguments from Vittorio Alfieri,⁶ an admirer of Montesquieu and the author of Della Tirannide.⁷

It appears that Na'ini, like most other constitutionalist ulema, was confused as to the meaning and implications of Western-style parliamentarism. While he wanted total ulema control over the judiciary and legislative branches of government and would not admit complete equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, positions not compatible with our modern notions of democracy, he nevertheless argued that a constitutional government with an elected assembly was preferable to a despotic regime. According to Na'ini a despotic regime usurped the legitimate rights of God, the Imam, and the people, whereas a constitutional regime usurped only the rights of the Imam, who, being in transtemporal occultation, cannot exercise his rightful dominion anyway.⁸ And with the ulema's control over the judiciary and legislative branches even the Imam's rights would not be usurped, since the ulema represent him.

⁶ Hairi, Shi'ism and Constitutionalism, pp. 160-164. For the link between al-Kawakibi and Alfieri see Sylvia Haim, "Alfieri and Al-Kawakibi," in Oriente Moderno, 34 (1954), pp. 321-334.

⁷ Of Tyranny, tr. Julius A. Molinaro and Beatrice Corrigan, (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1961).

⁸ Mirza Mohammad-Hosein Na'ini, Tanbih ul-ummah wa tanzih ul-millah (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-ye Enteshar, n.d.), p. 47. Even for Na'ini constitutional government was therefore the lesser of two evils, which allows Khomeini, an admirer of Nuri's, to invoke him too.

Na'ini soon became disappointed with the course of events in Iran and, faced with the continued hostility of large sectors of the ulema, decided to withdraw his book. It nevertheless remained popular, and in 1955 a new edition appeared for the first time in over thirty years, edited, annotated, and with an introduction by Ay. Taleqani. As the Shah's personal dictatorship took shape after the 1953 coup, and given the support that his regime enjoyed among the ulema, this book very naturally became a major source of inspiration for religiously oriented Nationalists. In the defense Bazargan submitted to the military court that tried him in 1963, he made frequent use of Na'ini's arguments,⁹ and after the clerical take-over in 1981 LMI figures would again turn to the text and quote passages condemning religious despotism. These same passages were also quoted by Shariati in his attacks on the clergy.¹⁰

3.1.1.2 S. Jamaleddin Asadabadi, "al-Afghani" (1838-1897)

The second major source of inspiration for religiously oriented Nationalism in Iran is Seyyed Jamaleddin Asadabadi, known in the West as Al-Afghani.¹¹ Al-Afghani cannot be called an outspoken advocate of Western constitutionalism, but his influence resides in that he was an advocate

⁹ Mehdi Bazargan, Modafe'at dar dadgah-e gheir-e saleh-e tajdid-e nazar-e nezami (Defenses in the Illegitimate Military Court of Appeal) (n.p.: Entesharat-e Modarres, 1971), pp. 294-96, 305.

¹⁰ See for instance his Fatemeh Fatemeh ast (Fatima is Fatima) (Teheran: Shabdiz, 1977), p. 29.

¹¹ On Al-Afghani see Nikki Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: The Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal-al-Din "al-Afghani" (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, 1983); Nikki R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": a political biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Homa Pakdaman, Djamal-ed-Din Assad Abadi, dit Afghani (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1969).

of Muslim peoples' rising up to the challenge of the West and putting their own house in order so as to eliminate the sources of weakness that made them easy targets for Western imperialism. He is celebrated throughout the Islamic world for having provided the initial impetus for reform and modernization. On the whole his impact on Iran was less important than that on Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, but towards the end of his life he decisively influenced the course of events in Iran by giving one of his followers the green light to assassinate Nasereddin Shah, in 1896.

New studies have shown that Afghani was not a religious person by orthodox standards, but this fact is overlooked by (or unknown to) most Islamic modernists (including Bazargan and Shariati), who have accepted the mystifications that surround his person.¹²

3.1.1.3 S. Hasan Modarres (1858-1938)

If Na'ini and al-Afghani influenced contemporary religious modernism in Iran on an intellectual level (the first by providing content, the second by giving the initial impetus), Modarres provided an exemplary model for religiously inspired political action.¹³ As a young cleric he had been a leading constitutionalist activist during the revolution of 1906 in his native Isfahan, and went on to become a member of a clerical tri-

¹² On this mystification see Elie Kedourie, Afghani and 'Abduh (London: Frank Cass, 1966).

¹³ On Modarres' life see Ebrahim Khajehnuri, Bazigaran-e asr-e tala'i: Seyyed Hasan-e Modarres (Actors of the Golden Age: Seyyed Hasan Modarres) (Teheran: Javidan, 1979). Interesting information can also be gleaned from Mohammad-Ebrahim Bastani Parizi, Talash-e azadi (The Struggle for Freedom) (Teheran: Novin, 1977), *passim*.

umvirate that drafted the compromise article 35 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law which got around the sticky issue of sovereignty by stipulating that it was a "divine gift entrusted by the people to the Shah."¹⁴

After the ulema had more or less withdrawn from politics in the 'teens of this century, Modarres remained a member of the Majles: A skilful parliamentarian, he maneuvered to stop anybody from acquiring too much power. As a parliamentarian he had also helped drafting Iran's first civil code by ensuring that it conformed to the Shari'a, which made it acceptable to a reluctant clergy. This compromise code was later abolished by Reza Shah in 1927.¹⁵

Modarres also constantly opposed foreign intervention in Iranian affairs. During World War I he became a member of the pro-Central Powers, Nationalist provisional government that fled Teheran before advancing Russian troops, and after the war his house become one of the main meeting places for opponents of the 1919 treaty.¹⁶ All this brought him the cordial hatred of the Western diplomats stationed in Teheran, who were weary of his influence on the populace.¹⁷

¹⁴ Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1980), p. 26.

¹⁵ Bastani Parizi, Talash, pp. 507-508.

¹⁶ Cf. chapter 1, section 1.

¹⁷ For interesting details see Ahmad Mahrads, Iran unter der Herrschaft Reza Shahs (Frankfurt a/M.: Campus, 1977), pp. 48-51.

In domestic politics, he successively opposed Reza Khan's nomination as Prime Minister, the abolition of the monarchy, and Reza Khan's accession to the throne. His opposition to Reza Shah finally cost him his life, as the new Shah had him first arrested in 1929, then assassinated in 1938.

Modarres was a religious person who took political action in defense of Iran and Islam. He wrote:

Our religion is the same as our politics, and our politics is the same as our religion...The source of our politics is our religion.¹⁸

Modarres' life thus adumbrates the very raison d'être of the LMI.

There are of course other Iranians whose words, thoughts, and actions have contributed to the elaboration of the LMI's intellectual baggage, but it is fair to assume that the three mentioned above are the most important. My choice was recently confirmed by reports that it is their pictures, together with that of Shariati, that adorn the walls of LMI headquarters in Teheran.

3.1.2 External Influences

The exogenous influences on Islamic modernism deserve more attention than they have received so far. In recent times fundamentalists have accused Bazargan of being more or less a gharbzadeh ("West-struck") in Islamic disguise,¹⁹ and Shariati was widely accused by orthodox circles

¹⁸ Quoted in Abolhasan Banisadr, Vaz'iyat-e Iran va naqsh-e Modarres (Iran's Situation and the Role of Modarres) (Paris: Entesharat-e Modarres, 1977), pp. 124-125.

¹⁹ On this concept and its fortunes in Iran see chapter 6, section 4.

of wanting to instrumentalize Islam.

Bazargan, and even Taleqani, view the West with far more serenity than does the generation of Iranians that followed them. Bazargan likes to point out that in the early years of Islam the Arabs borrowed freely from the Persians and Byzantines those aspects of the latter's cultures that were not incompatible with their new religion, as a result of which Islamic civilization flourished. Bazargan has written both on what he considers positive features of the West²⁰ and those aspects which he deems negative.²¹ Taleqani, for his part, pointed out that "one cannot deny that constitutional government first reached Islamic lands from abroad."²² Shariati, finally, liked to point to the difference between the West that westernized Iranians imitated, which was not the true one, and the West that valued intellectual inquiry and moral righteousness, and that was worth emulating.²³

While studying in France in the 1930's, Bazargan had been surprised to see that religion was very much alive in that advanced country, and he came into contact with Catholic circles in Paris.²⁴ It is perhaps here that he became acquainted with the thought of a French intellectual whose traces can be found throughout the work of Bazargan and even Shariati: Alexis Carrel.

²⁰ See his Modafe'at, pp. 42-66.

²¹ See for instance Mazhab dar Orupa (Religion in Europe), third edition, ed. and notes by M. Khosroshahi, (Teheran, n.d.).

²² See his introduction to Na'ini, Tanbih, p. 4.

²³ See for instance Fatemeh, pp. 55-58.

²⁴ For details see chapter 5, section 1.

3.1.2.1 Alexis Carrel (1873-1944)

Born into a provincial, Catholic, upper-class family in Lyons, Carrel became a prominent intellectual of the interwar years.²⁵ He combined a highly distinguished career as a surgeon and scientist (in 1912 he won the Nobel Prize in Medicine for his work on the suturing of blood vessels and transplantation of organs) with an active interest in spiritual and religious matters and phenomena. From 1906 to 1939 he worked intermittently for the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in New York City, where he was given his own laboratory and engaged in highly original and pioneering research on blood vessels, organ transplants, and the culture of organs. For a while he closely collaborated with Charles Lindbergh, who constructed an artificial heart pump for him.²⁶

In 1933 Carrel wrote his best known book, L'Homme, cet inconnu, which became a tremendous publishing success and was translated into nineteen languages.²⁷ This book contained a good summary of the state of knowledge of human physiology and medicine as it existed in the mid-1930's. It was also a plea for scientists to devote more attention to the study of the human mind. Carrel had witnessed miraculous healings on his annual pilgrimages to Lourdes,²⁸ and he endeavored to inte-

²⁵ Biographical information on Carrel is taken from W. Sterling Edwards and Peter D. Edwards, Alexis Carrel: Visionary Surgeon (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1974).

²⁶ For a contemporary account of their collaboration and a critical review of Carrel's most famous book, see Time Magazine, July 1st, 1935, pp. 41-42, and September 16, 1935, pp. 40-43.

²⁷ An English translation came out soon after the original: Man The Unknown (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935).

²⁸ For details, see Edwards and Edwards, Alexis Carrel, pp. 57 and 105.

grate his findings into a general picture of man. However, his relations with the Catholic Church were quite problematic. He had a generally low opinion of the clergy, and his endorsement of eugenics was condemned by the Church. Like so many intellectuals in the interwar period he viewed certain aspects of fascism and Nazism quite favorably.

The appeal of Man The Unknown to Islamic apologists is not difficult to understand. Here was a well-known, widely respected scientist who upheld his religious faith defiantly, criticized the materialism of the West, and devoted much time to achieving a synthesis between the natural sciences and religious beliefs. At a time when Middle Eastern governments were pushing for secularization in the name of progress, Carrel was living proof that the progress of civilization was not incompatible with belief in phenomena that science could not yet explain but that were congruent with religious beliefs. In addition, the book contained views with which a Muslim could easily agree: Carrel's views on women and sex were conservative even by the standards of his own time, and he believed in the preeminent role of an intellectual elite that would have to lead the rest of society.²⁹

After Man The Unknown, Carrel wrote a series of articles for Reader's Digest, including one that eventually became an opusculum on the human need for and the efficiency of prayer.³⁰ In 1939, upon his retirement, he left New York for France, where he seems to have collaborated with

²⁹ For a summary of the book and a glimpse of contemporary reactions to it, see *ibid.*, pp. 97-103.

³⁰ Alexis Carrel, Prayer, tr. Dulcie de Ste. Croix Wright (New York: Morehouse-Gorham Co., 1949).

Vichy and even the Germans. He died in 1944, before he could stand trial.

Bazargan quotes Carrel often in his writings, and Shariati started his career as a publicist in 1948, when, at the early age of fifteen, he translated Carrel's Prayer into Persian.³¹ In a later book, he mentioned Carrel first in a list of "star intellectuals" of the twentieth century.³²

3.1.2.2 Pierre Lecomte de Noüy (1883-1947)

Scion of an artistically inclined family of minor aristocracy, Pierre Lecomte de Noüy was born in 1883 in Paris.³³ He started his adult life as a playboy, actor, and playwright. In 1915, as an officer in the French Army, he met Alexis Carrel, who was also serving in his country's armed forces. Through Carrel he became interested in biology, and in 1917 he found a mathematical expression of the process of healing of wounds, the first time mathematics had been successfully applied to a biological problem. Lecomte de Noüy collaborated closely with Carrel, especially from 1920 to 1927, when he was an Associate Member of the

³¹ A. Shariati, Niayesh (Mashad, 1948).

³² The others on the list are Frantz Fanon, Omar Mowlud, Albert Einstein, Max Planck, Kateb Yasin, Omar Ozgan, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Josué de Castro, René Guénon, and Chandel. Ali Shariati, Man and Islam, tr. Fatollah Marjani, (Houston: Free Islamic Literature, Inc., 1981), p. 80. The fact that as confirmed an "occidental-centric" as Carrel and a militantly anti-Western "Third-Worldist" such as Fanon head the list, illustrates the wisdom of Borges' insight on precursors.

³³ The only account of his life is due to the somewhat hagiographic pen of his wife, Marie Lecomte de Noüy The Road to "Human Destiny": A Life of Pierre Lecomte de Noüy (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955).

Rockefeller Institute in New York City. He fell out with Carrel over the latter's positive attitude to Vichy, and escaped to the United States in 1942, where he died in 1947.

Lecomte de Noüy's major contribution to religious apologetic literature is his book Human Destiny.³⁴ Grossly simplified, his thesis runs as follows: The second law of thermodynamics states that inanimate matter tends towards entropy. Scientific evidence shows, however, that this law does not apply to organic matter. Besides, the evolution of living beings shows that they have constantly moved towards more complicated and higher states, rather than in the direction of entropy. The highest form so far reached is the human brain. Chance alone cannot explain its apparition at the end of the long process of evolution, therefore evolution must have been willed and directed towards a goal. This is Lecomte de Noüy's theory of "telefinalism." The logical consequences of this are, first, the philosophical necessity of man's complete liberty, and second,

the necessity of revivifying religion by a return to its source, to the fundamental principles of Christianity and of fighting against the superstitions which creep into the doctrine and menace its future. It is certain that the additions to the Christian religion, and the human interpretations which started in the third century, together with the disregard for scientific truths, supplied the strongest arguments to the materialists and atheists in their fight against religion.³⁵

Substituting "Islam" for "Christianity," this could be the summary of any Islamic modernist's agenda. References to Lecomte de Noüy abound in the writings of Bazargan.

³⁴ (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947).

³⁵ Ibid., p. 238. For a summary of "telefinalism" and its consequences, see pp. 223-245.

3.1.2.3 Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931)

One of the most influential thinkers of the first half of the twentieth century, author of books analyzing the behavior of crowds and the internal dynamics of revolutions, Le Bon is famous throughout the Islamic world for having made many favorable statements about Islamic peoples. His book La Civilisation des Arabes ³⁶ praises the genius of the Arabs, compares their tolerance favorably with Christian intolerance as practiced by the crusaders, calls the Reconquista the end of civilization in Spain, and contrasts the non-Western, non-Arab peoples' easy adoption of Islam with their impenetrability to Western culture. The book was translated into Persian in 1934, but significantly its title was changed to "The History of Islam and the Arabs."³⁷ It was disseminated widely, and read even in the religious seminaries of Qum.³⁸

The prominence of such writers as Carrel and Le Bon has two reasons. On the one hand it is in the very nature of a thought grounded in a cultural synthesis that it should take recourse to a wide variety of sources, and on the other hand Islamic modernists living in Iran share certain limitations that affect intellectuals in most peripheral countries. There are no good libraries, many books are not available, some are not available in languages that the local intellectuals can read, and above

³⁶ (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1884), recently reprinted in Algeria (Algiers: SNED, 1969).

³⁷ Tarikh-e islam va arab, tr. Fakhr Da'i, (Teheran: 1934).

³⁸ Ho. Jalal Ganjeh'i, who studied there in the 1960's, told me that the tollab at the howzeh read three foreign books before the 1970's: Le Bon's book Islamic Civilization, Will Durant's The Story of Civilization, and the inevitable Man The Unknown by Carrel. Personal interview, Nanterre, July 1985.

all hangs the constant threat of official censorship. This explains the sudden fame of certain texts that would be considered quite secondary in their home countries (e.g. Carrel), but that, having been translated into Persian, become central to intellectual arguments and are mined for suitable quotes. Herein lies the somewhat provincial flavor of much modernist apologetic literature, whose arguments sometimes bear an uncanny resemblance to what one might imagine the discussions of Catholic circles in a Third Republic sous-préfecture to have been like.

3.1.3 Interpretative Principles

As we saw in the previous chapter, modernism came to Iran later than to other Islamic countries. By the time Bazargan, Taleqani, and Motahhari started their work, the basic parameters of Islamic modernism had already been established elsewhere. The principles applied to their reinterpretation of Islam by the Iranians are thus not original in the wider Islamic context.³⁹ Two stand out: The return to the Qoran, and a preoccupation with Science.

3.1.3.1 Return to the Sources of the Faith

Like their Sunni colleagues before them, Sh'ite modernists have tried, in their writings, to prove that "true" Islam was deformed by the accretions of later times (although less so than Christianity and Judaism), and that one therefore had to return to the sources of the religion to find its pristine qualities. These sources are the traditions of the Prophet or hadith, the book Nahj ul-Balaghah, which Shi'ites attribute

³⁹ See "Islah," in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, especially pp. 145-147.

to Imam Ali, and above all else, the Qoran itself.

The exegesis of the Qoran (tafsir) had fallen in neglect among the orthodox Shi'ite ulema in the nineteenth century: although individual ulema practiced it, it was no longer an obligatory subject matter in the religious schools, where feqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, clearly dominated the curriculum. In the 1920's Ay. Aqa Mirza Khalil Kamareh'i revived tafsir at the newly reconstituted howzeh-ye elmiyeh (center for religious learning) in Qum. When S. Mahmud Taleqani studied there, Ay. Kamareh'i became one of his favorite teachers.⁴⁰ After Taleqani founded his Islamic Center,⁴¹ a large part of its activities consisted in interpreting the Qoran in contemporary language. Bazargan, who was an early friend of Taleqani's, was thus introduced to the technique of tafsir.

When one surveys Bazargan's writings chronologically, one notices that Qoranic quotations become ever more frequent, possibly a reflection of Bazargan's personal growth as an Islamicist.⁴² Unlike Shariati, Bazargan's knowledge of Islam seems to be respected by the clergy. In the late 1960's and early 1970's he was invited to lecture at Ay. Shariatmadari's Dar ot-Tabliq in Qum, and after his resignation as Premier of the Provisional Government he was still allowed to give a few lessons of Qoranic exegesis on Iranian television.

⁴⁰ Bahram Afrasiabi and Sa'id Dehqan, Taleqani va tarikh (Taleqani and History) (Teheran: Entesharat-e Nilufar, 1981), p. 29.

⁴¹ For details see chapter 5, section 2.

⁴² This technique is on occasion carried quite far. After the disgrace of the Tudeh party, the LMI in 1983 published an article entitled "The Tudeh from the Point of View of the Qoran"!

Taleqani has written a multi-volume interpretation of the Qoran that enjoys great popularity among lay Muslim activists, but does not meet with much respect from the ulema, who deem it intellectually inferior to the contemporary twenty volume work of Allamah Tabataba'i.⁴³

3.1.3.2 Science

As early as the 1870's Muslim apologists tried to prove that the absence of a scientific spirit of inquiry was a recent phenomenon, that the West had acquired its science from the Muslims, and that, if modern Muslims learned science afresh from the West, they would be recovering their own past and fulfil the neglected commandments of Islam.⁴⁴

In 1883 Ernest Renan had given a lecture on Islam and Science at the Sorbonne, in which he had attributed the backwardness of Muslims solely to their religion. This drew a reply from Al-Afghani, who was residing in Paris at the time. Although the latter actually agreed with Renan, and even went further by suggesting that all religions stifle the spirit of scientific inquiry, Muslim modernists in general believe that Al-Afghani defended Islam against Renan's accusations.⁴⁵ It seems as if Muslim modernists, at least in Iran, had never ceased trying to prove Renan wrong.

⁴³ On the latter see chapter 6, footnote 94.

⁴⁴ Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 50-51.

⁴⁵ For details on this exchange and on the mystifications to which it gave rise, see E. Kedourie, Afghani and Abduh, pp. 41-46.

Bazargan, as a French trained engineer, was in a particularly favorable position to set out proving that Islamic precepts are grounded in science, which is the twentieth century variety of what all religious rationalists, from Avicenna and St. Thomas of Aquinas to our own day, have tried to do, namely to prove the oneness of reason and religion.⁴⁶ In his essay on religion in Europe, Bazargan wrote that in the West religion had not come to terms with science, as a result of which Christians emphasized faith, whereas Islam always talked about knowledge.⁴⁷ One of his first articles upon his return to Iran was entitled The Thermodynamics of Love, and it is not far fetched to assume that it derived either from Carrel's suggestion that "as much importance should be given to feelings as to thermodynamics,"⁴⁸ or from Lecomte de Noüy's generous use of the second law of thermodynamics.

The two aspects, return to the sources and Science, come together in Bazargan's book Seir-e Tahavvol-e Tadriji-ye Qor'an (The Gradual Evolution of the Qoran), in which he attempts to prove the revelatory nature of the book by analyzing its contents with the help of analogies drawn from the natural sciences.

Having elucidated the major sources of Bazargan's and Taleqani's thought, let us now turn to some of the substantive ideas in their variety of Shi'ite modernism.

⁴⁶ For details on Bazargan's endeavors, see chapter 5, section 2.

⁴⁷ Mazhab dar Orupa, p. 46.

⁴⁸ A. Carrel, Man The Unknown, p. 279.

3.2 MAJOR THEMES

Among all modernists, Bazargan, being a politician, gave the most detailed attention to political questions. Our discussion of political concepts concentrates on his work, whereas on economic matters we will present the views of both him and Taleqani. We will end by considering the ideology of the LMI as a political party.

3.2.1 Political Aspects

Bazargan's political thought is liberal, but his liberalism is pragmatic rather than ideological. He favors political pluralism but is opposed to the secularist foundations of classical liberalism. Taleqani's views are more problematic.

3.2.1.1 Iran's and Islam's Position in the World

Given the defensive nature of religious modernism that was explained in chapter 2, it is not surprising that modernists in Iran have devoted considerable attention to the problem of Iran's collective identity. The early modernizers of the late nineteenth century had rediscovered Iran's pre-Islamic past but not repudiated the country's Islamic heritage. Under Reza Shah's rule the Islamic ingredient was definitely deemphasized. Bazargan's conceptions of what constitutes the Iranian identity must be seen in this context: coming from a religious background he could not accept the marginalization of Islam, but growing up under Reza Shah, he internalized many of the topoi of secular nationalism, such as the notion of an "Aryan race."

For Bazargan and for the LMI, Islam is indissolubly linked with Iran, and is the major, albeit not the only ingredient of Iranian identity. Iran's obvious decline is therefore both part of the wider decline of the Islamic world, and due to specific, national, circumstances.

Bazargan analyzes the sources of Islamic countries' relative underdevelopment, and, significantly, comes to the conclusion that this underdevelopment predates the rise of the West, and that the West should therefore not be blamed for everything that is wrong in the Islamic world. The main source of Muslims' plight is that very early in their history religion withdrew from public affairs, pious people concentrating on practicing their religion and leaving the conduct of social and political affairs to those not committed to Islamic values. One result of this divorce was the emergence of a class of religious men totally oblivious to practical concerns.⁴⁹

Iranians are part of the Islamic world, but in addition do have an old history as a separate nation.⁵⁰ Unlike fundamentalists, who tend to be more pan-Islamic and downplay the national differences among Islamic peoples, the modernists admit the distinctiveness of their nation but refuse to draw chauvinistic conclusions from it. Bazargan has written a lot about the factors that explain the present make-up of the Iranian nation and its national character. He gave the most coherent statement

⁴⁹ Bazargan, "The Causes of the Decline and Decadence of Islamic Nations," in The Islamic Review, 23 (6), June 1951, pp. 8-12. In this text, which later appeared in an augmented Persian version as Serr-e aqab-ofstadegi-ye melal-e mosalman, Bazargan's anti-clericalism is quite blunt and foreshadows future elaborations by Ali Shariati.

⁵⁰ See chapter 1, footnote 47.

of these ideas in a supplementary chapter he wrote for the Persian translation of Andre Siegfried's L'Ame des Peuples.⁵¹ To "Latin realism," "French ingenuity," "English tenacity," "German discipline," "Russian mysticism", and "American dynamism," to quote Siegfried's chapter headings, Bazargan added "Iranian adaptability." Bazargan begins by refuting the notion of racial purity so dear to some secular Iranian nationalists, but betrays some ethnic pride when he notes that Iranians are the outcome of mixtures between "peaceful and tolerant Aryans" and "aggressive and violent" peoples such as the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Umayyad and Abbasid Arabs, Mongols, and Tatars. Iranians have never resisted their invaders actively, but rather assimilated them over time, which is why they survived as a nation.

The immense majority of Iranians have always engaged in agriculture, and the Iranian genius has always flowed from the countryside to the culturally sterile cities. Agriculture demands less precision than commerce or artisan activity, and the fruit of man's work is always ultimately dependent on elements over which he has no control. The result of all this is that Iranians are fatalist and indifferent to precision. Persian literature prizes exaggeration at the expense of realism, and

unfortunately we have to admit that neatly ironed trousers, punctual arrival at the work place, finishing one's job or one's talking on time, respect for strict guidelines in the remuneration and promotion of employees, and thousands of other principles and criteria that today are the undisputed necessities of civilized life, all came to our country from Europe.⁵²

⁵¹ (Paris: Hachette, 1950). Translated by Edward Fitzgerald, it became The Character of Peoples (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952) in Britain and Nations Have Souls (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1952) in the United States.

The fact that the inhabitable areas on the Iranian plateau are far apart from each other, has led to extreme individualism, an inability to cooperate on larger projects, and the weakness of a national consciousness among Iranians at the mass level. Bazargan also states that Iranians have a tendency to be hypocritical, making constant professions of piety while "lying and cheating have perhaps been more common in Iran than in any other country."⁵³ In politics, this has meant that Iranians are always prone to use force to implement their goals, and want everything right away, having no patience for careful planning and systematic changes. Towards the end of the book he writes, somewhat prophetically as it turned out: "many of our revolutionaries are equally impatient, and it is obvious that with haste and without careful calculations nothing can be improved."⁵⁴

Bazargan's views of Iran and Iranians are interesting for three reasons. First, they show him to be critical and to look for the roots of Iran's travails inside Iran, which contrasts favorably with so many others who blame outside forces, especially the West, for everything that is wrong. Second, it sets the agenda for his political and social action. And third, it shows him to be a nationalist, in that his analyses center around Iran and aim above all at the improvement of Iran. This combination of religious modernism and moderate nationalism is not peculiar to Iran, as earlier Arab Islamic modernists such as Muhammad Ab-

⁵² Mehdi Bazargan, Sazegari-ye Irani, second edition, (Houston: Book Distribution Center, 1978), p. 30.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 46.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 67.

duh in Egypt and al-Kawakibi in Syria also combined both elements.⁵⁵ In all cases this nationalism is justified by the hadith "hubb al-watan min al-iman," "the love of the motherland is part of religion." Although an ethnic component is not absent from this nationalism, it is above all patriotic in nature.

In the case of Bazargan, his nationalism would lead to disagreements with Khomeini after the revolution, when Bazargan wrote that he had wanted "Islam for Iran," whereas Khomeini had wanted "Iran for Islam."⁵⁶

3.2.1.2 The Need for Political Action

Like other Muslim reformers before him, Bazargan starts from the premise that if Muslims want to improve their lot, they have to take their destiny in their own hands: "God changes not what is in a people until they change what is in it themselves" (13:12).⁵⁷ Having established that Muslims have to act and give up their fatalistic attitude towards the course of events, Bazargan outlines the direction this action must take.

It must be remembered that Bazargan's thought developed under conditions where the State was largely in secular hands. This explains its originally defensive aspects. In an article entitled "The borderline between religion and social affairs," Bazargan writes that as long as

⁵⁵ See Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 156-160 and 271-273.

⁵⁶ He develops the theme in "Iran va eslam" (Iran and Islam), in Bazyabi-ye arzeshha (The Recovery of Values), vol. 2 (Teheran: LMI, 1982).

⁵⁷ This sura is the basic starting point for all Islamic modernists. See Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 121.

the State was not yet developed, as under the Qajars, any pious person could expect to be left alone by the State to practice his religion in exchange for total political abstinence. But with the development of the State in recent times, such a "pact of non-aggression" was no longer possible, for the State now actively interfered with people's lives, making it difficult for them to be good Muslims.⁵⁸

One way to assure a Muslim presence in society is to create associations in which Muslims could come together and further their interests. Here Bazargan admits the influence of his experiences in France.⁵⁹ Hence Bazargan's support for Islamic associations of students, engineers, teachers, etc.

Bazargan also called for less quietism on the part of the ulema. If one remembers that the clergy's attitude to the Shah's government was not altogether hostile in the years 1953-1961, one understands why Bazargan in 1961 urged the ulema to lend their support to the Nationalists and become politically active (a wish he may have come to regret since!).⁶⁰

Ultimately the necessity of a Muslim presence in politics led to the founding of the LMI, as analyzed later.

⁵⁸ Bazargan, Marz-e mian-e din va omur-e ejtema'i (Houston: Book Distribution Center, 1976), pp. 6-7.

⁵⁹ The Modafe'at, pp. 54-58, contain a very Tocquevillean discussion of the beneficial effects of associations on society.

⁶⁰ See A.K.S. Lambton, "A Reconsideration of the Position of the Marja Al-Taqlid and the Religious Institution," in Studia Islamica, 20 (1964), pp. 122-123.

3.2.1.3 Islamic Government

What is this Muslim presence in social and political life to achieve? In other words, what does Bazargan's Islamicized society look like? It is here that the potential for conflict between, on the one hand, the absolute nature of a religion like Islam, which, unlike Christianity, does not a priori separate the temporal from the religious realm, and, on the other hand, the professed liberalism of Bazargan's political views is greatest. Bazargan's solution is that religious affairs and socio-political matters are separate, but that their separation is asymmetrical: While politics must never interfere with religion, religion should inspire and inform all acts social and political.

Religion must not be used by politicians for their partisan aims, nor may the clergy assume that their privileged religious status gives them ipso facto the right to interfere in politics. For Bazargan, the prominence of Islamic jurisprudence (feqh), and consequently the Islamic jurisprudents (foqaha), is a result of the general decadence of Islamic societies that set in soon after the death of the Prophet.⁶¹ As a result of this exclusive preoccupation with feqh other aspects of Islam, especially its ethical injunctions, have been consistently neglected.⁶²

Islam provides general outlines for the governance of society but leaves the details to be worked out by believers according to the needs

⁶¹ M. Bazargan, "The Causes...", pp. 10.

⁶² In his Marz-e mian-e din va omur-e ejtema'i, on pages 17-18, Bazargan, quoting the French orientalist Jules La Beaume, gives a break-up of the suras of the Qoran according to their subjects. Ethics occupy 184 pages, while the Shari'ah gets only 14 pages!

of the times.⁶³ Moreover, the Qoranic injunction to "consult with them upon the conduct of affairs" (3:159), and the principles of "enjoining what is good and preventing what is evil" can be understood as a plea for wide-ranging participation of the citizenry and accountability of the rulers vis-a-vis the ruled.

One can suppose that Bazargan infers from all of this that a parliamentary, democratic system of government in a society where Islamic values and ethics govern people's lives and their social conduct is an Islamic government. This can be interpreted to mean that Bazargan has in mind more an Islamic order than an Islamic State.

3.2.1.4 The Means of Political Action

A liberal attitude in politics, regardless of the contents of one's beliefs or opinions, entails a particular attention to methods and the acceptance of the principle that ends do not justify means. Therefore the question arises as to how Bazargan proposes to achieve his Islamic order. Among the various verses of the Qoran and the body of hadith dealing with the imposition of Islam, Bazargan consistently quotes "There is no compulsion in Religion" (2:256). This verse is repeated over and over.

Since Islamic precepts are for Muslims, any political ideology based on Islam has to come to terms with the fact that there will be citizens who do not order their lives according to that religion, whether they be irreligious persons of Muslim background, "people of the book," athe-

⁶³ M. Bazargan, Marz-e..., p. 29-30.

ists, or adherents of religions not recognized by Islam as divinely inspired. There is no getting around the fact that Islam differentiates between Muslims and non-Muslims, and does not confer the same rights on everybody. This raises the question of how an Islamic liberal proposes to achieve legal equality for all citizens, a condition sine qua non for a functioning parliamentary democracy.

Bazargan, like other modernists, stresses the rationalistic character of Islam. Mere faith is played down as a manifestation of earlier (although in its time fully justified) form of religiosity, which Islam has transcended. God created Man free. Open debate, meaningful only under conditions of free speech, is therefore in the long run the most efficient way to bring about voluntary compliance with Islam. On the topic of the Islamic veil, for instance, Bazargan says: "The chador and scarf which are imposed by force and threats on women's heads are a hundred times worse than going uncovered."⁶⁴

Bazargan in one of his books takes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and argues point by point that Islam goes beyond it. He concludes that when the Prophet declared on the day he took Mecca that "the dearest to God were those who were most virtuous," this transcends all later pleas for equality between nations, the sexes, races, and religions.⁶⁵ To believe that, obviously, one has to indulge to a considerable

⁶⁴ In his funeral oration for Ay. Taleqani at Teheran University, on September 11th, 1980. The text is reprinted in Engineer Abdolali Bazargan, Masa'el va moshkelat-e nakhostin sal-e engelab (The Problems and Difficulties of the First Year of the Revolution) (Teheran: LMI, 1983), p. 334.

⁶⁵ Bazargan, Rah-e teyy shodeh (The Completed Path) (Houston: Book Distribution Center, 1977), pp. 113-117.

extent in eisegesis. Less optimistic writers, such as Hamid Enayat, have shown that Islam is in fact incompatible with certain key assumptions of liberal democracy.⁶⁶ One conceivable solution to this problem would be to declare that liberal democracy, with all that it entails, is only a temporary form of government, which will be superseded by a purely Islamic State as soon as this can be done without coercion. If such a view contains the implicit understanding that the temporary period is quite long, that it takes time to convince people, and if therefore the advent of the Islamic State is tacitly deferred usque ad kalendas Graecas, the incompatibility of Islam with these key assumptions of liberal democracy is of only academic interest.

This discussion may seem pedantic, but it is not. Let us not forget that Islamic liberalism was elaborated under a secular dictatorship, which means that Islam could only benefit from a liberalization of political mores. It requires far more ingenuity theoretically to justify liberalism under conditions where Islam's triumph in Iran seems complete. In the years since his resignation as Prime Minister, Bazargan has taken up this challenge. He spells out his fundamental differences with the current leadership of the Islamic Republic in a series of articles, most of them based on lectures, that have been collected and published under the title "The Recovery of Values".⁶⁷ In the introduction he observes that the Islamic Republic was more demanding towards its citizens than God had been with the prophets, or the prophets with their

⁶⁶ Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 125-139.

⁶⁷ Bazyabi-ye arzeshha (Teheran, 1983).

communities.⁶⁸ After adducing ample evidence from the Qoran, he concludes that "Freedom is a divine gift that God has bestowed on Man, his vicar. Whoever takes away freedom commits the greatest treachery against Man."⁶⁹ In another article, Bazargan writes that those verses of the Qoran which command violence against infidels, concentrated in the sura of "Repentance" and constantly invoked by the leadership of Iran, apply only to those infidels who have broken their peace agreements with Muslims.⁷⁰ He admits that in Islam apostasy is punishable by death, but observes that apostasy is very hard to prove and applies only to those who deny the oneness of God, not to those who merely contest principles such as Prayers and Fasting.⁷¹ Finally, in his most recent work, he interprets medieval Christianity and the Inquisition in light of the first sura of the Qoran, and by implication condemns the methods used by the Iranian regime to impose religion.⁷²

Taleqani did not address the problem of the ideal political system explicitly. In his major work, Ownership in Islam (vide infra), references abound to an "Islamic ruler." The powers Taleqani ascribes to him far exceed those of a democratic chief executive. Later in his life, perhaps under the influence of his leftist children, Taleqani increas-

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 13.

⁶⁹ Din va azadi (Religion and Freedom), in Ibid., pp. 68-69.

⁷⁰ "Iran va eslam," pp. 143-144. He might have added that this sura is the only one in the Qoran which does not start with "In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate," which for many underscores its exceptional character.

⁷¹ Din va azadi, p. 78.

⁷² Gomrahan (The Misled) (Teheran, 1983).

ingly stressed "rule of the people," which he wanted to enshrine in a vast network of "councils." Towards the end of his life, he told foreign reporters:

From an Islamic point of view Western democracy is not government by the people, nor does it benefit the people. What is Western has a colonialist face. It rules over the whole people and deceives them with its false propaganda. The colonialist governments that have dragged people through blood and debased them derive from the same democracy. Moreover, I see clearly that the prostitution and loose morals that prevail in the West, especially America, will destroy them before long."⁷³

Taleqani clearly opposed one man rule, both political and religious. He also favored popular participation. But from his writings it is impossible to infer that his ideal political system was a liberal democracy.

3.2.2 Economic Aspects

Maxime Rodinson has shown that historically Islam has not evolved a particular economic system, and that "the precepts of Islam have not seriously hindered the capitalist orientation taken by the Muslims world during the last hundred years, and nothing in them is really opposed to a socialist orientation."⁷⁴ This, of course, need not discourage a Shi'ite modernist, as for him the true precepts of Islam have never been applied in the Muslim world, except for the time of the Prophet and the brief effective rule of Ali.

⁷³ B. Afrasiabi and S. Dehqan, Taleqani va tarikh, p. 419.

⁷⁴ Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, tr. Brian Pearce, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 186.

The Shi'ite writers who have given Islamic economics most detailed attention have not been directly linked to the LMI. In Iraq, Ay. S. Muhammad Baqir Sadr (1930-1980), hardly a modernist, wrote a lengthy treatise on the subject, while in Iran Abolhasan Banisadr, who has had some university training in economics, has written prescriptively about it.⁷⁵ LMI figures have not developed a coherent set of integrated ideas and policies on economic matters, perhaps because in Iran political questions have always had more urgency. The most important work to come from the pen of modernist associated with the LMI is Ay. Taleqani's Eslam va Malekiyyat, "Islam and Ownership."

Taleqani's analysis centers, as the book's title indicates, on the question of ownership, and is not intended as a systematic exposition of Islamic economics. The book's gestation coincided with the Shah's efforts to carry out an agrarian reform. Its final version, published in 1965, was an attempt to confront the agrarian reforms critically. As a socially conscious person Taleqani was unable to oppose agrarian reform as such, but as a cleric and oppositional politician he could not condone the ways in which agrarian reform was carried out by the Shah. Hence his efforts to dissect the very notion of 'ownership':

Ownership is relative and limited. Ownership means the authority and power of possession. As human power and authority are limited, no person should consider himself the absolute owner and complete possessor. Absolute power and complete possession belong only to God who has created man and all other creatures and has them constantly in his possession. Man's ownership is limited to whatever God has wisely willed and to the capacity of his intellect, authority, and freedom granted

⁷⁵ For a critical appraisal of both writers see Homa Katouzian, "Shi'ism and Islamic Economics: Sadr and Bani Sadr," in Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Politics in Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 145-165.

to him.⁷⁶

As far as the question of land ownership is concerned, the upshot of this is:

Since the rights of individuals to possess and distribute resources differ depending on the commodities, they are not defined legally in perpetuity. That is, the right of possession and revitalization of unexploited lands is established to the extent that the act of revitalization has been carried out and will last for as long as the land is properly exploited. Among resources such as pastures and forests as well as surface waters the right of exploitation is established by the person only to the extent he keeps it productive."⁷⁷

For Taleqani, therefore, property was not sacred, as some of his conservative colleagues maintained, but this did not mean that the government had the right to rearrange property relationships as it pleased.

The implications of these principles for a modern industrial and service economy are not spelled out, which is not surprising, given the essentially agrarian nature of Iran's economy in the 1950's and early 1960's. Taleqani does chide professional economists for basing their theories and prescriptions exclusively on the reality of the advanced industrialized countries.

Economic considerations do not form an important part of Bazargan's thought. His book Kar dar eslam (Labor in Islam) is more an analysis of the Islamic work ethic than a discussion of the social problems of labor.⁷⁸ If we try to ascertain what Bazargan's preferences in economic

⁷⁶ Seyyed Mahmood Taleqani Islam and Ownership, tr. Ahmad Jabbari and Farhang Rajaee, (Lexington, KY: Mazda, 1983), p. 88.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 136.

⁷⁸ Mehdi Bazargan, Work in Islam, tr. M. Yasfi, Ali A. Behzadnia, and Najpu Denny, (Houston: Free Islamic Literatures, Inc., 1979).

policy are, one conceivable way would be to look at the policies carried out under his tenure as Prime Minister of the provisional government in 1979. This, however, is not very satisfactory. First, the LMI was not the only group represented in the provisional government, although it dominated it. Second, the provisional government was faced with a host of immediate problems for which short-term solutions had to be found. Given the multifarious constraints under which it had to operate (lack of true executive authority, pressure from the clergy, leftist agitation at the plant level, lack of experience of most cabinet ministers), the provisional government never had a chance to start or implement any long-term planning. Given the magnitude of the economic problems that Iran had to face in the wake of the 1979 revolution, short-term, stop-gap solutions had to be found. Decisions were thus most often taken on an ad hoc basis and did not necessarily reflect the LMI's or Bazargan's ideological preferences in matters economic. However, scattered in his writings, we do find some indications of his ideas on economic life.

Bazargan is aware of the necessity for Iranians (and Third World people in general) to sever the links of dependency that bind them to the advanced nations. The necessary precondition for independence is to make do with little, to accept a lower standard of living. He cites the example of Gandhi approvingly.⁷⁹ In his writings he often laments the fact that Iran uses her oil-income for current expenditures rather than for capital investment.

⁷⁹ See M. Bazargan, Serr-e..., pp. 51-52.

In so far as the role of the State in the regulation of the country's economic life is concerned, Bazargan repeatedly warns against an overblown State apparatus, because the bureaucracy is already too large. Nationalization of industry is therefore no panacea.⁸⁰

In the context of an ideology that claims Islamic inspiration it does not take much ingenuity to justify liberal ideas on economic matters.

Maxime Rodinson has pointed out that

The Koran has nothing against private property, since it lays down rules for inheritance, for example. It even advises that inequalities be not challenged, contenting itself with denouncing the habitual impiety of rich men ...

[The] Koran ... looks with favour upon commercial activity, confining itself to condemning fraudulent practices.⁸¹

Quite clearly, the burden of proof is on those who opine that socialist principles inhere in Islam.

And yet, Bazargan's approval of private enterprise is not absolute and admits exceptions. Moreover, it must be understood in the general context of his thought. In a society ruled by Islamic ethics the quest for justice that characterizes Muslims will prevent the Islamic entrepreneur from exploiting his work-force. The fact that no historic precedent exists for this state of affairs does not mean much, since true Islam has never been applied in the past. One may find this view naive; one has no right to call it hypocritical. Bazargan is a truly religious man. As such he has an eschatological view of human history. Man is

⁸⁰ See for instance Bazargan's message on the occasion of the nationalization of big industries in 1979, which he accepted only grudgingly. This text can be found in Abdolali Bazargan, ed., Masa'el, pp. 197-201.

⁸¹ M. Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, p. 14.

continuously advancing on the path to perfection: therefore the fact that benign capitalism does not exist now does not preclude its coming into existence once righteous, well-meaning, and competent Muslims have come to dominate social life.⁸²

In practical terms, the conclusion obtrudes itself upon the outside observer that Bazargan's ideal economic system bears, mutatis mutandis, a certain resemblance to the economic views of Christian Democracy or even right-wing Social Democracy, something therefore akin to the post-WWII "social market economy" of West Germany.

It would be hard to prove that Taleqani and Bazargan actually contradict each other, because they address different sets of problems. Both essentially argue that things would be better if people were good, i.e. ordered their lives according to the precepts of true Islam. But beyond this quasi-tautology, Taleqani is more concerned with achieving justice, whereas Bazargan aims at enabling people to go about their business. These different emphases reflect perhaps their social backgrounds, and one need not be a dour determinist to come to the conclusion that Bazargan's family background does not predispose him to socialism.⁸³

The two authors' attitude to socialism is instructive. Bazargan warns against religiously oriented people adopting a vocabulary, style, argumentation, and sets of symbols alien to their tradition,⁸⁴ for they

⁸² I realize that I am guilty of a certain amount of eisegesis here myself. My aim is to lay bare the internal logic of Bazargan's thought on these matters.

⁸³ For details on their social backgrounds see chapter 5, section 1.

⁸⁴ Mehdi Bazargan, Afat-e towhid, (The Bane of Monotheism) (Houston:

may lose sight of what is essential, namely religion. As examples he offers two shibboleths of the revolutionary movement in Iran, este'mar (colonialism) and estesmar (exploitation). An overuse of the term 'colonialism' causes the revolutionary movement in Iran to be identified with Communism in Western eyes, thus lessening its chance of success. Insistence on the idea of 'exploitation' entails inevitably class warfare and acceptance of an ineluctable and ascriptive membership of every individual in a certain social class, which heightens the potential for internal conflict.⁸⁵

This rejection of Third World socialist themes can be contrasted with Taleqani, who appropriated one of the slogans of socialism for Islam:

The phrase "from each according to his ability and to each according to his need" is the first slogan of Islam and the last one of socialism. From the totality of Islamic injunctions and teachings on ownership, this principle can be seen to be of certain validity.⁸⁶

Not content to state a convergence between Islam and socialism, Taleqani goes on to say that the phrase is more representative of Islam than of socialism, as its "second part..."to each according to his need" does not conform to the labor theory of value... The socialists had to use this slogan even though it is based on human value and not economic surplus."⁸⁷

Book Distribution Center, 1978), p. 60. This book originated in two lectures delivered in 1977 in Teheran and was badly received by many of Bazargan's friends. See chapter eight, section 4 for details.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 62-63.

⁸⁶ Islam and Ownership, p. 124.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 130n.

In economic matters Islamic modernism clearly faces the same problems as Christian Democracy and Catholic social doctrine. From a religious and ethical point of view, capitalism is amoral at best and immoral most of the time, while socialism puts too many constraints on the individual. The ideal could logically be expected to lie somewhere in the middle, as European Christian Democrats and Social Democrats have found out. But to admit that would be a blow to the religious apologist's contention that his religion is "original," and transcends current antinomies. Hence all the talk about "Islamic economics." A close look, however, reveals that, depending on their own predispositions, Islamic modernists are either in favor of capitalism with an Islamic face, or socialism with an Islamic face, or something in between, with an Islamic face.

3.2.3 The Ideology of the LMI

The ideology of a political party is necessarily more watered down than that of an intellectual movement. A party has to operate in a political arena whose parameters were set independently of it, which puts constraints on what it can advocate or state in its program.

In the case of the LMI, the important thing is to remember that it was founded as a component of the National Movement,⁸⁸ whose uncontested leader was the secular minded Mosaddeq. The formation of a new party had therefore to be justified. For the founders of the LMI, Nationalist parties like the various liberal, pan-Iranist, and socialist parties united in the National Front could mobilize Muslims momentarily around

⁸⁸ See chapter 2, section 1.

specific goals such as the nationalization of oil, but were ill-equipped, given the masses' commitment to Islam above all else, to lead to an over-all improvement in society.⁸⁹ Committed Muslims themselves, therefore, had to become a force in politics.⁹⁰

For Bazargan his brand of politically active Islamic modernism had to confront three forces: the communists of the Tudeh, whose growing influence on Iranian campuses was the main reason for the founding of the Islamic Student Associations; the traditional clergy, whose obscurantism was driving the youth away and straight into the arms of anti-religious materialism; and, after 1953, the dictatorship of the Shah, whose unjust, anti-religious rule threatened to ruin the country and made it difficult for Muslims to live their lives in accordance with their faith.

It should be added that this religious orientation did not meet with unanimity in the party. Many of its initial founders, although by no means opposed to religion, were reluctant to give the LMI's actions a religious content. This heterogeneity was a source of weakness for the party. But on the whole it can be said that the LMI in its first period of activity (1961-63) constituted the most religious wing of the National Movement. At its founding meeting, it was defined as "Muslim, Nationalist, constitutionalist, and Mosaddeqist." Its immediate aim was

⁸⁹ M. Bazargan, Modafe'at, p. 207.

⁹⁰ A cogent statement of the role of religious motivation in party politics, the underpinning of the LMI, was given in Mobarezat-e siasi va mobarezat-e mazhabi (Political Struggles and Religious Struggles), first published by the LMI in Teheran and reprinted by the LMI(a) in 1976. For a fuller discussion see chapter 6, section 3.

to fight against despotism and corruption.⁹¹ At the time, the dominant political culture of Iran was secular, and the clergy by and large kept out of politics.

This changed in the fifteen years between the Shah's crackdown on the opposition in 1963 and the beginning of the revolution in 1978. In these years the LMI could not function as a party in Iran.⁹² With the onset of the revolution, the intellectual and political climate had changed, and as the revolutionary movement progressed, religion became ever more important in Iranian politics. Concomittantly, the religious coloration of the LMI also became more pronounced, and the party became in effect the moderate, modernist wing of the Islamic movement. Firmly entrenched in the opposition to the fundamentalist government since 1981 while loyal to the Islamic regime, the LMI has now become the standard-bearer of Nationalism in a system that excoriates all varieties of nationalism as un-Islamic. Again, as in the years 1961-1963, its major demands are free elections, and an end to the dictatorial rule of the regime. The language of its statements has become more religious, there are manifold quotes from the Qoran to buttress and legitimize the demands, but the function is essentially the same as in the first period: to work within the system, and to invite the regime truly to respect the constitution under whose rules it claims to operate. Therefore, the LMI is still Muslim, Nationalist, and constitutionalist (although the constitution has changed), but it is arguable whether it still is Mosaddeqist. Now as under the Shah, its primary goal has been to curb the sul-

⁹¹ For details see chapter 6, section 3.

⁹² See chapter 7 for details.

tanistic tendencies in the regime, to create a coherent order in society, and to base policies and programs on rational principles.

Given our discussion on democratization in chapter 2, we have to address the question whether the LMI has been a democratic party, whether it has striven to implant democracy in Iran. The answer is a cautious "yes." Democracy has not been the overriding aim of the LMI: like the rest of the National Movement, it has placed Nationalism before liberalism. This becomes clear when one looks at the LMI's foreign sympathies: after its foundation in 1961 LMI statements were enthusiastic about Nasser, who had put an end to Egypt's liberal regime, but were hostile to the democratically elected government of Adnan Menderes in Turkey. For the LMI, democracy seems to mean above all the citizenry's identification with its rulers, rather than a set of fixed procedures to determine who shall govern. The LMI has striven above all for representative government.

3.3 FROM RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY TO THE IDEOLOGIZATION OF RELIGION

By ideologization I mean the act or process of deriving normative statements about social, political, and economic relationships among the people from the ethical or metaphysical commandments of religion, or, in Ali Merad's words, "to formulate the 'content' of Islam in terms of norms and values of socio-political order."⁹³ Bazargan's main aim as an Islamic activist has always been to show the reasonableness of Islam's tenets, and to bring out its ethical content. Islamic activists who ad-

⁹³ See Ali Merad, "The Ideologization of Islam in the Contemporary Muslim World," in Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds., Islam and Power (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 37.

here to the idea of Islam as ideology often say that Bazargan started a trend, and created a craving for an Islamic ideology that he was not able to satisfy. There is some truth in this, but our discussion has shown that the creation of an ideology was not in the nature of Bazargan's endeavor. Based on the methods and ideas Bazargan pioneered, others set out to formulate this ideology.

3.3.1 Shariati

To say that it was Shariati who "ideologized" the strain of thought created by Bazargan and Taleqani, amounts to implying that the corpus of modernist pronouncements that came before Shariati was not "ideology." At one level of analysis, all empirically unverifiable statements are "ideology," but such an ultra-positivistic stance makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to say anything meaningful about the history of ideas.⁹⁴ The difficulty, of course, resides in the manifold meanings of the term ideology.⁹⁵ Paraphrasing Geiger's narrow definition of ideology, one can define it as "a system of ideas about social reality that is articulated with internal consistency and elaborated logically on the basis of initial assumptions, and that forms a well-defined written corpus, independent of peoples' minds, to which one can refer and that can form the basis of exegesis, comment, and indoctrination."⁹⁶

⁹⁴ For an extreme formulation of this view see Theodor Geiger, On Social Order and Mass Society, edited and with an Introduction by Renate Mayntz, tr. Robert E. Peck, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 125-165.

⁹⁵ For a good summary of the various ways the term has been used, see Jorge Larraín, The Concept of Ideology (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1979).

⁹⁶ See Theodor Geiger, Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes

Taken together, the writings of Bazargan and Taleqani, and the policy statements of the LMI do not amount to an ideology thusly defined. One of the hallmarks of an ideology is its reductionist nature. While Bazargan, as an engineer, is very fond of expressing complex relationships with the help of pseudo-mathematical formulae, there is no attempt to squeeze the totality of political, social, economic, religious, and cultural relationships into a set of rigid normative statements.

In the early years of the LMI Bazargan did use the term "ideology," but it referred more to a party program or a general outlook on the world, a general framework for addressing problems. Referring to the LMI, Bazargan would speak of "an Islamic ideology" (presumably one of many conceivable ones), or an "ideology based and inspired by Islam." His outlook is much more a mentality, which, again paraphrasing Geiger, one might define as "the spiritual disposition of an individual caused by the influences of his social environment on him and oriented by his life experience."⁹⁷

Shariati, parallel to such fundamentalists as S. Ali Khameneh'i, set out between 1965 and 1977 to prove that Islam itself, or rather his, correct, interpretation of it, was an ideology capable of providing solutions to all problems.

This leads us to ask how Bazargan and Shariati saw each other's work. On the personal level, there is little doubt that, in spite of disagreements, their relationship was characterized by mutual esteem. On an in-

(Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke, 1932), pp. 77-78.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

tellectual level, Shariati often acknowledged his debt to Bazargan,⁹⁸ although he found his gradualist, reformist approach doomed in advance. Admitting that it was better than conservatism or a sudden break with the past, he added:

But most of the time this gradual reformism has the disadvantage that during its long period of implementation negative elements, reactionary powers, and the hands of internal and external enemies can divert the reformist movement from its course or bring it to a complete halt.⁹⁹

Bazargan himself accepted the risk of alienating the young by taking his distance from Shariati. On December 4, 1977 (Azar 13, 1356), a few months after Shariati's death, he cosigned a text prepared by Ay. Motahari, which became a joint communiqué in which they clarified their position vis-a-vis the teachings of Shariati. The nuances of this text are worth pondering, we therefore give it in its entirety:

In the Name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate
Considering that problems pertaining to the late Dr. Ali Shariati have for quite some time been creating commotion, and [that they have] wasted the time of various strata [of the population] and thus distracted them from our fundamental and vital problems, [and that this] has been used by interested people and the Establishment, [we] deemed it necessary to exchange views on the matter and after a series of meetings came to the conclusion that we agree to a large extent. Since the vast majority of those who are troubled by the problem are seekers of truth, we considered it our religious duty to make public our common views on it, so as to free [the people] from this perplexity and rebuild unity and love among Muslims, for this will please the Lord. Concerning the rumors about [Dr. Shariati] and his leanings, interpretations, and opinions about Islamic problems as reflected in his writings, [we], who are not only familiar with his works but also knew him person-

⁹⁸ In a lecture delivered on October 24, 1972, Shariati likened Bazargan's discoveries concerning the Qoran (vide supra) to Newton's discoveries of the laws governing the movements of the planets. See his "Shi'eh, yek hezb-e tamam" (Shi'a, a total party), reprinted in Shi'eh (Shi'a) (Teheran: Hoseiniyeh Ershad, 1979), p. 80.

⁹⁹ A. Shariati, Fateme, p. 39.

ally, believe that accusations of Sunnism and Wahhabism are unfounded. In none of the principles of Islam, from the Unity of God to Prophethood, Resurrection, Divine Justice and the Imamate, did he sway from Islam. However, since his education was Western, he had not found enough time to devote himself to the acquisition of the Islamic body of knowledge, to the point where he would sometimes be ignorant of certain basic truths of the Qoran, the Sunna, Islamic Studies, and Jurisprudence. Although he was, with great effort, gradually adding to his knowledge on these matters, he committed many errors on Islamic problems, even on questions of principle. It would be wrong to remain silent on these. Therefore, considering the enormous success and attention that his books have encountered among the young, and considering that he himself, at the end of his life, having become aware of his errors through the intervention of disinterested persons and a general rise in the level of his readings, gave one of his relatives full authority to correct his errors, [we] decided to make our views on the contents of his books public in a frank way. We recognize and honor his personality and his efforts and services in driving the young generation toward Islam, but we will not hide the truth or pay undue attention to the feelings of his most enthusiastic supporters or interested enemies. We seek the help of God and thank all those disinterested people who will help us by putting their reasoned comments at our disposal.¹⁰⁰

Nothing came of this, but the mere fact that Bazargan considered the corpus of Shariati's ideas as a coherent whole independent of Shariati is indirect proof that he considered it an ideology.

Bazargan had been educated in the France of the 1930's, and when he started to write on social, political, and religious problems his main aim was to make Iran an equal among equals on the international scene. Shariati lived in Paris during the early 1960's, years marked by the Algerian War of Liberation, the rise of Fidel Castro, and the beginning escalation of the Vietnam War. He saw Iran as part of the Third World, and in addition to the Western influences that reached him through Ba-

¹⁰⁰ I should like to thank Mr. Nejatbakhsh, currently of Paris, for bringing this text to my attention and providing me with a copy of it.

zargan (Carrel etc.), he came under the spell of the ideologues of Third World emancipation such as Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire. Bazargan had tried to formulate an alternative to secularism, which is more a mentality than an ideology, but Shariati reacted directly to Marxism, an ideology par excellence. Shariati thus self-consciously set out to create an ideology, which he regarded as indispensable for struggle.¹⁰¹

Amir Arjomand has argued that he was above all influenced by Durkheim, and that what he called "ideology" corresponded to Durkheim's conscience collective.¹⁰²

Shariati's ideological constructs have been strongly influenced by Marxism, a Marxism that is shorn of its materialism.¹⁰³ Shariati's social thought and his theories are reductionist, even more so than Marxism. For instance, he accepts that class struggle has characterized human history since the creation of man, but sees evidence for this not in the various socio-economic stages but in the parable of Cain and Abel, the first representing agriculturists and all exploiting classes in general, the latter standing for the "primitive communism" of the pastoralists, and all exploited classes in general:

The story of Cain and Abel depicts the first day in the life of the sons of Adam on this earth...as being identical with the beginning of contradiction, conflict and ultimately war-

¹⁰¹ For a reconstruction of his conception of ideology and the impact of Marxism on it, see Daryush Shayegan, Que'est-ce qu'une révolution religieuse? (Paris: Les presses d'aujourd'hui, 1982), pp. 204-231.

¹⁰² Said Amir Arjomand, "A la recherche de la conscience collective: Durkheim's ideological impact in Turkey and Iran," in The American Sociologist, 17 (1982), pp. 98.

¹⁰³ For an effort to sort out the various Marxian borrowings in Shariati, see Ervand Abrahamian, "'Ali Shari'ati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution," in MERIP Reports 12 (January 1982), pp. 24-28.

fare and fratricide. This confirms the scientific fact that life, society and history are based on contradiction and struggle, and that contrary to the belief of the idealists, the fundamental factors in all three are economics and sexuality, which come to predominate over religious faith, brotherly ties, truth and morality.¹⁰⁴

Contrary to what Shariati's editor claims,¹⁰⁵ he based this theory not on folk traditions concerning Adam's two sons, but quite clearly on Rene Guenon, whom, as we saw earlier, he considered one of this century's major intellectuals.¹⁰⁶

For Shariati Abel symbolizes towhid, monotheism, and Cain shirk, pluralism. Shariati never makes any clear pronouncements on his preferred political system, but the implications of his societal interpretation of the concept shirk do not congrue with the basic requirements of liberal democracy. This has led some authors to define Shariati's ideal political order as "totalitarian democracy," similar to Khomeini's conceptions.¹⁰⁷ Shariati himself reconciled his modernist faith in the democratic nature of Islam with his Shi'ite belief in the legitimacy of the unelected Imams by ingeniously arguing that

The society of Medina, [in which the Prophet chose the Imams as his successors], ...was similar to the present societies of Africa, Latin America, and Asia, which are beginning to come out of the pressure of decline, colonialism, and lack of

¹⁰⁴ Ali Shariati, On the Sociology of Islam, tr. Hamid Algar, (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979), p. 104. Shariati develops the same theme in Man and Islam, tr. Fatollah Marjani, (Houston: Free Islamic Literatures Inc., 1981), pp. 17-22.

¹⁰⁵ On the Sociology of Islam, p. 98n.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. René Guénon, The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times, tr. Lord Northbourne, (London: Luzac & Co, 1953), pp. 177-183.

¹⁰⁷ Cheryl Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Government of God" -- Iran's Islamic Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 43.

awareness. They have a revolutionary period during which...a revolutionary leadership exists, not a democratic leadership based on public votes... The elections which were held immediately after the death of the Prophet...should have taken place 250 years later.¹⁰⁸

For me, this confirms Shariati's antidemocratic position, for who can tell when the people will be "aware" enough to make informed decisions?

The centerpiece of Shariati's ideologization of Shi'ism is his formulation of an ideal Alavi Shi'ism, which he contrasts with the actual Safavi Shi'ism. The former was dynamic, liberating, and embodied by Ali, whereas the latter is sterile, exploitative, and represented by the ulama ever since Shi'ism became Iran's state religion under the Safavids.¹⁰⁹

In chapter 1 we noted the importance of the myth of Husein and the Kerbala paradigm for Iranian Shi'ism. The modernists' handling of that myth is instructive. Taleqani, as early as 1963, began using its commemorations in the month of Muharram for political anti-regime purposes by weaving anachronistic references to current events of his own time into his sermon.¹¹⁰ Shariati also took up the Kerbala myth and used it

¹⁰⁸ Dr. Ali Shariati, Selection and/or Election, tr. Ali Asghar Ghassemy, (Houston: Free Islamic Literatures, Inc., 1980), pp. 11 and 12.

¹⁰⁹ For a summary of Shariati's formulations see Akhavi, Religion and Politics, pp. 149-150, and 231-233. For a critique of Shariati's concepts see Dr. Esma'il Nuri Ala', Jame'eh shenasi-ye siyasi-ye tashayyo'-e esna-ashari (The Political Sociology of Twelver Shi'ism) (Teheran: Qaqnus, 1978), pp. 75-80.

¹¹⁰ See his "Jihad and Martyrdom," in Society and Economics in Islam: Writings and Declarations of Ayatullah Sayyid Mahmud Taleghani, tr. R. Campbell, (Berkeley, Mizan Press, 1982), pp. 75-104. For an analysis see Gustav Thaiss, "Religious Symbolism and Social Change: The Drama of Husain," in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions since 1500 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 359-365.

to illustrate his "Alavi" Shi'ism. The reductionist nature of the ideologizing enterprise can be seen in the following passage:

Our masses lovingly weep, for only with tears can they express their deeply felt bond with this beloved house that is a true Pantheon [sic], a real Olympus [sic], and in which real idols dwell...

No other religion, history, or nation has such a family, a family in which the father is Ali, the mother Fatima, the son Husein, and the daughter Zeinab. All of them under one roof, in one epoch, and one family.¹¹¹

Understatement is not the forte of ideologues, but this passage is revealing in that it omits one important member of the august household: Imam Hasan, the second Shi'ite Imam, who made his peace with the Caliph. This omission betrays a deliberate attempt to make martyrdom and struggle the only truly Islamic attitude. The constant reference to Husein by Islamic activists of all hues and colors has recently provoked Bazargan to ask whether Imam Hasan was in any way less Shi'ite than his younger brother. He criticizes the overemphasis of the notion of martyrdom, for which he deems Shariati responsible.¹¹²

Bazargan's opposition to the excessive ideologization of Islam is apparent in his post-revolutionary writings. In a recent work he derides those who have popularized the idea that a Muslim has to serve Islam, where in reality it is God who has to be served, not Islam. He concludes:

The line of serving Islam is in itself an ideology [maktab]..., thus it bears a certain resemblance ... to the European philosophical 'isms' of recent centuries, such as Nationalism, Socialism, and Marxism. Its supporters call themselves maktabi, and single themselves out. The ideology has

¹¹¹ Shariati, Fatemeh, p. 16.

¹¹² "Iran va eslam," p. 126.

to be implemented in the country and in the government, and among the organizational methods used by contemporary political and philosophical ideologies are the monopolization of power and party discipline.¹¹³

The ideologization of religion is a reaction to the secularization of society, but ironically it is also an expression of that very process. It represents a deliberate downplaying of the sacred, metaphysical aspects of religion in favor of a this-worldly set of a priori solutions to socio-economic problems.

3.3.2 The Rhetoric of Apologetic Thought

So far we have only presented the ideas of Bazargan, Taleqani, and Shariati. The present section analyses the ways in which they articulate their arguments, the distinctive style of modernism, i.e. its "rhetoric" in the original sense of the word. Only then can we hope to account for modernism's intellectual strengths and weaknesses, and perhaps for the fact that the effect of some of these ideas on society seems quite independent of their intellectual validity.

The problem is not new. Gibb sensed it when he wrote:

However much we may sympathize with the objectives of the reformers...it has to be admitted that most of these essays surprise and sometimes shock us by their methods of argument and treatment of facts. We feel a strain somewhere, a dislocation between the outward argument and the inner train of reasoning. We are all of us familiar with books in our own language which leave us with the feeling that either the author is incapable of handling his materials or his treatment of them is vitiated by writing to a predetermined conclusion. That we should have something of the same feeling about these modernist writings is only natural, when we reflect that modernism involves a revolution in the very concept of knowledge itself.¹¹⁴ (Empha-

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 125.

sis added)

Not all of Bazargan's, Taleqani's, and Shariati's writings are apologetic in character, but naturally most of the ideology is embodied in those that are. This apologetic function is the key to an analysis of the "dislocation between the outward argument and the inner train of reasoning," as Gibb calls it. The apologists' rhetorical structures and stylistic devices ultimately shed light on these dislocations.¹¹⁵

The semiological structures of modern myths, as defined by Roland Barthes,¹¹⁶ provide an adequate means for analyzing the apologetic functions of modernists' ideological writings. These texts contain two semiological systems: a), a linguistic system, i.e. all apparent statements about facts and ideas, and b), an apologetic system, analogous to Barthes' myth.¹¹⁷ What the apologists say may or may not be true or accurate, but what they mean is, that Islam is viable, even superior to all other systems. This superimposition of the two semiological systems takes various forms, each corresponding to a different function. What follows is an attempt to identify and analyze some of the rhetorical figures as signifiers of the apologetic system.

¹¹⁴ H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 64.

¹¹⁵ To analyze the writings of the Iranian modernists in terms of their rhetoric is further justified by the fact that most of the texts are based on oral lectures.

¹¹⁶ See his Mythologies, tr. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975). Of course this use of the term "myth" is different from Eliade's definition of the archaic myth as used in chapter 1. My aim is not to define a term, but to explain social reality.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 114-115.

3.3.2.1 "Neither-norism"

Barthes defines "neither-norism" as the "mythological figure which consists in stating two opposites and balancing the one by the other so as to reject them both."¹¹⁸ Islamic modernists are so fond of this figure that their discourse often assumes a similar structure, Taleqani's Islam and Ownership being the most obvious example. However, the rejection of the "thesis" and "antithesis" does not result in a "synthesis", but in "something-altogether-superior": Islam. Barthes' ironical observation about the Neither-Nor critics being "adepts of a bi-partite universe where they ... represent divine transcendence"¹¹⁹ applies quite literally.

Modernists apply neither-norism to a number of themes. True religion, for instance, is neither the set of practices and rituals preached by the obscurantist clergy, nor the inherently worthless corpus of ideas secularists want to eradicate. True religion is their interpretation of Islam. Here they betray their inability to distinguish clearly between normative Islam and historical Islam.¹²⁰ Yet neither-norism may also lead to a reasonable golden mean, for instance when both outright rejection of the West and indiscriminate borrowing from it are rejected in favor of a critical attitude, or when both racial chauvinism and the negation of national distinctions are rejected in favor of a moderate national consciousness. But modernists employ neither-norism most consistently to establish the superiority of Islam over both Marxism and liberal capi-

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 153.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 83.

¹²⁰ As analyzed by Fazlur Rahman in his Islam and Modernity, p. 141.

talism. The comparisons that serve to discredit the two dominant ideologies of the (Western) world are not always rigorous. Taleqani's book illustrates this point.

Taleqani tries to be fair to both capitalism and Marxism, but his analysis is not immune to a logical fallacy to which most ideologues fall victim and which consists in comparing the reality of the systems one rejects with the ideals of the system one endeavors to promote. Concretely, Taleqani compares the reality of capitalist and communist countries with the ideals of Islam, as sorted out by himself. The resulting contradictions ultimately weaken his claims concerning Islam. When speaking of the Western systems, Taleqani first states that

these two opposing theories, "absolute individual freedom and private ownership," and "constraint on individuals and a communal and social ownership," have irreconcilably and distinctly confronted each other since the end of the eighteenth century.¹²¹

Later, however, he suggests the opposite, as the two theories seem to converge:

Capitalism and communism in practice dispense with their general theories. The capitalist countries which practice the principles of unlimited individual freedom have transgressed these principles and constantly try to "muzzle and fetter" this unbridled horse of capitalism through nationalization of large productive enterprises and factories. On the other side are the principles of theoretical collectivism -- with all their rigidities -- which in practice have allowed for individual ownership of housing and farms...

There are obvious violations of their respective principles because these two schools of thought are not applicable to the realities of life. Rather they are by-products of recent Western industrial economic fluctuations.¹²²

¹²¹ Islam and Ownership, p. 28.

¹²² Ibid., pp. 131-132.

According to Taleqani, neither capitalist, nor communist, nor Muslim countries apply the social and economic theories of capitalism, Marxism, or Islam. But he implies that the reality of capitalist and communist societies leaves something to be desired, because the theories cannot be applied, whereas the sorry state of Islamic countries is due to the fact that Islam is not applied. Moreover, Taleqani asserts that the Western theories' demonstrated capacity to adapt to new realities is a sign of their inherent weakness, whereas when speaking of Islam Taleqani praises its supposed ability to adapt to changing circumstances; indeed "the duty of a Muslim scholar and thinker is...to discover and to adapt."¹²³ These kinds of double standards distinguish the apologist from the scholar.

Where Bazargan discusses socio-economic systems, he too tries to refute both classical liberal capitalism and communism, although one cannot help feeling that his refutation of the latter is more passionate:

Under the protection of freedom and democracy, civilization, the economy, science, and welfare can develop freely. Work and money become the chief pastimes and the highest values...But this [high level of] production results in the enslavement of those who earn less and are unsuccessful...which leads the dissatisfied and the intellectuals to say that the [dominant] order and its laws should not be based on freedom... Society must become the individual's god and the individual must become society's servant and be sacrificed to it... In these schools of thought [i.e., socialism] they speak about freedom, equality, human rights, and humanism, but in practice we see that they can hold on to power only by the use of force (the dictatorship of the proletariat).¹²⁴

¹²³ Ibid., p. 148.

¹²⁴ Bazargan, Afat-e towhid, pp. 39-40.

Shariati, too, made copious use of neithernorism. In fact, his first book, The Median School, (1955), written when he was just over twenty years old, was an effort to prove that Islam had all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of both capitalism and communism.

As these examples show, neithernorism is one of the essential features of contemporary Shi'ite modernism. As noted in chapter 2, Islamic modernism is often defensive, hence the 'anti' dimension that finds its expression in the rejection of all existing systems. It would be wrong to single out Islamic modernism for its refusal to choose "between two evils": to some extent structural neithernorism is inevitable in late-comer ideologies. We find it in Christian Democracy, in the social doctrine of the Church,¹²⁵ in fascism, and in many nationalist ideologies. It is also quite common in the Third World, the term itself being a neithernorism. Consider the following double neithernorism by Julius Nyerere: "We don't need to read Karl Marx or Adam Smith to find out that neither the land nor the hoe actually produce wealth."¹²⁶ As noted in chapter 2, fundamentalism in Iran inherited this 'anti' dimension from religious modernism.

¹²⁵ Cf. the encyclica Rerum Novarum of 1891 with its vehement repudiation of liberal capitalism and socialism. See M.-D. Chenu, La "doctrine sociale" de l'Eglise comme idéologie (Paris, CERF, 1979), especially pp. 39-55.

¹²⁶ "Ujamaa -- The Basis of African Socialism," in Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa -- Essays on Socialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 4.

3.3.2.2 Quotations

Modernist ideologues love to quote, but the quotations' function in their discourse is not limited to their semantic content, to what they add to the meaning of the texts.

Qoranic quotations are of course needed to convince the religious audience. A statement's plausibility can be established more firmly if some verse from the Qoran, or a hadith corroborates it. To the outside reader these quotations' relevance to the subject matter of the text is not always clear, but that hardly matters; the texts are not addressed to outsiders. For the targeted audience the fact that God Himself is being quoted matters more than the relevance of the quotation. Moreover, according to an old belief, the meaning of the Qoran is infinite. Occam's Razor need not be wielded.

As modernists our ideologues also have a proclivity to quote Westerners, even Western orientalist. Books of Western authors dealing with the Islamic world fulfil a special function. Most immediately, of course, they lend the prestige of Western learning to favorable treatments of Islam. But to have a favorable view of Islam, Islamic modernists need not turn to Gustave Le Bon and his likes. The hidden agenda behind the use of such materials is the need to preempt possible criticisms of domestic secularizers. The argument, never made explicit, would be something like this: "We all know that Westerners do not have our best interests at heart and tend to look down on us. Therefore, when such a Westerner admits the greatness of our civilization, chances are that he is not engaging in wishful thinking. If it elicits his

grudging respect, it stands to reason that our cultural heritage be worth more than our secularizers would care to admit."

3.3.2.3 Historicism

Historicism is to some extent inherent in a religious frame of mind. Even Marxism partakes of the old Asianico-Mediterranean myth structure that informs the eschatological content of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.¹²⁷ To some extent, then, a historicist approach to the human condition is part of any religious outlook, and must be seen as a question of content, rather than rhetorical structure.¹²⁸

But historicist passages in modernist texts assume an additional function. Modernists employ the language of historicism to explain the current situation and reassure their audience about the future. In Barthes' terms, the inevitability of both the present situation and the desired future developments are the signified of the apologetic system of the texts. To prove their points, modernists use historical facts selectively. Like many ideologues, they are voracious readers and attempt to integrate those parts of their readings that corroborate their views, or that can serve to make their views more attractive to the targeted audiences, into their writings. The resulting eclecticism is not always felicitous. One example: In his book Rah-e teyy shodeh,¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality, tr. Willard R. Trask, (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 183-184.

¹²⁸ For a critique of historicist historiography see David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 155-157. See Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (New York: Harper, 1964) for a cogent argument why a scientific prediction of the future is not possible.

which many of his followers think is his best work, Bazargan gives an interpretative outline of human history. He tries to prove that human history proceeded along the lines predicted by the prophets, although most people were not aware of this. For his historical data Bazargan has recourse to such diverse sources as the Qoran, the Belgian symbolist poet Maurice Maeterlinck's book Le Grand Secret, and one Major Owrang's opus Yekta-parasti dar Iran-e bastan (Monotheism in Ancient Iran). The references in Shariati's works are perhaps even more eclectic.

These juxtapositions do not diminish the texts' attractiveness or credibility for two reasons: First, the readers are unlikely to be serious students of history; and second, as Roland Barthes has noted, fact cannot be distinguished from fiction by any elements inherent in historical discourse, as "historical facts" do not exist independently of it.¹³⁰

A more recent example for this use of historicism is Bazargan's post-revolutionary tendency to combine the National Movement under Mosaddeq with the Islamic movement of Khomeini, and to speak of a "National and Islamic movement."¹³¹ While it is true that both movements represented moments in Iran's struggle for emancipation, their goals, leaders, methods, and relevant social forces were very different. Mosaddeq was not St. John the Baptist to Khomeini.

¹²⁹ See footnote 64.

¹³⁰ Roland Barthes, "Le discours de l'histoire," in Social Science Information, 6 (4), August 1967, pp. 65-75.

¹³¹ For instance in his Showra-ye engelab va dowlat-e movaqqat (The Council of the Revolution and the Provisional Government) (Teheran: LMI, 1982), pp. 7-18.

3.3.2.4 Tautology

This is one of the most elusive features of modernist writing, and very difficult to document. Outright tautologies as defined by Barthes¹³² are very rare. There is of course Shariati's Fatima is Fatima, a book ostensibly about the position of women in Islam but, as is typical for Shariati, containing many ideas and tidbits of information that happened to cross his mind when he composed it. But the title, which is also the book's last sentence, does not suggest the bourgeois myth of common sense, but the uniqueness of Fatima.

We do encounter tautologies under another form in many modernist texts, but they are logical flaws in the argument rather than figures of an apologetic system. The trick consists in planting an axiom, in other words, not distinguishing clearly between assumptions and demonstranda. One example: modernists often like to point out that Islam is in accordance with nature, which is one of the proofs of its superiority to other religions. (The celibacy of Catholic priests is often mentioned as a counter example) But since their faith conditions their definition of "nature," or "human nature," the accordance of "nature" and Islam is a foregone conclusion. Gibb's remark about the modernists "writing to a predetermined conclusion" captures the circularity of much modernist reasoning.

¹³² Mythologies, p. 152-153.

3.3.2.5 Repetition

Modernist texts from Iran strike the reader by their sheer amount of repetition. To some extent this is due to them having begun their existence as lectures, which means that they were not all meant to be cumulative. Still, the impression remains that often the authors in their discourse bring up subjects well known to their audience, and proceed to draw a moral from them with which all the audience agrees. The aim of these repetitive passages is therefore not to communicate something new to the listeners/readers, but to create and uphold a climate of mutual understanding and intellectual communion between speaker/writer and audience: their function is phatic.¹³³

Two examples illustrate this point. In Bazargan's, and later in Shariati's writings, one constantly comes across derogatory remarks about the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages. Gibb noted that an obsession with Christianity, and an urge to prove its inferiority to Islam, was a constant theme with the Arab modernists he studied.¹³⁴ In their case this was easy to explain, for Christian missionaries in Arabic countries under European domination could be seen as a threat to the spiritual integrity of Muslim society. By the time Bazargan and Shariati were writing, however, there was no such threat in Iran. Why then this obsession with the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages, with the terribly reactionary Popes who oppressed the Christians?

¹³³ On the phatic function see Pierre Guiraud, La Sémiologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), pp. 12-13.

¹³⁴ Gibb, Modern Trends, p. 68.

There are probably a number of reasons. The first one is to make the listener/reader comfortable about his own religion. The second reason, made explicit in the texts, is to prove that secularism as it appeared in the Renaissance was to some extent justified -- or at least understandable -- in Europe, given the obscurantism of the Medieval Church, which was opposed to science (remember Gallilei!). But since Islam does not oppose progress and abhors oppression, secularist ideas in Iran are a foreign import unsuited to Iranian society. The logical fallacy of this argument, of course, is that, as analyzed above, historical Christianity is being compared to ideal Islam. Sometimes, however, the arguments are more subtle and avoid this fallacy. The authors then aver that since Christianity had no socio-political ideology and was merely an ethical system, reformers had to turn against it: hence secularism. Islam, by contrast, has all the ingredients for a successful ideology, which makes secularism superfluous. A third reason for this obsession with the Medieval Church can be only suspected in pre-revolutionary writings, but is quite obvious in one of Bazargan's post-revolutionary books: the parallel between the Shi'ite clergy and a dominant Catholic clergy is so clear, that a denunciation of the latter amounts to a thinly veiled attack on the former. Shariati went so far as to call for a veritable protestant reformation of Islam.¹³⁵

A second theme, more related to internal affairs of Iran, is the constant denunciation of the Iranian bourgeoisie. In the writings of Shariati, Iranians who have struck it rich under the Shah are forever aping

¹³⁵ See his lecture

From Where Shall We Begin, tr. Fatollah Marjani (Houston: Free Islamic Literatures, Inc., 1980), pp. 30-31.

the worst habits of the West, are forever travelling to Europe to gamble away the surplus value extracted from "the people," to dance in night clubs, and to waste their time and money in "cabarets." The Persian word Kabareh, for some reason, is a favorite of Islamic ideologues: more than a place where people go and have fun, it serves to focus all the ascetic tendencies of would-be revolutionaries.

What are the functions of these repeated references? Again, they are not communicating anything to the audience that it would not already know. The first reason is obvious: it is natural that pious people should disapprove of other people sinning. But a merely pious person is more likely to feel sorry for sinners and to attempt to guide them back to the righteous path rather than vituperate against them. The second reason, and here the phatic function comes in, is to create a bond among the elect, who can define themselves and acquire a collective identity by being what the Others, those in power, are not, namely "good." Righteousness, when ideologized, becomes self-righteousness. This links up with a natural tendency of all intellectuals, which is to presume to tell others how to live their lives and how to spend their free time. A third reason for this obsession with the alleged Kabareh culture of the Iranian bourgeoisie is just plain resentment. We analyzed Iran's dual society in chapter 1, and the repeated accusations against the westernized elite are an expression of the resentment felt in the traditional segment, articulated by its most intellectual circles, against the modern segment. In the case of Shariati, more personal motives were present too, as his sojourn in Paris was marked by severe financial diffi-

culties.¹³⁶

The frequent use of quotations, as analyzed above, also has a phatic function, in that it reassures both the speaker/author and the audience that the discourse is both Islamic and "scientific."

3.3.2.6 Irony

Irony is a favorite device of Bazargan's, which he uses in political statements and writings but not in his religious texts. Personal temperament aside, external factors easily explain this recourse to irony: During most of his political career, Bazargan has had to operate on the very borders of what successive Iranian regimes tolerated. One form of irony, antiphrasis, consists in seemingly saying the opposite of what one means. When what one wants to say would be too offensive to the regime, antiphrasis can indeed be an elegant way out. Taleqani was always more direct in his approach, saying things "as they were." His style was often vituperative and polemic, which may have something to do with the fact that he spent more years under arrest than Bazargan.

As a rhetorical device irony presupposes a certain degree of subtlety in the audience. This may be one of the factors explaining Bazargan's lesser success during the revolution, a period of mass mobilization, compared to the period 1961-1963, when the politically articulate strata were more limited. As Joseph Conrad put it in Under Western Eyes, "revolutionists hate irony, which is the negation of all saving instincts, of all faith, of all devotion, of all action." If this is true, it

¹³⁶ Testimony of close friends of his in Paris, who wish to remain anonymous.

would fit in with the ascetic component of revolutions mentioned in chapter 1, an ascetic component that has caused most post-revolutionary societies, whatever their ideology, to become so unspeakably antithalian after the initial period of creative euphoria is over.

Shariati also uses irony a great deal, but with him irony becomes sarcasm more often than not. Its function changes: while Bazargan uses it to get away with saying what he wants to say, Shariati employed it to discredit the arguments of his adversaries. One of Shariati's favorite rhetorical devices was to present the arguments he wished to refute under their most extreme and caricatural form, which obviously made his task easier. Here sarcasm can become an auxiliary to neithernorism.

In his writings Bazargan often complains about Iranians' propensity to exaggerate (vide supra), and, perhaps as a conscious reaction to these perceived national traits, practices self-restraint, even at times understatement. There is a certain sober quality to his writings that makes them unsuitable for revolutionaries. Shariati, by contrast, had no such inhibitions and could blow up the smallest fait divers to gigantic proportions in order to derive propagandistic benefit from it.

3.3.3 Modernism's Legacy to Fundamentalism

As Fazlur Rahman has pointed out, modernism and fundamentalism have many features in common,¹³⁷ such as a dissatisfaction with the present and a return to the sources of the religion. However, modernism and fundamentalism are, as we saw in chapter 2, two different responses to the chal-

¹³⁷ Islam and Modernity, p. 142.

lenge of the West. What is the link between the two?

Beyond its ethical exhortations, Bazargan's type of modernism, in which the core of religious beliefs remained orthodox, provided a framework for analysis, not a set of solutions. The solutions were elaborated by Shariati and the Mojahedin on the left, and by the fundamentalists on the right. The main legacy of modernism to fundamentalism is a certain type of discourse, as analyzed above. This discourse is common to both modernists and fundamentalists, and quite different from that of the traditionalists like Khomeini, who does not care about comparing Islam with Marxism and Capitalism or proving its scientificity.

I would argue that in order to supplant modernism, fundamentalism borrowed its rhetorical structures. Shariati, by ideologizing the religious and political thought of Bazargan, and by adding some Third-Worldist topoi to it, created a type of discourse with a certain amount of rhetorical structures that was then taken over by the fundamentalists and used in the service of different ideas. A few examples will have to suffice.

The traditional neutralist position in foreign policy that the Nationalists advocated under Mosaddeq and which they called "negative equilibrium," became the neither-norist nah gharb, nah sharq, "neither West nor East." The formula probably derives from the following verse:

God is the light of the heavens and the earth; the likeness of His Light is a niche wherein is a lamp (the lamp in a glass, the glass as it were a glittering star) kindled from a Blessed Tree, an olive that is neither of the East nor of the West whose oil wellnigh would shine, even if no fire touched it

(24:35).¹³⁸

Thus the omnipresence of God, becomes, ideologized, a metaphor for Iran's equidistance from the two political and ideological blocs. And in Persian too, "Neither West nor East" makes for a better and more shoutable slogan than "Negative Equilibrium."

The repeated denunciations of the West, meant as corrective to the Shah regime's indiscriminate westernization, acquired a life of their own and led to a xenophobic mind frame in which the West became the ra-dix malorum.

The never ending attacks on the Kabareh culture, and the construction of the irreligious, philistine, fat, rich, and hedonistic bourgeois as a countertype produced, when popularized, a negative attitude towards all refinement, all subtlety, values for which Iranian culture has been known traditionally.

3.4 THE PARALLEL WITH CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

The similarities between the institutional Shi'ism of Iran and Roman Catholicism were pointed out in chapter 1. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Bazargan's and Taleqani's thought display some parallels with Christian Democracy.

¹³⁸ This is one of the most complex and profound verses of the Qoran, and has given rise to many commentaries by orthodox ulema, mystics, and modernists. The most celebrated commentary is Al Ghazali's Mishkat-ul-Anwar, tr. with an introduction by W.H.T. Gairdner, (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1924).

Taleqani's dissection of the notion of ownership is not very different from the Church's teaching on the issue as contained in the Social Doctrine, and Bazargan's formulation of the asymmetrical relationship between religion and socio-political affairs bears a certain resemblance with the Church's position as formulated at Vatican II: "...in every temporal affair [the faithful] must be guided by a Christian conscience. For even in secular affairs there is no human activity which can be withdrawn from God's dominion."¹³⁹ And "[t]here are, indeed, close links between earthly affairs and those aspects of man's condition which transcend this world. The Church...does not lodge her hope in privileges conferred by civil authority."¹⁴⁰

We know that Bazargan was to some extent influenced by his early contacts with Catholic activists in France, and we have seen the influence that some Catholic lay writers have exercised on him. And yet, this line of thought should not be carried too far. The Iranian modernists' insistence that the Catholic Church has no ideology betrays their ignorance of the Social Doctrine, and what similarities do exist can be explained by the fact that the problematique of reconciling the absolute nature of monotheistic faith with the relativism of liberal democracy allows for only a limited set of solutions.

To continue our comparison on the social level, it is striking that Bazargan and Taleqani began their efforts without the explicit encouragement or support of the ulema, rather like Dom Sturzo in Italy or

¹³⁹ The Documents of Vatican II (New York: Guild Press, 1966), p. 63.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 289.

Lueger in Austria. Furthermore, the radical transformation of their thought, as undertaken by Shariati, finds a parallel in the Theology of Liberation. The analogy ends here, however, as the Catholic traditionalists around Mgr. Lefevre lack the populist dimension of Khomeini's movement.

All this should not blind us to the basic differences between Shi'ism and Catholicism, which reflect Christianity's and Islam's fundamentally different attitudes towards political power. The moderating role the Catholic Church played in Poland during the 1979-1981 crisis illustrates this best.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to present some of the modernist arguments and to analyze them critically. We now have to place this corpus of ideas in its social context, by examining the social bases of the LMI.

Chapter 4

SOCIAL BASES OF THE LMI

In the absence of any survey data everything we say about the social bases of Islamic liberalism and the kinds of people Bazargan is popular with must remain hopelessly impressionistic. The results of the 1980 legislative elections, in which a number of party members and sympathizers were elected to the Majles, are of little use. The widespread irregularities that characterized those elections and Iran's peculiar electoral system¹ render any attempt at psephological analysis meaningless. In this chapter we will first look at the background of the LMI leadership, then examine the party's ties to the Bazaar, and conclude with a few remarks about the social bases of the party's support in the Iranian population.

4.1 SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE LMI LEADERSHIP

The changing fortunes of the LMI throughout its history make it difficult to define a "leadership." In a sense it could be argued that the LMI means only Mehdi Bazargan, and secondarily a few of his relatives. Ay. Taleqani, Bazargan's close friend and political ally, was formally a leader of the party only in the years 1961-1963. At the time of this writing (January 1986) the LMI is ruled by a council of about thirty people, whose identity was not available to the author. The matter is

¹ For details see chapter 10.

further complicated by the fact that over time many once important figures have become, for various reasons, estranged from the party. For these reasons I decided to compile a list of all those men who at one point or another have been prominent figures in the LMI. They include the twelve founding members of the LMI, those members who were tried and jailed in 1963, leaders of the LMI's external wing, party members who held cabinet rank posts in the Provisional Government, members of the Islamic Republic's first parliament, and a few figures identified by elite respondents. The founders of the Mojahedin, although important activists in the early LMI, were not included, as they are primarily identified with that movement.² Detailed biographical data are provided for prominent LMI leaders in Part II of this study at points where they become key figures in events, the following list summarizes the information for the wider group.³

² On the relations between the LMI and the Mojahedin, see chapter 7, section 4.

³ See chapter 5, section 1; chapter 6, sections 2 and 3; and chapter 7, section 1.

Name	Origin	Birth	Class	Education	Left LMI
Mehdi Bazargan	Teheran	1907	Bazaar	Engineering	-
Mahmud Taleqani	Taleqan	1912-79	Clerical	Religious	'70's
Yadollah Sahabi	Teheran	190?	?	Sciences	-
Mansur Ata'i	Teheran	19??-83	U. Middle	Agriculture	1963
Abdorrahim Ata'i	Teheran	1920-77	U. Middle	Law	-
Hasan Nazih	Tabriz	1921	Bazaar	Law	1979
Abbas Radnia	Teheran	19??-82	Bazaar	High School	-
Abbas Sami'i	Teheran	?	Bazaar	?	1979
Ahmad Sadr					
Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi	Qazvin	1921	Clerical	Law	-
Ahmad Ali-Baba'i	Teheran	1925	Bazaar	High School	1977
Ezzatollah Sahabi	Teheran	1932	Middle	Engineering	1980
M.-Mehdi Ja'fari	Bushehr	1940	Peasant?	Teachers' Co.	1980
Abbas Sheibani	Teheran	1931	Upper	Medicine	1964
Mohammad Moqaddam	Teheran	193?	?	Engineering	-
Ebrahim Yazdi	Qazvin	1931	Bazaar	Pharmaceutics	-
Ali Shariati	Mashad	1933-77	Clerical	Humanities	-
Sadeq Qotbzadeh	Isfahan	1936-81	Bazaar	High School	1978
Hashem Sabbaghian	Teheran	1937	Bazaar	Engineering	-
Reza Sadr	Qum	1932	Clerical	Rel., Chem., Bus. Adm.	-
Mohammad Tavassoli	Teheran	?	Bazaar	Engineering	-
Mostafa Chamran	Teheran	1933-81	L. Middle	Engineering	-
M.-Ali Raja'i	Qazvin	1933-81	Lower	Mathematics	1979
Abbas Amir-Entezam	Teheran	193?	Bazaar	Engineering	-
Abdolali Espahbodi	Mashad	1939	Middle	Economics	?
Hosein Baniasadi	?	?	?	Engineering	-
Mahmud Ahmadzadeh	Mashad	1935	?	Engineering	-
Yusef Taheri	Qum	1930	Middle	Engineering	?
Abdolali Bazargan	Teheran	1941	Middle	Engineering	-
Abolfazl Hakimi	Mashad	193?	Bazaar	Engineering	-
Hasan Arabzadeh	Mashad	1935	Bazaar	Engineering	1980
Asayesh	Mashad	19??-68	Middle	?	-
Moham. Bastehnegar	?	1941	?	Law	80-85
Mostafa Mofidi	?	?	?	Medicine	?
Shahriar Rowhani	Teheran	195?	?	Physics	-

Table 1: Social Background of LMI Leaders

The table shows that most LMI leaders have a Bazaar background, and thus come from the traditional segment of society. This fact is very important and will be analyzed later, but we have to keep it in mind as we look at the other data. One important fact that cannot be shown in the above table are the close family ties between the core group of the party around Mehdi Bazargan:




Figure 1: Kinship Ties of the LMI Leadership

Such family ties are common in the traditional segment of Iranian society, both in the Bazaar,⁴ and among the ulema.⁵ In the case of the LMI leadership, they have certainly contributed to the maintenance of the party as an aggregate throughout the years when it could not function openly, as it allowed Bazargan to maintain close contact with his political associates. Kinship ties have not prevented one prominent and very active member (E. Sahabi) from leaving the party, but even in that case the break was devoid of hostility.⁶

⁴ Gustav Thaïss, "The Bazaar as a Case Study of Religious and Social Change," in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the Seventies (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 199.

⁵ Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 89-95.

⁶ See chapter 10, section 1.

Turning to the geographic origins of party leaders, we notice that with very few exceptions all come from the northern provinces of Iran. Most of Iran's population lives in the northern half of the country, but the geographical distribution of party leaders is nonetheless significant. The main centers of economic activity are situated in the north. Thus, the Bazaar has played a greater role in the north than in the south, where landed interests dominated. In the period 1941-1953, with its relatively free elections, the south was always a bastion of conservatives,⁷ although these did include Nationalists (the ruling family of the Qashqa'i tribe is a case in point.)

More important, perhaps, is the north's greater exposition to the West, which includes the Soviet Union. As we saw in chapter 2, religious modernism in Iran was a response to the perceived threats of communism, secularism, and Baha'ism. Communism, in particular, has played a far more important role in the north of Iran, for the obvious reason of the long border with the USSR.⁸ Among the founders of the LMI, Bazargan was profoundly shaken by the Tudeh's influence among university students in Iran, and Taleqani was deeply affected by the aftermath of the autonomist episode in Azerbaijan.⁹ Some years later this development would be paralleled in Lebanon, where a group of Shi'ites founded the Amal movement partly as a response to communist inroads among the Shi'ite youth.

⁷ See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 186-224, passim.

⁸ The oil-workers of Abadan are an exception to this rule.

⁹ Cf. chapter 5, section 1.

Turning to education, we notice a marked preponderance of engineers and scientists. To some extent this is due to Bazargan's personal influence and his key role in the founding of the Engineers Association and later the Islamic Engineers Association.¹⁰ The latter, in particular, became an important recruiting ground for party cadres and a meeting place for like-minded men in the years when the LMI was not able to function. In the years since the revolution the Association has been something of a sister organization of the LMI, and many members of it held cabinet posts in the Provisional Government.¹¹

However, I do not believe that the preponderance of engineers and scientists among LMI figures is only a consequence of the chosen profession of the party's leader. Both their religious background and their social roots predisposed these men to eschew the humanities, the arts, law, architecture, the military, and the social sciences in favor of engineering, the sciences, and medicine. A military career was probably ruled out on account of the close association between the army and the Pahlavi regime. Merchants are practical men, and for them the purpose of an education is to make a living. Their cultural level is also somewhat lower than that of the aristocracy and land-owners, which would make more intellectual, not to speak of artistic, careers seem essentially useless and unproductive to them.

¹⁰ See chapter 5, section 2.

¹¹ See chapter 9, section 1.

When we look at the secular component of the National Movement, we find far more non-scientists: Mosaddeq himself had studied law and political science, and law was also the chosen profession of Karim Sanjabi, Ali Shayegan, Abdollah Mo'azzami, Mozaffar Baqa'i, Shamseddin Amir-Ala'i, and Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari. Hosein Fatemi was a journalist, Baqer Kazemi and Allahyar Saleh were high-ranking civil servants, while Gholam-Hosein Sadiqi is a sociologist.¹²

I would argue that in a post-traditional society religious people are attracted more to the exact sciences. The old dichotomy between Science and Religion seems to have given way to a new one which opposes the certainties provided by positivistic science (pace, Heisenberg) and Revelation to the vagaries and relativism of the humanities, the arts, and the social sciences. While in the sciences one might run into such problems as evolution, which for some contradict basic religious tenets, there is very little in engineering that will shake one's faith. Engineers are also prominent in religio-political activist circles elsewhere in the Middle East, such as in Egypt.¹³ This affinity between religion and the exact sciences almost naturally leads to religious modernism, which is, as we showed in chapter 2, an attempt to reformulate eternal religious truths in the light of the scientific knowledge of the day.

¹² The data on the secular Nationalists are taken from Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 190-199 and 232. It should be noted that the National Front had its share of engineers and the LMI has included a few lawyers.

¹³ Eric Davis, "Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt," in Said Amir Arjomand, ed., From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), p. 141.

On the relationship between Nationalism and professionals, such as engineers, David Apter has observed that "the earliest claims to authority... were made by professionals who demanded equal treatment for all qualified men. Technical training was thus a point of entry into the power and prestige hierarchy at a time when the superordinate roles were monopolized by expatriates operating under a colonial mandate."¹⁴ Mutatis mutandis the engineers of the LMI fit this description, for as founder of the Engineers Association Bazargan was a leader of a nationwide strike in 1943 in which engineers, later joined by other professionals, gained access to important positions of decision-making.¹⁵ Moreover, Apter notes, in modernizing societies engineers have a predisposition to view themselves as part of the political elite, as they "have the capacity to build positions of authority into their technical roles that are converted to all-purpose symbolic roles."¹⁶ In one of his most recent writings, Bazargan confirms this when, looking back on his long and active life, he states:

For someone who has been among the people and in public service administrations and whose profession is engineering, which amounts to building and managing, the only aim is serving his country.¹⁷

¹⁴ David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 219-220.

¹⁵ For details see chapter 5, section 2.

¹⁶ Apter, Politics, p. 220.

¹⁷ "Iran va eslam" (Iran and Islam), in Bazyabi-ye arzeshta (The Recovery of Values), vol 2, (Teheran: LMI, 1982), p. 119.

One final remark on the educational background of LMI figures. An astonishingly high number received their secondary education at the Dar ol-Fonun. This school had been founded in the nineteenth century by the government to train cadres for the State's military and civil bureaucracies, but transformed into a high school at the end of the century.¹⁸ It always retained its prestige of the oldest Iranian run modern school in Iran. Although it furnished many members of the post-WWII Iranian political elite, it was increasingly rivalled by Alborz High School, which had been founded as a college by Presbyterian missionaries but transformed into an Iranian high school in 1940. Alborz recruited its pupils among the aristocracy and the ruling elite, and by the 1950's and 1960's was the most prestigious school for members of the modern segment of society, while Dar ol-Fonun continued catering to the traditional segment. Many of the Alborz graduates who were so prominent in Iran's ruling elite of the Pahlavi years¹⁹ had received their education while the "College" was still run by missionaries. This fact, and later on the high tuition charged by Alborz, may have predisposed middle class religious people to send their sons to Dar ol-Fonun. The waning over-all prestige of the latter may then have induced some of its graduates to challenge the system and become politically active. Even later, in the 1960's and 1970's, pious individuals endowed an academically demanding

¹⁸ For information on the Dar ol-Fonun, see A. Reza Arasteh, Education and Social Awakening in Iran 1850-1968 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969, 2nd ed.), pp. 28-32.

¹⁹ For testimonies see E. Alexander Powell, By Camel and Car to the Peacock Throne (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City Publishing Co., 1923), pp. 262-263; Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 168-169 (these pages also contain quotes from the first book); and Clarence Hendershot, Politics, Polemics, and Pedagogues (New York: Vantage Press, 1975), pp. 14-15.

but religiously rigorous high school, the Alavi School, which became a nursery of the future fundamentalist cadres of the Islamic Republic.

We must now turn our attention to the LMI leadership's social background proper, namely their base in the Bazaar. Bazargan's father had been a major figure in the Bazaar of Teheran (which found a reflection in his choice of a family name) and president of the Bazaar Merchants' Association, and most other founders of the party also had roots in the Bazaar. This does not mean that the LMI is or ever was a party of merchants: although the vast majority of its founders and leaders came from Bazaar families, very few (notably Radnia and Alibaba'i) were active as merchants. Bazargan and the Sahabis, father and son, were university professors and entrepreneurs; Nazih and Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi were lawyers. However, their connection with the Bazaar and their relative affluence made them independent of the State, which allowed them to take bigger risks in opposing the government. Bazargan was often expelled from the university, at which point he would devote himself to his business and continue his work as writer and animator of associations. But before examining the significance of the tie between the LMI and the Bazaar, we have to elucidate the latter's role in Iranian society and recent history.

4.2 THE BAZAAR

4.2.1 The Bazaar as a Social Force

Bazaars are the central market places in the Middle East.²⁰ The societies of the Islamic Middle East have always been urban dominated, which has conferred great importance to the commercial hearts of the cities. Thus a bazaar is not merely a place where goods are bought and sold, but "a multi-faceted entity comprising religious, commercial, political, and broadly social elements ... [and] religion is the cement that binds this structure together."²¹ Sociologically speaking, the Bazaar connotes a community with a hierarchy of "merchants at the top of the order, the masters of artisans, and shop-keepers of well over 100 guild-like associations at the middle level, and the masses of workers and apprentices at the bottom, with some marginal elements such as peddlers and beggars at the lowest level."²² As Weber has pointed out, the social status of merchants and the degree of their commitment to religion has varied

²⁰ For an exhaustive study of bazaars see Eugen Wirth, "Zum Problem des Bazars (suq, çarşı) - Versuch einer Begriffsbildung und Theorie des traditionellen Wirtschaftszentrums der orientalisches-islamischen Stadt," in Der Islam 51 (1974), pp. 203-260 and 52 (1975), pp. 6-45. For a detailed description of the Teheran Bazaar see Seger, Teheran, pp. 125-169. There is also an in-depth monograph on the bazaar of Isfahan: Heinz Gaube and Eugen Wirth, Der Bazar von Isfahan (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1978).

²¹ Thaiss, "The Bazaar," p. 193.

²² Definition quoted by Ahmad Ashraf in "The Roots of Emerging Dual Class Structure in Nineteenth-Century Iran," in Iranian Studies, 14 (1981), p. 9. See also Michael Fischer, "Persian Society: Transformation and Strain," in Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth Century Iran (London: Heinemann, 1977), p. 180; and Michael E. Bonine, "Shops and Shopkeepers: Dynamics of an Iranian Provincial Bazaar," in Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., Continuity and Change in Modern Iran (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), pp. 203-207.

greatly across societies and ages.²³ In Islamic societies trade and merchants have traditionally enjoyed great esteem: The Prophet himself was a merchant.²⁴ In nineteenth century Iran merchants and the leaders of the guilds were well respected members of society. They were closely allied to the ulema, for a variety of reasons. The bazaars occupied the centers of cities, an area that also included the mosques and madrasahs; merchants and ulema were thus in daily contact. This close contact helped them in their relations with the government: the ulema needed the bazaaris as a mass basis to put pressure on the government, while the bazaaris needed the ulema's protection against the arbitrary government bureaucracy. In addition, the merchants were also an important source of financial support for the religious institutions and its activities.

The alliance between the Bazaar and the ulema crystallized in the face of foreign encroachments on Iranian sovereignty. The ulema feared infidel penetration of the Islamic society, while the merchants' prosperity was endangered by Western competition.²⁵ This alliance won a major victory during the "Tobacco Rebellion" of 1892,²⁶ and again in 1906-07 during the Constitutional Revolution, this time together with

²³ Max Weber, Economy and Society, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 477-480.

²⁴ Cf. A.K.S. Lambton, "The Merchant in Medieval Islam," in Percy Lund, ed., A Locust's Leg (London: Humphries & Co, 1962) and Tidjara, in Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden, 1913).

²⁵ See Kamran Ekbal, "Der politische Einfluss des persischen Kaufmannsstandes in der frühen Kadscharenzeit, dargestellt am Beispiel von Haġgi Halil Khan Qazwini Maliku't-Tuġġar," in Der Islam, 57 (1980). See also Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 58-61.

²⁶ See chapter 1, section 2, subsection 3.

liberal intellectuals.²⁷ In the first Majles, elected on a corporate basis, 29 seats were reserved for the guilds, and 28 seats for the merchants. Together, Bazaar representatives made up one third of that body's total membership. In parliamentary debates the Bazaar deputies spoke out for Iranian sovereignty, against foreign loans, and in favor of governmental responsibility.²⁸ The Bazaar also contributed more than any other force to the defeat of Mohammad Ali Shah, when he attempted to reestablish the absolute rule his father had given up. Withal, the Bazaar lost its corporate representation in parliament when the electorate was unified in 1909. From then on the guilds and the merchants of the Bazaar played only a minor role in the politics of Iran.²⁹ This loss of influence thus paralleled the decline in the overall role of the ulema, which led to their retrenchment and caused many mujtahids to break with the constitutionalists.

4.2.2 The Bazaar in Pahlavi Iran

After Reza Shah came to power, the Bazaar suffered a fate similar to that of the ulema in that the centralizing State put tight controls on it and attempted to put an end to its autonomy.³⁰ The etatist economic policies of Reza Shah hurt the old business communities and destroyed

²⁷ For details about the Bazaar's involvement in the Constitutional Revolution see Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 81-85.

²⁸ Ahmad Ashraf, Mavane'-e tarikhi-ye roshd-e sarmayehdari dar Iran: dowreh-ye Qajariyeh (Historical Obstacles to the Growth of Capitalism in Iran: The Qajar Period) (Teheran: Zamineh, 1980), pp. 118-122.

²⁹ W.M. Floor, "The Guilds in Iran: An Overview from the Earliest Beginnings till 1972," in Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 125 (1975), p. 109.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 109-110.

handicraft workshops. The abolition of guild taxes deprived the guild elders of the power to determine how much each guild member paid in taxes, paving the way for the weakening of Bazaar organizations.³¹ And the new commercial thoroughfares threatened to dilute the spatial concentration of mercantile activity in central Teheran, and were therefore opposed by the traditional merchants.³²

The Bazaar revived in the years 1941-1953, and generally supported the National Movement and Mosaddeq. In the years 1953-1960 it was the organizational backbone of the National Resistance Movement.³³ During the liberalization of the early 1960's the Bazaar again supported the Nationalists by closing at various points. In the years following the showdown of June 1963, which started outside the Teheran Bazaar,³⁴ the Bazaar partook of the general growth of the Iranian economy. This growth, incidentally, also benefitted the ulema, to which the Bazaar merchants paid their religious taxes. Politically, however, the Bazaar community lost most of its influence, as the regime more and more severed its ties with society's traditional segment. At the same time, Bazaar merchants had some cause to have a sense of relative deprivation.

As an Iranian economist has noted, the Iranian state, committed to Capitalism but having tremendous oil income at its disposal, tended to make these financial resources available to the private sector by dis-

³¹ Abrahamian, Iran , p. 151.

³² Avery, Modern Iran, pp. 359-360.

³³ See chapter 5, section 3.

³⁴ See chapter 6, section 5.

tributing generous credits through the modern banking system. These credits were thus more readily available to modern entrepreneurs who could socialize with the bankers in the company of their wives during cocktail parties than to traditional Bazaar merchants who would not drink (in public) and whose wives lacked the necessary social graces.³⁵

The Bazaar became restless again in the mid-1970's. The Bazaaris resented the creation of the Resurgence Party, whose totalitarian tentacles threatened to reach into the farthest corners of civil society and take away the last vestiges of Bazaar autonomy. Two years later, in 1976, the party was used by the regime when, in an attempt to stifle inflation, it began an anti-profiteering campaign and imposed price controls. Many respected merchants were fined, jailed, or exiled to inhospitable places in the south. The Bazaaris interpreted the creation of the party and the anti-profiteering campaign as a declaration of war, and many hitherto apolitical Bazaaris were driven into the ranks of the opposition. Their anger and hostility contributed greatly to the close cooperation between the Bazaar and Khomeini during the years leading to the revolution.³⁶

Although not immune to change, the Bazaar remained an essentially traditional force in society. In the 1960's and 1970's most important merchants were still of a generation that had received a traditional ed-

³⁵ Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, "The Political Economy of Surplus Transfer: The Middle Strata and Private Sector Accumulation," in State, Culture and Society, 1 (fall 1985).

³⁶ See Ervand Abrahamian's interview with Ahmad Ashraf, "Bazaar and Mosque in Iran's Revolution," in MERIP Reports, March-April 1983, pp. 16-18.

ucation, the regular interaction with the ulema continued at the weekly meetings of the religious hei'ats, and one Western anthropologist noted that Bazaaris still maintained traditional ways of conflict resolution, eschewing the modern courts of law, associated in their minds with corruption and bribery, in favor of arbitration by trusted ulema according to Islamic guidelines.³⁷ After his fall, the Shah openly admitted his dislike for the Bazaar:

Bazaars are a major social and commercial institution throughout the Mideast. But it remains my conviction that their time is past. The bazaar consists of a cluster of small shops. There is usually little sunshine or ventilation so that they are basically unhealthy environs. The bazaaris are a fanatic lot, highly resistant to change because their locations afforded a lucrative monopoly. I could not stop building supermarkets. I wanted a modern country. Moving against the bazaars was typical of the political and social risks I had to take in my drive for modernization.³⁸

The Shah's opinion of the Bazaar is highly instructive. For one thing it is factually inaccurate, as the Bazaar did adapt, to some extent, to socio-economic changes: with the development of modern shopping areas in the modern parts of the city the Bazaar's retail function diminished, while its wholesale functions developed considerably.³⁹ But the Shah's statement also illustrates his curious conception of modernity: moving against his country's main centers of social and economic activity and

³⁷ Thaiss, "The Bazaar," p. 190; and Fischer, "Persian Society," pp. 180-181.

³⁸ Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *The Shah of Iran, Answer to History* (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), p. 156.

³⁹ For details on the ways the Teheran Bazaar adapted to the changing times see Seger, *Teheran*, pp. 155-169. For the effects of economic development on a provincial bazaar see Howard J. Rothblatt, "Structural Impediments to Change in the Qazvin Bazaar," in *Iranian Studies*, 5 (1972), pp. 130-148; and Bonine, "Shops and Shopkeepers," pp. 207-228.

... building supermarkets, many of which were opened precisely by Bazaar merchants. It did not work: In 1984 Iran's national conference of mayors decided to change existing zoning laws so as to ban all large-scale development of shopping facilities outside the Bazaars.⁴⁰

4.2.3 The LMI and the Bazaar

Table 1 shows the preponderance of Bazaar families in the LMI leadership. This is in sharp contrast with the top leadership of the more secular National Front, whose background was often more aristocratic.⁴¹ This explains the relative radicalism of the party's politics in the 1960's as compared to the secular elite of the National Front, who were more part of the traditional power structure and belonged to the modern segment of society (a paradox only if we forget that in Iran modernization came from above). Upon occasion Bazargan has complained that traditionally a gentleman was recognized by his asceticism and distinguished bearing, while activism was considered somewhat vulgar.⁴² The traditional elite of Iran does look down on Bazaaris, and part of the tension between the NF and the LMI may have been due to latent class antagonism.

In the period 1953-1963 the NRM/LMI had its base mostly in the Bazaar and among the students. The students liked the political radicalism of Bazargan and his friends, and he had a good reputation as a professor at

⁴⁰ Iran Times, August 3, 1984, p. 4.

⁴¹ See Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 190-191 and 232.

⁴² Mehdi Bazargan, Pragmatizm dar Eslam (Pragmatism in Islam) (Houston: Book Distribution Center, 1976), p. 25.

Teheran University. As for the Bazaar, it should be noted that not all Nationalist Bazaaris preferred the LMI over the NF. In spite of the fact that the Nationalist Bazaar leaders shared a common social background with the founders of the LMI and had cooperated with them in the NRM, when the split occurred in the National Movement, all preferred cooperation with the more cautious, statesmanlike, and secular leaders of the National Front, most of which were of upper middle if not aristocratic background. Such men as H.S. Mahmud Manian and H. Hasan Qasemi-yeh were members of the NF's Central Council to the end, and the LMI did not manage to co-opt any of them.⁴³ Thus inside the National Front, the Bazaar leaders deferred to the secular leadership, which occupied a higher social position.

Bazargan and his friends' enterprise can then be interpreted as an emancipatory movement of the traditional middle class.⁴⁴ They came from a traditional Bazaar background, a milieu that had lost much of its social prestige and political influence, and yet educationally they were on a par with both the ruling elite of the Pahlavi regime and the leadership of the NF. Many, especially among the younger members (Shariati,

⁴³ A leading Nationalist Bazaari told me about Bazargan's role in the early 1960's: "He had not done any political work, and had only been active under repressive conditions. Although selfless, he and his friends were immature and too emotional. The National Front, however, thought politically." Haji Lebaschi, personal interview, Creteil, July 1982.

⁴⁴ It would be interesting to compare the social background of the LMI to that of the leadership of the fundamentalist Islamic Republican Party that has been the major political force in Iran since 1980. We lack biographical data, but impressionistic evidence suggests a preponderance of lower-middle class people from the traditional segment. Those figures that have received higher education have as a rule not studied abroad.

Yazdi) had done very well in high school but had been denied state scholarships to study abroad because of their political activism,⁴⁵ a discrimination they resented. The same state that marginalized them was also attempting to take away the independence of their social class, and here the link with the Bazaar is crucial. Bazargan or Taleqani have never made specific reference to the declining role of the Bazaar, perhaps because they were not personally affected. Not so their supporters -- in February 1961 the student organization of the LMI published a pamphlet entitled "The University's Destiny and its Role in the Past and Future." On page two we read the following assessment of the Bazaar's decline:

The truth is [the regime] ... does not want the university to reopen... The university is the focal point of the nation's hopes ... and has to some extent replaced the old religious sanctuaries (bastgah).

Formerly the Teheran Bazaar, supported and led by the ulema, was the convening point of demonstrations and Nationalist reactions [to government policies]. The Bazaar had a certain independence and a Bazaari could earn his living independently of the State apparatus. With his modest savings he could afford to close shop for a few days. But for a long time now the banks, the monopolies, and the [government] files on the one hand, and the difficulty of earning a living, coupled with police threats on the other hand, have deprived the Bazaari of his freedom and prevent him from speaking out. In the strike that followed [the 1953 coup] they destroyed the roofs of the Bazaar and let them fall in.

This middle-class Bazaar orientation also explains the party's rather moderate economic program, with its insistence on the creation of a climate in which people could go about their business.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ See chapter 7, section 1.

⁴⁶ See the party program of 1961 in Appendix A.

In the years 1963-1977 the LMI did not exist as a party, and its founders pursued apparently non-political activities in religious and educational fields. By the time political activity became possible again in 1977, two developments had taken place. Those students opposed to the regime had become radicalized and had no use for either the LMI or the National Front, and the ulema had reentered the political scene under the leadership of Khomeini. The Bazaar thus dealt directly with the ulema, over the heads of the politicians. It is only since the fall of the Provisional Government and the limited reactivation of the LMI that Bazargan and others have sought to rebuild the alliance with the Bazaar, appealing to the economic self-interest of Bazaaris and contrasting their supposed technocratic skills with the incompetency of the ruling fundamentalists.

Let us now consider the social bases of the party's support.

4.3 SOCIAL BASES OF LMI SUPPORT

As Iran's educational system expanded in the 1950's and 1960's, ever wider groups of traditional middle-class people gained access to the country's universities. Confronted with institutions dominated by the older, Westernized elites, these newcomers to academia felt an urgent need to justify their continued adherence to Islam to themselves. They joined the Islamic Student Associations⁴⁷ where Bazargan and others like him would assure them (and be a living example) that Islamic faith and the modern world were indeed compatible.

⁴⁷ See chapter 5, section 2.

The student support for Bazargan in the early 1960's was not distributed evenly across all faculties. For reasons on which we speculated earlier, the students of traditional background tended to flock to the technical and engineering faculties, whose graduates had a reasonable chance of earning a decent living. Competition was toughest for these faculties, and sons of middle class or lower middle class members of the traditional segment of society usually succeeded better, perhaps because they were less distracted by what constitutes an affluent modern young person's normal social life. It is notorious that Islamic Student Associations were far better implanted in the technical and scientific faculties than in the humanities or social sciences, where the mood was more apolitical or leftist. This preference of the more religious students for engineering and the sciences and of the more secular ones for the humanities and the social sciences still held for the radical offshoots of the LMI and the National Front, the Mojehadin and the Fada'iyan.⁴⁸

Upon entering professional life, the new engineers would often join the Association of Islamic Engineers, also founded by Bazargan. This associational network therefore constituted the real organized social support for Bazargan and Islamic modernism, much more than a political party like the LMI, which was allowed to function freely for just over two years.

⁴⁸ See chapter 7, section 4.

Herein lies one weakness of Bazargan and his Islamic modernism. A nation's counter-elite cannot only consist of engineers, with a sprinkling of physicians and scientists. Bazargan likes to see himself and his party as bridging the gap between Iran's intelligentsia and its religious heritage. In terms of our scheme of the dual society, Bazargan has attempted to overcome the duality of society by gently bringing the traditional segment into the modern age (or certain aspects of it), and by dispelling the modern segment's misgivings about Islam.

This vision does not correspond to reality. Few intellectuals in Iran, writers, essayists, artists, university professors outside the technical faculties, were seduced by the religious applications of the laws of thermodynamics. The appeal of Bazargan and his friends was mainly to those strata of society that felt a need to have their religious traditions confirmed, not to those who had already lost them. They share this limitation with other Muslim modernists. Noting that modernists direct their apologetics toward Muslim doubters, Hamilton Gibb explains that

The object of the apologetic is to prove the divinely inspired origins of the Islamic religion and way of life, in order to establish and strengthen the foundation of an ethic which would otherwise stand exposed and helpless before the subtle assaults of secularism.⁴⁹

This fact limited their impact on the country's intellectual life. People like Bazargan, Taleqani, and Shariati may have been extraordinarily well educated and cultured by the standards of the milieu from which they came, but in comparison to Iran's intelligentsia they were ama-

⁴⁹ H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1947), p. 53.

teurs. Bazargan may be an excellent engineer, but as a thinker he is only moderately impressive. Shariati may have been a gifted writer, but his sociology is confused and mediocre. Ay. Taleqani may have possessed great courage and was certainly more cultured than his peers, but his contributions to economics have been vastly exaggerated by his admirers, far beyond his own modest claims. All have in common that they did more thinking and writing than most secular intellectuals, but quantity cannot substitute for quality. Besides, it takes a special kind of intellectual to produce ideology, and apologetics should not be confused with scholarship. They thus appealed mainly to those people who had no access to anything better.

Moreover, Bazargan's and Taleqani's appeal was not necessarily based on their liberality of mind or their advocacy of parliamentary democracy. It was based much more on the fact that they gave the rising sectors of the traditional middle class a sense of dignity, which allowed them to affirm their identity in a society politically dominated by what they saw as a Godless, Westernized, and corrupt elite, the modern segment, as we called it.

Having achieved this goal, the population strata thus awakened by Bazargan and his friends naturally looked for substantive solutions to the growing problems of Iran. Liberalism, be it Islamic liberalism, may have many attractions, but it does not provide for ready-made solutions to social and economic problems. So it came to pass that the high school students who had flocked to hear Bazargan and Taleqani speak in the Islamic Student Associations or at the Hedayat Mosque, as they ma-

tured in the 1960's and 1970's, a period when the LMI was not allowed to function and Bazargan could do little more than give not too conspicuous talks in mosques while Taleqani was isolated in his exile most of the time, looked for solutions elsewhere. Some of these "solutions" came from within the LMI, but from what I have called its second generation.

Shariati developed Bazargan's methods and ideas in a distinctly radical and totalitarian way, and became one of the main fathers of the Islamic revolution. This radicalism, and the apparent lack of what can only be termed "stuffiness" in his style (in marked contrast to Bazargan, who, in spite of his attempts to come across as "folksy," had become quite old-fashioned by the standards of the 1970's) drew large numbers of people to him, even from among the modern segment of society, in which many people had become aware of their alienation. Relatively uneducated people were also drawn to him, because more than Bazargan he was able to articulate the resentments of the disadvantaged strata. Although Shariati's writings were a more direct influence on the Revolution than Bazargan's, his person is systematically played down in the Islamic Republic, while Bazargan continues writing. Ultimately Shariati's thought is much closer to that of the Mojahedin than to the political reformism of Bazargan and the LMI.

In contrast to Shariati, Ibrahim Yazdi's influence went in a direction that is closer to Khomeini's fundamentalism. Yazdi has not contributed much explicitly doctrinal writing, but an analysis of the newspaper he edited in the 1970's and which was read mainly by the membership of the ISA's in the United States shows little continuity

with the generosity of Bazargan.⁵⁰ Most of the cadres of the Islamic Republic are former members of these associations.

Bazargan tried to socialize the traditional segment into politics, but events overtook him. By time the revolution broke out, Bazargan was a wealthy businessman living in the northern suburbs of Teheran and his appeal to the masses was limited. It is significant that at present the LMI is headquartered in the north of the city, while the IRP chose a run-down neighborhood in the poor south of Teheran as its seat.

But in the absence of a free press, of opinion polls, and of free elections, this is about all that can be said about the social appeal of a party.

⁵⁰ See chapter 7, sections 2 and 5.

PART II
THE LMI UNDER THE SHAH

The Liberation Movement of Iran was formally constituted in May 1961. Its founders had all actively supported Mosaddeq's National Movement, although none of them had counted among his close collaborators. Most of them came to the fore of organized political activity shortly after the 1953 coup, when they organized, along with others who later parted company with them, the "National Resistance Movement" (Nehzat-e Moqavemat-e Melli). In chapter 5 we will look at the early careers of the LMI founders and examine the NRM, which is the direct forerunner of the LMI. chapter 6 deals with the crucial years 1960-1963, a short period of liberalization and a watershed in recent Iranian history, and focuses on the problematic relationship between the LMI and the rest of the National Movement. Chapter 7 analyzes the various ways in which remnants of the party attempted to keep alive the opposition against the Shah after he consolidated his personal dictatorship. The NRM/LMI's record 1953-1977 illustrate the impossibility of waging a legal and constitutional opposition against the Shah regime.

Chapter 5

ON THE SIDELINES: THE EARLY YEARS

The LMI is the brainchild of three men who were and are closely related by ties of friendship and kinship.¹ These are the late Ay. Taleqani, Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, and Dr. Yadollah Sahabi. Since their early activities and life-experience shed considerable light on the character and later development of the LMI, it is necessary to give an account of these before we get to the actual founding of the NRM.

All three belong to the generation whose childhood coincided with the instability that plagued Iran after the 1906-07 Constitutional Revolution.² Their adolescence and early adulthood witnessed the rise to power of Reza Khan, Reza Shah after 1925, and the attempts of a small band of Majles deputies to oppose this rise.³

¹ See chapter 4, section 1.

² For an account of this period see Nikki Keddie, Roots of Revolution (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 73-93.

³ These were the clerical leader S. Hasan Modarres, S. Hasan Taqizadeh, Hosein Ala', Mohammad Mosaddeq, and H. Mirza Yahya Dowlatabadi. They were led by Mirza Hasan Mostowfi ol-Mamalek, who was, however, not present in the Chamber when the crucial vote was taken. In the parliamentary debate that preceded the removal of the Qajars and the installation of Reza Khan as Shah, Mosaddeq ironically declared that Reza Khan's services to the nation were too valuable for him to become a mere figure-head, the position of the ruler under Iran's 1906 constitution.

After 1941, when Reza Shah was forced to abdicate by the Allies, who had occupied Iran, political activity became once again possible in Iran. During the period 1941-1953 the communist Tudeh Party became a powerful force, especially in those parts of the country that had been occupied by Soviet troops.⁴ An irreligious regime, which in its final years had become openly anti-religious, had given way to a situation where an atheist party was becoming ever more influential among the youth, the intelligentsia, and the young industrial proletariat. Christian missionaries and Baha'is were offering religious alternatives to Islam. This course of events could not fail to produce a considerable amount of anxiety among the more lucid elements of those societal strata that were still attached to Islam as a way of life.

5.1 FORMATIVE YEARS

5.1.1 Ay. S. Mahmud Taleqani

Ay. S. Mahmud Taleqani was born on March 6, 1912⁵ (Esfand 15, 1290) in Taleqan, a mountain valley north-west of Teheran.⁶ He was the oldest son of Ho. S. Abolhasan Taleqani, himself a scion of a family of local Taleqan ulema. S. Mahmud's childhood was spent in an atmosphere of frugality and defiance to Reza Shah's regime. Unlike many mullas who were notoriously venal and led quite comfortable lives, S. Abolhasan had a reputation for incorruptible honesty. In Najaf, where he had studied as

⁴ See Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles: California University Press, 1966), pp. 71-84.

⁵ Nikki Keddie and Ervand Abrahamian give 1910.

⁶ Unless otherwise indicated, all biographical data for the late Ay. Taleqani are taken from Bahram Afrasiabi and Sa'id Dehqan, Taleqani va tarikh (Taleqani and History) (Teheran: Entesharat-e Nilufar, 1981).

a young man, he had learned the craft of watchmaking. After he moved to Teheran, he refused to live off tithes, although part of the religious taxes are traditionally designated for the upkeep of mullas. Instead, he eked out a meagre income repairing watches.

Although Ho. Abolhasan Taleqani was a friend and supporter of Modarres,⁷ his activities were on the whole more religious than political: he organized public debates between Moslems and members and in some cases proselytizers of other religious communities, both recognized (Christians, Jews), and unrecognized (Baha'is). At least one of these debates took place in the house of his good friend, H. Abbasqoli Bazargan, Mehdi Bazargan's father.⁸ The perceived danger of these non-Islamic religious groups forced more lucid Islamic elements to think rationally about their religion, which was the first step towards religious modernism.

Ho. Abolhasan Taleqani also regarded the modernizing State's authority with great suspicion. Thus he refused to get identity cards for his children (which explains the lack of agreement concerning their birth-dates), would not allow a number-plate to be affixed to his house-door, and, like many other mujtahids, he opposed his young relatives doing their military service.⁹

⁷ Cf. chapter 3.

⁸ Mehdi Bazargan, Modafe'at dar dadgah-e qeyr-e saleh-e tajdid-e nazar-e nezami (Defenses in the Illegitimate Military Court of Appeal) (n.p.: Entesharat-e Modarres, 1971), p. 75.

⁹ For the motivations behind the ulema's opposition to Conscription, see Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 37-38.

S. Mahmud Taleqani spent his childhood in Taleqan and Teheran, where he received his first education in traditional maktabs. When he was ten, he was sent to Qum, one of Iran's two traditional "religious capitals," where Ay. S. Abdolkarim Ha'eri Yazdi had revived the howzeh-ye elmiyeh (center of religious learning) only two years earlier, after a century of neglect.¹⁰ His father knew Ay. Ha'eri Yazdi, who was the leader of the howzeh but not a marja', and so the young S. Mahmud managed to get a single room at the Feyziyyeh madrasah, the main "seminary" in Qum. Students at the howzeh have a certain degree of choice as to the courses they take (i.e. the teachers they frequent), and S. Mahmud attached himself more particularly to Ay. Ha'eri Yazdi.

Ay. Ha'eri Yazdi was something of a reformer, although his ideas were often frustrated by the conservative inertia of his environment. In the 1920's he had suggested sending some young "seminarians" to Europe to learn foreign languages and introduce Islam abroad, but his plans came to naught when Teheran Bazaaris threatened to cut off their payment of the tithes if he went ahead with his plan to send youngsters to learn kafer (unbeliever) ways.¹¹ He was also the first to suggest that, given the growing complexity of the problems with which a modern-day believer is faced, the leading mujtahids establish some sort of specialization and division of labor among themselves, because the totality of all these problems, he said, is beyond the grasp of any one individual.¹²

¹⁰ Cf. Michael .M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 109.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 85.

¹² Ibid., p. 164.

His sense for practical matters is also evinced in his active interest in Welfare.¹³ After Taleqani Sr. died in 1931 (Sha'ban, 1350 A.H.), Teheran's ulema, in keeping with custom, offered to appoint S. Mahmud to his father's position of emam-e jama'at of the mosque he had presided over. He declined, left the position to his sister's husband, and went back to Qum to pursue his studies. During this period he clandestinely made it to Najaf, the major center of Shi'ite devotion and learning (situated in Iraq), and studied there as an extern with Ay. S. Abolhasan Esfahani and Ay. Aqa Zia'eddin Eraqi, the two maraje' of that time. After receiving his ijazah from the former, he returned to Iran and got another ijazah from Ay. Ha'eri Yazdi.

His mentor in Qum died in 1935, and thenceforth Taleqani came to Teheran more often, finally settling there in 1939. He took up his father's activity of organizing religious meetings to discuss current problems and seemed to have a certain degree of success.

The anti-clerical tendencies of Reza Shah's reign had intensified after 1935. Thus, the dress-codes of 1928 were stiffened: women were forced (after a while manu militari) to unveil, and men were ordered to wear rimmed hats (the clergy interpreted this as an attempt to make it impossible for men to touch the ground with their foreheads during public prayers). Members of the ulema were given permission to continue wearing the turban, but had to carry the appropriate government-issued license with them at all times.¹⁴

¹³ Ibid., p. 96.

¹⁴ On the dress-codes, see Sh. Akhavi, Religion and Politics, pp. 42-44, and M.M.J. Fischer, Iran, p. 98.

One day in 1939 (Ashura 1318), Hojjat ol-Eslam Taleqani, as he was now called, was arrested for not having his license with him. He was sentenced to three months imprisonment, a sojourn which was to mark him: he got a first-hand knowledge of the dictatorship's ways, and, sharing a cell with a member of the 'group of 53,' men who had been arrested in 1937 for communist activity and who were to become the nucleus of the Tudeh party,¹⁵ he became acquainted with Marxist views. Long discussions followed, and from this experience dated his grudging respect for leftists, against whom he would henceforth advocate free debate and the power of persuasion rather than coercion.

Reza Shah's rule had a profound impact on Taleqani. Recalling that it had been the ulema who had persuaded Reza Khan to become Shah rather than declare a republic, as had been his original intention, Taleqani wrote in 1955, in his introduction to Ay. Na'ini's Tanbih ul-ummah:

From the day I became aware of the society I was living in, I have always seen the people of this land under the whips and boots of self-centered despots. At home, every evening, we would be waiting for some bad news: what had happened that day, who had been arrested, exiled, or killed? What decisions had been taken for the people? From the moment my father, who was one of the well-known ulema, left our home in the morning, until his return in the evening, we little children and our poor mother would be worrying that something might have happened to him.

The period when I was studying in Qum were days when the people of this country were subjected to all the pressures of despotism. They were afraid of one another. Their lives, property, and honor, even the turban of the ulema and the kerchief of the women were not safe from the grab of despotism's henchmen. The effects of this state of affairs on my health and nerves will be with me until the end of my days. In those days I began to reflect: was it not that the ultimate aim of

¹⁵ Cf. Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement, pp. 64-70, and Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 155-162.

all these erudite scholarly debates about the branches (foru') and principles (ahkam) [of Islam] consisted in the improvement of the lot of the individual and of society? Could a people which was so blatantly lorded over by an individual or a group ever see happiness and righteousness? Would it not be appropriate to concentrate one's thinking and action on the creation of a wholesome environment and the prevention of egocentric wills?

Upon the other hand, I saw that some men in religious habit had hoisted a self-centered man onto the back of the people while reciting the Qoran and the hadiths, ... that others had ratified this act by their silence and circumspection, only to start praying and asking God for a speedy return of the absent Imam after [the despot] had firmly established himself in the saddle and crushed everything under his feet.

This policy of some religious leaders, this dark environment, these psychological pressures, all had the effect that I began to study more deeply the Qoran, the Nahj ul-Balagha, and the history of the Prophet and the Imams... It was given to me to meet certain eminent teachers and ulema, and little by little I found my world brightening up. I got to know the roots of religion, my heart knew certainty, and I recognized the goals and ends of my social duties.¹⁶

Immediately after the demise of Reza Shah, Taleqani, joining others, founded the "Islamic Society," Kanun-e Eslami.

5.1.2 Engineer Mehdi Bazargan

Mehdi Bazargan was born in 1907 (1286) into a pious family of Bazaar merchants.¹⁷ His father was Hajj Abbasqoli Bazargan, a wealthy merchant from Azerbaijan who had established himself in Teheran and, as already mentioned, had been a close friend of Ho. S. Abolhasan Taleqani's.

¹⁶ S. Mahmud Taleqani, Introduction to Tanbih ul-ummah wa tanzih ul-mil-lah, ya hokumat az nazar-e islam by Ay. Mohammad-Hosein Na'ini (Teheran, 1955), pp. 4-6. Taleqani's text adumbrates themes that would later preoccupy the LMI: the responsibility of the clergy, a return to the sources of religion, and opposition to despotism.

¹⁷ All biographical information on Bazargan is taken, unless otherwise indicated, from Bazargan, Modafe'at.

Young Mehdi received his elementary education in the Madreseh-ye Soltani, a traditional school, and his secondary education in the Dar-ol Mo'allemin-e Markazi, one of the country's earliest modern schools.

In 1928 he was one of the Iranian students who were selected by competition to be sent abroad to pursue their studies there. Sometime in September of 1928 Reza Shah received the chosen students, and of all the things he said, the following words were to engrave themselves on Mehdi Bazargan's memory:

You must be wondering why we are sending you to a country whose regime differs from ours. There, they have freedom and a republic, but they are also patriots. What you will bring back when you return is not only arts and sciences, but also patriotism.¹⁸

Europe made a profound impression on him, "who [had] never stepped on a paved road and had learnt to bind a tie in the great hall of the Iranian Ministry of Culture."¹⁹ Bazargan stayed in France for close to seven years. First he went to Nantes, where he attended the classes préparatoires for the Grandes écoles at the Lycée Clémenceau.²⁰ In the Defenses he enumerates the seven impressions or lessons with which the stay in Nantes left him:²¹

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 42.

²⁰ A class-mate was Abdollah Riazi, the long-time Speaker of Parliament under the Shah, who was executed by a revolutionary tribunal in 1979. Ibid., p. 49.

²¹ Whether these seven lessons were actually learnt during his stay in Nantes, as he implies in the book, or represent a later ex-post-facto condensation of his experience there, is immaterial for our purposes. Whatever the case may be, their formulation sheds considerable light on his relationship with the West, especially since, after 1980, he was to become the target of a fundamentalist campaign deriding him as

1- Although the French were advanced and civilized, they had not given up religion. On his first short visit to Paris, before he was sent to Nantes, he was struck by the picture of well-dressed people filling the naves of Notre Dame Cathedral in devout prayer. And for the Iranians of those days, Paris was a summary of the world.

2- The French were patriots. The anecdote illustrating this lesson concerns a Vice-Minister of the Interior who refused to evacuate his office, as ordered by his minister, when German troops were believed to be within shooting range of Paris in World War I. He was awarded the legion of honor by Clémenceau, while his superior resigned.

3- Westerners build things to last, and take seriously whatever they do. He compares this attitude to Iranian sloppiness.²² The wiring and plumbing of his Nantes dormitory, executed as if serving a castle, illustrated this.

4- The French have a sense of national solidarity. Some volunteers selling anti-tuberculosis stamps in the streets of Nantes prompted this insight.

5- The French are honest: a class-mate once lost a glove in a store, and the store-owner immediately had it sent back to the lycée.

a "westernized liberal."

²² Cf. his writings on the national character of Iranians, chapter 3, section 1.

6- The French are not prone to jealousy and schadenfreude. After the first three months at the lycée, exams were held. Riazi came first in Mathematics, Bazargan in Physics. They expected to be treated by their French classmates as provincial Iranians in Teheran would have been treated by their Teherani comrades, namely with abuse and derision, yet the French carried on business as usual and remained friendly with the Iranians.

7- The French are moderates. In Iranian schools there had been two clearly distinct sets of students: those who were hard-working, religious, and well-mannered, and those who were irreligious, lazy, and ill-mouthed. In the French lycée, by contrast, students would get drunk and have a good time on weekends, while studying hard during the week. They were, to quote Bazargan, "ni bête, ni ange."

At the end of his first year in Nantes he participated in the preliminary concours for the Ecole centrale des arts et manufactures, and became the first Iranian ever to pass an entry-exam to a grande école. Another year in Nantes followed, at the end of which he again took part in entry competitions for the elite schools. This time he was definitively admitted to the Ecole centrale, and in addition was accepted at the Ecole des mines. This was quite an accomplishment, for both schools count among France's best.²³ He chose to become a centralien and stayed at the school for four years. After graduation another year was spent on work-training in various factories around France.

²³ Cf. Ezra Suleiman, Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 25.

The lessons of his Parisian period were threefold:²⁴

1- The French were not leader-oriented, but honored the individual. Their dignitaries put wreaths on the tomb of the Unknown Soldier rather than on some military hero's grave. In their public places, they put statues not only of kings and military leaders, but also of discoverers, inventors, and scientists.

2- The French had voluntary associations for everything. In Iran, by contrast, one had to become a member of whatever state-sponsored associations there were. He recalls that in his country there had been only one truly voluntary association functioning free from government interference, and that was the Bazaar Merchants' Association. His father had been its chairman for a while. It was dissolved when Reza Khan came to power.²⁵

3- There are significant resemblances between machines and democracy. In a machine, all the various components, nuts, and bolts work together according to a plan. Similarly, in a society that wants to progress, all members must cooperate and work towards the common good. Society can only succeed if the individual members go about their tasks willingly and know what they are doing and why they are doing it. The machine had created democracy in the West. Conversely, without democracy modern-scale development and industrial production was not possible.

²⁴ M. Bazargan, Modafe'at, pp. 52-61.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

Bazargan's decision to attend the Ecole centrale was to be of great consequence for later Iranian politics. The school was then the only private one among the major grandes écoles, (since then it has been practically taken over by the state) and in the heavily laïc atmosphere of Third Republic France provided a haven for the Catholic elite. Bazargan reports that fully 68 per cent of the school's students were card-carrying and due-paying members of Catholic student associations. It is only natural, therefore, that after two years spent in traditionally Catholic Brittany, and four years of studying in a Catholic enclave in Paris, Bazargan came away with an exaggerated sense of the importance of religion in contemporary Europe.

In 1935 Bazargan decided to leave Europe. With Yadollah Sahabi and some others he drove to Iran in a car. Barely inside Iran, they were immediately confronted with the ill behavior and harassment of government officials.

For Bazargan, a year of military service followed. He spent it first shifting pebbles in the courtyard of his barracks (much to his outrage, given his qualifications), and then translating technical articles from French. Then came a variety of jobs, some held simultaneously. He joined the Technical Faculty²⁶ of Teheran University, founded, with some friends, a multi-purpose company called "Union of Iranian Engineers"; and then, in 1940 (1319) became the director of the Construction Bureau (in charge of building new branches, updating old installations, etc.)

²⁶ Since Teheran University was initially modelled after European universities, I prefer this literal translation of the Persian Daneshkadeh-ye fanni to other renditions such as 'School of Engineering,' 'College of Engineering,' 'Technical College' etc.

of the Bank Melli Iran, Iran's national bank.

There, one day in 1941, two young men came and asked to see him. It turned out that they were members of the Islamic Society. They presented him with a copy of the Society's organ, Danesh-amuz, and asked him to contribute an article. On the head of the newspaper Bazargan saw a name that had a familiar ring: S. Mahmud Taleqani.

5.1.3 Dr. Yadollah Sahabi

Unfortunately, I know little about the third historical founding figure of the LMI. A close companion of Bazargan's, he has always played second fiddle to him.

Sahabi was born in 1905 (1284) in Teheran. Here, he received his education in a variety of traditional and modern schools, including Dar ol-Fonun, Iran's oldest modern high school, until he entered the capital's newly founded Teachers' Training College in 1928. He graduated in 1931, ranking first in his class. After a year of teaching in a Teheran high school, he was sent to France with a government scholarship. He enrolled at the University of Lille,²⁷ whence he was graduated in 1936 with a doctorate in Geology. Upon his return from France he joined the faculty of Teheran University, where he was to teach for 26 years. On the whole, Sahabi's role has been that of an organizer more than anything else.

²⁷ It is perhaps worth noting that Catholic student associations were quite active at the University of Lille in the 1930's. I do not know, however, whether Sahabi had any encounters with them.

5.2 YEARS OF TURMOIL: 1941-1953

In the August of 1941 (Shahrivar 1320), Britain and the Soviet Union, disregarding Iran's neutrality in World War II, occupied the country. Reza Shah was forced to abdicate, left the country in September, and was succeeded by his young son, Mohammad-Reza Shah (henceforth referred to as "the Shah"). After an authoritarian interlude of sixteen years, civil society once more became active in Iran. Ervand Abrahamian summarizes the effects of Reza Shah's abdication thusly:

In rupturing the autocracy, the Anglo-Soviet invasion of August 1941 unleashed the pent-up social grievances of the previous sixteen years. As officers fled to the capital and conscripts absconded to their villages, tribal chiefs, many of whom had given up hope of better days, escaped from police surveillance in Tehran and rushed home to their tribal warriors. Veteran politicians who had been nursing their wounds in forced retirement hurried back into public life. Religious leaders, emerging from seminary libraries, resumed the exhortative stance of pulpit preachers. Intellectuals, many of them too young to remember the difficulties of 1907-1925, plunged enthusiastically into politics, editing newspapers, publishing pamphlets, and forming political parties with the goal of building a new Iran. Even the obsequious deputies and sycophantic bureaucrats suddenly found the courage to declare their political independence and denounce their former master. The reign of silence was superseded by the clamor of flamboyant deputies, lively journalists, outspoken party leaders, and discontented demonstrators.²⁸

Economically, the allied occupation and the general problems caused by the war, created great hardship for Iranians. Internal trade was disrupted by the use of the Trans-Iranian Railroad mainly to send supplies to the USSR. The demand created by the presence of allied troops fuelled inflation, which was aggravated by the activities of speculators. A particularly bad harvest in 1942 brought famine to many areas. As the government took little action to remedy the situation, discontent

²⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 169-170.

grew.²⁹

The first crisis Iran had to face after the war was the continued presence of Soviet troops in the North-West of the country and the existence of separatist governments under their protection in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. In 1946 this problem was solved, Soviet troops left the country, and the central government reestablished its sovereignty over the north-west. The years 1949-53 are characterized by the struggle for the nationalization of oil and the power struggle between Mosaddeq and the Shah, leading up to the coup of 1953. After sketching out the main patterns of politics and religious life in this period, we will examine the activities, both political and religious, of the future founders of the LMI.

5.2.1 Political Forces

The aim of the following exposition is not to give an account of Iranian politics in the twelve years of relative freedom that followed Reza Shah's abdication. Rather, our aim is to introduce the dramatis personae of the country's political life in this period, for many adversary relationships, alliances, and affinities crystallized in these years. With the general revival of civil society after 1941, a number of major currents emerged in Iranian politics.

The first, and most organizationally sophisticated, of these currents was the communist left. In September 1941 the survivors of the "group of 53" were released from prison. Joining others, they formed the Tudeh

²⁹ Cf. Nikki Keddie, Roots, p. 114.

party in late 1941. Given the measure of widespread discontent that was developing in Iran, and its initially moderate party program, the Tudeh managed to get a considerable amount of support from all walks of society. Its success was initially bigger in the north, which had a long-standing radical tradition and which was also under Soviet occupation until 1946. But after 1944 it also spread to the center and south of the country, where important oil fields and textile mills are located. In the elections of 1943-44, although the Tudeh contested only a few seats, its candidates received 70 per cent of the votes cast in their constituencies.³⁰ The trade union movement was completely dominated by the Tudeh,³¹ and the party also had the support of a large part of Iran's intellectuals, writers, and thinkers. After 1946 the party was repressed by the government, but could nevertheless continue its activities in semi-clandestinity. Its attitude towards the National Movement led by Mosaddeq was unsteady: At first it attacked Mosaddeq for being allegedly pro-American, only to rally to his government after enough ill feeling had been created between the two sides to make any meaningful cooperation impossible. Mosaddeq's last act as Prime Minister was to unleash the security forces on Tudeh-led demonstrations demanding the declaration of a republic after the Shah had left Iran in August 1953.³²

³⁰ E. Abrahamian, Iran, p. 292.

³¹ For the history of the trade union movement in this period see Ervand Abrahamian, "The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Labor Movement in Iran, 1941-1953," in Michael E. Bonine and Nikki Keddie, eds., Continuity and Change in Modern Iran (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), pp. 181-203.

³² For a detailed account of Tudeh's fortunes in its heyday see E. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 281-326; or Sepehr Zabih, Communist Movement, pp. 71-208.

The second current was composed of conservative elements such as the big landowners, tribal chieftains, many members of the clergy, and some Bazaar merchants, and could be called the "Establishment." The most important leaders of this tendency were S. Zia'eddin Tabataba'i, Reza Shah's erstwhile ally and later rival; Ahmad Qavam, who became prime minister a number of times; and General Ali Razmara, who preceded Mosaddeq as prime minister in 1951. These men were torn by internal rivalries, and would oftentimes enter tactical alliances with other political currents. Some were pro-Shah, others, like Qavam, opposed the Shah's personal political ambitions. They were generally supported by Western powers, which, together with their conservative leanings on socio-economic issues, disqualified them in the eyes of most intellectuals and nationalists.³³

The last tendency to be considered here was the National Movement led by Mohammad Mosaddeq.³⁴ The National Movement's dual aim of reasserting Iran's national sovereignty both inside the country and in the conduct of its foreign relations found widespread support among politically articulate Iranians; therefore it is not surprising that it contained widely divergent ideologies and conceptions as to what constituted Iran-ity. In it coexisted moderate secular nationalists, religious elements to whom the very idea of an ethnically based nationalism was anathema, Pan-Iranists, and socialists.

³³ Cf. E. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 169-281, passim.

³⁴ For a definition of "National Movement" in the Iranian context see chapter 2.

Mosaddeq himself, a European-educated aristocrat who had spent part of Reza Shah's reign in prison, reentered politics in 1941. Early in his career he had joined the Moderate Party (E'tedaliyun) at the insistence of Ali-Akbar Dehkhoda, but after 1941, considering himself a national leader, he never joined, nor founded, any political party, and took some pride in being an independent.

The main political grouping in the National Movement was the Iran Party, which was founded on the eve of the elections to the fourteenth Majles in 1943 by members of the Engineers Association (cf. infra), which had been founded two years earlier, the Party of Patriots (Hezb-e mihanparastan), and some other little groups.³⁵ The new party's membership consisted of young, often foreign educated technocrats and professionals with vaguely socialist leanings, government employees, and students. As early as 1943 the party more or less consistently supported Mosaddeq, who, together with five candidates of the party, was elected to Parliament in the 1943-44 elections.

In 1946 the Iran Party, against the wishes of Mosaddeq, entered an electoral coalition with the Tudeh, causing many members to leave it. Some of these then founded the Party of the Unity of Iran (Hezb-e Vahdat-e Iran), which soon faded into insignificance. The Iran Party, however, soon left the alliance and when the National Front was formed in 1949, became the most important political party in this alliance of par-

³⁵ For the founding of the Iran Party and an interesting discussion of the social bases of early party leaders, see E. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 188-192. Cf. Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 209-211.

ties, personalities, associations, and religious leaders.³⁶

A second element in the National Front were the progressive Muslims usually associated with the name of Mohammad Nakhshab. Nakhshab was in a sense the first Iranian to attempt to form a party based on reformist Islam, and since his endeavors foreshadowed (and later paralleled) those of Bazargan and Taleqani, his activities should perhaps be related in greater detail.

Born in Rasht, in Iran's northern Gilan province, he joined the Iran Party in 1944, then left it in 1946 over the party's coalition with the Tudeh. In 1944 (1323), with Dr. Ashtiani and a few others he founded the Society of God-Fearing Socialists (Nehzat-e Khodaparastan-e Sosial-ist). In 1949 (1328) together with some other members of the Society he rejoined the Iran Party. Soon after, however, he left the IP with his followers.³⁷ This split in the IP was prompted to some extent by the Nakhshab group's greater emphasis on religion (they advocated what they called a "spiritual socialism"), but also by tactical differences with the IP leadership, which the younger people around Nakhshab considered too conservative.³⁸ In 1952 (1331) Nakhshab's group contacted Bazargan and proposed the founding of a large, openly Islamic Party.³⁹ Given Ba-

³⁶ For an account of the founding of the National Front, see E. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 251-257.

³⁷ Bazargan, in his chronology of the Islamic movement in Iran in Show-ra-ye engelab va dowlat-e movagqat va sima-ye dowlat-e movagqat as valadat ta rahlat (The Council of the Revolution and the Provisional Government, and the Provisional Government from its Birth to its Death), (Teheran: LMI, 1982), p. 9, gives 1950; while Richard Cottam, in Nationalism, p. 266, gives the year 1952.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 265-266.

zargan's objections to the IP (vide infra), which resembled Nakhshab's, it is puzzling that he did not accept the offer. Perhaps Bazargan's pronounced Bazaar background made him somewhat suspicious of Nakhshab's 'socialism.' Also, in those years Bazargan did not see himself as a politician, and one must also bear in mind the generational gap between the two: Nakhshab was considerably younger. After Nakhshab left the Iran Party, he founded the "Society for the Freedom of the People of Iran," (Jam'iyat-e Azadi-ye Mardom-e Iran), which in 1953 (1332) finally became the "Party of the Iranian People" (Hezb-e Mardom-e Iran).

The third ideologically distinguishable current within the National Movement was the Pan-Iranist current of thought. Composed of anti-Arab and pro-German ultra-nationalists, this current was weakened by successive splits, some siding with Mosaddeq, others with the Shah. The numerical strength of the Pan-Iranists was never great. They concentrated their activities in high schools and universities, specializing in brawling with Tudeh sympathizers. Thus they managed to maintain a presence far out of proportion with their real weight.⁴⁰ The pro-Mosaddeq faction of the Pan-Iranists was organized by Dariush Foruhar into the Party of the Iranian Nation (Hezb-e mellat-e Iran).

³⁹ Yadnameh-ye bistomin salgard-e Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran (Commemorative Publication for the Twentieth Anniversary of the Liberation Movement of Iran), May 21, 1981 (Ordibehesht 31, 1360), p. 5.

⁴⁰ On the Pan-Iranists, see L. Binder, Iran, pp. 216-220, and Mehdi Mozafari, L'Iran (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1978), pp. 162-164.

The fourth element in the National Movement was its left wing, as represented by the Toilers' Party (Hezb-e zahmatkeshan) of Dr. Mozaffar Baqa'i and Khalil Maleki, the latter a renegade Tudeh leader. The Toilers Party split in 1952: Baqa'i left the National Front, while Khalil Maleki formed the Third Force party (Niru-ye sevvom), a party of vaguely Titoist sensibility which attracted many a leftist intellectual.⁴¹

To these four currents in the National Movement one has to add the "independent personalities," collaborators of Mosaddeq. The dichotomy between parties and personalities would lead to conflicts in later years.

The National Front had its moments of glory from March 1951 to August 1953, the years of Mosaddeq's Prime-Ministership and the struggle for the nationalization of oil. Although led by liberals, the National Front appealed above all to Nationalist sentiment in Iran.⁴²

5.2.2 The Religious Community

After 1941, the clergy revived after the humiliations inflicted upon it by Reza Shah. In 1945, at the death of S. Abolhasan Esfahani in Najaf and H. Hosein Qomi, the leadership of the Qum Howzeh-ye Elmiyeh passed to Ay. Borujerdi, a scholarly man with no political ambitions. For the first time the top leader of Shi'ism now resided inside Iran. Under Bo-

⁴¹ The main contemporary exegete of Khalil Maleki's Third Force is Homa Katouzian. See his introduction to Khalil Maleki, Khaterat-e siyasi (Political Memoirs) (Teheran: Entesharat-e Ravaq, 1979), pp. 9-248.

⁴² See R.K. Ramazani, "Intellectual Trends in the Politics of the Musad-diq Era," paper presented at the conference on Iranian nationalism organized in Austin, Texas, October 1985.

rujerdi's leadership (he soon became the sole marja') the bulk of the ulema stayed out of politics. Ay. Borujerdi applied himself to rebuilding the religious networks in Iran and strengthening the institutions of religious learning.⁴³ Some of the ulema supported conservative groups, such as S. Zia'eddin Tabataba'i's National Will Party.⁴⁴ But among those who engaged in autonomous political activity, two groups stand out.

The first is the movement associated with Ay. S. Abolqasem Kashani. An early foe of British influence in the Middle East (he had participated in the largely Shi'ite anti-English rebellion in Iraq in 1920), he was interned by the British occupiers in 1942 and spent the rest of World War II in jail. Kashani was not a marja', and the traditional clergy felt uneasy about his activities. His relations with Ay. Borujerdi were cool.⁴⁵ After the war, he became associated with an organization called the "Warriors of Islam" (Mojahedin-e Eslam). This group had not been founded by him but by a cleric named Shams Qanatabadi; but it soon came under the leadership of Kashani. With it, he became an important ally of Mosaddeq's, and his services as a skilful rabble-rouser soon proved to be very valuable to the National Movement, whose educated, often aristocratic, secular leaders had no such inclinations or tal-

⁴³ For a detailed discussion of these efforts, which ultimately made possible the clerical domination over the 1978 revolution (if not the revolution itself!), see Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics, pp. 65-91, and Hamid Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the ulema in Twentieth Century Iran," in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints, and Sufis. Muslim Religious Institutions since 1500. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 242-244.

⁴⁴ Nikki Keddie, Roots, p. 117. tion,

⁴⁵ On Kashani's place within the ulema see Sh. Akhavi, Religion and Politics, pp. 61-69, passim.

ents. But this alliance was based on common aims (the nationalization of oil and the general curtailment of foreign influence in Iran) rather than on common ideological grounds, and it is therefore not surprising that the relations between Mosaddeq and his secular followers on the one hand, and Kashani on the other, were marked by strains right from the beginning.

The first open signs of this rift appeared in the wake of the elections to the seventeenth majles in early 1952. Mosaddeq and his Minister of the Interior, Allahyar Saleh, had vowed that they would be the first truly open and free elections in Iran's history.

In Tabriz the National Front presented two slates of candidates for the nine available seats. An active campaign was waged between moderate intellectual figures associated with the Iran Party and religious figures supported by Kashani. The result was a stunning victory for the latter. The Iran Party, thoroughly alarmed, called for the Tabriz elections to be abrogated. (They were not.) In an editorial that, with the benefit of hindsight, can be called prophetic, the organ of the party stated: "We are in turn threatened by the possibility of military dictatorship and the rule of the clergy."⁴⁶ Faced with the possibility of not gaining a decisive majority in the elections, Mosaddeq stopped any further balloting after the necessary quorum of deputies had been reached.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Jebhe-ye azadi, February 20, 1952. As quoted in Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, second edition, 1978), pp. 153-154.

⁴⁷ For a full account of these elections, which were far too complicated to be gone into detail here, see R. Cottam, Nationalism, pp. 274-277.

In July 1952 (Tir 1331), Mosaddeq resigned from the Premiership after the Shah had refused him the right to name his own Defense Minister. It now appears that the street riots that brought Mosaddeq's triumphant return to power (July 21, 1952/ Tir 30, 1332) were largely the work of Kashani. For all this cooperation, Kashani demanded a price, namely a bigger say in the running of the country. This, Mosaddeq refused. As a result, Kashani parted ways with Mosaddeq in early 1953. It is a sign of Mosaddeq's charismatic hold on public opinion and popular emotion, that in spite of Kashani's great personal popularity before the split, the overwhelming majority of the National Movement, including its religious sector (such as the deputies from Tabriz), sided with Mosaddeq, while Kashani faded into obscurity. He died in 1962.⁴⁸

Most observers associated Kashani with a small traditionalist group of religious fanatics who called themselves the "Devotees of Islam" (Fada'iyān-e Eslām). It appears that Kashani skilfully manipulated them, but was not their leader. The group was founded in 1945 by a young mulla, Navvab Safavi.⁴⁹ They were the Iranian, Shi'ite, counterpart to the Muslim Brotherhood, but unlike these, never became a mass

⁴⁸ Because of his split with Mosaddeq, Kashani is one of the most vilified figures in recent Iranian history. After the revolution, the Islamic regime rehabilitated him, using his experience as an instrument in its struggle against the 'Liberals.' An objective view of his life and activities is just emerging. See Yann Richard, "Ayatollah Kashani: Precursor of the Islamic Republic?," in Nikki Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983).

⁴⁹ On the Devotees of Islam, see Adele Kazemi Ferdows Religion in Iranian Nationalism: Fedayani Islam. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Indiana, 1967; and also Farhad Kazemi, "The Fada'iyān-e Islam: Fanaticism, Politics, and Terror," in Said Amir Arjomand, ed., From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984).

movement. It appears that the intellectual level of the group's activists was uniformly mediocre. They were an important force in Iranian politics mainly in the late 1940's.⁵⁰ It now appears that the Devotees had early contacts with Ruhollah Khomeini, who was a second-rank mujtahid in Qum, and who had attacked the Pahlavi regime as early as 1943. In 1944 Khomeini had written a tract attacking Ahmad Kasravi, the flamboyant historian, nationalist essayist, and anti-clerical thinker.⁵¹ The Devotees interpreted Khomeini's pronouncement to mean that Kasravi's life was free for a Muslim to take, and consequently a Fada'i assassin by the name of Khalil Tahmasbi murdered Kasravi in 1946.⁵² In March 1951 another member of the organization assassinated the Prime Minister, General Ali Razmara, who was believed to be in collusion with the British. Shortly after the murder of Razmara, Kashani broke with the organization. As Richard Cottam notes, the entire concept of nationalism was

⁵⁰ For an interesting discussion of the similarities and differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Devotees of Islam, and of the influence of the latter upon the Islamic Republic of Iran after the revolution, see Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 93-99. For a comparison between the views of the Devotees of Islam and Khomeini's ideology, see Amir H. Ferdows, "Die Fedaiyan-e Eslam und Ayatollah Khomeyni: das Modell einer Islamischen Gesellschaft," in Kurt Greussing, ed., Religion und Politik im Iran (Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat, 1981), pp. 120-137.

⁵¹ For an account of their feud, see M.M.J. Fischer, Iran, pp. 130-133.

⁵² On Kasravi's brand of nationalism, see Ervand Abrahamian, "Kasravi: The Integrative Nationalist of Iran," in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim, eds., Towards a Modern Iran (London: Frank Cass, 1980), pp. 96-131; and Amin Banani, "Ahmad Kasravi and the "Purification" of Persian: A Study in Nationalist Motivation," in Ivo Banac, John G. Ackerman, and Roman Szporluk, eds., Nation and Ideology. Essays in Honor of Wayne Vucinich (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1981). Most secondary literature on Kasravi has centered on his nationalism. What is less well known, is that he also founded a new religion, which made him a heretic and apostate in the eyes of the ulema. Neither he nor his followers ever claimed to have formed a new cult, but

foreign to the Devotees. The strengthening of the secular arm of government and the refusal to take guidance from the religious leadership which accompanied Mosaddeq's rise quickly threw them into opposition. A year after Razmara's death, a Fada'i gunman wounded Dr. Hosein Fatemi, a leading anti-clerical Mosaddeqist. The gunman proclaimed that the Prime Minister had been his first target.⁵³ At this point, at the latest, the Devotees of Islam became anathema to the secular elements in the National Front, and began to be accused of connivance with the Court.

5.2.3 Early Activities

After 1941 the rise of the Tudeh was perceived as a great danger by Bazargan and Taleqani and propelled them to action. For them the struggle against the Tudeh has taken three forms in Iran. First, there is repression. This method was used by some of the conservative groups, like S. Zia's National Will Party, in the years of open politics 1941-1953, when they would occasionally burn Tudeh Party offices in the south of Iran; and by various governments, especially after 1953. The second method was political, national, and governmental action. This was the way of the National Movement. The third, and for people like Bazargan and Taleqani, the most efficient and correct way, was to confront Tudeh on the ideological level. They wanted to offer Iran's youth an alterna-

since they rejected some fundamental commandments of Islam (prayers, fasting) and introduced new types of worship, the conclusion is inescapable that we are dealing here with a new religion. See Yusef Faza'i, Tahqiqi dar tarikh va falsafeh-ye Babigari, Baha'igari va Kasravigara'i (An Investigation into the History and Beliefs of Bábism, Baha'ism, and Kasravism) (Teheran: Mo'aseseh-ye matbu'ati-ye Farrokhi, 1975), pp. 302-336.

⁵³ R. Cottam, Nationalism, p. 151.

tive to the Communists, who seemed to have history's dynamics on their side.

As they saw it, the Conservatives were backed by the West (then chiefly Britain), and Tudeh benefitted from Russian support. The clergy being hopelessly out of touch with the political situation and the spirit of the times, unwittingly contributed to the massive defection of Iran's youth from religion. The National Movement was certainly worthy of wholehearted support, but such support was not enough.

Bazargan and Taleqani experienced Tudeh's impact on society in many ways, and their responses to the communist challenge must be seen against this background. Bazargan had become a professor at the Technical Faculty of Teheran University, and in 1945 (1324) was elected its Dean. He was to hold that post for six years, serving with distinction. This is how he summed up Tudeh's influence on campus in the late 1940's:

In those days it was not easy to administer a Faculty. More difficult than all educational, technical, administrative, financial, and human problems was the struggle against the Tudeh members. You know, no doubt, that the Tudeh Party had made the university its main bastion. Tudeh activities reached their height in the years 1324-1330 [1945-1951], from the government of Qavam os-Saltaneh to that of Mosaddeq. We were besieged from all sides -- by students, professors, clerical workers, janitors. The communist students had taken over the university clubs, held their meetings in classrooms, ordered employees and workers to strike, and claimed they had a right to interfere with the curriculum. They had no discipline and committed all sorts of outrages and insults. Administrative and educational activities had totally broken down. These were truly dark days. You no doubt remember how one day they besieged the University Council and imprisoned the professors...⁵⁴

⁵⁴ M. Bazargan, Modafe'at, p. 116.

Taleqani diagnosed the situation as follows:

The biggest problem confronting Religion and the People after Shahrivar 20 (August 1941) was the rapid spread of Marxist and Materialist principles and the founding of the Tudeh Party. Iran's rulers have always made the mistake of trying to destroy any ideology or way of thinking that they deem harmful to their interests by pressure, force, jail, and killing. The fact is that beliefs and thoughts can not be wiped out in this fashion, and even if they are forced underground, will reappear under a new guise at the first opportunity.⁵⁵

The events following the reoccupation of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan by the forces of the central government in 1946 confirmed Taleqani in his views. He had been delegated by the ulema to accompany the troops, and to prepare a report on the affair afterwards. He went as a loyal supporter of the central government, addressing the officers and troops, praying for their success. After the rebels were routed, it became clear to him, however, that the lines between good and bad were not clearly drawn. The separatists had enjoyed a certain measure of popular support, had managed to limit corruption, and carried out useful reforms. They only lost popular support when they turned against religion. The behavior of the government troops, on the other hand, was far from exemplary. He remembers:

They had told us that the Democrats [as the separatists called themselves] had cut heads and looted people's property. They had conditioned us to believe that nothing remained of the city of Tabriz. But when we arrived there, we saw that although the Democrats had done such things to their enemies, most savage acts, including plunder and rape, had been perpetrated by the Army.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Quoted in Afrasiabi and Dehqan, Taleqani, p. 64.

⁵⁶ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 79.

For Taleqani and Bazargan the lesson of this state of affairs was that the struggle against Tudeh, in order to be efficient, had to take three forms: founding associations to counter their influence, preparing elements of an ideological alternative to Tudeh's attractive Materialism, and supporting Mosaddeq's National Movement. Among the associations that the future founders of the LMI were involved with, three stand out: The "Islamic Society," the Engineers Association, and the Islamic Student Association.

5.2.3.1 The Islamic Society

Sometime in late 1941 Taleqani founded the Kanun-e eslami, or Islamic Society. Its headquarters was on Amiriyeh Street, then a middle class neighborhood of Teheran. The aims of the Society were to discover, teach, and spread religious truths. It grew out of the regular religious meetings that Taleqani had organized as a continuation of his father's efforts. Soon, however, what with the hardship caused by the allied occupation, the Society also started welfare activities at a modest level.⁵⁷ Towards the end of 1941 the Society started publishing its own journal, called Danesh-amuz, "Seeker of Knowledge."

As we saw, Bazargan was approached by the editors of this journal to contribute an article. The piece he wrote -- it appeared in 1942 -- he called "Religion in Europe." It was to be his first article after his return to Iran and he recalls its genesis as follows:

Next to my professional activities I considered my most important task making my compatriots understand that the civilized, developed, real Europe [was] not the Europe of the novels and

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 64.

the cinema. Europe had not become Europe because of the men's ties and the women's lipstick. Europe had spirituality, religion, and ideals. It [was] dynamic, had the will to sacrifice, and [was imbued with] righteousness and social spirit.

In those days Europe was the model for all Iranians.⁵⁸

Bazargan's article was critical both of the West and of Iran. He wrote that Europeans were clean although their religion had discouraged cleanliness in the Middle Ages, whereas Muslims were obsessed with ritual hygiene and lived in filth.⁵⁹

The year 1942 also marks the beginning of Bazargan's and Sahabi's close collaboration with the Islamic Society proper. They attended Taleqani's Qoran interpretation sessions, and after a while mastered the technique themselves, to the point that they (and later other LMI figures) have published exegeses (tafsir) of various suras from the Muslim Holy Book.

It was during these meetings that Bazargan first began reflecting in a sustained way on the congruence between modern science and Islamic tenets; tenets which were accepted as a matter of course by believers and ridiculed as superstition by secular modernists. In 1943 (1322) Bazargan published his first study on the matter, in which he set out to prove with mathematical formulae and using the laws of chemistry and physics that Islamic prescriptions for ablution and personal cleanliness

⁵⁸ M. Bazargan, Modafe'at, pp. 73 and 77.

⁵⁹ Mazhab dar Orupa (Religion in Europe), edited and annotated by Hadi Khosrowshahi (Tabriz: 1382 A.H., third printing), p. 53. Khosrowshahi systematically qualified all the good things that Bazargan had to say about Christians and the West. After the Islamic revolution he became ambassador to the Holy See!

(motahharat), an important chapter in Islamic jurisprudence, were grounded in science, more specifically the principles of biochemical filtration.⁶⁰

Parallel to Taleqani's activities in Teheran, Mohammad-Taqi Shariati, Ali Shariati's father, was pursuing similar aims in Mashad (Iran's other "religious capital" and, unlike Qum, an important city in its own right) with his "Center for the Propagation of Islamic Truths" (Kanun-e nashre-e haqayeq-e eslami).

5.2.3.2 The Engineers Association

While in France, Bazargan had come to frequent the meetings of the Société des ingénieurs civils de France, the professional association of French engineers.⁶¹ Thus, in 1942 he became one of the leading figures in the founding of the Iranian equivalent of that association, the Kanun-e Mohandesin, which was joined by the overwhelming majority of Iranian engineers.

The Engineers Association first attracted attention in April 1943, when it called a strike throughout Iran, soon joined by professionals in other fields. The slogan of the strike was "entrust tasks to the qualified," for as the association saw it, the older generation of bureaucrats was preventing younger and more skilled professionals from exercising authority and responsibility in their areas of expertise. The strike was called off after a few weeks, having brought about a consid-

⁶⁰ Modafe'at, p. 78,

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 57.

erable shake-up of bureaucratic procedure. Engineers and other skilled personnel were appointed to key positions in government agencies and on the administrative boards of educational establishments. Moreover, the University gained its independence, and every faculty gained the right to send two elected representatives to the University Council.

Tudeh had jumped on the band-wagon of the strike, and actually organized most of the supportive action elsewhere. A few months after the victory, Tudeh sympathizers within the association seceded from it. Accusing the association's leadership of working too closely with the Iran Party (which, as we have seen, had grown out of the association), they formed their own Syndicate of Engineers and Technicians, affiliating to the Tudeh dominated Trade Union Movement. The Syndicate soon overtook the Engineers Association in terms of membership, and by 1946 was the main representative body of engineers.⁶² After the split the Engineers Association's activities were more scientific and its political role diminished, largely because the Iran Party was now available as a vehicle for political action.

The Association's Central Council, reelected annually, practiced political pluralism and from its very inception Bazargan always belonged to it. A number of times he was elected its president. His popularity among his peers can be gauged by the fact that he received his highest personal score in the elections of 1964, when he was in prison and could not campaign. More particularly, Bazargan was entrusted with two tasks:

⁶² After 1953, however, the Tudeh and all the organizations it had spawned were outlawed, whereas the Engineers Association has never ceased functioning.

presiding over the association's loan fund, and editing its organ, San'-at (Industry), for which he also regularly wrote technical articles.⁶³

5.2.3.3 The Islamic Student Associations

From the very beginning, Tudeh concentrated an important part of its propaganda efforts on the country's student body. Even after 1946, when the party had to revert to semi-clandestinity, the Government would continue tolerating Tudeh activities among students.⁶⁴ In April 1943 Tudeh began its activities on the the campus of Teheran University, then the country's only one. In that month the party's youth organization, formed a month earlier, opened a club near the Faculty of Medicine, and attracting members, established a student union. By February 1945, the union won recognition from university authorities as the official representative of medical students.⁶⁵ Although Tudeh publications tried to avoid direct attacks on religion, the organized presence of so many communist or pro-communist students on campus was resented by those students, mostly from the provinces, who were believers and found it difficult to have to perform their daily prayers in secret. In addition Baha'is were actively proselytizing among the students. To stem this tide of what Muslims perceived to be anti-religious propaganda, some medical students founded the first Islamic Student Association at the

⁶³ Information on the Engineers Association is taken from M. Bazargan, Modafe'at, pp. 102-104, and E. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 329-331. In later years Bazargan also founded an Islamic Association of Engineers and an Alumni Association of the Technical Faculty of Teheran University.

⁶⁴ M. Bazargan, Modafe'at, pp. 117-122.

⁶⁵ E. Abrahamian, Iran, p. 331.

university's Faculty of Medicine in 1944.⁶⁶

The Association's main aim was the spreading of religious propaganda, thus counteracting Tudeh's and the Baha'is efforts. Its statute spelled out four objectives:

1. To reform society on the basis of Islamic precepts,
2. To foster friendship and unity among Muslims, especially the young intellectuals among them,
3. To publicize Islamic Truth by means of propaganda centers and written publications, and
4. To struggle against superstitions.

The program's preamble said that what had prompted this action was the fact that society's leaders had not measured up to their responsibilities for ensuring that Islamic laws and practice be respected in the country.⁶⁷

The ISA quickly spread to other educational establishments. Ezzatollah Sahabi, Yadollah Sahabi's son, became an early member of the Technical Faculty's ISA, and was the editor of the two publications of the ISA's: First, until 1950 (1329) Forugh-e elm ("The Light of Science"), and then Ganj-e shayegan ("The Bountiful Treasure").⁶⁸ The ISA's solli-

⁶⁶ This date is given by E. Sahabi in Naser Hariri, Mosahebeh ba tari-khsazan-e Iran (Interviews with Makers of Iranian History) (Teheran: 1979), pp. 173-74; and by Bahram Afrasiabi and Sa'id Dehqan, Taleqani, p. 75. M. Bazargan, however, gives 1942 as the founding date of the ISA. Cf. M. Bazargan, Modafe'at, p. 78.

⁶⁷ Quoted from M. Bazargan, Modafe'at, pp. 78-81.

⁶⁸ Modafe'at-e mohandes Ezzatollah Sahabi dar bidadgah-e tajdid-e nazar-e nezami (The Defenses of Engineer Ezzatollah Sahabi in the Military Court of Appeals) ([Springfield, MO]: LMI[a], 1976), pp. 5-6.

cited the cooperation of Bazargan, Sahabi, and Taleqani, and they responded favorably. The titles of some of Bazargan's talks at the Association ("Islam or Communism," "Pragmatism in Islam," "Labor in Islam"), which were then printed in the Association's publications, reflect the preoccupation with communism. Taleqani's major contribution was a talk on "Ownership in Islam," which in later years was to become a major source of inspiration for Islamic economics.⁶⁹ These early talks by Bazargan, Sahabi, and Taleqani became the seeds of the LMI's ideological canon.

The activities of the Islamic Student Associations, mostly held on Fridays, were essentially religious and its members shunned political involvement, at least until 1951 (1330), when Mosaddeq's struggle for the nationalization of oil began in earnest. At that point many ISA members became active in the Nationalist movement, but never qua ISA members.

However novel the concept of intellectuals forming Islamic associations may have been in the years 1941-1953, the general atmosphere among Iran's intelligentsia in those years was secular. Thus, the real influence and impact on society of the Islamic Students Associations was negligible in the years prior to the coup.⁷⁰ Their importance lay in the fact that they were seedbeds for a new generation of political activists who entered politics after the 1953 coup, when many members joined the National Resistance Movement, and when, unlike political parties, the

⁶⁹ For details, see chapter 3.

⁷⁰ This is admitted by Ezzatollah Sahabi in Naser Hariri, Mosahebeh, p. 173.

ISA's could continue functioning openly (although they had to restrict their activities). While it is true that Sahabi, Bazargan, and Taleqani co-operated closely with the Associations, many others, whose political options would later diverge considerably from the LMI, did also. Thus, the ISA's were also the structure where some future fundamentalist leaders would get their first organizational experience.

Following the Student Associations, Islamic Teachers, and even Physicians Associations were also founded, but failed to gain any importance. Although large parts of the clergy looked askance at these associations, since they undermined their monopoly on the country's religious life, the ISA's organized regular trips to Qum, where members could come together with young tollab (seminarians) for discussion and exchange of ideas.

5.2.3.4 Religious Activities

In the wider sense of the term, Bazargan's, Sahabi's, and Taleqani's involvement with the Islamic Center and the Islamic Student Association is of course religious. Here, we are concerned with Taleqani the cleric. For, as we shall see, his understanding of his role as a mulla was rather atypical for his time.

Taleqani had multiple activities. He taught at the Sepahsalar School, Teheran's main center of religious learning. In 1948 (1327) he became the emam-e jama'at of the Hedayat Mosque, located on Istanbul Ave. in what was then Teheran's modern business district. In due time this mosque became an important and much frequented gathering place for

religious Mosaddeqists. His thursday evening sermons and talks⁷¹ earned him a modest notoriety in Nationalist circles.⁷²

But Taleqani's major contribution to the spreading of the Islamic message was his innovative and daring use of the mass media. In early 1947 (Bahman 1325) the Internal Propaganda Office of the Ministry of Labor and Propaganda (sic!) had invited "the distinguished orator" S. Mahmud Taleqani to contribute articles which could be read over the radio. The ulema had always shunned the airwaves, arguing that they spread corruption (i.e. music). Taleqani's response was characteristic of him:

[I have been invited] to publish a few articles over the radio. There are two reasons why I found it difficult to accept. First there are the reservations many believers have about the radio. Second there are my own occupations and activities. However, upon consulting certain ulema and religious (fiqh) sources, I see no more obstacle. For although this mysterious apparatus is also used for corruption (lahv), it was not invented for that purpose; and the definition of an instrument of corruption (alat-e lahv) demands that it be invented for that purpose, not merely used for it!

Inspite of all their purity and virtue, the righteous ulema have to be faulted for their negative attitude, as a result of which they have deprived themselves of all means of propaganda (tabligh) and education, leaving the field free for the ignorant... Jihad, in its general sense, and amr-e beh ma'ruf va nahy-e az monkar ⁷³ by means of all available instruments are among the obvious commandments of the living religion of Islam.⁷⁴

⁷¹ These would often be discussed in the meetings of the ISA's, which met on the morrow of the Hedayat Mosque gatherings.

⁷² For an account of how Taleqani became involved with the Hedayat Mosque, see Afrasiabi and Dehqan, Taleqani, pp. 107-108.

⁷³ Two Shi'ite articles of faith, meaning "enjoining what is good and preventing what is evil."

⁷⁴ As quoted in Afrasiabi and Dehqan, Taleqani, pp. 84-85.

In his weekly talks Taleqani dealt with topics of general interest, illustrating his points with episodes from the life of the Prophet. Having noticed that the hadith and suras he included in his articles were often misread, he started giving only their content in Persian. The general style of these pieces, where the Prophet and other leading figures of early Islam were talked about in everyday language, was also rather unorthodox. Taleqani's aim was to derive exemplary significance from events which, until then, had been shrouded in ritual and myth.⁷⁵ This method of making Islamic history "relevant," increasingly adopted by others in later years, would become an indispensable element in the rhetoric of the Islamic Movement of the 1960's and 1970's. These radio-talks were discontinued by the government after a while.

5.2.3.5 Political Activities

Politically speaking, Bazargan was the more active of the two, but it would be wrong to call him a politician in this period. Although a founding member and leader of the Engineers Association, he never became a card-carrying member of the Iran Party (by other accounts he only left the party after its alliance with the Tudeh in 1946). Bazargan saw this party as nationalist, socialist, and modernist, but lacking a veritable ideology. Its members, in his judgment, were well-meaning, reformist individuals who thought that for the country's ills to be cured it was enough that qualified and honest individuals occupy key positions in politics and administration. Unlike Tudeh, they did not believe in the necessity of deep ideological, social and political change to reform so-

⁷⁵ Examples of these articles can be found in *ibid.*, pp. 86-101.

ciety. He did not become a member of the Iran Party because he felt no disposition for party politics and because he was more interested in ideology, spiritual renewal, and self-improvement.⁷⁶

This did not prevent him from having many friends in the Iran Party, occasionally attending their meetings, and giving a number of talks. Two of these were later published. They are entitled "The Coefficient of Conversion between Material and Spiritual Matters" and "Swearing and Ta'arof in Iran." In the first talk he tried to get accross the point that spiritual values and morality were not only important from a religious or humanistic point of view, but also for the pursuit of mundane matters in everyday life. Therefore political reform programs should not neglect them. If nothing else, a higher degree of public morality would lead to savings in the budgets for the police and the judiciary, as many preventive measures, taken in anticipation of infractions, would become superfluous. In the second article Bazargan pointed out that the florid conventions of the Persian language and its ritualized courtesy formulas (ta'arof), favored artificiality and thereby predisposed its speakers for insincerity. Iranians, therefore, had to make extra efforts to be honest.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ This view of the Iran Party is given in Modafe'at, pp. 109-112. It has to be taken cum grano salis, however. Let us not forget, that this book was written after the events of the early 1960's. There was a lot of bitterness then between the leadership of the LMI and the secular leaders of the National Front. Bazargan may be projecting back in time his pessimistic view of the Iran Party as it was in 1964.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 110. Cf. his views on the national character of Iranians, as described in chapter 3.

The founding of the National Front in 1949 was greeted with relief by Bazargan. He admits that he and his likes had failed to get through to the hearts of the young at Teheran University and that the ISA had not managed to weaken the Tudeh's grip on the student-body.⁷⁸ The struggle for the nationalization of the oil industry had finally provided a counter-attraction to the lure of communism. For the first time Nationalist candidates opposed Tudeh candidates in student elections and won. The élan of Tudeh's penetration of the University was broken.

After Mosaddeq became Prime Minister in March 1951, his Minister of Education, Dr. Karim Sanjabi, a leading figure of the Iran Party, invited Bazargan to become his deputy. He accepted reluctantly. Soon, however, Bazargan was called upon to perform far more momentous tasks. He was chosen by Mosaddeq to become Chairman of the Provisional Board of Directors of the newly founded National Iranian Oil Company, in charge of overseeing the transfer of operations from the British to Iranians. When Engineer Kazem Hasibi brought him Mosaddeq's offer, he went to Taleqani's Hedayat Mosque, performed a Qoranic bibliomancy, and accepted. He performed the task successfully, but resigned after ten months and returned to his Thermodynamics Laboratory. It is said that Hasan Makk-i's constant meddling in oil affairs caused Bazargan's disenchantment. Academia could not hold him, however, for soon the head of the Plan Organization, Eng. Ahmad Zanganeh, also a leading Iran Party member, asked him to oversee the installation of Teheran's water-supply network. He was busy with this task when General Zahedi's coup ousted Mosaddeq.

⁷⁸ Modafe'at, pp. 123-124.

As we have seen, Bazargan had no political ambitions in the years 1941-1953. Mosaddeq knew him only vaguely in those days, but had a high opinion of his managerial capabilities. As a result, he would have liked Bazargan to accept a cabinet post, such as the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone.⁷⁹ Bazargan consistently refused. It is said⁸⁰ that he secretly coveted the Ministry of Culture (with its responsibility for education). This Mosaddeq, who, although not antireligious, was "religiously unmusical," to use Weber's felicitous term, would not give him, arguing that Eng. Bazargan wanted to "put kerchiefs on the heads of school girls." The story may be apocryphal, but it is not implausible.

Taleqani's activities in those years were mostly religious, as we have seen. He was in contact both with religious politicians, such as the Devotees of Islam and Kashani, and secular politicians of the National Movement; and his main aim was to bridge the gap between the two currents. He warned Kashani not to break with Mosaddeq, but when the break occurred, like most politically active clerics, he sided with the latter. In 1979, in a speech on Mosaddeq's tomb commemorating the anniversary of his death, Taleqani spoke of the split between Mosaddeq and the Devotees. Typically he suspected foreign agents behind it. Noting that the period of unity between religious and secular forces had seen great accomplishments (i.e. the nationalization of oil), he laments the breakdown of this understanding, which he explained as follows:

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 162.

⁸⁰ Convergent testimonies of personalities linked to the National Front, as interviewed in Paris, July 1982.

They [spies, agents of despotism etc.] told the Fada'iyān that it had been they who had advanced the Movement. To that, the Fada'iyān replied that they wanted full Islamic government. They told them that Mosaddeq was irreligious and will not heed your wishes. To Mosaddeq they said that the Fada'iyān were fanatic young terrorists and that he should shun them. I wanted to create understanding between the two, but that was impossible. Mosaddeq would say that he neither pretended to be working towards Islamic government, nor intended to remain Prime Minister forever. He asked them for time to finish the oil business. The Fada'iyān insisted that he act according to their wishes. That is how they separated that wing [from the Movement]. Then they went to Kashani. Spies whom I knew personally surrounded him and separated him from Mosaddeq.⁸¹

His most visible political activity came in early 1952, when Taleqani became a Nationalist candidate in the Caspian provinces (the shores of the Caspian Sea, an area with a long radical tradition) for the elections to the seventeenth Majles. The initiative to invite him to become a candidate seems to have come from the large immigrant population of people from the Taleqan Valley who lived in the North. His opponents were Tudeh candidates and from the Conservative, Royalist side, an important land-owner by the name of Zal-e Zar. Taleqani's candidacy was warmly endorsed by Ay. Kashani. He appears to have waged an active campaign, but we cannot tell whether he could have become a deputy, because the northern constituencies were among those where Mosaddeq halted the election process after the quorum of 97 elected members had been reached for the seventeenth Majles.⁸² Incidentally, the same fate was reserved for Mohammad-Taqi Shariati's candidacy in Mashad. There various religious organizations had presented a common slate of candidates, among them Shariati (another candidate was Sheikh Halabi, founder of the

⁸¹ Quoted in Afrasiabi and Dehqan, Taleqani, pp. 139-140.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 142-144.

ultra-conservative, anti-Baha'i, traditionalist Hojjatiyyeh society).⁸³

Summarizing Bazargan's and Taleqani's political involvement in the twelve years of open politics that preceded the 1953 coup, we can say that it took place at a relatively low level, that neither was particularly close to the charismatic leader of the National Movement, and that the privileged sphere of their activities was the as yet small world of modernist Shi'ism. As we have seen, the National Movement of Mosaddeq was torn by strife between secular and religious elements. Until his break with Mosaddeq, Kashani had been the pole around which religious Nationalists congregated. Had the National Front been allowed to function openly, in due course Bazargan and Taleqani might have taken Kashani's place at the center of a reconstituted and reformulated religious wing of the National Front. But there was not enough time for such a development to take place.

It bears emphasizing that at all critical moments in the life of the National Front the future founders of the LMI sided with Mosaddeq (and by implication, the secular forces). This shows that in those years they did not directly mix politics with religion: they were Nationalists who happened to be good Muslims. Their relative obscurity prior to the coup was to be both an asset and a handicap in the next stage, namely the formation of the National Resistance Movement.

⁸³ Interview with H. Mohammad Shanehchi, Paris, July 1982.

5.3 THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

On August 19, 1953 (Mordad 28, 1332) the Iranian army, under the leadership of General Fazlollah Zahedi and with generous help from the CIA, toppled Mosaddeq and called back the Shah from his temporary exile in Rome.⁸⁴ Mosaddeq and most of his close collaborators were arrested or went into hiding; his Foreign Minister and arguably the most radical of the country's leaders, Dr. Hosein Fatemi, was executed on November 10, 1954 (Aban 19, 1333).

Barely a few days after the coup, in late August or early September, a few low-ranking Mosaddeqists established contacts among themselves to try to set up some sort of organization that might keep the flame of Nationalism alive. Perhaps because all main secular Iran Party politicians were in jail, most of these men were more religiously oriented. They were soon joined by others, who, while not religious, sympathized with their radical aims.

Roughly a month after the coup Ay. S. Reza Zanjani, a leading Mosaddeqist cleric from Teheran, convened a first meeting. The initiative was shared by the late Dr. Abdollah Mo'azzami (d. 1972), a member of the Iran Party who had replaced Ay. Kashani as Speaker of the Majles after the latter's break with Mosaddeq. Present at this meeting were: Ay. S. Reza Zanjani, Dr. Mo'azzami, Abbas Sami'i, Eng. Abdorrahim Ata'i, Eng. Mansur Ata'i, Abbas Radnia, Mehdi Bazargan, and Shah-Hoseini. These men, plus Hasan Nazih, who joined a few weeks later, became the Central

⁸⁴ For an account of this coup see Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

Council (Kadr-e Markazi) of the National Resistance Movement.⁸⁵ They immediately issued a statement declaring "nehzat edameh darad" (the movement goes on), and established contact with Dr. Fatemi, who was still in hiding.⁸⁶

As already indicated, most initiators of the NRM were lower level collaborators of Mosaddeq. This lack of previous visibility meant that the newly installed government took relatively little notice of their activities, a fact which facilitated their moves. This does not mean, however, that the Government was not suspecting anything: Ay. Zanjani's house was under constant surveillance, and Bazargan was told that although his activities were known, the Prime Minister wanted him to finish his job of bringing drinking water to the inhabitants of Teheran (Bazargan resigned in February 1954).⁸⁷

5.3.1 The Composition of the NRM

Most initial members of the NRM came from a religious Bazaar background. Abbas Radnia, Abbas Sami'i, and Hasan Nazih, a Swiss-educated lawyer and former Iran Party member who had switched to the Party for The Unity of Iran after the 1946 split (vide supra), had secular views, but coming from Bazaar families, had a certain affinity with people like Bazargan

⁸⁵ Unless otherwise indicated, information on the NRM has been obtained from Hasan Nazih in an interview, July 18, 1982, Paris.

⁸⁶ Bizhan Jazani, Tarh-e jame'eh shenasi va mabani'ye estratezhiki-ye jonbesh-e engelabi-ye khalq-e Iran -- Tarikh-e si saleh-ye Iran (The Sociology and Strategic Bases of the Revolutionary Movement of the Iranian People -- Iran's Thirty Year History) (Teheran: Maziar, 1979), p. 83.

⁸⁷ M. Bazargan, Modafe'at, pp. 145-149.

and Zanjani. Eng. Mansur Ata'i had been Minister of Agriculture in one of Mosaddeq's cabinets and was a member of the Engineers Association. His (and Bazargan's) nephew, Abdorrahim (Rahim) Ata'i (1920-1977) had studied at Dar ol-Fonun high school in Teheran and then read Law and Political Science at Teheran University, joined the Iran Party, and left it in 1946. He then worked for the State Railway Company, and soon became the head of its accounting division. Here he started a drive against corruption and bad management and produced the first surplus in the history of the Company. As a high-ranking employee of the Railway Company his task was complicated by the activities of the Tudeh-led unions.⁸⁸ Rahim Ata'i's brother-in-law, Ezzatollah Sahabi, long active in the ISA's, was also a major figure in the NRM.

They were soon joined by Dr. Nakhshab and his Party of the Iranian People, whose younger members were often active in the Islamic Student Associations. In Mashad the NRM was led by Taher Ahmadzadeh. Here, many of the members of the circle around Mohammad-Taqi Shariati, including himself and his son, Ali Shariati, were also active. Ali Shariati and many of the young PIP members (such as Kazem Sami, who would rise to a certain prominence in later years) had in the years prior to the coup been members of Dr. Nakhshab's Society of God-Fearing Socialists. Nakhshab himself, however, left Iran for New York City in the mid-1950's and took a Ph.D. in Public Administration at N.Y.U.

⁸⁸ Biographical information for the late Rahim Ata'i is taken from an article announcing his premature death that appeared in the organ of the LMI (Abroad), Payam-e Mujahid (Houston), Mehr 1356 (September 1977), p. 3.

In Teheran most of the activists of the NRM came from the University or the Bazaar. The university students tended to be members of the Islamic Student Association, which means that many had probably Bazaar connections.

The NRM did include some secular intellectuals, however. After the coup, Khalil Maleki, the leader and founder of the Third Force party, had been arrested and jailed in Luristan. With his arrest, the party, which had never been very big, went underground. Three weeks later, two other leaders of the Third Force, Dr. Mohammad-Ali Khonji (d. 1972) and Dr. Mas'ud Hejazi, accused Maleki of being a traitor, because he had visited the Shah once.⁸⁹ A split occurred, and the faction that followed Khonji and Hejazi was admitted to the NRM.⁹⁰

The Iran Party, on the other hand, joined the NRM only for a short period. Initially most of its leaders were in jail or abroad anyway. After some time, however, the IP was admitted to the NRM, together with Foruhar's Party of the Iranian Nation. In early 1955 disagreements occurred within the NRM leadership. The secular intellectuals of the IP and the PIN argued that the new regime was consolidating itself, and that opposition to it should be cautious. Leading figures like Dr. Sanjabi and Allahyar Saleh attacked only the administration in their state-

⁸⁹ The prime motivation for Dr. Khonji's falling out with Maleki seems to have been his unsuccessful courting of a woman member of the Third Force, whom Maleki had advised not to marry Khonji. I give this little piece of detail not to relate gossip but to show that there are limits to what social science research can explain about political moves.

⁹⁰ The information on the Third Force comes from H. Katouzian's introduction to Khalil Maleki, Khaterat, pp. 114-123, and M. Mozafari, L'Iran, pp. 176-179.

ments, sparing the Shah himself. The original members of the NRM, by contrast, insisted on identifying the Shah himself as the main element of the regime. These tactical differences of opinion explain why the people around Bazargan and Taleqani became emotional radicals in the eyes of the more politically prudent leadership of what had been the National Front. Later in 1955 the IP and the PIN left the NRM.⁹¹ The IP leader who was most active in the NRM was Dr. Shapur Bakhtiar, who had been deputy Minister of Labor in Mosaddeq's last cabinet.⁹²

From among the clergy, very few became active in the NRM. Ay. Borujerdi, then Shi'ism's main marja', had congratulated the Shah upon his return to Iran. We now know,⁹³ that under the direction of Ay. Behbahani, a pro-Court cleric, letters with forged Tudeh signatures were sent to all major mullas in Iran, threatening that they would be "hanged by their own turbans from the lamp-posts of Iran's streets." Many were thus hoodwinked into believing that a communist take-over was imminent, which led them to support the coup. Besides, in those years most ulema were supporting the Court anyway.

On the whole relations between the regime and the ulema were courteous and good in the 1950's. The Shah managed to buy a certain amount of goodwill by instituting an anti-Baha'i campaign, and the ulema quietly acquiesced in the crushing of the Devotees of Islam (Navvab Safavi was

⁹¹ E. Sahabi, as quoted in N. Hariri, Mosahebeh, pp. 174-177.

⁹² It is probably for this reason that, after 1979, he called his Paris-based anti-Khomeini movement 'National Resistance Movement' too.

⁹³ The revelations are made by Taher Ahmadzadeh in the section he contributed to Afrasiabi and Dehqan, Taleqani, p. 121.

executed in 1955).⁹⁴ Taleqani, Zanjani, and the late Ay. Khonsari were thus in a tiny minority.

5.3.2 Organization

The Central Council of the NRM met at irregular intervals in the houses of its members, usually when responses had to be formulated to particular policy initiatives of the Shah's.

From the outset, the Bazaar played an important role in the organization of the Movement. In September of 1953 Bazaar merchants were said to have constituted a secret committee with a capital of forty million rials to help bring back Mosaddeq.⁹⁵ The NRM's own expenses did not amount to much and were met by prominent Bazaar leaders such as H. Maghfur Shamshiri, owner of a famous chelo-kabab restaurant in the Bazaar, Haji Qasemiyeh, an important cotton merchant, and Taqi Anvari, a wholesale textile merchant. This involvement of the Bazaar also meant that declarations, pamphlets, newsletters, and other documents could easily be disseminated throughout Iran concealed in the constant flow of merchandise.

Unlike the Tudeh elements that had returned to the underground after the coup, none of the founders of the NRM had any experience in clandestine organization: they had to improvise. It was decided to form cells of three to five members. In order to maintain maximum secrecy, the

⁹⁴ For State-Clergy relations 1953-1958 see Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics, pp. 72-90.

⁹⁵ Edouard Sablier, "L'extravagant en pyjama," in Le Monde, September 18, 1953.

members of one such cell would not know the identity of other cells' members.⁹⁶ Such cells were also formed outside Teheran. In Qazvin Dr. Ahmad Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi was active. Tabriz and the Caspian provinces knew some activity, but the most important center outside Teheran was Mashad, as described earlier. One member of each cell maintained contact with the Central Council.

In Teheran, Taleqani's Hedayat Mosque also provided a relatively safe place for religiously oriented Nationalists to come together and discuss the issues of the day.

5.3.3 Activities

The first open act of defiance against Zahedi's regime sponsored by the NRM took place on October 8, 1953 (Mehr 16, 1332) when thousands of students demonstrated against the coup. The next opportunity to manifest opposition to the coup was provided by Mosaddeq's trial, which began on November 8 (Aban 17) and provoked widespread strikes and demonstrations in Teheran and the provinces. The Bazaar declared a general strike for November 12 (Aban 21, 1332), and a mass demonstration was organized in front of the Bazaar. Repression was harsh: thousands were arrested and exiled, including prominent Bazaar leaders. Shamshiri was exiled to Khark Island in the Persian Gulf. To add insult to injury, the Government destroyed parts of the Bazaar's ceiling, not merely an act of random destruction but one imbued with great symbolic significance in Iran.

⁹⁶ One such group, for instance, included Hasan Nazih, Abbas Sami'i, Abbas Radnia, and Rahim Ata'i.

A few weeks after these events it was announced that the Vice-President of the United States, Richard Nixon, was to visit Iran. Also, Iran reestablished diplomatic relations with Britain, which Mosaddeq had broken. The NRM planned further mass-actions to protest against these, as they saw it, acts of treachery. Unrest began on December 5 (Azar 14) and gradually spread to all faculties of Teheran University. To forestall further action, the government took the offensive and in the morning of December 7, 1953 (Azar 16, 1332), the day Nixon was due to arrive, security forces attacked the Technical Faculty of Teheran University. Three students were killed by machine gun fire.⁹⁷ The events of December 7 had a great significance in recent Iranian history, and the day has since been Iran's unofficial "University Day."

In all these instances the NRM tried to repeat the July 21 uprising of 1952 (Tir 30, 1331), when popular demonstrations had brought Mosaddeq back to power after the Shah had attempted to replace him with Qavam. All these actions, incidentally, took place with the active collaboration of the Tudeh. However, since the NRM lacked any kind of organizational preparation, these acts of protest were quite easily repressed, and it is estimated that there were between ten and fifty deaths. Of the many more who were arrested, most were young high school or university students, of which many were exiled to remote places in the south of Iran.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Bozorgnia, Qandchi, and Shari'at Razavi. The latter's sister later married Ali Shariati.

⁹⁸ The information on these demonstrations has been obtained from Farrokhzad Dadachpour, Les partis politiques et la vie politico-sociale en Iran depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale. Thèse Lettres, Paris, 1964, p. 406; and Zendeginameh-ye sardar-e rashid-e eslam shahid doktor

In late winter 1954 (Esfand 1332) the NRM produced a letter bearing the signatures of its leading members to protest against the lack of democratic freedom surrounding the elections to the eighteenth Majles. To distribute the letter among the people of Teheran, at one point Bazargan and Bakhtiar had to take a taxi and drive around Teheran, throwing copies out of the windows and speaking in French to conceal their identity and purpose from the driver.⁹⁹ This episode shows how weak the organizational capacities of the NRM were: whatever sympathy it may have commanded in the population, it could not rely on a vast network of activists.

The NRM also attempted to put out a regular publication, which was called Rah-e Mosaddeq ("Mosaddeq's Way"). Given the regime's vigilance, it could only appear sporadically and few issues saw the light of day. Another publication was Hashiyeh bi hashiyeh ("Never mind annotation") devoted to developments on the international scene for which Rahim Ata'i did most of the work. Given his international interests, Ata'i (together with a young NRM activist by the name of Abbas Amir-Entezam) were also in contact with an American graduate student, Richard Cottam, whose research in Iran led to his study on Iranian nationalism.

The main activist leaders of the NRM were often imprisoned for their activities. Ay. Taleqani, in spite of his having taken sides with Mosaddeq after the Devotees of Islam had fallen out with the Prime Minister, extended his help to the terrorist organization and sheltered Nav-

Mostafa Chamran (Biography of ... Dr. Chamran) (Teheran: LMI, 1982), pp. 8-9.

⁹⁹ Shapur Bakhtiar, personal interview, Suresnes, August 19, 1983.

vab Safavi on a few occasions. In the end he could not prevent the organization from being crushed, but for his efforts on their behalf he was jailed a number of times, always for short periods. This fact alone limited his participation in the NRM, and consequently he does not stand out as one of the main organizers of the movement.¹⁰⁰

In 1955 Bazargan and Ezzatollah Sahabi were arrested. When they were freed, they found that the IP had left the NRM, and that from among the top-level organizers of the NRM only Rahim Ata'i and Yadollah Sahabi were left.¹⁰¹

By now the security apparatus of the Shah regime had become more and more efficient (SAVAK was founded in 1957), and it became increasingly difficult to engage in any sort of anti-regime activity. The last important acts of the NRM were the dissemination, in 1957, of two long open letters. The first commented on the change in Iran's constitution in 1957,¹⁰² The other was based on foreign press reports and was a reflection upon the economic and political consequences of the 1954 oil

¹⁰⁰ That Taleqani should have chosen to aid the Fada'iyan shows that even for as enlightened a cleric as he was, ultimate aims counted for more than the methods used to attain them. There is no doubt that Taleqani disapproved of the tactical decisions of the Devotees, and we know that he had always attempted to bring them back into the fold of the National Movement. Yet when they called on him to ask for his help, he hid them, both in his own house, and in a hamlet in Taleqan. (See Afrasiabi and Dehqan, Taleqani, p. 158.) The episode throws some doubt on Taleqani's (and by extension, the LMI's) commitment to democracy as an ultimate value. It may also explain some of the distaste many secular National Front leaders felt for the leaders of the NRM.

¹⁰¹ E. Sahabi, as quoted in N. Hariri, Mosahebeh, p. 175.

¹⁰² See M. Mozafari, L'Iran, p. 82.

agreement¹⁰³ Both letters were written by Hasan Nazih, and apparently caused a certain amount of unhappiness among the country's ruling circles.¹⁰⁴

In 1957 the Mashad branch of the NRM was found out, and Mohammad-Taqi Shariati, his son Ali Shariati, Taher Ahmadzadeh, and the eleven other members of the Khorasan provincial committee of the NRM were arrested, flown to Teheran, and jailed in the capital. According to Ay. Zanjani¹⁰⁵ the pressures exerted on the arrested Mashad activists led to the uncovering of the Teheran organization. In 1957 Taleqani, Zanjani, Bazargan, E. Sahabi, Y. Sahabi, R. Ata'i, and some others were arrested. This meant the definite end of the NRM as an active resistance force against the Shah. The top leadership of the NRM stayed in prison for eight months. They would become active again when, at the beginning of the 1960's, the Shah attempted one of his liberalization projects.

Parallel to their activities in the NRM, the future founders of the LMI also pursued other tasks. At the suggestion of Ruhollah Khomeini, then a teacher of philosophy in Qum and a former class-mate, Taleqani unearthed an old copy of Ay. Na'ini's Tanbih ul-ummah wa tanzih ul-millah, ya hokumat as nazar-e eslam, the major treatise on constitutional-

¹⁰³ On this agreement see H. Katouzian, Political Economy, p. 202. For an exhaustive treatment see Chamseddine Amiralai, Les régimes politiques et le consortium en Iran (1953-1962) (Aix-en-Provence: La Pensée Universitaire, 1963), pp. 89-126.

¹⁰⁴ Khalil Maleki had also written an open letter attacking the agreement. He had that letter read in the Majles by a member of the officially tolerated opposition, Mohammad Derakhshesh, which cost Derakhshesh his seat at the next 'election.' See H. Katouzian's introduction to Khalil Maleki, Khaterat, p. 122.

¹⁰⁵ See his interview in N. Hariri, Mosahebeh, p. 273.

ism from an Islamic point of view.¹⁰⁶ He wrote an introduction (in which allusion is made to "Dr. S. and Eng. B."), and provided copious explanatory footnotes to a text which must have seemed hopelessly gongoristic to the average mid-century reader of Persian.¹⁰⁷

Bazargan, for his part, returned to the University after he was forced to resign from his position at Teheran's water company (Jan. 1954, Bahman 1332). Before long, however, his outspokenness again incited the wrath of the authorities: The government of Gen. Zahedi had negotiated a new oil agreement with the big oil companies, which was deemed unsatisfactory by Nationalist opinion. Before the agreement was submitted to the newly "elected" parliament, an open letter bearing the signature of over 70 public figures was sent to the majles, asking it not to ratify the agreement. Among these figures we find such NRM leaders as Ay. Zanjani, Bazargan, Mo'azzami (who initiated the move), Ata'i, Y. Sahabi, but also many non-members. Of these, the most famous were Ay. Firuzabadi, a prominent cleric, ex-MP and philanthropist, and Ali-Akbar Dehkhoda, the man of letters who is remembered for having single-handedly started a 40 volume dictionary of the Persian language. On the whole, the group included twelve university professors. As a result of this action, the twelve professors were suspended from the university. To earn a living eleven of them, including Bazargan, founded a company which they called "Yad," the Persian acronym for 'eleven university professors.' The private sector thus provided a safe space for many top

¹⁰⁶ On this book and its author see chapter 3 and the references therein.

¹⁰⁷ It is said that Taleqani's edition differs somewhat from Na'ini's original text. But this is very difficult to verify.

NRM activists in which to survive materially. Their services were missed at the university, however, and in September 1954 (Shahrivar 1333) the press announced that "His Majesty had consented that the expelled professors be reinstated." A few months later, in the spring of 1955, Bazargan was arrested for the first time, together with E. Sahabi. He was kept in jail for five months, during which he wrote a book called "Love and Adoration, or the Thermodynamics of Man," in which he set out to prove the importance of Love. He also came to the conclusion that after 2500 years of despotism, Iranians had lost the capacity to work together. Therefore, before any meaningful political action could be attempted, it was necessary to educate Iranians for democracy by teaching them to practice tolerance, compromise, and cooperation. These thoughts later became the material for a talk he gave at the ISA of the Agricultural Faculty in Karaj. He was released from prison just in time for the beginning of the new academic year, and began teaching again in the autumn of 1955. His teaching career was not to last long, however, for as we have seen, he returned to jail in 1957, together with many other NRM leaders.¹⁰⁸

In 1957 Bazargan also founded an Islamic Association of Engineers, probably because the earlier Engineers Association had been eclipsed by a government sponsored professional association for engineers that had a monopoly on patronage.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ This account of Bazargan's personal trajectory after the coup is based on his Modafe'at, pp. 148-164.

¹⁰⁹ L. Binder, Iran, p. 179.

In conclusion, it can safely be said that in spite of the occasional participation of certain secular elements, the NRM was essentially a movement of religious Mosaddeqists. At this stage of Iran's history, however, the leaders of the Resistance Movement kept religion and politics apart. While their action may or may not have been religiously motivated, they did not attempt to give any explicitly religious content to it. The beliefs of its principal leaders notwithstanding, the NRM's main function was to keep alive Nationalism, not to advance Islam. Their Islamic activism had been motivated by their fear of communist and Baha'i inroads into Iranian youth, and this religious activism gradually converged with their political involvement in the National Movement to produce the LMI.

In terms of our scheme of chapter 1, the crisis of sovereignty of 1953 propelled a new group of men into political action, people who had been socially concerned and active, but who by and large had remained outside politics. Their political aims were more radical than that of their predecessors in the National Movement, which would lead to tension between the two groups, as we shall see in the next chapter.

MODERNIST SHI'ISM AND POLITICS: THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN

Volume II

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of
Yale University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by

Houchang Esfandiar Chehabi

May 1986

Chapter 6

THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE EARLY 1960'S

In 1957 the main leaders of the NRM went to prison, and stayed there for eight months. The harshness with which the regime treated its NRM prisoners was so unprecedented in recent times, that a clerical MP usually sympathetic to the Court, S. Ja'far Behbahani, questioned the Prime Minister, Dr. Manuchehr Eqbal, about it in Parliament. Eqbal replied that "these people in Teheran and Mashad have again followed Mosaddeq's thesis."¹ The regime thus effectively crushed the NRM in 1957.

After the prisoners were freed, the NRM disbanded, although its former leaders would still meet informally, these meetings being facilitated by the fact that the core group of activists were blood relatives. The Islamic Association of Engineers also provided a forum. Like other Nationalists, they were looking for ways and means to end the post-1953 dictatorship. The hope that the Shah regime might only be an unpleasant interlude was not absurd. Let us remember that at that point it was only four years old. The leader of the National Movement, Mosaddeq, who had lost a considerable amount of support before the coup, had regained his popularity after his courageous defense during his trial.²

¹ Keyhan (Teheran), September 29, 1957 (Mehr 7, 1336).

² Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, second edition, 1978), p. 288.

Since the regime was well entrenched, two possibilities suggested themselves. One was for Nationalists to start some sort of rapprochement with liberal elements within the regime. It must be remembered that Mosaddeq had had internal enemies and that the Shah regime was not quite monolithic between 1953 and 1963. A number of politicians played a role of their own. This path to liberalization, however, proved to be unfeasible. For one thing, the Shah did not allow any independent figure to develop enough initiative to help bring about such a scenario. The case of Mohammad Derakhshesh, alluded to earlier, is exemplary in this regard. The other reason is that, as Richard Cottam notes

Since these organizations [i.e. the Nationalists] believed the Shah and many of his lieutenants to be little better than foreign agents, compromise was extremely difficult, if not impossible. Had the issues separating the Nationalists from the Shah been simply ideological, compromise would have been a possibility; but the Nationalists' belief that their antagonist was guilty of treason made any type of mutual dealings difficult. Since treason is an absolute term, those who use it to describe the Shah could hardly cooperate with him without incurring some of the opprobrium.³

Coming to terms with the "liberal wing of the ruling class" had been suggested by Khalil Maleki, which resulted in his being accused of having sold out to the imperialists.⁴ Also, when Prime Minister Hosein Ala', who replaced General Zahedi in 1954, tried to coopt Nationalists into his cabinet and offered the Ministry of Justice to Allahyar Saleh, the Secretary-General of the Iran Party, the organ of the NRM, Rah-e Mosaddeq, publicized the plan and warned Saleh not to accept it, an 'advice' he heeded.

³ Ibid., p. 293.

⁴ Ibid., p. 294.

The alternative path to liberalization followed from this view of the situation. Since the Shah regime was seen by Nationalist opinion as entirely foreign based, Nationalists were convinced that any change in the degree of its repressiveness could only come about as a result of U.S. pressure. U.S. attitudes towards the Shah regime were of crucial importance to the Nationalists. The more moderate⁵ elements, such as the Iran Party, hoped to convey the message to the United States government that the Nationalists would not necessarily threaten the vital interests of America. Thus, when the U.S. government proclaimed the "Eisenhower Doctrine," to the effect that it would come to the help of any nation attacked by Communism, Allahyar Saleh, in the name of the Iran Party, issued a statement on January 21, 1957, in support of the idea. The more radical NRM elements, by contrast, hoped that U.S. pressures on the Shah to liberalize his regime could be used to block a retreat into a more dictatorial stance and that the climate of liberty thus created could be used to wrest a true democratization from the regime.

Whatever the strategy, Nationalists were paradoxically hampered by the fact that Mosaddeq was still alive. No Nationalist leader could speak for the National Movement and be accepted by all Nationalists. Mosaddeq himself was in jail until 1956, and then under house arrest at his estate in Ahmadabad until his death in 1967; communication with him was therefore difficult and sporadic. This explains why part of the argument between moderates and radicals was about who really represented

⁵ In this context I use the terms 'moderate' and 'radical' only to denote various degrees of opposition to the Shah. They do not have socio-economic connotations, as some secular 'moderates' were probably much more progressive on socio-economic issues than many of the religiously oriented 'radicals.'

Mosaddeq's thought, arguments which on occasion descended to quite petty levels, as we shall see.

Nationalist activity surfaced again in the period 1960-1963, during which the Shah attempted a certain liberalization of his regime.⁶ Usually the Kennedy administration is credited with this liberalization, during which the LMI constituted itself. If we look carefully, however, we find that in the United States signs of impatience with the Shah were already visible as early as 1956.

6.1 AMERICAN DISSATISFACTION

The immediate reason for U.S. disenchantment with the Shah's post-1953 regime was its incapacity to improve the country's economy and to alleviate social tensions. As a result the Shah became a cumbersome ally, one who had to change or be changed.

6.1.1 Economic Mismanagement

When the coup occurred, Iran's treasury was empty. This was largely due to the international boycott imposed on Iranian oil by Britain after the Iranian oil industry had been nationalized by Mosaddeq. To keep the country afloat, the U.S. government gave generous help to Iran, help which did not achieve the desired results. This led to a series of hearings in the House of Representatives in mid-1956. Testimony was re-

⁶ My account of these pivotal period in Iranian history focuses on the opposition. A general history of these years still remains to be written. For two contemporary accounts see T. Cuyler Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," in Foreign Affairs, 15 (January 1962); and Andrew F. Westwood, "Elections and Politics in Iran," in The Middle East Journal, 15 (Spring 1961).

ceived by the Subcommittee on International Operations (of the Committee of Government Operations) from the Comptroller General of the United States, as well as from officers of the Department of State, of the International Cooperation Administration, and the United States Operations Mission in Iran.⁷ The resulting report was published in January 1957. From it, it transpired that the U.S. had given Iran about a quarter of a billion dollars between 1951 and 1956, the bulk of it after 1953, when mutual security funds were supplied to Iran at an average rate of five million dollars a month for three years to make up for the deficits in the Iranian budget. The report came to the conclusion that

1. United States aid and technical-assistance programs in Iran ... were administered in a loose, slipshod, and unbusinesslike manner ...

6. The participation of Iran in sharing the expense of the program appears to have been little more than nominal, and it is clear that, from the Iranian standpoint, the program's virtue was that it supplied a source of foreign exchange ...

11. United States control over what Iran did with [the] budget aid was practically nonexistent and the subcommittee notes that Iranian budget deficits increased rather than decreased during this period.

12. United States aid, alleged to be granted on the basis of austerity levels of Iranian government expenditures, was utilized to pay for many extraordinary items, like the payroll of the National Iranian Oil Co ...

13. Whatever Iranian efforts may have been made to solve their own difficulties through appropriate reforms in Government spending and tax collection, their successes in this regard do not appear to have been noteworthy during the period when United States aid was financing Iranian budget deficits...⁸.

⁷ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. United States Aid Operations in Iran. 85th Congress, 1st session, 1957. Report No. 10. P. 1.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 3-5. Barry Rubin writes that "between August 1953 and the

But on the whole the report criticized more the way U.S. organizations had handled the aid, and abstained from any criticism of the Shah. Moreover, the criticisms addressed to the Iranian government centered around its technical incompetence, rather than on its dictatorial nature. And yet, there are some indications, that in late 1957 the United States was involved in an attempted coup against the Shah. To explain this, we have to turn to Iran's position in the Cold War.

6.1.2 The 'Qarani coup'

On the whole, relations were quite correct between Iran and the USSR after 1953. For the U.S., Iran was an important link in its Cold War strategy of encircling the Soviet Union. In 1955 Iran joined the Baghdad Pact (which became CENTO after Iraq left it in the wake of the 1958 coup in that country), an anti-communist alliance between Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Britain, and the U.S. as an associate member. The Americans pressed for more: they wanted bases in Iran. The Soviets manifested their displeasure, but kept the doors open. By the beginning of 1956 relations had improved so much that in June the Shah visited the Soviet Union. He pledged that he would not let his country be used as a base of aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. From here on, there were marked signs of a thaw in Irano-Soviet relations. During the visit the Soviets unilaterally relinquished their right to a seventy-year oil-concession obtained in northern Iran. In March 1957 the Soviets gave the Shah an Ilyushin transport aircraft as a personal gift; in

end of 1956, the United States gave \$ 200 million in economic and \$ 200 million in military assistance." See B. Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 94-95.

April they reached a new border accord with Iran; and in August offered the Iranian government unlimited credit for heavy industrial development at two percent interest.⁹

Although we have no firm evidence, the circumstances around General Qarani's aborted coup in late 1957 strongly suggest American involvement. Let us not forget that in the late 1950's there would have been nothing strange about the U.S. government replacing a client regime that was internally corrupt, important geopolitically, and flirting with the Soviets. The truth about the matter may never be fully known; what matters for us is what Nationalists in Iran believe to have been the truth.

General Zahedi had relinquished power soon after the coup, and was followed by Hosein Ala' and then Manuchehr Eqbal. Both of these politicians were seen as pro-British. Now most Iranians have always believed that the U.S. and England are rivals in the Middle East and more particularly in Iran, and that the lesser visibility of Britain on Iran's political scene in recent times is not due to any waning of her worldwide influence but rather to her higher levels of skill in handling countries like Iran. According to this view, therefore, by 1957, the British had taken control in Teheran, and the Shah was enjoying good relations with the Soviets to boot.

General Qarani was the chief of Army Intelligence. At the time of his arrest the charges against him were not made public, and therefore little information about the whole episode leaked to the general public.

⁹ Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), p. 49.

We now know that he had planned a coup, and that he had contacted Nationalist personalities. Neither the NRM nor Khalil Maleki believed in the genuineness of Qarani's opposition to the Shah, because it was widely believed that he acted on behalf of American interests. It was further believed that information about the coup was conveyed to the Court by Soviet Intelligence.¹⁰

Qarani always denied having had any contacts with the U.S.,¹¹ but the following circumstances were (and are) seen as pointing to an American connection: Since the Suez crisis of 1956 relations between the U.S. and the U.K. had chilled considerably, and given the corruption, unpopularity, and economic inefficiency of the Shah regime, the U.S. had good reason, it was believed, to replace him with an "Iranian Nasser" who could initiate long-delayed reforms. This view was confirmed later in 1958 when in neighboring Pakistan General Ayub Khan, with American backing, replaced the regime of Iskandar Mirza and promised reforms.

Nationalists in Iran further believed that Qarani's main political ally was Dr. Ali Amini.¹² Since Amini would play a key role in later developments a few words should be said about him here. Homa Katouzian has aptly characterized the man, who is perhaps the last giant of traditional Iranian politics:

¹⁰ Unless otherwise indicated, information on the 1957 coup comes from Homa Katouzian The Political Economy of Modern Iran (New York and London: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 198-201.

¹¹ In an interview he gave shortly before his violent death in 1979. See Omid-e Iran (Teheran), April 30, 1979.

¹² In a personal interview with the author Dr. Amini firmly denied this. Paris, July 22, 1983.

Amini was, by political conviction, a radical conservative, or -- in not wholly accurate, Western jargon -- a right-wing liberal; he was pro-Western in the sense that he believed that American financial support and strategic guarantees were indispensable for a moderately reformist regime in Iran, though I do not think -- as some do -- that he was 'a paid agent of American imperialism'; he was by nature an able, ambitious but self-respecting politician who would not be prepared to become a 'house-born slave' to His Majesty; he was not a liberal by any stretch of the imagination, but he was opposed to dictatorship and corruption; he had been Minister of Economic Affairs in one of Musaddiq's cabinets, and a Minister of Finance in Zahedi's. Clearly, this combination of personal attributes and political tendencies was extremely unpalatable to the Shah; that is why he had honourably discharged Amini by sending him as Iranian ambassador to Washington.¹³

For Nationalists, with their tendency to divide Iranian politicians into 'Patriots' and 'Traitors,' however, Amini was among the latter, having signed the oil agreement of 1954 (vide chapter 5).

It so happened that soon after Qarani's arrest in January 1958 Amini was recalled from Washington and given a cool welcome at Teheran airport. Hasan Arsanjani, a reformist but non-Mosaddeqist politician who in 1958 had formed an organization whose express purpose it was to advance Amini to the Premiership, was detained too.¹⁴ Qarani was tried in camera and sentenced to three years' imprisonment; his relatively light sentence (the mandatory minimum for any civilian convicted of "activities to overthrow the constitutional monarchy") was seen as further evidence that he had powerful allies abroad.¹⁵

¹³ H. Katouzian, Political Economy, pp. 199-200.

¹⁴ Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 54.

¹⁵ Qarani was not the only officer with plans for toppling the Shah. We now know that, in that same year 1958, General Teimur Bakhtiar, the head of SAVAK, also went to Washington and told the American intelligence community that he planned to take over from the Shah. He was told that he could not count on U.S. support. Barry Rubin, Good In-

If the Qarani coup was intended as a warning to the Shah, it worked. Early in 1959 a high-ranking Soviet delegation visited Teheran to sign a non-aggression treaty with Iran. The Soviets were ready to cancel article 6 of the 1921 Irano-Soviet treaty which gave them the right to enter Iran if their interests were threatened by a third power operating in Iran. But in the last moment the Iranians backed down, and instead signed a 'mutual' defense pact with the U.S. in return for military and financial aid. Predictably, relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, only to improve again after 1963.

The new flow of aid sharpened American sensitivities to how this money would be spent; and in the Senate senators like William Fulbright and John F. Kennedy were critical of the Republican administration's attitude toward corrupt Third World regimes in general and the Shah's in particular.¹⁶ The government in Iran was as corrupt as ever, and Premier Eqbal's much fanfared attempts at combatting corruption in high places quickly became a public joke. At the same time the general economic situation was very bad and deteriorating. There were widespread strikes, prominent Bazaar leaders were facing bankruptcy, and there was a general perception, both inside and outside Iran, that the Shah regime was faltering. The recent revolutions in Cuba and Iraq, where corrupt pro-Western regimes had been replaced by increasingly pro-Soviet ones, added to Western anxiety. The problem that the Shah constituted for the U.S. was summarized by Andrew Tully, an unrepentant CIA operative, who

tentions, p. 108.

¹⁶ H. Katouzian, Political Economy, p. 213.

wrote in 1961:¹⁷

[The 1953 coup] was ... necessary to the security of the United States, and probably to that of the Western World. But it was another case of the United State not requiring tough enough terms in return for its support. It is senseless, as some observers have written, to say that the Iranians overthrew Mosaddeq all by themselves. It was an American operation from the beginning to end. But at the end, the CIA -- and the American government -- stood by while a succession of pro-Western and anti-Communist administrations, uninterested in the smallest social reforms, brought Iran once again to the edge of bankruptcy. And, of course, the American taxpayer has contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to this corruption.

Tully continues that, although Iran's treasury was "being fattened" to the tune of \$ 300 million a year in oil revenues, this was not enough to keep the country's economy afloat. He adds:

While Iran officialdom lived in palaces and rode around in Rolls Royces (Cadillacs were not chic enough), the House committee reported that American aid was administered in such a "loose, slipshod and unbusinesslike manner that it is now impossible -- with any accuracy -- to tell what became of these funds."

The author then goes on to give a few concrete examples of corruption in high places in Iran, and the criticism does not spare the Shah himself.

It is therefore clear that disenchantment with the Shah and his post-1953 personal rule started in the United States well before Kennedy became president. Under pressure to bring Iran nearer to democracy, the Shah, who wrote in his autobiography that he would never establish a one-party system since that was what the communists and Hitler had

¹⁷ Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1962), pp. 96-99.

done,¹⁸ had encouraged the formation of two parties. One, the Melliyn, or 'Nationalist' party, would be "conservative" and form the government, while the other, Mardom, or 'People's' party, would be "liberal" and constitute the "loyal opposition." Until 1974 the Mardom Party was the "pseudo-opposition," in terms of our classification of chapter 2. The first was led by Manuchehr Egbal, the second by Asadollah Alam, both trusted and, to the extent that he had any, loyal friends of the Shah's. These two parties were to contest the elections to the 20th Majles, which were scheduled for the summer of 1960, and which the Shah promised to be free. But as one observer wryly noted, "Since neither party had been permitted the independence to develop a distinctive personality,... the fascination of the game was limited to the Shah and the candidates."¹⁹

6.2 THE SECOND NATIONAL FRONT

Washington's disenchantment did not go unnoticed in Teheran, and was a signal to Nationalists to start organizing again. On the whole the Nationalists had weathered the post-1953 much better than the Tudeh, which by the early 1960's was a mere shadow of its former self.²⁰ Their renewed activism led to the 'Second National Front.' The NRM saw itself as part of the National Front, therefore a discussion of the reasons why

¹⁸ His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran [sic] Mission for My Country (London: Hutchinson, 1960), p. 173.

¹⁹ Richard Cottam, Nationalism, p. 297. One might add that soon some people called the parties "Coca-Cola Party" and "Pepsi-Cola Party."

²⁰ The reasons for this decline were many and not only due to government repression. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 451-457.

its leaders decided to found the LMI must deal with the internal workings of the National Front too.

6.2.1 The NRM's Role in the Revival of the National Front

In early 1960 the Central Council and the Executive Committee of the NRM had come to the conclusion that the Shah and his foreign allies had decided to respond to the mounting dissatisfaction in the population by opening up the political system a little bit. By granting a few rights, the regime could create a safety-valve to diffuse the revolutionary potential that was building up in Iran. This expected liberalization was seen as an opportunity for the NRM to leave the narrow constraints of clandestinity, and impose a vast popular movement on the Shah, which would prevent him from retreating into a more authoritarian stance once the pressures from within and from without had diminished. It was time to reactivate the National Front, as whose militant vanguard the NRM saw itself.

To begin this task it was deemed necessary to gain the cooperation of all Nationalist forces, such as former collaborators of Mosaddeq, the Nationalist MP's in the seventeenth Majles, the leaders and activists of the Nationalist parties, Islamic figures and sympathetic members of the ulema, Bazaar leaders, and university students.

A list of about 130 persons was prepared. From among the members of the NRM little groups of three men were formed, and each team had to establish discreet contacts with three to five personalities on the list. In meetings with these men the political and economic situation of the

country and possible plans of the government were to be analyzed, and the personalities be sounded out on their willingness to partake in a general movement. Each team met with the men on its list one to three times. Then all teams held a general meeting in which they gave a report. It transpired that the majority of those approached favored a new beginning.

Thereupon the Executive Committee of the NRM decided to invite all those whose response had been positive to come together to deliberate on an action plan. The invitation went out in the name of Ay. H. S. Reza Firuzabadi, a prominent Nationalist cleric and philanthropist, and was convened at the house of his son.

Before this invitation went out, however, Saleh seized the initiative,²¹ and invited many leading collaborators of Mosaddeq to his house for a meeting. He did not include any leading NRM figure. It is true that none of the NRM leaders had been close collaborators of Mosaddeq's, nor were they as well-known and respected by the public as the former Prime Minister's circle. But courtesy would have demanded that Bazargan and Taleqani be invited, given their endeavors after the coup. Not content with this snub, Saleh published, with a few changes, as his own a draft-declaration on the future of the National Movement prepared by the NRM and submitted to him for his comments. Upon the intervention of common friends, however, Bazargan and Taleqani were invited to join the "Central Grouping" that met regularly at the house of Saleh. This group

²¹ LMI sources indicate that Saleh had at first been unenthusiastic about the NRM's plans, but changed his mind after a meeting with the U.S. ambassador. The veracity of this could not be ascertained independently, and Saleh died in 1981 and cannot give his story.

eventually constituted itself as the Central Council of the National Front.²²

Meanwhile, preparations went ahead for the elections. The Central Council named a five-member committee, of which Bazargan was a member, to coordinate the NF's participation in the elections. The committee prepared lists of candidates, declarations, and policy statements and sent these to the national press to be published. The two important newspapers, Keyhan and Ettela'at, refused to print anything. Exasperated, the Central Council mandated a delegation of five members, which included Bakhtiar, Bazargan, Keshavarz Sadr, and Sadiqi, to meet with the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Atabaki, to ask for assurances that the NF would be allowed to participate in the elections. The leadership of the National Front had wanted this meeting to be discreet, but NRM militants nevertheless mounted a small demonstration outside the ministry while the NF delegation was inside, causing the leadership to take umbrage. After the delegation left, the militants descended upon the editorial offices of the two main newspapers and shouted some slogans there too.

Atabaki had been very courteous and promised a reply to the NF's request, but an answer never came. Worse, the Prime Minister, Eqbal, said in one of his speeches that the elections would indeed be free, but not for Mosaddeqists.

²² This information is taken from Chegunegi-ye tashkil-e jebhe-ye melli-ye dovvom va naqsh-e nehzat-e moqavemat-e melli-ye Iran (How the Second National Front was founded and the role of the National Resistance Movement) (Houston: LMI[a], 1977).

After this episode, Firuzabadi's letter was made public. Its initial purpose had been to convene a preliminary meeting of the Nationalist leadership. That having been accomplished at the initiative of Saleh, the NRM decided to broaden the invitation and make it a public meeting. The first meeting took place on July 20 (Tir 29, 1339) at the house of the younger Firuzabadi. The next evening another meeting was held at the same place, and Hasan Nazih read a declaration officially announcing the reconstitution of the National Front. On the eighth anniversary of the uprising that restored Mosaddeq to the Premiership, amid the cheers and outpourings of joy of everybody present, Mosaddeq's name was once again acclaimed in public and the Second National Front was born. The rebirth of the Front thus coincided with the elections to the 20th Majles.

6.2.2 The Summer Elections of 1960

After the unsuccessful démarche at the Ministry of the Interior, the National Front decided that it could only boycott the elections. After many postponements balloting finally started in the provinces on July 26, and by August 12, when the last results came in, the Prime Minister's Melliyun had obtained 104 seats, and the "opposition" Mardom around 25. By the time voting was to begin in Teheran on August 15, two provincial cities had not held elections yet: one was Kerman, where Dr. Baqa'i, the leader of the Toilers Party, was presenting himself, the other Kashan, where Allahyar Saleh was running. The latter case is worth pondering. Saleh, the National Front's second most prominent and popular politician, was a native of Kashan and had his political base

there. Soon after the Shah had announced that the elections would be free, Saleh had posed his candidacy in his home town and started paying it frequent visits to campaign. Certain elements within the Government wanted to coopt the National Movement, and the prospect of a parliamentary mandate from Kashan was probably held as a "carrot" in front of Saleh to lure him away from Mosaddeq. In Isfahan, by contrast, when a prominent local Mosaddeqist, Abdorrahman Borumand, announced his candidacy, he was quickly arrested and jailed.²³ Baqa'i, for his part, contributed with his characteristically vitriolic style to a general heightening of the tone of the campaign, ultimately forcing even the leader of the pseudo-opposition, Alam, to denounce the irregularities of the elections.

In Teheran a group of Independents under the leadership of Amini were also contesting the elections. Untainted as they were by any recent association with Mosaddeq, the Government left them greater leeway, and thus their campaign quickly gathered momentum, so much so that it seemed as if Amini and his followers were becoming a more dynamic force in Iranian politics than the NF. To be sure, Amini did not have the popular backing that the Nationalists could count on, but on the other hand he had a well-defined political program of reforms, which the Nationalists lacked. Thus in Teheran the elections quickly turned into a duel between Eqbal and Amini, who accused the Prime Minister of betraying the Shah's wishes by allowing so many flagrant irregularities.

²³ R. Cottam, Nationalism, p. 297.

The Shah had invited the foreign press to come and cover his free elections. When it became clear that nobody inside or outside Iran believed this emerging chambre introuvable to be representative of the Iranian people, the balloting in Teheran was halted and the Shah advised all already elected MP's to resign, so as to pave the way for fresh elections. Eqbal himself resigned as Prime Minister on August 27, 1960 (Shahrivar 5, 1339) and was replaced by Ja'far Sharif-Emami, a German trained engineer with a relatively good reputation.

6.2.3 Internal Conflict in the NF (II)

One day after the July 21 meeting which saw the resurrection of the NF, another one was held at the same place, but broken up by SAVAK. The meetings then moved to the house of Abbas Sheibani, who was to play a major political role in the future.

The Sheibanis, one of the largest families in Iran, are originally from Kashan. Born in 1931 (1310) in Teheran, Abbas was the son of Hedayatollah Sheibani (entitled Monazzam os-Saltaneh), a civil servant in the Ministry of Finance who had voluntarily distributed his land-holdings among the peasantry before the land reform. After high school Abbas Sheibani enrolled in the Technical Faculty of Teheran University (1949), where he was a student of Bazargan's, but insufficient mathematical skills impelled him to switch to the Faculty of Medicine one year later. He was active politically first in the National Movement and later in the NRM, and went to jail so often that it took him fifteen years to finish his degree.²⁴

²⁴ Biographical data on Dr. Abbas Sheibani were kindly provided by his

After the meetings at the house of Sheibani were in turn stopped, they moved to the house of H. Lebaschi, a Bazaar leader. All of these meetings were arranged and organized by the old NRM which, now that the NF existed, had no official existence of its own, but whose activists formed a well-organized network within the Front and operated as a current within it, a current calling itself nehzat, or 'movement.' The moderate leadership of the National Front resented this ebullion and with few exceptions, such as Keshavarz Sadr, did not attend the meetings.

After the annulation of the summer elections and the opening up of the political system that ensued, fronts hardened inside the National Front, with two clearly distinguishable wings confronting each other on a number of issues. These issues would remain unresolved, which certainly contributed to the ultimate failure of the Second National Front. But before considering these issues, let us turn to the composition of the National Front's Central Council. It consisted of a number of former collaborators of Mosaddeq's, either without a party affiliation, or members of the Iran Party, such as Allahyar Saleh, Baqer Kazemi, who acted as chairman, Dr. Gholamhosein Sadiqi, Nosratollah Amini, Shapur Bakhtiar, Dr. Karim Sanjabi, and Keshavarz Sadr; H. Mahmud Manian and H. Hasan Qasemieh representing the Bazaar; four leaders of the NRM, namely Nazih, Bazargan, Y. Sahabi, and Taleqani; Dariush Foruhar of the PIN and Hosein Razi of the PIP; plus Khonji and Hejazi, the dissident socialists.²⁵ One notable absence was that of Khalil Maleki. His membership in the Council and that of his party in the National Front were blocked

brother, Eng. Hasan-Ali Sheibani of Düsseldorf, Germany.

²⁵ Cf. chapter 5, section 3.

by Khonji, who soon became the main mover in the Council.²⁶ Most other members were not very prominent and owed their membership in the ruling body of the National Front to their friendship with one or another of the above. The total membership of the body reached 36 at its peak. Within the Central Council the rule of unanimity prevailed, which made the simplest decisions, such as the wording of a declaration, difficult to reach.²⁷ LMI representatives of political parties were vastly outnumbered by "independent personalities." This had a certain bearing on the issues that divided the National Front.

The first bone of contention was the National Front's very structure. The Iran Party, the "independent personalities," and Khonji wanted a unified party. In the autumn of 1960 Khonji circulated a paper in which he demanded the self-dissolution of all parties in the Front and, to give an example, announced the dissolution of his own "Socialist Party," which he had apparently created for the sole purpose of dissolving it to prove his commitment to a unitary structure. Khonji's plans were opposed by the PIN, parts of the PIP, the Socialists of Maleki, who hoped to be admitted into the Front, and, after May 1961, the LMI.

The second issue concerned the strategy of the Front. The radical wing pruned mass-mobilization to block any retreat of the Shah, while the elder statesmen preferred behind-the-scenes maneuvering and dis-

²⁶ Maleki's own troubled relationship with the National Front cannot be enlarged upon here, although it in many ways parallels that of Bazar-gan and the NRM/LMI. See H. Katouzian, Political Economy, pp. 217-219 and 221-222.

²⁷ Homa Katouzian's introduction to Khalil Maleki, Khaterat-e siyasi (Political Memoirs) (Teheran: Entesharat-e Ravaq: 1979), p. 135.

creet talks with the Shah, hoping that American pressure would induce him to turn to them.

The third issue was linked to the second and had to do with the Shah himself. The NRM/LMI wished to identify him personally as the root of Iran's troubles and include him and his role in all discussions, whereas the leadership of the NF addressed their attacks to the various governments.

Organizationally the radical wing of the NF consisted of the NRM/LMI, the PIN,²⁸ and the students, who formed the Student Organization of the National Front when the academic year 1960-1961 (1339-1340) began in the fall of 1960 and students returned to campuses and high schools. The student leaders were in their majority secular minded; they admired Bazargan and the NRM/LMI for their courage and dynamism, but could not find any taste for their religious tendencies. The Student Organization itself, however, was pluralistic and Abbas Sheibani was one of its most visible leaders. The radicals of the NF also enjoyed the sympathy of the majority of the lower-level militants.

It should be pointed out, however, that as the conflict inside the Front smoldered under the surface, both sides took care not to let the public know about it. The NRM current (Bazargan, Taleqani, many Bazaar merchants, and the students) did not operate under that label but formed a distinct informal network with the Front.

²⁸ In 1961 the Party of the Iranian Nation held a congress which eliminated the term 'Pan-Iranism' from the party program and also did away with the fascistoid trappings of the organization. However, a certain element of style inherited from pre-World War II fascism would always remain.

After the National Front's new incarnation had been made public and the houses of individual members had become inadequate to contain the ever increasing numbers of sympathizers who attended meetings, the radical current within the Front decided to hold its first public meeting on the Jalalieh Field, an open tract of land in Teheran's north-west mainly used for horse racing and Polo. This gathering, held on August 17, 1960 (Mordad 26, 1339) was the first public meeting of the Nationalists after the coup. The NF's leadership had been skeptical about its opportuneness, and to assuage their feelings it was officially held by the "Student Supporters of the National Front," consisting in the main of NRM supporters and followers of Dariush Foruhar's PIN.

The major organizer of the meeting was Abbas Sheibani, who was more and more becoming a student spokesman vis-a-vis the leadership. Roughly 3,000 people participated in the meeting. Three speeches were held, a poem was read, and the meeting ended with a reading of a declaration demanding the annulation of the elections.

The relative success of this meeting emboldened its organizers but irritated the NF leadership, who felt that the initiative was slipping away from them. The students wanted to organize another, bigger meeting on Baharestan Square, in front of the Majles. Leaflets distributed all over Teheran announced it for September 1 (Shahrivar 10). The NF leadership again opposed the meeting, and the government declared that it would not tolerate it. The NRM backed down and instead announced a meeting for September 4 (Shahrivar 13), again at Jalalieh. Security forces had, however, sealed off the area and thus the proposed meeting

degenerated into anti-government demonstrations which lasted for the whole day. Another meeting was convened at the Hedayat Mosque, but on that evening Taleqani was prevented from entering his mosque. New demonstrations were the result. These demonstrations, the biggest in Iran since the coup, received widespread coverage outside the country, and one of their consequences was the beginning of the National Movement's activities abroad.²⁹

After the summer elections were cancelled, and Sharif-Emami became Prime Minister, Teheran calmed down somewhat. The NF was still very cautious in its approach. On the one hand it had always asked for "free elections," since that was all the diverse groupings within it could agree on, and on the other hand it was incapable of pulling itself together and could not even come up with a nationwide list of candidates. In November John F. Kennedy became President of the United States, and that event raised hopes in Iran that his administration would exert enough pressure on the Shah to lead Nationalists to power.

All this time the radical wing's impatience with the leadership grew. It ultimately led the NRM to write a letter to the Central Council. The letter, dated November 15, 1960 (Aban 24, 1339), was accompanied by a lengthy paper analysing the international situation and its bearing on the domestic policies of Iran, which was written by Rahim Ata'i.³⁰ The two texts are fundamental to an understanding of the reasons that led the NRM to constitute itself as a party a few months later; it is there-

²⁹ See chapter 7, section 2.

³⁰ Both are reprinted in Chegunegi.

fore appropriate to summarize them.

The letter claimed that the leadership of the NF was weak, did not have a sufficient understanding of political matters, and was out of touch with reality and the wishes of the population. To make up for these deficiencies NRM members had tried to organize mass meetings and to bring about changes in the leadership structure of the Front, but on that last point nothing had been achieved. So far the NRM had refused to act independently of personalities who, because of their past association with Mosaddeq, had a good reputation among the population. But since the last successful meeting at Jalalieh two months had passed and still the Central Council had shown no initiative. Apologizing for its frankness, the NRM gave its analysis of the situation and outlined a plan of action.

The paper lamented that "the Salehs, Kazemis, Sanjabis, and Sadiqis" became active only when foreign newspapers started criticizing the Iranian regime, when the Shah promised free elections, and after the likes of Baqa'i and Makki had come out of their holes too. Foreign interests tried to save the Shah so as to safeguard their own military interests, because change was necessary after the chasm between the government and the people had grown too wide. Mosaddeq was not acceptable, since he would have insisted on gaining control over the military apparatus, but if some of his old collaborators were brought to power, the gap might be bridged for a while. Neither the Nationalists nor the Shah had responded adequately to the pressures from abroad. The Shah did not realize that these pressures and the resultant liberalization were meant pre-

cisely to save his throne, and by suppressing the NF he was acting against his best interests. The Nationalists, for their part, did not realize how serious foreign interests were about the liberalization, and therefore did not take full advantage of it. A stalemate had ensued.

The paper then analysed the world situation and came to the conclusion that everywhere in the under-developed world people were seeking revenge against those responsible for their plight. Communism was waiting precisely for that, and its danger had decreased only in those countries (Egypt, Iraq, Syria) where revolutionary governments had been able to satisfy the people's thirst for revenge. If the leaders of the NF could not provide the necessary leadership for a similar development to take place in Iran, they should step aside and save Iran from either falling victim to communism, to which people would turn if the Nationalists failed, or remaining under the rule of colonialism. Next, President-elect Kennedy was quoted on his remarks concerning past American mistakes in supporting unpopular regimes, and the conclusion was reached that until Iranians did not show initiative themselves, it did not matter who occupied the White House: Iranians had to force their view of the situation upon the Americans while assuring them that a different regime in Iran would not upset the global balance of power. The Shah was trying to revive the ancient glories of Cyrus and Darius at a time when, under the influence of socialist ideas, Iranians no longer believed in an essential difference between themselves and their Shah. Even Kings Feisal of Iraq and Faruk of Egypt had not treated their subjects with so much disdain as the Shah. There was a majority of ill-informed, illiterate people who, although deprived of essential necessi-

ties, did not recognize the source of their misery and would applaud the Shah's arrival somewhere, even celebrate his wedding or the birth of his son. The Shah did not realize that every country is ruled by an enlightened minority which decides the country's fate, and that others merely follow. The applause and deference of the illiterate masses was no index of the Shah's popularity, for the same sort of people also celebrated and danced when the beheaded body of Nuri Sa'id was dragged through the streets of Baghdad.

To stop Iran's slippage towards communism, therefore, the NRM warned foreign powers to stop their useless attempts to keep regimes like those of Singhman Rhee, Nuri Sa'id, and Adnan Menderes in power, to accept the necessities of history, and thus prevent the rise of communism.

With their positive program the NRM filled the gaps in the actions of the National Movement. Its goals were threefold: to preserve Iran's interests, to eliminate the danger of an upset in East-West relations and prevent Iran from falling to communism, and to make sure that Iran played its part in world politics and contributed its share to world peace. The NF leadership was asked not to impair these efforts and to allow them to be carried out in good understanding with the West. The NRM also asked Nationalist leaders, groups, and parties to put aside their over-cautiousness and doubts and forcefully to enter the forefront of the political stage. Spies and hypocrites inside the National Movement were warned to cease their activities, and the military was reminded that the people now acting were their brothers and nephews and that their ultimate goal was honor for Iran, from which the military would

benefit too. The paper further argued that Nationalists lacked the capacity to carry out a military coup, but that if any effervescence should emerge in the Army, and if it were led by honorable men, Nationalists should seek to strengthen it. The NRM was in favor of lawful and open political struggle, but that excluded any flirts with the regime and other circles hated by the population. The truth should be said aloud: when the Shah called Nationalists traitors, their answer should be that the traitor was he who had taken the rights of the people away from them, had deprived them of the right to choose their deputies and their government, and had wasted the national income in ways dictated by foreign interests. After the success of the first meetings at Jalalieh, Nationalists had gone home and had made no new moves. They had to become more active before the initiative was seized by the likes of Baga'i and Amini.

The paper then finished with a blueprint for a program, which was a "minimal" one, drawn up "with due regard for the leadership's state of mind and capacities." The National Front should:

1. Get a permanent local and put up a sign.
2. Protest against the delay of the elections in an open letter, with meetings and sit-ins.
3. Ask for a permit to print a newspaper, and to proceed to publish it.
4. Recommence electoral meetings at the homes of prominent members.
5. Draw up a list of 200 parliamentary candidates and an electoral program.
6. Hold press conferences.
7. Hold electoral meetings.

8. Arrange for all leaders to travel to the provinces and present the candidates.
9. Take good care and provide a livelihood for the victims of repression.
10. Establish contacts with the representatives of foreign powers to remove their doubts and provide them with the National Movement's program.
11. Encourage structured groups to take a bigger part in [the National Front's] executive affairs.
12. Oblige every member of the Central Council to accept the responsibility of directing one student, workers or local group, so as to get acquainted with [the activist base].

The paper ended by noting that these articles were all within the realm of the law. If the government were to use force against its implementation, strikes, demonstrations, and meetings should be organized in response. If these were stopped by the regime, bolder methods would have to be used. In any case "sitting back like old women and nagging" was not in the spirit of the times. Unless Iranians created something themselves, foreign interests could not make their final decision.

In these two texts one is struck by the total absence of any reference to religion. This is one more proof that religious motivations did not play a major role for all founders of the LMI. The two texts also reflect the NRM's impatience with the disproportionate influence of the "independent personalities" within the NF. And finally, the references to Nasser in Egypt and the Menderes government in Turkey throw some light on the NRM's ambiguous attitude towards democracy: on the one hand they called on the Shah to allow democracy to function in Iran, on the other hand they professed admiration for "revolutionary," and clearly non-democratic governments in Arab countries, while criticizing a demo-

cratically elected Turkish government, whose election had moreover been a setback for Kemalist secularism. This is further proof for the strength of the Nationalist, and the relative weakness of the religious motivation in the NRM.

The letter did not please the NF leadership at all, and elicited a sharp reply from Sanjabi. On at least one point, however, the NRM gained cause, for the National Front moved into a house made available by Bazargan and set up headquarters there. Meetings were held at the Khaneh-ye 143, or 143 House, as it became known,³¹ but most often these meetings were broken up by chaquakesh elements.³²

With Bazargan and his friends still members of the Central Council, but the rank and file of the NRM and the students ever more thirsty for action, the campaign began again for the second elections to the 20th Majles, elections known as the winter elections of 1961.

6.2.4 The Winter Elections of 1961

The campaign started towards the end of 1960. Conditions were hardly better than in the previous round.³³

³¹ It was situated at 143 Fakhrabad Ave.

³² Bazargan, Modafe'at, p. 198.

³³ We have exact knowledge of all the rigging that went on, because in January 1962 the government of Ali Amini charged the deputy Attorney General, Fathollah Banisadr (older brother of the future first president of the Islamic Republic), who was a NF sympathizer, to write a detailed report of the irregularities of both elections. Parts of this report are available in Chamseddine Amiralai, Les régimes politiques et le consortium du pétrole en Iran (1953-1962) (Aix-en-Provence: La Pensée Universitaire, 1963), 54-62.

After the annulation of the summer elections Amini and Baqa'i had become very active. Baqa'i established a society he called "The Defenders of Freedom" and waged a campaign whose content was not that different from that of the Nationalists, although because of his break with Mosaddeq in 1953 no rapprochement was possible between him and the National Front. Amini's main organization was the Mehrgan Club, ostensibly the Alumni Association of Teheran's Teacher Training College, and was led by Mohammad Derakhshesh, leader of the Teachers Association. These two forces developed far more dynamism than the NF could muster. This was due partly to the asthenic nature of the Nationalist leadership, and partly to the fact that Amini and Baqa'i were less objectionable to the regime, having both distanced themselves from Mosaddeq. Be this as it may, the Nationalists were once again prevented from participating, and again they did not even manage to produce a country-wide list of candidates.

On January 30 (Bahman 10) the headquarters of the National Front was closed down by the police. At that point the NF leadership, exasperated, decided to stage a sit-in in the Senate building and thus attract attention. The delegation consisted of Kazemi, Keshavarz Sadr, Hasibi, Bakhtiar, Sadiqi, Dr. Ghanizadeh, Eng. Khalili, Nosratollah Amini, Ali Ashraf Manuchehri, Dr. Ardalan, and Bazargan. It was received with courtesy by two elder statesmen of the regime, Hasan Taqizadeh and Sardar Fakher Hekmat, both senators now. The Nationalists were treated well, but the government forbade them to leave, and thus while the election campaign raged in Teheran, a good part of the Nationalist leadership was imprisoned in the Senate, whose reading room had been con-

verted into a dormitory. To sweeten their stay, Shamshiri sent chelo-kabab every day. They were not allowed to leave until the election was over and the Shah had solemnly opened Parliament.³⁴

During this time students also intensified their activities. On February 2, 1961 (Bahman 13, 1339) students at Teheran University began a strike, which caused the government to close the university. Demonstrations continued and even spread to the universities of Shiraz, Tabriz, and Isfahan. The government reopened universities on February 11, but most students refused to attend classes. The demonstrations culminated in serious rioting when Dr. Eqbal visited the university on February 23 (Esfand 4), on which occasion his car was set on fire and completely destroyed, and he himself was threatened. The burning of Eqbal's car had a tremendous impact on the population and was seen as a major victory. This time the government responded by closing the university until after the end of the New Year recess (April 3, 1961 / Farvardin 14, 1340).³⁵ The chancellor of Teheran University, Dr. Farhad, was an Amini supporter and condemned government interference in academic affairs. Meanwhile, on February 11 the Bazaar had been closed in response to a call for a general strike issued by the National Front.

With the National Front paralyzed, Amini seemed to benefit more and more from the disturbances. Iran's economic situation was worsening, and the new Kennedy administration was making the granting of more aid contingent on the enactment of bold reforms. With reforms in the air

³⁴ A full and instructive account of this episode is given in Bazargan, Modafe'at, pp. 198-201.

³⁵ The chronological account can be found in Keesings, 18012.

now, Amini had the advantage of having a clear program, while the National Front's only program was "free elections" and the establishment of "the rule of law," points that were beginning to lose their mobilizing power.

When the election results were announced, the Melliyun had obtained about 45 per cent, and the Mardom 35 per cent of Majles seats, with the rest going to Independents. In Teheran pro-Amini Independents had gained 6 out of 15 seats, but Amini himself had not run. Nationalist candidates running individually, like Borumand in Isfahan, had been forcibly prevented from campaigning, with one exception: in Kashan Saleh ran unopposed and was elected. After the Shah opened the new Parliament on February 21, Saleh, knowing that his presence in the Chamber could easily be construed as an act of complicity with the regime, gave a strong and courageous speech in which he denounced the irregularities of the elections. Student demonstrations continued, and the National Front made an ill-prepared and therefore unsuccessful attempt to close the Bazaar in a one day general strike. To diffuse the rising tide of dissatisfaction the Shah decided to depose all major security chiefs, including Teimur Bakhtiar, the powerful and ambitious SAVAK chief, and make scapegoats out of them.³⁶

The new parliament had a majority of Conservative members of the old establishment, often big landowners, who were not likely to assent to any reform program the government might present under American pressure. The central issue became more and more agrarian reform, and its most

³⁶ R. Cottam, Nationalism, p. 302.

prominent proponent Arsanjani, Amini's close associate. In March of 1961 Ay. Borujerdi, the undisputed leader of Iran's Shi'ites who had opposed legislation for agrarian reform (on which more below), died and thus a major obstacle to the enactment of reforms was removed. To carry out the reforms demanded by Washington, the Shah had the alternative of either turning to the National Front or to Amini. He had a long talk with Saleh, whose brother Jahanshah was loyal to the regime and would soon become Minister of Culture, but because of Saleh's intransigence on key points nothing came of it. Besides, the position of the Nationalists on agrarian reform was not at all clear, as we will see.

On May 2 (Ordibehesht 12) the teachers of Teheran, led by Dera-khshesh, went on strike to demand higher salaries, as inflation had taken a hefty bite out of the teachers' chronically low emoluments. They staged a demonstration outside the Majles, during which police opened fire on them and killed one teacher. Mass demonstrations now intensified, spread to the rest of the country, and to the demand for higher salaries was added the punishment of the killer and then the resignation of the Prime Minister. Sharif-Emami would not caution the repression of the strike and resigned on May 4. On May 6 Amini presented his cabinet. The same month of May 1961 saw the birth of the LMI.

6.2.5 Political Action under the Sign of the Qoran

The radical NRM elements within the NF felt that the structure of the Front and its lack of dynamism impeded any meaningful action, and they decided to form a party, which would be the continuation of the NRM.

According to Hasan Nazih³⁷ the object was at first to form an action group to demand free elections, which would have been called Nehzat-e azadi-ye entekhabat, "Movement for Free Elections," but since that would have become a misnomer after elections, agreement was reached on Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran, "Movement for the Freedom of Iran."³⁸ But for Bazargan, Sahabi, and Taleqani, the aim was to form a party with an Islamic coloration. As Bazargan saw it:

The National Front was, as its name indicated, a Front. That is a union of social philosophies and prominent personalities which had a common goal, namely the independence of the country and the freedom of the people. But having a common goal is not tantamount to having common motivations. One cannot expect that. Some may be motivated by nationalism, others by humanitarian feelings, race consciousness, or socialism...

However, for us, for many of our friends, and perhaps for a majority of the Iranian population, there could be no motivation other than the principles and religious tenets of Islam.

I am not saying the others were not Muslims or that they were opposed to Islam. Only, for them Islam did not constitute a social and political ideology. But for us it was the basic motivation for our social and political activism.

Towards the end of the summer of 1339 [1960] I went to Borqan ... with Dr. Sahabi. In that verdant valley we talked about founding a party, something our friends, the young, and even our conscience were urging us to do. Three things were clear to us:

1. Under present conditions it was incumbent upon us to be politically active and to found a party.
2. The ideology and program of such a party would have to be based on Islam.
3. We had neither the talent, nor the time, nor the forcefulness to do it.

³⁷ Personal interview, Paris, July 1982.

³⁸ See the Introduction, for a discussion of the party's name in English.

Seven or eight months went by in doubt and delay. Finally, at the end of 1339 [March 1961] our doubts ceased and we decided to found the Liberation Movement of Iran.³⁹

Bazargan and Sahabi also invited Taleqani to join them. Taleqani had not been a major leader of the NRM and his activities had been more religious in nature, although he supported the National Movement. In early May he performed a Qoranic bibliomancy and the result⁴⁰ encouraged him to answer Bazargan's call.⁴¹ Joining a political party was a rather novel step for a mulla; Ay. Zanjani, for instance, did not join. At his trial in 1963 he explained his participation. To understand the reason-
ing it should first be pointed out that hezb, is the common Persian word for "political party." The same word hizb (in Arabic) is used in the Qoran and usually translated in English as "sect" or "party." After pointing out that groupings based on common beliefs are a more advanced form of social organization than those based on national, racial, linguistic, and geographic distinctions, he continues:

The Qoran is the first book and Islam the first system of beliefs that ignored racial, ethnic, geographic, and linguistic bonds and instead organized their primary grouping on the basis of belief. The word hezb was brought up and in the Qoran

³⁹ M. Bazargan, Modafe'at, pp. 207-208.

⁴⁰ The Qoran opened on Sura al-Nisa'. Here is an excerpt relevant to Taleqani's decision: "Such believers as sit at home -- unless they have an injury -- are not the equals of those who struggle in the path of God with their possessions and their selves. God has preferred in rank those who struggle with their possessions and their selves over the ones who sit at home; yet to each God has promised the reward most fair; and God has preferred those who struggle over the ones who sit at home for the bounty of a mighty wage, in ranks standing before Him, forgiveness and mercy, surly God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate." (4:95)

⁴¹ Jarayan-e ta'sis-e Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran (How the LMI was founded) ([Springfield, MO.]: LMI[a], 1975/1354), p. 30.

there is a sura called Ahzab.⁴² The Prophet organized committed and believing people from Mecca and Yathrib... and the Qoran calls these people "hezbollah" ["Party" of God], while every adversary hezb that arose from reaction, ignorance, ... was called "hezb-osh-sheitan" ["Party of Satan"].

The rest of his remarks more or less reiterate the party line as expressed in its program.⁴³ The quoted section is significant, however, for here Taleqani adroitly takes advantage of a semantic coincidence to legitimize his party by presenting it as an avatar of the original group of Muslims around the Prophet. His use of the word hezbollah caught on, and after the revolution many a meeting of the LMI was broken up by thugs calling themselves hezbollahi, a prime case of "unanticipated consequences."

The three testimonies show that from the very outset the new party's leadership and membership were not homogeneous, as key members were driven by different, although by no means mutually exclusive, motivations. What united them then was a radical stance vis-a-vis the Shah and, as we saw in chapter 4, a common background based on the Bazaar.

In a letter dated Ordibehesht 21, 1340 (May 11, 1961) Bazargan, in the name of the founding members of the new party, informed Mosaddeq of their step. The letter speaks of the founders as "believing" (mo'men) and invokes the help of God,⁴⁴ but is silent on the new party's world-view: probably a compromise solution. In his reply of Ordibehesht 25 (May 15) the old man of Ahmadabad gave his blessing.

⁴² Translated in English as "Confederates."

⁴³ Taleqani's full text can be found in B. Afrasiabi and S. Dehqan, Taleqani, pp. 187-193.

⁴⁴ Jarayan, p. 1.

6.3 THE LMI AND ITS ACTIVITIES

The beginning of the LMI's short existence as a political party coincided with Ali Amini's tenure as Prime Minister. It is therefore appropriate to sketch out the main traits of Amini's administration before turning to the activities of the LMI and the NF proper.

6.3.1 Amini's Premiership

In a radio broadcast on May 8 Amini gave warning that Iran faced "economic poverty" because "vast resources [had] been squandered and financial laws ignored," and added that Iran's "financial and economic systems" were "at their last breath because incompetent and dishonest men in responsible positions [had] misused public funds and enriched themselves at the expense of the Treasury."⁴⁵

As Prime Minister Amini had to navigate a hazardous course between the Shah, who mistrusted him, the National Front, which was jealous of him, and the conservatives who dreaded his plans for land reform. He tried to appease the Nationalists by easing restrictions on their activities, and increased press freedom. Faced with a hostile parliament, he obtained the dissolution of both houses from the Shah on May 9, arguing that Iran could only have honest elections once the electoral laws had been rewritten. Circumstances which I will discuss later thus forced him into a more authoritarian stance after a few weeks.

⁴⁵ Quoted in Keesings, 18117.

His cabinet included some notable personalities. Derakhshesh was named Minister of Culture and ended the teachers strike to the complete satisfaction of the strikers. Arsanjani was named Minister of Agriculture, but Amini decided to postpone action on agrarian reform until he had consolidated his position. A former Tudeh member, Nureddin Alamuti, became Minister of Justice, while a former IP member, Gholam-Ali Fari-var, was given the Ministry of Mines and Industry. But all told Amini did not have enough authority personally to choose all his ministers, which diminished his potential effectiveness.

Amini faced three major tasks: restoring government finances, instituting the long-awaited agrarian reform, and combatting corruption. His first important action was billed an administrative reform, but had in fact other aims. Many government agencies and state-owned industries had come under the control of members of the various security forces, and thus become centers of corruption, both economic and political. Amini relieved these generals of their positions. Many were simply retired, but quite a few powerful ones were arrested. The disaffected generals became his bitter enemies, and the most important of these was Teimur Bakhtiar, erstwhile head of SAVAK. Initially they had hoped that they could count on the Shah's support, but the latter, although wary of Amini, could not afford to oppose his policies. These arrests did not amount to an "administrative reform" but weakened the position of the old establishment.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ For details see Bizhan Jazani, Tarh-e jame'eh shenasi va mabani-ye estratezhiki-ye jonbesh-e engelabi-ye khalq-e Iran -- Tarikh-e si sa-leh-ye Iran (The Sociology and Strategic Bases of the Revolutionary Movement of the Iranian People -- Iran's Thirty Year History), pp. 120-123, and Keesings, 18117.

Amini then proceeded to stabilize Iran's balance of payments by restricting foreign travel and ceasing to sell foreign currency to importers of alcoholic beverages, cosmetics, electrical appliances, and other "luxury items."⁴⁷

During their summit meeting in Vienna in June 1961, Khrushchev had told Kennedy that the potential for revolutionary upheaval in Iran was a critical issue in U.S.-Soviet relations, since the USSR's proximity to Iran would lead America to blame the Soviets if a revolution were to occur in Iran. When Kennedy returned to Washington he requested a full report on the Iranian situation. The United States government now took an active interest in Iran.⁴⁸ Thus, when Amini requested a \$ 750 million loan from the United States, he was rebuffed and the loan was made contingent on rapid and thorough agrarian reform. Until September 1961 a number of U.S. officials came to Iran, negotiated with the government, and in the end Iran received the aid in regular instalments.⁴⁹ In October Iran joined Western countries in denouncing Soviet nuclear tests, and relations between the two neighbors reached a new low, a state of affairs beneficial to U.S.-Iranian relations.

⁴⁷ For details see Keesings, 18882.

⁴⁸ For more details and a discussion of U.S. foreign policy motivations see Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975), pp. 97-103.

⁴⁹ For details on who went to Iran when and why see B. Jazani, Tarh, pp. 122- 123.

In the winter of 1961 the Amini government enacted the first land reform laws. The conservative forces, panicking, attempted to discredit Amini and get rid of him by staging a violent attack on Teheran University, which left one student dead. Conservative elements in the National Front had a role in this event, which will be discussed in more detail gladly on. After this last challenge to land reform the first parcels of land were distributed among the peasantry; and on February 10 1962 (Bahman 21, 1340) Amini first referred to the agrarian reform as a "white revolution."

The carrying out of the agrarian reform met with approval in the United States, and in March 1962 (Farvardin 1341) the Shah paid a visit to the States, where he was hailed as a modernizer.

Amini's apparent successes did not earn him the gratitude of his monarch. Although he was carrying out the policies to which the Shah had resigned himself, the very presence of an independent Prime Minister was perceived as a threat by the Shah. Amini was the last of the line of strong Prime Ministers who, having a political personality of their own, tried actually to govern the country. Like Qavam, Razmara, and Mosaddeq before him, he became unacceptable. When in July 1962 (Tir 1341) a difference of opinion surfaced between the Shah and his Premier over the military's budgetary allocation, Amini tendered his resignation, which the Shah gladly accepted. Soon after Amini left for an extended stay in Switzerland. He was replaced by Amir Asadollah Alam who, although of ancient and noble stock, took pride in calling himself a "house-born slave" of the Shah. A few years later the Shah remembered the months of

Amini's premiership as "the worst period" of American interference, when it tried to "impose your type of regime on other people."⁵⁰

With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that Amini was the last chance of Iran's political class to steer the country through the pitfalls of modernization. Both the Shah and the Nationalists bear some blame in his failure. A cunning and skilful politician, he tried during his brief tenure to establish contacts with the population, and would every now and then drop in on shop-owners for a chat. As a member of the old ruling class he was fully aware of the importance of religion in Iranian society: to gain the goodwill of the religious sectors of the country he prohibited the serving of alcohol at government functions, put an end to the entry of foreign cabaret artists into the country,⁵¹ and had himself photographed sweeping the courtyard of Imam Reza's shrine in Mashad. At a meeting of the Association of Judges he had said: "I declare war on my own class. If rapid reforms are not carried out in the country, far worse disturbances will befall it."⁵² Fifteen years later his prediction came true.

⁵⁰ Interview in U.S. News and World Report, January 27, 1969, p. 49.

⁵¹ "Crisis in Iran," in The World Today, 17 (June 1961), p. 229. On the symbolic significance of cabarets, see chapter 3.

⁵² Quoted in B. Jazani, Tarh, p. 123.

6.3.2 The Founding of the LMI

Conveniently, the founders of the LMI numbered twelve. They were Bazargan, Taleqani, Yadollah Sahabi, Hasan Nazih, Mansur Ata'i, Rahim Ata'i, Abbas Radnia, Abbas Sami'i, Abbas Sheibani, Ezzatollah Sahabi, Ahmad Alibaba'i, and Ahmad Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi (?). All except the last two have already been presented. Ahmad Alibaba'i was born in 1925 in Teheran and is a Bazaar merchant with a keen interest in religious affairs. Ahmad Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, a lawyer, comes from a prominent Qazvin family long active in Nationalist politics.

The highest organ of the new party was its Executive Committee, which consisted of Bazargan, Taleqani, Sahabi, and Rahim Ata'i.

Like that of the NF (II), the inaugural meeting of the LMI was held at the house of Sadeq Firuzabadi. It took place on May 17, 1961 (Ordibehesht 27, 1340) and was organized (and briefly addressed) by a young LMI member who was to reach a certain prominence during the Iranian revolution, Abbas Amir-Entezam.⁵³

The various speeches and statements made that day speak for themselves, I therefore summarize them without much comment. Bazargan gave the first speech. He began by justifying the founding of yet another party. Iranians had become mistrustful of political parties for two reasons. First, the performance of parties had been deeply disappointing, and they had hitherto served mainly as vehicles for the personal ambition of individual politicians. Second, Iranians were unable to cooperate, lacked public-spiritedness, and were hopelessly individualis-

⁵³ For biographical data see chapter 7, section 1.

tic. Bazargan then analyzed at great length the geographical and historical factors that had brought about these national character traits. However, this general disenchantment with political parties did not diminish the objective need for them, for if Iranians wanted to live and breathe freely they had to overcome their internal and external oppressors, and to achieve that, they had to organize. The concessions wrought by the NF from the government in recent months showed that if people organized they could contribute to change.

Bazargan went on to say that to found a party was not easy. The cement that bound members of any organization together consisted of friendship, cooperation, and piety. The political arena was one of the toughest fields of action, and finding solutions and formulating alternative policies for pressing economic, cultural, administrative, and political problems was a mighty task. It also meant that one had to leave one's other occupations and be ready to go to prison periodically. Given all these obstacles and popular disenchantment with parties, one had a tendency to give up and mind one's own business. But one's conscience would not rest. If the country were inhabited by angels and saints all this talk would be irrelevant: the baker would bake good bread, the teacher would give good lessons, and the politician would engage in good politics. But in Iran the higher people's position in society, the less honest and qualified they became. If Iran belonged to everybody, all had to toil for it, for the country would not be made by Americans, Arabs, or Englishmen. Those Iranians who stayed abroad pretexting the unsettled conditions inside the country were egregiously wrong. The task was therefore arduous, but they planned to overcome the difficulties by trusting in God.

[The LMI founders] were not suggesting that the existing parties were bad. The other National parties were honorable and their leaders good people. But in their programs, methods, and record the majority of the population had not found a reflection of its beliefs and hopes, and some of these people might find in the principles of the LMI a better answer to their convictions and yearnings.

Bazargan continues that first it was necessary for all who thought alike to come together and organize; then the various organizations with similar goals should join and cooperate, which is precisely what the NF had done. At the present time it was unthinkable to organize all Iranians in one party and to disband the others.⁵⁴ This had not been the goal of the NF founders, for whom, as in all democracies, the Front had to be a combination of parties and perhaps personalities which would lead Iranians towards democracy. Bazargan affirmed that the LMI was not setting up shop in opposition to the National Front but rather wished to be a constitutive member of it. If its membership was accepted, it would cooperate sincerely. If not, the LMI would manifest no hostility or grudge.

Finally, Bazargan summed up the four basic principles of the party. Its members were Muslim, Iranian, adhered to the Constitution, and were Mosaddeqist:

1-We are Muslims, but not in the sense of considering Prayers and Fasting our only duties. Rather, our entry into politics and social activism was prompted by our national duty and religious obligations. We do not consider religion and

⁵⁴ Not a comment on a single-party state but the LMI's position in the discussion over the internal structure of the NF.

politics separate, and regard serving the people and administering their affairs as an act of worship. We recognize freedom as a primary divine gift and its achievement and keeping are for us an Islamic tradition and a hallmark of Shi'ism. We are Muslims in the sense that we believed in the principles of justice, equality, sincerity, and other social and humane duties before they were proclaimed by the French revolution and the Charter of the United Nations.

2-We are Iranians but do not claim that Iranians are first in everything.⁵⁵ Our love for Iran and our Nationalism imply no racial fanaticism, and are on the contrary based on an acceptance of our own short-comings and honoring of others' virtues and rights. We insist on our country's standing and independence but are not opposed to contacts with other nations, [as we live] in an [increasingly interdependent] world.

3-We respect the Iranian constitution but [not selectively.] We support the Constitution as an integral whole and will not accept that its basic principles, namely the freedom of thought, press, and reunions, the independence of judges, the separation of powers, and finally honest elections be forgotten and sacrificed, whereas minor details and misinterpreted legal formalities occupy the major role, resulting in the abrogation of National sovereignty and the rule of law.

4-We are Mosaddeqists and regard Mosaddeq as one of the great servants of Iran and the East, but not such as he has been accused of out of stupidity and hindthought, where his school is presented as synonymous with lawlessness, the strengthening of communism, xenophobia, and the separation of Iran from the rest of the world. We honor Mosaddeq as the only head of government in Iran's history who was truly chosen and loved by the majority of the people, who acted in a direction desired by the people, enabling him to establish bonds between the rulers and the ruled and explain the true meaning of government and thus achieve the greatest success in Iran's recent history, namely the victory over colonialism. That is why we follow his thesis and path and ask God that our pact with him and with you may never be broken and that we may always work for righteousness in the service of Iran according to [our] principles.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Inadequate translation of an old Persian saying, Honar nazd-e Iranian ast o bas, "Art is with Iranians and that's all."

⁵⁶ Jarayan, p. 10.

After Bazargan Hasan Nazih gave a speech. In it he analyzed the current situation, noting that all of [the LMI founders'] predictions and warnings had come true and were now even admitted by the Prime Minister. He went on to quote regime members' rosy predictions and later admissions of defeat. The main reason for these repeated failures had been foreseen by Dr. Mosaddeq at his trial when he had said: "Even if billions of pounds and dollars are channelled to a ruling group that is not chosen by the people, not only will no ill be remedied, but poverty, debts, and the economic crisis will increase day by day." Nazih then analyzed the regime's attempt at creating a two-party system, ridiculing it but not mentioning the Shah himself. Next he turned to the Shah's position in Iran, quoting Mosaddeq at great length to the effect that the monarch must reign but not rule. He adduced additional evidence from Montesquieu and Ferdowsi.

As the LMI saw it, the best guarantee for the maintenance of the regime was an integral application of the constitution, so that the country might be governed by a government chosen by the people, as was the case in other monarchies like Sweden, England, Denmark, and Belgium. That could only be brought about by holding elections. Inadequate electoral laws were but a pretext to delay elections. The LMI would fully cooperate with the National Front on this issue. Only a government designated by a popularly elected parliament could succeed in fighting corruption, otherwise people would not trust it. Nazih then called on Amiri to prepare elections as soon as possible. He ended with a lengthy discussion of Iran's international situation, in view of which neutralism was the best position.

The seven members of the founding council (Bazargan, Taleqani, Y. Sahabi, Nazih, Mansur Ata'i, Rahim Ata'i, and Abbas Sami'i) then issued a formal declaration announcing the founding of the LMI. It reiterated, in somewhat more emotional and less analytic language, the motivations and goals of the enterprise. Taleqani and Ay. Reza Zanjani issued statements of their own, although the latter did not join formally.

The LMI also published its program that day. The complete program can be found in Appendix A; what follows is a brief summary. Based on "the principles of Islam, the Iranian constitution, the international declaration of human rights, and the Charter of the United Nations," in that order, the program was organized around twelve major points. It insisted on the necessity to establish the rule of law, demanded the respect of the constitution, a true separation of powers, the abolition of special jurisdictions, and the eradication of all forms of corruption, political and moral. In the realm of economics, the program reiterated the old Nationalist demand that oil revenues not be used to cover current expenditures, but rather to finance development projects. Significantly it did not call for agrarian reform. In view of the dismal failure of the Shah's land reform, it would be tempting to attribute this to foresightedness. However, the failure of the land reform was not necessarily predictable in 1961, and it is more probable that the LMI's reluctance to commit itself to sweeping changes in property relations reflected the fact that the conformity of such changes to Islamic laws was an unsettled question then. (A few months later, in October, Taleqani would attempt to clarify this thorny issue, as we shall see) Also, the party was above all urban and Bazaar-based, which helps explain why

agrarian questions were peripheral to its concerns. It should also be added that Mosaddeq himself had not advocated radical agrarian reform, instead during his tenure as Prime Minister a program was elaborated whereby landowners would have been required to pay 20 per cent of their profits back to the village, half for the peasants and half for community improvements.⁵⁷ In the program of the LMI this became a call for the establishment of "just relations between peasants and landowners."

The main thrust of the party program was the desire to create an atmosphere of trust and predictability in society. Corruption had to be combatted and "correct financial, commercial, social, cultural, health, agricultural, and industrial orders" be created, so that people could reap the benefits of harder work and be encouraged to repatriate capital held in foreign banks and invest it in Iran. Words such as "genuine," "principle," "correct," and "principled" abound and reflect the view that so long as the government and the ruling group did not enjoy the public's confidence all changes, reforms, and programs would only be cosmetic and have no lasting effect. There was also the idea that reform proposals coming from an illegitimate government could not be sincerely meant. All of this can be seen as an expression of the LMI's frustration over the lack of a legal-rational order in Iran.

The program also included four points dealing with foreign policy which show the attraction of the then young non-aligned movement. Iran should revert to neutralism and establish close ties with developing nations, especially Islamic ones.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ See R. Cottam, Nationalism, pp. 271-272.

From the outset the LMI was somewhat handicapped by its internal heterogeneity. To be sure, all members were Nationalists and believing Muslims. But the Islamic orientation was more pronounced in Bazargan, Taleqani, and Sahabi while others, most importantly Ata'i, Radnia, and Sami'i, had vaguely socialist tendencies.⁵⁹ The rank and file membership was made up mostly of members of the Islamic Student Associations who generally came from lower middle-class backgrounds, were often provincial, and were thus less sophisticated and more narrow-minded than certain key figures in the party leadership, people who spoke foreign languages, were financially well-off, and had travelled abroad. Some people joined the new party because of their past association with the NRM and were thus more attracted by the LMI's radical stance vis-a-vis the Shah than by its religious bent. A certain amount of tension thus existed from the outset.⁶⁰

6.3.3 The LMI as a Party

The Liberation Movement of Iran operated openly as a party within the political system for nineteen months. In May 1961 it was founded, in January 1963 most of its leaders went to prison. During these nineteen months no elections took place which would allow us to gauge its popularity, the party held no congress which would permit us to investigate

⁵⁸ The original texts of the LMI's exchange of letters with Mosaddeq, Bazargan's and Nazih's speeches, the LMI's proclamation and program, Taleqani's declaration and Ay. Zanjani's message are reprinted in Jarayan.

⁵⁹ B. Jazani, Tarh, p. 87.

⁶⁰ Ezzatollah Sahabi's interview in Naser Hariri, Mosahebeh ba tarikhsazan-e Iran (Interviews with Makers of Iranian History) (Teheran: 1979), pp. 179-182.

its internal workings, and the two governments that Iran had in this period did not include the LMI in their discussions with the opposition. There is therefore precious little that can be said about the LMI as a party.

At the outset the party was allowed to open a club on 141 Kakh street, in what was then an upper middle-class neighborhood of Teheran. The house was owned by Bazargan. On the day the club was inaugurated it was packed with people, a sign of the public's impatience with the National Front. On May 22, 1961 (Khordad 1, 1340) Bazargan, in the name of the party founders, sent a short letter to Baqer Kazemi, the chairman of the National Front's Central Council, and asked for the LMI to become a member of the Front. The question was never formally considered in the Central Council but in spite of all the differences that would occur between the LMI and the NF's leadership it was always understood that the LMI was a member of the Front, unlike Maleki's socialists.

The LMI also proceeded to put out regular publications. The party did not have an organ, but something called the "Internal Publication of the LMI" (Nashriye-ye dakheli-ye Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran) first came out on June 11 (Khordad 21). Only three issues saw the light of day, for the newsletter had to cease publication in the wake of the July 22 demonstrations organized by the Nationalists. (Paradoxically the publication was revived when the remainders of the party went underground in January 1963.) Another publication, called "With and Without Interpretations" (Ba tafsirha va bi tafsirha) was published in three mimeographed issues in early January 1962 and carried mostly translations of

articles on Iran that had appeared in the New York Times and other Western newspapers. Finally, from October 1962 to December 1962 four issues of something called "With and Without Annotation" (Ba hashi-ye va bi hashiyeh) was produced. It carried news, comments, and again translations from foreign newspapers. In addition the party would produce declarations at important junctures which would be widely distributed in Teheran.

As for the club on Kakh Street, it was also closed after the July demonstrations. In the few months that it existed regular meetings were held which would be addressed by party leaders. On several occasions members of the Student Organization of the NF would visit and exchange views with LMI members. After the closing down of the club the meetings of the Monthly Talks Society (vide infra) and of the various Islamic Associations (of students, engineers, physicians etc.) provided opportunities for leaders and sympathizers to come together.

During this period of more or less open activity the LMI also issued a number of more lengthy declarations in which it analyzed the current situation. One was an "Open letter to His Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi," and was published in July 1962. In it the LMI introduced itself and its program to the Shah and painted a dire picture of the country's current situation. It contrasted Prime Minister Amini's gloomy analyses of Iran's woes with the Shah's own optimistic views, and compared the Shah's practice with what he had written in his book Mission for my Country. Basing itself on a remark the Shah had made at the American Press Club during his visit to the States in March to the ef-

fect that he welcomed constructive criticism, the LMI exhorted the monarch to reign and not to rule, and asked for free elections since only a popularly chosen government could guide Iran out of the crisis it was in.

Some time after this letter the LMI issued a major ideological statement, entitled "Political Struggles and Religious Struggles" (Mobarezat-e siasi va mobarezat-e mazhabi.) ⁶¹ In this document the party presented a rationale for harnessing people's religious aspirations for political action. It is of capital importance. So far the LMI had defined itself as a party that was "Muslim, Iranian, Constitutionalist, and Mosaddeqist"; Islam had therefore been one of four constitutive components of the party's ideology. Now, in the summer of 1962, as frustration over the lack of progress in reaching the National Movement's most minimal goals grew, the linkage between politics and religion became more explicit in the minds of party leaders. The document's argumentation runs as follows:

First, it defines the term "struggle" as "the confrontation of a person, an organization, or a people with the existing state of affairs in order to change it and transform it to the desired state." It then plants the axiom that all progress is the fruit of struggle thusly defined, and that the opposite of struggle, immobilism, is a form of corruption. The agents of this struggle have to be the people themselves, for it is said in the Qoran: "God changes not what is in a people, until they change what is in themselves" (13:12). The text notes that the

⁶¹ The text was reprinted once in Iran and then abroad. ([Springfield, MO]: LMI[a], 1976).

verse makes no reference to foreign elements.

The documents then dismisses material causes as the main motivation for struggle and observes that most leaders and initiators of great revolutions did not suffer material deprivation themselves. Instead they were people with a special sensitivity, which shows that the main motivation behind struggle has always been spiritual rather than material.

It goes on to say that although there are certain similarities between political struggle and religious struggle based on similar motivations, the differences are more important and centered around the ultimate aims of both. Political struggle is for improvement in this-worldly matters, whereas religious struggle aimed at improvements in this world and rewards in the other. In any event, there is an old difference between the Orient and the West. While the latter had since the times of the Greeks witnessed political struggles, all major religions had sprung up in the Orient. This had left a legacy, in as much as Oriental peoples were more responsive to religious appeals than to appeals based on nationalism or material benefits. Western powers had always been aware of this and in order to weaken the religious impulse in Eastern peoples they had attempted to plant their agents even among the ulema. The Iranian national trait of resignation in the face of adversity had facilitated matters for the enemies of Iran, and the steady income produced by oil and foreign aid had dispensed Iranians from having to strive for their survival.

Political struggle is less likely to have lasting effects than spiritual struggle, as a comparison of the achievements of Attila, Alexan-

der, and Ghengiz Khan with those of Muhammad, Martin Luther, and Gandhi demonstrates. However, if some people wanted to limit themselves to political struggle there is nothing wrong with that and the LMI would cooperate with them towards common goals. So much for this doctrinal text.

This growing emphasis on religion was also a major bone of contention between the LMI and the NF. To be sure, no NF leader could politically afford openly to attack the LMI for its religious orientation: Iran was an Islamic country and a number of ulema sat on the National Front's Central Council. While some members of the NF leadership were more or less believing Muslims who did not want to mix religion with politics (e.g. Saleh and Sanjabi), others like Sadiqi and Bakhtiar were quite openly freethinkers. Thus we have no records of debates between the two sides on the proper role of religion in politics, but informal talks with political leaders of that time indicate that very often discussions on the Central Council of the NF concerned just that.

During its brief existence the LMI also tried to demonstrate what properly motivated and honest people could accomplish if they organized. The most visible outcome of this effort was an entire village that the LMI financed and built (many party leaders were engineers and/or in the construction business!) for victims of a strong earthquake that shook the region of Qazvin in 1962. The effectiveness of that relief effort was contrasted with the government's allegedly inefficient and corrupt handling of the international aid it received for the same purpose.

Politically, as we have already seen, the often stated aims of the LMI were free elections, the establishment of the rule of law, putting an end to the personal rule of the Shah, fighting economic and moral corruption, and ending foreign meddling in Iran's internal affairs. All of these aims were more or less shared by the NF. There is, however, one more issue which the LMI put on the agenda of Iranian politics, a move that would have a lasting effect on the political outlook of Iranians: Iran's relations with Israel.

Its religious orientation immunized the LMI against the anti-Arab feeling that made it possible for some Iranians, even inside the National Movement, to contemplate normal relations with Israel. Israel was depicted in LMI party publications as a surrogate for Western imperialism in the Middle East, and the Shah's government was repeatedly chided for maintaining relations with it. The impetus for this vehemently anti-Israeli policy of the LMI came from Taleqani's two trips to what was then East Jerusalem, to attend Islamic congresses sponsored by the Jordanian government (1959 and 1961). In 1959 he also headed a clerical delegation to Cairo bearing a message from Ay. Borujerdi to Sheikh Shaltut, the Rector of the Al-Azhar University and Grand Mufti of Egypt. Sheikh Shaltut then officially recognized Shi'ism as a legitimate branch of Islam, alongside the four traditional Sunni schools, a move that greatly facilitated later manifestations of Muslim unity. Taleqani left Egypt impressed by the Egyptian revolution,⁶² and that probably laid the ground for the LMI's infatuation with the Egyptian dictator.

⁶² B. Afrasiabi and S. Dehqan, Taleqani, pp. 169-176.

The main focus of the LMI's attacks was Israeli involvement in agricultural development in the area of Qazvin. Both the Iranian and the Israeli governments tried to keep these contacts secret,⁶³ and it is perhaps only because of their efforts on behalf of the earthquake victims that the leaders of the LMI became aware of the increasing Israeli presence in Iran. This antipathy towards the Jewish State went very far and had at times clearly antisemitic overtones. That the LMI objected mainly to the presence of Israeli experts in Iran shows that the party was not aware of a far more sinister link between the two countries, namely the close cooperation between the Israeli secret service, MOSSAD, and its Iranian counterpart, SAVAK.⁶⁴

A corollary of this hostility to Israel was strongly expressed sympathy for Arab causes. The LMI celebrated Algerian independence and raised a big fuss over the union of Egypt and Syria in the "United Arab Republic." Since Nasser was becoming increasingly hostile to the Shah, this policy was a direct challenge to the Shah's foreign policy.

While the LMI functioned openly as a political party, it was both an ally and a rival of the National Front. The religiously colored discourse that it more and more adopted could not be matched in terms of effectiveness by anything the other factions of the National Movement had to offer: the vague Fabianism of the IP, the exalted nationalism of the PIN, the Islamic socialism of the PIP, or the socialism of Khalil

⁶³ Robert B. Reppa, Sr., Israel and Iran: Bilateral Relationship and Effect on the Indian Ocean Basin (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 98-99.

⁶⁴ On SAVAK's co-operation with MOSSAD and other Western intelligence agencies see Harald Irnberger, SAVAK oder Der Folterfreund des Westens (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1977), passim.

Meleki. In the end even veteran leaders of the NF had to admit that the LMI was the more popular of the National Movement's two wings.⁶⁵

However, the LMI failed to reap the benefits of this popularity. The Shah was increasingly determined to crush any opposition at whatever cost (as the June 1963 riots would later demonstrate). And yet, perhaps the LMI itself could have done more to advance its cause. Altogether too much time was spent in internal debate between the two constitutive elements within the party (NRM and ISA people) and in quarrelling with the NF. There were no membership drives and the LMI always remained a (potential) cadre party. Organization in the provinces was minimal. Thus, when the top leadership was arrested in January 1963, for all intents and purposes the party was at its end.

6.3.4 The LMI, the National Movement, and Amini

In its reaction to Amini the National Front divided along the same lines as on the other issues. The radical wing clearly saw the difference between Amini and the Shah and wanted to take advantage of that. The purpose was to weaken the Shah by strengthening Amini.

The students of the NF had actively supported the teachers strike and even held a small meeting in support of Amini's dissolution of the Majles. To the more religious elements in the radical wing, basically the LMI, Amini's tact and consideration for religious susceptibilities may very well have been an added incentive to give him a chance, at

⁶⁵ Allahyar Saleh, as quoted in the secret U.S. documents published by the "Students following the Imam's Line," reprinted in Iran Times (Washington, D.C.), January 13, 1984, p. 15.

least for the time being. The most ardent supporter of a modus vivendi with Amini, however was Khalil Maleki, but he was kept out of the National Front at the time.

We saw that at its founding ceremonies the LMI had not attacked Amini directly. On the contrary, both Bazargan and Nazih pointed out the convergencies between their party's assessment of the general situation and Amini's.

The moderate wing, by contrast, resented Amini. They had never criticized the Shah personally, and now they transferred their opposition to Eqbal and Sharif-Emami to Amini. Their political program consisted in the demand for free elections, which the Prime Minister could not grant: the old conservative establishment was still so well entrenched in the rural districts of the country that genuinely free elections, or rather elections free of government interference, would have resulted in a chamber dominated by landlords who would have toppled Amini. Let us not forget that even Mosaddeq had not dominated the country sufficiently to get a clear majority of deputies in the elections to the seventeenth Majles.

On the question of land reform the National Front was also most cautious, for which there are many reasons. The National Front did include a number of major landlords on its Central Council, such as Amir-Teimur Kalali of Khorasan, and such prominent leading members as the chiefs of the Qashqa'i tribe (in exile at that time). Also, it appears that the National Front did not want to antagonize high members of the clergy, among whom many opposed agrarian reform. Khonji, whose role in the run-

ning of the day-to-day affairs of the Front became ever more dominant, finally wrote a tract in which he argued that since Iran had never known European-style feudalism, there was no class-struggle in the country, and that instead Iran was ruled by a tiny foreign-supported elite, which had to be got rid of.⁶⁶

As Prime Minister Amini had hoped to reach a truce with the Nationalists and as a goodwill gesture allowed them to hold a mass meeting at Jalalieh. This meeting, the first and last official meeting of the National Front, was held on May 18 (Ordibehesht 28) and around 80,000 people came, demonstrating to the world the vitality of Mosaddeqism. The speakers, however, attacked Amini mercilessly and Sanjabi declared that the people of Iran did not want a Prime Minister imposed by America.

The next step in the confrontation between the moderate wing of the NF and Amini came on July 21 (Tir 30), when the Nationalists wanted to commemorate the anniversary of the 1952 events which had led to Mosaddeq's return to power. As Prime Minister Amini could not countenance this public humiliation of his sovereign, but he let it be known that any other day would be all right. The NF was adamant, and went ahead with its preparations for a show of force. The result was that the meeting did not receive official authorization and degenerated into riots. Many Nationalist leaders were arrested, and the clubs of both the NF and the LMI were closed down. Amini also sent a note to Moscow protesting against Soviet interference in Iranian affairs. Not to be outdone by the Nationalists, the Shah organized his own celebrations of the

⁶⁶ H. Katouzian's introduction to Khalil Maleki, Khaterat, p. 134n.

day he was brought back to power (August 19/Mordad 28), but for the first time he staged the show outside Teheran. In his speech he reminded his opponents of the disorder they were creating and sent a warning both to the Nationalists and to Amini.

In the period after this affair, it was the Student Organization of the National Front that had the greatest amount of leeway.⁶⁷ The students implicitly supported Amini against a coup attempt by General Bakhtiar, which many people saw as a real possibility. They also welcomed Derakhshesh's proposals for combatting illiteracy, but ultimately did not take part in the minister's campaign. While the National Front had no regular publication of its own, the students journal, Payam-e daneshju (The Student's Message), came out regularly and was even printed rather than photocopied.

The moderates in the Front reacted in two ways. Firstly, they established contacts with members of the old conservative establishment to find ways to get rid of Amini. Parallel to that, Khonji and his lieutenant, Hejazi, began a drive against leftists in the Front and prepared a black list.⁶⁸ In the demonstrations of July 21 the entire leadership of the National Front's Youth Organization (made up of high school students and mostly leftist) was arrested. Hejazi, who was freed by the

⁶⁷ The unofficial go-between between Amini and the students was Ehsan Naraqi, who in the 1970's became a leading sociologist in Iran.

⁶⁸ It should be pointed out that this witch-hunt was not completely unjustified, for the Tudeh Party had instructed its sympathizers in Iran to abstain from open Front activity and instead join or infiltrate other anti-Shah organizations, whatever their ideology. See Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 230-239.

authorities earlier than the rest of the NF leadership, took advantage of the vacancy and placed his own people at the top of the Youth Organization. When the original leadership was released a struggle ensued, with the result that over 90 leaders of the Youth Organization were expelled from it on charges of being communist. The expulsion took place under the supervision of Sanjabi, who was goaded by Khonji and Hejazi. Many of the expelled students began attending university a few months later, however, and were welcomed into the ranks of the Student Organization of the NF.

Although he had been mobbed by students on his October 25 visit to the university, Amini continued to grant students a certain leeway. On December 7, the anniversary of the slayings of 1953 was commemorated calmly and without any incident, while two days later a planned NF demonstration had to be cancelled after it failed to receive government authorization.

On November 15, 1951 (Aban 24, 1340) the Shah issued a proclamation addressed to Prime Minister Amini in which he spelled out details of the reform program he wished the government to enact. The reactions from the National Front and from the LMI differed only slightly. Both emphasized that the regime's pretexts for not holding elections were invalid and that elections were a cornerstone of Iran's constitution. But whereas the NF's reasoning was mainly legal and included Amini in its reproach,⁶⁹ the LMI ignored the Prime Minister completely and instead prefaced its declaration with statements by the Shah in which he had

⁶⁹ The Shah's proclamation and the NF's response are available in English. See Middle East Journal, 16 (winter 1962), pp. 86-92.

said the opposite of what he was now proposing to do. This use of irony is typical for the LMI (also in later periods): essentially they were calling the Shah a liar.

In January Khonji and the conservatives hatched a final plot to discredit Amini. On January 21 (Bahman 1) Khonji and Hejazi used their control over the Youth Organization to start a demonstration on the campus of Teheran University by spreading false rumors. It appears that they were in league with Teimur Bakhtiar, who would see to it that the demonstrations would be so harshly repressed that Amini would have to step down and make place for a "law and order" government led by Bakhtiar himself and in which certain elements of the NF would find a place.

Amini, however, got wind of the plot and on the day of the demonstrations asked the commanders of the three branches of the armed forces to come and pay him a visit. It thus happened that at that precise moment the army proper could not intervene. But just as the demonstration was about to calm down, paratroopers under the command of Major Manuchehr Khosrowdad attacked the university savagely, beating up students, breaking windows and doors, and destroying much expensive laboratory equipment. Most leading members of the Student Organizations, who had had no hand in the affair, were arrested. Three days later one Dar ol-Fonun high school student was killed by the police. On January 24 (Bahman 4) Khonji persuaded the National Front leadership to issue a call for a general strike.⁷⁰ But this was so badly prepared that hardly anybody took notice, and in the words of Khalil Maleki there had not even been a

⁷⁰ B. Jazani, Tarh, pp. 128-130.

"particular strike."⁷¹

After that fiasco the National Front was exposed as ineffective, and its most active members, the student leaders, were in prison. Amini, for his part, let it be known that he had had nothing to do with the severe repression and refused to be identified with it. He declared that the disorders had been provoked by opponents of the agrarian reform law and by Tudeh agitators (In early November 1961 90 members of the outlawed Tudeh had been arrested, and one of the arrested had confessed that he and others had received orders to join the National Front).⁷² On January 26 Teimur Bakhtiar left Iran at the request of the Shah, and from Europe began agitating for free elections and democracy and against Amini. (He later went to Iraq and was eventually hunted down by SAVAK and killed.)

Soon after the attack on the University a publication of the LMI claimed that in Europe Bakhtiar had presented the cabinet he would have formed after a successful coup. The list, as reproduced by the LMI, contained two NF leaders: Shapur Bakhtiar (Teimur Bakhtiar's first cousin) as Minister of Labor, and Khonji as Minister for the Land Reform. This amounted to a grave accusation and certainly did not improve relations between the NF and the LMI.⁷³

⁷¹ As quoted in Katouzian's introduction to Khalil Maleki, Khaterat, p. 136.

⁷² Keesings, 18882.

⁷³ See Ba tafsir va bi tafsir, no. 3, n.d., p. 4. Shapur Bakhtiar has consistently denied any collusion with his cousin.

After the January attack on the University the radical wing of the National Front -- the Students, the LMI, and the PIN -- openly attacked the NF leadership, which it accused of incompetence. The NF was obliged to create a commission to investigate the incident, but the composition of the commissin was such that no report ever saw the light of day.

On July 17, Asadollah Alam, hitherto administrator of the Pahlavi Foundation, took over from Amini as Prime Minister. The conservatives hoped that the appointment of a landed aristocrat would herald an end to their travails, but the land reform could not be rolled back since it had the full support of the United States. Alam vowed to continue Amini's reforms, and Arsanjani even kept his portofolio as Minister of Agriculture -- for the time being. (He lost his post after a cabinet reshuffle in March 1963, was sent as ambassador to Rome, and soon after died under mysterious circumstances.)

The new Prime Minister initiated high level talks with the leadership of the NF and intimated that he might take a few Nationalists into his cabinet. Again the gap between the Mosaddeqists and the Shah's government was too large to bridge, but at least the negotiations kept the NF in check for a while.⁷⁴

The tension between the LMI and the NF continued and culminated in an angry exchange over a ... photo. Both sides in the internal conflict of the National Movement claimed to represent Mosaddeq's thought. In late October 1962 Mosaddeq, in response to an LMI request, sent them a photo-

⁷⁴ Homa Katouzian's introduction to Khalil Maleki, Khaterat, pp. 159-160.

graph bearing the inscription: "To those who, when the public good is at stake, sacrifice their personal interests, to those who in political matters have not compromised and who sacrifice everything for Iran's freedom and independence, this unworthy picture is presented." Members of the LMI youth organization affixed the name of the party to the top of the photo, reproduced it in large numbers, and distributed the copies widely in Teheran, claiming that with it Mosaddeq had designated the LMI as the true continuator of his way.

To this day National Front people resent this claim to exclusiveness. They argue that Mosaddeq used to dedicate his photos to people by name, and had he wished to do so, there is no reason to believe that he would not have dedicated it to the LMI. To conclude from the inscription alone that Mosaddeq regarded LMI adherents as his true followers is indeed not realistic. The incident of the photo was ultimately silly and strikes one as trivial twenty years later; if I relate it in detail it is because it created bad blood between the NF and the LMI and kept coming up in the two organizations' publications for a long time.

In exchange for the NF leadership's lack of zeal the government allowed preparations to go ahead for the first congress of the National Front. In these preparations the cards were heavily stacked against the radicals. Different groups were to elect delegates according to the following key:

Students:	35
Bazaar:	10
Workers:	10
Neighborhoods:	10
Teachers:	8
Guilds:	7
Government employees:	5
Private sector employees:	5
Administrations:	7
Suburbs:	9
Clergy:	2
Women's Organization	2
Athletes	2
[Students abroad:	7]

That meant that over 100 participants were to be sent by the various organizations affiliated with the National Front, while about sixty were there as individuals, a number that included party leaders. Some organizations, such as that of the private sector employees, existed only on paper and sent no delegates. The Neighborhood Councils sent no delegates either, for the elections which would have designated them were sabotaged by the NF because the councils were thought to be dominated by the PIN.⁷⁵ The inclusion of athletes, perhaps curious to the Western reader, is explained by the important place traditional athletics occupy in Iranian society.⁷⁶ Almost all participants came from Teheran: the NF had developed almost no activity outside the capital, except for individual leaders' efforts in their home towns (e.g. Saleh in Kashan). Of the 35 student members 29 were for students from Teheran, the rest for their provincial comrades. The seven seats initially reserved for students abroad were not filled after student leaders in Europe and the

⁷⁵ Sadeq Qotbzadeh in a speech given in 1964 to the NF's Munich branch, the text of which is in my possession.

⁷⁶ See A. Reza Arasteh, Man and Society in Iran (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964), pp. 29-33.

United States expressed doubts about being able to return after the congress.

The 35 seats reserved for students made them the single most important group. And yet they felt underrepresented, for of the total of all the people who had voted for NF delegates, about half had done so in the universities.

6.3.5 The LMI at the Congress of the National Front

Four leaders of the LMI had been invited to participate: Bazargan, Taleqani, Nazih, and Sahabi. But like other party leaders they were there in their own right, not qua LMI representatives. The ranks of the LMI were strengthened by a number of student delegates who were LMI members, such as Abbas Sheibani and Mohammad Moqaddam. The congress elected Mo-saddeq honorary president of the National Front, and then elected a new Central Council of 35 members,⁷⁷ who were to coopt fifteen other members later. Bazargan and Taleqani were included in the Council because it had been decided that all groups should be represented on it. But then the leadership decided that the two representatives of the students would be elected by the congress at large, and not by the student delegates themselves. This resulted in the selection of Abbas Naraqi, who

⁷⁷ They were: Dr. Mehdi Azar, Dr. Shamseddin Amirala'i, Dr. Abdolhosein Ardalan, Mehrdad Arfa'zadeh, Ali Ardalan, Eng. Mehdi Bazargan, Dr. Shapur Bakhtiar, Asghar Parsa, Gholam-Reza Takhti, Ay. S. Baqer Jala-li Musavi, Dr. Yusef Jalali Musavi, Ay. H. S. Zia'eddin Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, Dr. Mas'ud Hejazi, Eng. Kazem Hasibi, Eng. Jahangir Haqshenas, Eng. Abdol-Hosein Khalili, Dr. Mohammad-Ali Khonji, Eng. Ahmad Zirakzadeh, Hosein Shahhoseini, Allahyar Saleh, Dr. Gholam-Hosein Sa-diqi, S. Mahmud Taleqani, Dariush Foruhar, H. Hasan Qasemiyeh, Baqer Kazemi, Ebrahim Karimabadi, S. Mohammad-Ali Keshavarz Sadr, Asghar Gitibin, H.S. Mahmud Manian, Ali Ashraf Manuchehri, Dr. Fereidun Mah-davi, Hasan Mir Mohammad Sadeqi, Abbas Naraqi, and Eng. Nushin.

would not necessarily have been the students' first choice.⁷⁸ The congress of the National Front was dominated by one debate: should it be a unitary organization, or should it encompass a variety of parties and personalities?

Three factions developed at the congress.⁷⁹ The unitarist faction, whose most prominent leaders were Sanjabi and Saleh, essentially wanted to transform the National Front into a unified party. The main movers of this faction were Hejazi and Khonji, and its "man Friday" was Ahmad Salamatian, then a student at Teheran university.

The unitarists were opposed by a faction which came to be known as the "Congress Minority": essentially what we have called the radical wing. It included party leaders, such as the four LMI leaders, but also Dariush Foruhar of the PIN and Dr. Hosein Razi, General Secretary of the PIP (Dr. Nakhsab was still in New York). Numerical strength was provided by the very important Student Organization of the National Front,

⁷⁸ The students would later complain about this procedure to Mosaddeq, who agreed, writing:

A Central Committee thus constituted is not effective, for its members should have each a constituency to which they feel responsible... Persons without constituencies chosen by the congress or the Central Council become instruments in the hands of those who proposed them and thus Iran will always remain without statesmen and it is for all this that in these last years the National Front has not been able to do anything to further the cause of freedom and independence in Iran.

Mokatebat-e Mosaddeq: talash baray-e tashkil-e jebhe-ye melli-ye sevvom (The Correspondence of Mossadeq: Efforts for creating the Third National Front) (Paris: Entesharat-e Mosaddeq, 1975), p. 71.

⁷⁹ The following account of the NF's congress was given to me by Dr. He-dayatollah Matin-Daftari during interviews in Paris, in July and August 1983.

whose 35 delegates were overwhelmingly favorable to the minority. The most prominent leaders of the Student Organization were, in alphabetical order, Ali-Akbar Akbari, Abolhasan Banisadr, Hasan Habibi, Bizhan Jazani, Hushang Keshavarz Sadr, Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, Hasan Parsa, Abbas Sheibani, Mostafa Sho'a'ian, and Mansur Soroush.

Between these two factions was the rest of the participants, undecided delegates whom the two factions tried to sway their way. The most prominent member here was Dr. Sadiqi, Mossadeq's last Minister of the Interior, who made some feeble efforts to reconcile the two sides.

It is interesting to note, that even the Iran Party itself was split three ways on the question. The most intransigent wing, led by Sanjabi, demanded nothing less than the dissolution of all parties. They were opposed by a wing led by Shapur Bakhtiar, who favored the continued existence of political parties. An intermediary position was taken by Allahyar Saleh and his followers, who, somewhat contradictorily wanted a unitary NF and the continued existence of Nationalist parties, but outside the Front -- perhaps because they thought this solution would enable them to maintain their domination of the National Front. When the unitarists presented a draft statute to the Congress which was blatantly antidemocratic, it was yet another IP member, Eng. Zirakzadeh, who delivered the most eloquent speech against the dissolution of the parties.

At the end of the second day of the Congress, the LMI's Central Committee met privately to decide whether to continue their participation in the Congress or to walk out, given that so many historic leaders of the NF were opposed to its existence as a party inside the Front. Rahim

Ata'i, Ezzatollah Sahabi, Eng. Hasan Arabzadeh, Mohammad Moqaddam, and Abbas Sheibani voted against staying inside the Front. They were out-voted, however, and with a majority of two it was decided that the LMI continue its struggle inside the Front.⁸⁰

On the third day of the Congress, the Congress Minority was making headway in its campaign to win over the undecided delegates, when suddenly Abbas Sheibani, disregarding the LMI Central Committee's vote, got up, distributed a harshly worded tract, and read a fiery speech, denouncing the NF leadership as traitors and asking for them to be tried.

It must be borne in mind that Saleh was a very popular figure at that time, and that any call for his trial was quite absurd. Therefore, as a result of Sheibani's rash act, the denouement which had seemed in the offing vanished. The unitarist faction started a counter-offensive to woo back the undecided votes, fuelled in part by Saleh's open personal dislike for Bazargan.⁸¹ In the commotion and angry exchange of charges and counter-charges that ensued, Bazargan left the Congress in a huff, exasperated both by Sheibani's and Moqaddam's antics and by Saleh's intransigence. The Student Organization attempted to avoid an open break, and following Bazargan and the other LMI leaders out of the hall, tried to bring about a reconciliation -- to no avail. The Congress Minority had now lost the crucial votes of LMI leaders and sympathizers.

⁸⁰ The above episode was related to me by Ahmad Alibaba'i, who was present. Interview, Cologne, August 23, 1983.

⁸¹ Shapur Bakhtiar, personal interview, Suresnes, August 19, 1983.

The end of the congress coincided with preparations for the Shah's referendum on his "White Revolution." But before we proceed further we have to stop and turn our attention to religious developments. The period 1959-1963 witnessed the first attempts by Islamic modernists to create a coherent body of political positions and to present their views to a wider audience: people associated with the NRM and later the LMI played an important part in this.

6.4 THE RELIGIOUS REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE EARLY 1960'S

These developments have to be seen against the background of the general state of relations between the State and Church, and against the background of internal developments within the clerical institution.

The hitherto harmonious relations between the Pahlavi State and the ulema began deteriorating in 1959. The rift became apparent in May 1960, when Ay. Borujerdi, who was at the peak of his prestige as sole marja' of the world's Shi'ites, denounced the agrarian reform bill of 1959, which had been presented to Parliament in early 1960, as contrary to both Islam and the constitution. He did not attack the Shah personally, but instead blamed his advisors.⁸² Given the general state of corruption and economic crisis that pervaded the country, the sentiment was appearing among the religious classes that tyranny and despotism were reaching intolerable levels. At long last Borujerdi had left his lofty indifference to politics, but not all religious people could agree with his motives. While it is true that the clergy as a whole stood to lose

⁸² On State-clergy relations in this period, see Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 91-117.

from agrarian reform, which impelled many of them to adopt conservative positions, other sectors, including many modernists, were alive to the need for agrarian reform, but mistrusted the Shah's motives and sincerity in championing the cause. A purely negative attitude towards the Shah's proposed reform program therefore would not do. Out of this grew the monthly lecture series in which socio-economic problems of Iran were discussed in the light of Islam.

Borujerdi died in March 1961. Since there was no clear successor in sight, and since there existed no formalized procedure to find a successor, some modernists decided to hold a seminar examining the question of succession to the marja'. Out of this seminar grew the second important development on the religious scene.

6.4.1 The Monthly Talks Society

As already mentioned, Taleqani's Hedayat Mosque was a center of political opposition against the Shah. Prominent Nationalist politicians would attend the lectures given under its aegis.

Around the summer elections of 1960 SAVAK closed down the lecture series. As a result, the organizers of these talks decided to move them to the house of Ahmad Alibaba'i, in the Bagh-e Shah section of Teheran. The first occasion was provided by the mourning period in the last third of the lunar month of Safar,⁸³ a period of extensive rowzehkhani. But instead of the usual setup, where the audience sits on the floor and

⁸³ This ten day mourning period begins forty days after Ashura, and also includes the anniversaries of the deaths of the Prophet, the second, and the eighth Imams.

printed was a strong incentive for them to do their homework. At each session the previous session's talk would go on sale for rls. 5 (7 cents).⁸⁴

The talks dealt with the interfaces of religion and socio-economic matters and therefore had a decidedly this-worldly emphasis. This new emphasis was seen (and is often seen even now) as a mark of the movement's "reformism." In fact, since such an important ingredient of the series' "modernity" lay in its novel form rather than any new content, it is not surprising that we find among its participants people who would later become prominent in the fundamentalist movement. A total of 31 talks were given. The most prominent speaker was S. Morteza (later Ay.) Motahhari, who gave a total of seven talks, including the two first.⁸⁵ Taleqani gave two lectures. The first, given on October 27, 1961 (Aban 5, 1340), formed the basis of his later magnum opus, Eslam va Malekiyyat (Islam and Ownership). This talk, and Taleqani's later elaborations on it, are very important because they were an attempt to transcend the alternative between the traditional ulema's preference for the economic status quo and the Shah's agrarian reforms. The Islamic modernists wanted to show that their opposition to the Shah's reform program did not signify uncritical acquiescence to extant property rela-

⁸⁴ Technical matters were handled by students and Ali-Akbar Ghaffari, owner of the Sadeqi book-store in Teheran.

⁸⁵ The titles of his talks were: "Piety in Islam" (two talks), "Enjoining what is Good and Preventing what is Evil" (a Muslim article of faith), "Ijtihad in Islam," "The Revival of Religious Thought," "The Duty of Science," and "The Leadership" of the Young Generation." Motahhari would rise to a certain prominence in the 1960's for his activities at the Hoseiniyeh Ershad Intitute, analyzed in chapter 7, and was killed in March 1979.

tionships, and Taleqani tried to spell out an innovative and progressive interpretation of the bases of ownership in Islam.⁸⁶ His other contribution was called "The Qoran's Method of Guidance" and given on November 23, 1962 (Azar 2, 1341). Ay. Khalil Kamareh'i, Taleqani's old teacher from Qum and an old mulla of the traditional variety, was persuaded to come and give two -- not very innovative -- talks.⁸⁷ Also close to the LMI was Ho. Ali Ghafuri, who spoke thrice.⁸⁸ S. Musa Sadr, the future leader of Lebanon's Shi'ites, gave one talk, "The World is Ready to Embrace Islam." S. Mohammad Beheshti, who after the revolution founded the Islamic Republican Party and became the nemesis of Islamic liberals, and who was killed in the summer of 1981, gave three talks ("A New Stratum in our Society," "Islam and Societal Linkages," and "The Rule of Elialiat in Religion and Human Knowledge") and thus fostered the image of a clerical intellectual for himself.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ An English translation of the book is available: Seyyed Mahmood Taleqani, tr. Ahmad Jabbari and Farhang Rajaei, Islam and Ownership (Lexington, KY: Mazda Publications, 1983). For a discussion see chapter 3.

⁸⁷ "Some Lessons from the Life of the Lord of the Martyrs" (Imam Hussein), and "A Book by the Commander of the Believers" (Imam Ali).

⁸⁸ "The Islamic Hajj Congress," "Anfal or Public Wealth," and "Islam and the International Declaration of Human Rights." After the revolution Ho. Ghafuri became a supporter of President Banisadr, and is in prison now.

⁸⁹ Other speakers included S. Morteza Jazayeri, who in the 1970's developed a cult-following as a wonder-man endowed with supernatural healing powers ("The Reasons for the Decadence of Muslims," "The Falsification of Personalities," and "The Necessity of Frankness among Religious Leaders"); Mirza Mohammad-Taqi Ja'fari ("The Share of Muslim Savants in World Science"); Mohammad-Ebrahim Ayati ("Enjoining what is Good and Preventing what is Evil," "The Book and the Sunna," "The Methods of [Religious] Propaganda," and "The Image of the Commander of the Believers from the Haram Mosque to the Mosque of Kufa"); S. Morteza Shabastari, ("The First Step on the Way to Success" and "What is Religion?"); S. Mohammad-Baqer Sabzevari ("Why

It would be impossible to summarize here the contents of all the articles contained in the three published volumes. The object of all speakers was to shake up the religious community, to put an end to the lethargy that had characterized it, and to attempt to make Islam relevant to social, economic, and political problems of the day. Weaving through all of them is the idea of work, deed, action, as opposed to listening, talking, and thinking. Religious circles must listen to the young and attempt to speak to their problems. Islam as an internalized outlook on the world is rejected in favor of the conception of Islam as a total way of life, with answers to all problems as might occur. These answers were to be found in the Qoran itself and not necessarily in feqh, jurisprudence, which had become the most important branch of the religious sciences. Of particular importance is the Islamic injunction of "Enjoining what is good and preventing what is evil." It is accorded great prominence and interpreted in an all-encompassing way. The social dimension of all ethical commands was emphasized over the private side, and Ay. Motahhari, for instance, took the widespread irregularities in the two elections to the 20th Majles as an example to demonstrate the disappearance of piety among the authorities.

Although the talks avoided any direct attacks on the Shah, Bazargan and Yadollah Sahabi avoided participating as speakers, so as not to make the Society suspect in the eyes of the regime. Nonetheless Aliba-ba'i was arrested together with the rest of the LMI leadership in January 1963. The talks continued for two more months, until they were

Muslims Start Their Calendar with the Hijra") and Hosein Mazini ("Religious Education" and "The Virtuous Individual is not Vanquished by Corrupt Society").

banned by the government in March 1963. The proceedings were however published in book form in 1964 and regularly reprinted thereafter.⁹⁰

6.4.2 The Discussions on Marja'iyat

The death of Ay. Borujerdi in March 1961 (Farvardin 1340) caused a considerable amount of uncertainty among believers. Shi'ites had become used to the idea of one supreme marja', who was clearly more learned (a'lam) than all other mujtahids. At the disappearance of Ay. Borujerdi a number of major ayatollahs were plausible as successors to him, but none had enough of a personal following to be clearly recognized as a'-lam by the entire community.⁹¹ At the same time the Shah attempted to influence the course of events by clearly indicating his preference for Ay. Hakim, who, from the Shah's point of view, had the advantage of being an Arab resident in Iraq, which lessened the likelihood of his getting involved in Iranian politics. It is difficult to gauge how much the Shah's symbolic gesture could have swayed people's choices in those years, but the fact is that the threat of royal meddling in religious affairs was taken seriously by religious activists.

When, a few months after his death, still no successor had emerged to Ay. Borujerdi, members of the Islamic Associations began taking an active interest in the question. A few discussion meetings were held, and

⁹⁰ Information on the organizational aspects of the Monthly Talks Society was obtained from Ahmad Alibaba'i, personal interviews, August 22 and 23, 1983, Cologne.

⁹¹ The major candidates were, in Qum, Ays. Shariatmadari, Mar'ashi-Najafi, Golpayegani, and secondarily Ays. Khomeini and Rowhani; in Teheran Ay. Khonsari; in Mashad Ay. Milani; and in Najaf Ays. Hakim, Kho'i, and Kashef-ol-Qeta'.

finally it was decided to organize a symposium in Teheran and invite certain progressive mullas to give papers dealing with various aspects of the "succession problem." Practical difficulties prevented the symposium from taking place, but the papers were collected and published in December 1962 (Azar, 1341).⁹²

In a sense one can say that the whole enterprise was predicated on a misunderstanding of recent Iranian history. The idea of having one supreme marja' was rather an exception, and for most of the time until Borujerdi there had been a number of maraje' competing for the faithfuls' allegiance.⁹³

The volume includes ten essays, and among the authors we find many who also participated in the Monthly Talks. Ay. Motahhari contributed three pieces, "Ijtihad in Islam," (a reprint of a lecture he gave at the Monthly Talks), "The Fundamental Problems of the Clerical Organization," and "The Merits and Services of the Late Ayatollah Borujerdi." Taleqani wrote one piece, "Centralization and Decentralization of the Marja'-iyat." Bazargan, the only lay member of the group, wrote on "People's Expectations of the Maraje'." Ay. S. Abolfazl Zanjani, a brother of S. Reza Zanjani, contributed a short piece entitled "The Conditions and Duties of the Maraje'." S. Morteza Jazayeri elaborated on Taleqani's arguments in piece called "Imitating the A'lam or a Fatwa Council," and

⁹² Bahsi darbarezeh-ye marja'iyat va rowhaniyat (A Discussion on Marja'-iyat and the Clergy) (Teheran: Sazeman-e Enteshar, 1341).

⁹³ It bears noting that even when Khomeini became supreme religious and political leader of Iran after the revolution, the plurality of maraje' was maintained, as the regime clearly differentiated between marja' and Imam.

Beheshti contributed an article on "The Clergy in Islam and among Muslims." Finally, S. Mohammad-Hosein Tabataba'i, the most learned of them all, gave two lengthy papers, one on "Ijtihad and Taqlid [imitation] in Islam," the other on "Guardianship and Leadership," (Valayat va za'-amat). Contributors thus covered four personalities in or close to the LMI, two (Beheshti and Jazayeri) who could be thought of as "intellectual clerics," while Allameh Tabataba'i was in a category all by himself.⁹⁴

In the collection's introduction the institution of taqlid is specifically upheld: "The Qoran does not forbid imitation, it forbids blind imitation." It argues that the contemporary world is characterized by growing specialization, therefore the institution of taqlid is in no way opposed to the spirit of the times. People tend to follow pre-established and well thought-out plans, but in our day and age planners and decision-makers are well-intentioned experts in such fields as politics, commerce, medicine, the sciences and technology, whom the people freely chose as members of parliament, ministers, directors, physicians, savants, etc. The position of the marja' was elective even before democracy was developed in the West, therefore the imitator must do thorough research before he chooses a marja'.⁹⁵ The question of who becomes

⁹⁴ The most prominent and perhaps last great exponent of classical Shi'ite philosophy in contemporary Iran, Tabataba'i was, as the title al-lameh indicates, a most learned man, though not a marja'. He never got involved in politics and maintained relations with traditional mullas, modernists, and Islamicists who were close to the regime. To him we owe an authoritative exposition of Shi'ism written expressly for Western readers: 'Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i: Shi'ite Islam, translated from the Persian and Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1975).

marja' is an important national question, also for non-Muslims, given the enormous weight that he has in the life of the Iranian nation.

Again, it is impossible to summarize all articles. It is important to note, that far from wishing to do away with the institution of taqlid, the writers upheld it and merely wanted to make it responsive again. They argued that the openness of the gates of ijtihad, a matter of pride for Shi'ites, was meaningless if it remained a theoretical possibility only and if the mujtahids did not actually make use of their authority to interpret religious principles to find answers for pressing problems of the day. This point was made with particular vehemence by Bazargan, who claimed to write as someone in between a lay-person and a member of the ulema, and who, because of his experience as a teacher, was well attuned to the needs and expectations of the young.

The idea of a collegial leadership, where the believer's marja' would be replaced by a council on which several specialized mujtahids would sit and render decisions on matters of their speciality was also bold, for it posited for the first time that the world had become too complex for one person to be competent on all questions.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the series was that concrete proposals were made to reorganize religious institutions, which were not spared from criticism. Nothing came of the proposals, however.

⁹⁵ Bahs, p. 3.

For our purposes it is important to try to gauge the importance of the collection for the development of modernist Shi'ism's political activities. It is of great significance that the most learned of all the participants, Allamah Tabataba'i, expressly rejected the idea of a congruence between Islam and democracy, and instead candidly discussed their fundamental differences. It would be interesting to know what Bazargan thought of those arguments. Bazargan himself in his piece reproached the clergy for not having been politically active enough. This has to be seen in light of Ay. Borujerdi's courteous and at times cordial relations with the Shah. Bazargan and his friends wanted the clergy to lend their authority to the creation of an Islamic ideology.

It is difficult to assess the significance of the religious "reform" movement of the 1960's. As far as the content of the talks and articles is concerned, one has to admit that although many questions were posed, few answers were given. That could not have been otherwise: it has always been up to the clergy to make pronouncements on articles of faith, and of the personalities involved in the movement none was a major mu-jtahid. All the "reformers" could hope for was to suggest directions of research, to provide some basic ideas, and thus prod the higher ranks of the ulema to become more sensitive to the important questions of the day.

As far as the movement's impact on the population is concerned, it was quite small. The language used in the talks and articles was often scholarly and abstract, and could therefore not compete in its accessibility to the public with the simple talk of preachers or the emotional

1960's. It was called Gharbzadegi, weststruckness,⁹⁷ and authored by the writer and essayist Jalal Al-e Ahmad.⁹⁸ Although he was never linked to the LMI, many of the ideas propounded in his book soon found their way into the ideological baggage of the LMI.

The book indicts Iranians for aping the West at the expense of their own traditions. To explain this, Al-e Ahmad essentially spins a conspiracy theory spanning many centuries to demonstrate and explain how the "West," which he views as an undifferentiated aggregate, has consistently striven to subdue Iran (and by extension the "East") and prevent its development. In spite of occasional insights (some arguments seem to foreshadow Dependency Theory, others Edward Said's critique of "Orientalism", and many instances of uncritical imitation of the West by Iranians are well analyzed) the book is little more than a salmagundi of anachronisms and anachorisms, ill-digested Kulturkritik by Western writers ranging from Jünger to Camus, and a very uncritical admiration of Iran's Islamic heritage⁹⁹ This last point is worth pondering. Al-e Ahmad, who had been a member of the Tudeh in the 1940's and then left the

⁹⁷ The Persian word is a neologism and has been translated in a variety of ways. "Weststruckness" is in my opinion the most accurate rendition, although people with a penchant for portmanteaux have proposed "westoxication," "westamination," "westernitis," even "westomania."

⁹⁸ The work has been translated into English: Jalal Al-e Ahmad, tr. John Green and Ahmad Alizadeh, Gharbzadegi (Weststruckness) (Lexington, KY: Mazda Publications, 1982).

⁹⁹ A rigorous textual analysis of Al-e Ahmad's book remains to be done. For some interesting interpretations see Mangol Bayat-Philipp, "A Phoenix too Frequent: The Concept of Historical Continuity in Modern Iranian Thought," in Asian and African Studies, 12 (1978), pp. 212-214; and Brad Hanson, "The "Westoxication" of Iran: Depiction and Reactions of Behrangi, Al-e Ahmad, and Shariati," in International Journal of Middle East Studies, 15 (February 1983), pp. 1-25.

party with Khalil Maleki, never became a believing Muslim. Asked, on a pilgrimage to Mecca, what his religion was, he answered that he would like to be a Muslim.¹⁰⁰ His spiritual trajectory is symptomatic of a general malaise that befell many Iranian intellectuals beginning in the early 1960's. Until then Western models of democracy, liberalism, socialism, communism, even fascism, had dominated the minds of educated Iranians. Given the seeming incapacity of these models to improve the lot of the average Iranian and to bring the country out of its international servitude, many began turning inward. Al-e Ahmad and the religious reform movement were thus parts of the same general trend. It is interesting to note that the agnostic Al-e Ahmad went farther in his encomium of Islam than the Islamic modernists. He was the first intellectual approvingly to mention the name of Ay. Khomeini in his writings, and he even went so far as to vindicate Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, the leader of the anti-constitutionalist ulema during the constitutional revolution of 1905-1906, a man always singled out by modernists as an example of what sort of people had contributed most to the decline in the clergy's prestige and influence.¹⁰¹

A book's influence on society is rarely a reflection of its intrinsic qualities, and the fortunes of Al-e Ahmad's opus exemplify this.

¹⁰⁰ Mangol Bayat, "Phoenix," p. 213.

¹⁰¹ See chapter 3, footnote 4.

6.5 THE END OF TRADITIONAL POLITICS

After Alam became Prime Minister the Shah fully assumed the governance of the country and claimed for himself the reforms begun by Amini. He issued a program of six points,¹⁰² which the people of Iran were invited to approve in a plebiscite (like all such events in Iran misnamed "referendum") scheduled for January 26, 1963 (Bahman 6, 1341). In this "referendum" to nobody's surprise only 4,115 people out of over five million voted against, which the Iranian press compared favorably to the 77.3 per cent approval rate de Gaulle had received in 1962.¹⁰³

The National Front responded to the Shah's move by contending that the use of the referendum procedure was unconstitutional since Iran had been without a parliament since May 1961. It claimed to be the only organization carrying out a genuine struggle for the freedom of workers and peasants. While advocating the "suppression of the feudal regime," the Front denounced the "arbitrary and despotic regime and the Shah's interference in the affairs of State."¹⁰⁴ A protest demonstration called by the NF for January 25 was banned by the government, and on that day most of the leadership of both the NF and the LMI was arrested. Their total would eventually reach about 400 men. Earlier religious leaders had also opposed the referendum and called for a strike. The NF had supported that action and on January 22 the Bazaar of Teheran closed for three days and there were demonstrations. The LMI also issued a state-

¹⁰² Later more points were added, until eventually the White Revolution comprised 21 points.

¹⁰³ Marvin Zonis, Political Elite, p. 76.

¹⁰⁴ Keesings, 19293.

ment condemning the referendum, but only after its top leadership was arrested. It said:

Honorable people of Iran -- Dear Iranian workers and peasants:
The Government and the Shah want to hold a referendum in your name and ostensibly for you... When Revolution !! and Change !! are carried out by the symbols of class inequality and the source of corruption and unhappiness, they cannot do better than this.¹⁰⁵

The arrest of the Nationalist leadership did not put an immediate end to political activity of the old type, however, and this took some time to fizzle out. The LMI, too, attempted to continue functioning.

6.5.1 The LMI after the Arrest of Its Leaders

After the arrest on January 23 (Bahman 3) of Taleqani, Sahabi, and Bazargan, lower-ranking members of the LMI tried to keep the party going. Rahim Ata'i was already quite ill and had had to abstain from party activism for quite some time. Other leaders had been travelling when the arrests came and thus escaped prison for the time being. In February Ezzatollah Sahabi established contacts with these elements and took charge of what remained of the party organization.¹⁰⁶ With great difficulty, they put out some issues of the fortnightly "internal publication" of the LMI, and in them attacked the government harshly. Earlier

¹⁰⁵ It is reproduced in Barkhord ba nehzat va pasokhha-ye ma (Attacks on the Movement and our Answers) (Teheran: LMI, 1983), p. 56. Taleqani at least was not aware of this statement. When asked after his arrest what his opinion about the referendum was, he replied that politically he agreed with the NF declaration and religiously with that of the clergy. See B. Afrasiabi and S. Dehqan, Taleqani, p. 197.

¹⁰⁶ Modafe'at-e mohandes Ezzatollah Sahabi dar dadgah-e gheir-e saleh-e tajdid-e nazar-e nezami (The Defenses of Engineer Ezzatollah Sahabi in the illegitimate Court of Appeals) ([Springfield, MO]: LMI [a], 1976), p. 13.

on the LMI had in its declarations respectfully counselled the Shah to change his ways, now all pretense was dropped and the Shah himself became the target of all opprobrium.

Israel was held responsible for many of the ills that were afflicting Iran, and antisemitism grew. Some leaders of the party may have been embarrassed by this, for in its no. 9 the publication brought a disclaimer in which it distinguished between Zionism and Judaism and denied any animosity towards the latter. This shows that the rank and file of the LMI, especially the more committed elements (who were taking the considerable risk of publishing the newsletter), were in general less sophisticated and enlightened than the party leadership. No wonder, then, that soon many started looking towards Qum for guidance.

These lower-ranking members, many of whom came from traditional lower-middle class families, also established closer relations with clerical circles. All major ayatollahs were approached and asked to issue declarations in favor of the imprisoned leadership of the LMI. Ay. Milani and Shariatmadari complied, but Khomeini hesitated, and only after much prodding did he write something, without however mentioning Bazar-gan's, Sahabi's, and Taleqani's party affiliation or their Nationalist persuasion. In March, when government troops attacked the Feiziye ma-drasah in Qum, the LMI issued another statement. But on the whole SAVAK made any sort of activity ever more difficult.

On May 1, 1963, a hitherto little known "Workers Organization" of the LMI issued a long statement in Teheran, in which the social injustices in Iran were mentioned and the LMI was suddenly depicted as the defender of the proletariat.

Taleqani alone was released from prison on May 25 1963 (Khordad 4, 1342; Muharram 1, 1383 A.H.). He wanted to resume his political preaching at his Hedayat Mosque but was prevented from doing so when the government closed it. SAVAK then laid him an elaborate trap. An agent gained access to the Taleqani household and stole drafts of declarations which were then printed and distributed. The resulting pamphlets were subsequently used against Taleqani after his rearrest. At his trial he admitted having written them, but denied having had anything to do with their publication. They can thus be deemed to represent Taleqani's thinking at the time. One was addressed to the military and exhorted them not to follow orders.

One is struck by the extreme paranoia that is apparent in these tracts. They attacked the Shah's repression, as was normal and understandable. But in last analysis all evils were blamed on Jews, Baha'is, Israelis, Freemasons, all international spies, who had colonized the Iranian government and administration and turned women into prostitutes, who were exploiting Iranian peasants and spreading corruption through their domination of the media, and who had given orders to the security forces to kill the ulema en masse! ¹⁰⁷ One month after his release Taleqani was again arrested, together with Ezzatollah Sahabi, Rahim Ata'i,

¹⁰⁷ These declarations were contemporary with the riots of June 1963, in which many people were killed. They may only reflect Taleqani's momentary rage and his frustration over his powerlessness. But then, they may also reflect his true beliefs, now coming to the fore in pristine form and unrestrained by political considerations. But who can tell for sure? For details on the declarations and the SAVAK plot see B. Afrasiabi and S. Dehqan, Taleqani, pp. 198-218. In a sermon entitled "Jihad and Martyrdom," held shortly before the June riots, Taleqani elaborated on these themes. See chapter 3. footnote 110.

Abbas Radnia, and some other lower ranking activists of the LMI. Now even the occasional publications ceased appearing and the LMI went into hibernation.

In the months after the plebiscite, rumors circulated that the imprisoned leaders of the NF (II) were negotiating with the regime about some form of cooperation. Some were freed from prison. But the June 1963 riots put an end to all these contacts, real or imagined.

6.5.2 The Rise of the Clerical Opposition and the Riots of June 1963

These riots had a dynamic totally independent of that of the National Movement. Khomeini was the leader, and his prominence on the political scene of Iran dates from that year. The later fate of the LMI would be conditioned by the displacement of the moderate Islamic forces by the radical elements led by Khomeini, we therefore have to examine briefly the 1963 events.

To understand the causes behind the riots we have to go back a few years. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Khomeini was a minor contender for the succession to Ay. Borujerdi at the latter's death in March 1961. Around that time he began making fiery speeches against such government reform programs as the enfranchisement of women and the Local Government Election Bill (which had done away with the requirement that candidates and voters be Muslims), speeches which got him arrested for the first time in 1962. Just before the January 1963 referendum on the White Revolution he was again arrested for allegedly opposing agrarian reform. After the referendum unrest among the clergy and in Qum

never ceased. In March Khomeini declared the day of the coming Iranian New Year (March 21, 1963/Farvardin 1, 1342) a day of mourning to protest against government attacks on religious values. That year the second day of the festivities coincided with the anniversary of the death of Imam Ja'far Sadiq, the sixth Shi'ite Imam and codifier of the religion (Shawwal 25, 1382, A.H.), and that would have meant somewhat subdued Nowruz celebrations anyway. In the event the coincidence furnished a kairotic opportunity to organize ceremonies of mourning in Qum. The government was aware of Khomeini's plans and dispatched security forces dressed up as peasants to attend the ceremonies. In due course fist-cuffs broke out between these "peasants" and the theological students, resulting in a massive attack of regular troops on the shrine and the various madrasahs. The attacks resulted in much destruction and many theological students were wounded. The Prime Minister, Alam, blamed the scuffles on the clergy's opposition to the land reform which had manifested itself in their hostility to gratefully pro-Shah peasants. After this attack on the center of Iran's religious sensibilities, which awakened memories of Reza Shah's methods, Khomeini's house in Qum became the headquarters of clerical opposition to the Shah. By the ruthless attack of March 22 (Farvardin 2) the regime had apparently hoped to cow the clergy into passivity. Khomeini responded by issuing a fatwa in which he declared taqqiah, the Shi'ite "prudent dissimulation of belief" unpermissible under present circumstances.¹⁰⁸ When Ay. Hakim in Najaf sent a telegram inviting the ulema of Qum to retreat to Najaf, Khomeini in

¹⁰⁸ For a discussion of this specifically Shi'ite concept see Hamid Enayat, Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 175-181.

his answer wrote that he preferred to stay behind and save Qum as a center of Islamic learning, much to the disappointment of the regime. Due to his unquestionable courage and outspokenness, he thus almost naturally assumed a major political role and became the leader of the most militant sector of the ulema. His popularity among the faithful also grew and he became a major marja'.

After the March events the religious classes' arousal was maintained by holding commemorative services for the victims forty days later -- only one day before the anniversary of the martyrdom of the fifth Imam, Mohammad Baqir (Dhiqa'dah 29, 1382, A.H.), which again was a day of public mourning. In May the lunar month of Muharram began, which in Iran is always a time of increased passions. It provided a perfect kairo for Khomeini to mobilize people against the Shah.¹⁰⁹

The government was aware of the danger. On the eve of Muharram, on May 24 (Khordad 3) the Shah revealed at a meeting of bus drivers that in his childhood he had had a vision of the twelfth Imam, who had charged him to carry out reforms. When the holy month of Muharram began, pictures of Khomeini began covering the walls of the Bazaars all over the country. On May 26 (Khordad 5, Muharram 1) the Iranian police published a statement in the press asking believers to celebrate the mourning ceremonies in accordance with Islam, and warned that those who would misuse the ceremonies for their personal goals would be harshly punished. Khomeini reacted with a message to preachers and organizers of public mourning in which he warned them not to comply with government orders

¹⁰⁹ For the significance of Muharram and our definition of "kairos" see chapter 1, section 3.

and not to fear a few days in jail, adding: "The danger to Islam is not smaller now than in the time of the Umayyads... Warn the people about the danger of Israel and its henchmen... To be silent in these days is to help the oppressive government and the enemies of Islam..." Thereupon preachers were summoned to SAVAK and asked at least to refrain from three themes: personal attacks on the Shah, attacks on Israel, and the warning that Islam was in danger. To the preachers, needless to say, this amounted to an admission of the close links between the Shah and Israel. On Ashura day (Muharram 10, Khordad 13, June 3) the traditional processions in Teheran were politicized as people carried portraits of Khomeini with them and chanted their support for him. The organizers tried to prevent anti-Shah slogans, but when the processions reached the Marble Palace they occurred nevertheless. The regime had sent Sha'ban Ja'fari, a pro-Court chaquesh leader and traditional athlete, to inject pro-Shah slogans into the procession, but his gang was met by the rival gang of Tayyeb Hajj-Reza'i, and the two groups fought it out in the middle of the mourning processions.¹¹⁰

* On that same day the clergy had planned large-scale speeches in the various madrasahs and mosques of Qum. The government sent its agents and threatened to attack the City if they did. Many clerical leaders backed down, but Khomeini went ahead and delivered a sermon in the Feiziye Madrasah in which he defended the ulema against the Shah's attacks and once again, but in blunt language, warned the Shah to behave.¹¹¹ As

¹¹⁰ Not an uncommon occurrence. See chapter 1, section 3.

¹¹¹ An English translation of that powerful and moving sermon is available in Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan

a result he was arrested in the wee hours of June 4 (Khordad 14, Muharram 11) and brought to Teheran.

Within a few hours crowds of protesters began to form in front of the Teheran Bazaar and by mid-morning troops opened fire. The rioting then spread to Mashad, Qum, Isfahan, and Shiraz, reached its climax on June 5 (Khordad 15, Muharram 12), but was finally put down with a heavy loss of life.¹¹² The riots were the heaviest Iran had known in recent memory and amounted to a veritable uprising.

Khomeini was released on August 3, but detained again in October, after he had urged his followers to boycott the long post-poned elections to the 21st Majles. This time he was held until May 1964. In October 1964 Parliament passed in close succession two bills, one to grant American military personnel diplomatic immunity, the other to accept a loan of \$ 200 million from the United States for the purchase of military equipment. The first law was reminiscent of the much hated capitulations that had limited Iran's sovereignty until 1928, and Khomeini issued a sharp attack on the bills. At this point the Government decided to exile him, first to Turkey, then to Najaf, where he would remain until 1978.

Press, 1981).

¹¹² Clerical sources routinely speak of 15,000 deaths. H. Lebaschi, a Bazaar leader and NF activist who was present, told me (in an interview in Creteil, July 1982) that these figures are vastly exaggerated and that the death toll was closer to 100. At any rate it was higher than anything else in recent history.

The movement that began in June 1963 had its own dynamic and was not organically linked with the Nationalist cause. The secular National Front could not hide its distaste for the religious movement. Mosaddeq himself did not send the customary messages of condolences for the victims of the riots.¹¹³ Allahyar Saleh in 1964 told U.S. embassy officials that under no circumstances would the National Front support the religious movement, since the latter's aims were the opposite of what the National Front stood for.¹¹⁴ Saleh's lucidity was not matched by the LMI, for on the second day of the rioting the party issued a statement in support of the movement, and party activists participated in the demonstrations. They tried to introduce Mosaddeqist slogans, apparently without major success: far deeper emotions and longings had been awakened and set free.¹¹⁵ The themes, catchwords, catchphrases, and methods used by the militant clergy in 1963 would fifteen years later be used again, but this time with the backing of far better organized support networks. The events of March-June 1963 were indeed a rehearsal for revolution.

¹¹³ This omission was gleefully pointed out by Dr. Baqa'i in one of the last declarations of his Toilers Party. See S. Jalaleddin Madani, Tarikh-e siyasi-ye mo'aser-e Iran, II (The Political History of Contemporary Iran, Vol. II) (Teheran: Daftar-e entesharat-e eslami, 1983/1361), p. 61n.

¹¹⁴ From the secret documents published by the "Students following the Imam's Line," reprinted in Iran Times, January 13, 1984, p. 15.

¹¹⁵ Factual information for this account of the beginning of clerical opposition to the Shah is based on S. Jalaleddin Madani, Tarikh, pp. 10-62, and Marvin Zonis, Political Elite, pp. 44-47.

6.5.3 The End of the NF(II) and the Third National Front

In late summer 1963 the regime started preparations for the elections to the 21st Majles, with the customary assurances that they would be free. In reaction, the Student Organization of the National Front wrote letters to Mosaddeq and the imprisoned leadership of the Front, asking for instructions. Mosaddeq replied to the effect that his grasp of the concrete situation was insufficient for him to profer any advice. The incarcerated NF leaders refused to commit themselves, and discharged responsibility upon those members of the Central Council who were still free; the latter, when approached, handed it back to their jailed colleagues. Thereupon the NF Central Council implicitly authorized the students to act as they saw fit.

The students decided to hold a public meeting in support of free elections on September 6, 1963 (Shahrivar 15, 1342), on Baharestan Square, in front of the Majles. They communicated their decision to the police and asked for an official authoriztion, so as to comply with the law. Either the police would grant it, in which case the opposition's public appeal would be demonstrated, or the meeting would be forbidden, in which case the spuriousness of the regime's claims about the free nature of the elections would be demonstrated. The police evaded giving an answer, upon which the students informed the authorities that the meeting would be held, and that it was they, the authorities, who would be responsible for security arrangements. Preparations now went ahead, and the Bazaar, the clergy of Teheran, and Ay. Milani of Mashad issued statements in support of it.

At this point the regime countered with a master-stroke: while all LMI prisoners were kept in jail, the NF leaders were released the day before the demonstration was scheduled (Saleh, who was in the hospital, was told he could consider himself free). They were told that it was up to them to stop the demonstration, if they wanted to avoid a blood-bath. Sanjabi wrote a letter to Saleh, and the latter, in a letter addressed to the students and dated "thursday afternoon, Shahriyar 14," ordered the meeting cancelled, arguing that the Military Command had not authorized the meeting and that it was NF policy to abide by the law.

It was of course too late to call the meeting off, and on the next morning masses of people converged upon Baharestan Square, all accesses to which had been sealed off by the police during the night. Scuffles ensued, and people demonstrated in the surrounding streets until the evening. Roughly hundred demonstrators were arrested.

By keeping the leaders of the LMI and releasing those of the NF, the regime achieved four goals: The students, the most active element in the National Front, disavowed by the leadership, lost face and credibility; the gaps between the NF leadership and the activists, and between the religious and secular wings of the National Movement, were widened; and the government did not have to go on record prohibiting a meeting in favor of free elections.

When the Central Council met after this incident, Saleh argued that times were not propitious for active political opposition to the Shah:

With all that has taken place, such as the events of Khordad 15 [the June riots], the prisons are filled and there is no sense in giving martyrs. I think there is nothing to be gained from getting many people killed. On the contrary, the

loss would mean that we will have fewer people to count on when conditions are right again ... In my opinion the NF has to spend this period with patience and calm.¹¹⁶

In the fall of 1963 what remained of the Central Council met a number of times and adopted Saleh's thesis, which became known as siasat-e sabr va entezar, i.e. "policy of patience and waiting." Saleh was asked to be plenipotentiary chairman of a new executive committee, but with one exception nobody volunteered to serve on such a committee. Saleh himself was quite ill and unwilling to take on the responsibilities. The National Front's activities thus fizzled out little by little; the last issue of its newsletter came out in March 1964.¹¹⁷

After the leadership of the NF in effect sabotaged the demonstrations of September 6, the students, exasperated by the leadership's cunctative tactics, decided to secede. Their organ, Payam-e daneshju, was published again in October, and from then on the students refused to have anything to do with the leaders of the National Front. They did decide, however, to maintain contact with other activist sectors of the National Movement, and Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, who as Mosaddeq's grandson had access to him, was designated as the students' representative to other groups.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Quoted in a letter by a Central Council member that is reproduced in Mokatebat, p. 129.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 57 and 126-134.

¹¹⁸ Matin-Daftari had been Mosaddeq's link to the NF all along, which caused the leaders of the Front to accuse him of dishonesty as a messenger after Mosaddeq took sides for the radicals. Matin-Daftari's break with the NF after the revolution and his creation of the National Democratic Front have to be seen in this light.

A letter of Mosaddeq written in late March 1964 to the leaders of the National Front in Europe, in which he complained that first the leaders of the NF had insisted on having his advice, only to disregard it afterwards, was widely reproduced and distributed in Teheran by the students. This impelled the leadership of the Front to write a letter to Mosaddeq, defending its record. A three-way correspondence followed between Mosaddeq, the NF Central Council and the students, in which each faction of the NF (the LMI leadership was in prison) made charges against the other and defended itself against the accusations of the other. Charges and counter-charges concerned both points of principle and personal conduct. It is clear from Mosaddeq's letters that he favored the point of view of the students. The issues cannot be dilated here: the debate was a continuation of earlier disagreements and was by now academic anyway, since neither side could realistically expect to develop much political activity. The upshot was that the NF leadership, feeling disavowed by Mosaddeq and arguing that it could not function without the full confidence of the leader of the National Movement, resigned en masse in late spring 1964. Mosaddeq accepted the resignation and in a private letter, dated September 26, 1964 (Mehr 4, 1343) to Shayegan, who was in the United States, he is on record for having declared the National Front dissolved.¹¹⁹

Parallel to the break between the students and the leadership, preparations went ahead for the formation of a new National Front, to be composed of political parties, as wished by Mosaddeq himself. This group-

¹¹⁹ The originals of all the mentioned letters are reproduced in Mokatebat.

ing became known as the Third National Front, and encompassed the LMI, represented by Ata'i and Sami'i, the PIN, the PIP, Maleki's socialists, and the Student Organization. Shapur Bakhtiar also participated as representative of anti-Unitarist sectors of the IP. The NF(III) issued a few statements in the spring and summer of 1964 and formally announced its existence in July 1965, but essentially nothing came of it: the dictatorship of the Shah would no longer tolerate any opposition. The quarrel between the NF(II) and the NF(III) lived on abroad, as will be related in chapter 7.

6.5.4 The Trials

The Special Tribunal no. 1 of the Military Court of Justice began the public trial of the eight arrested leaders of the LMI and their non-member co-defendant on October 22, 1963. The court appointed a number of retired Army officers, some of them NF sympathizers, as defense lawyers.

The prisoners were accused of plotting against the constitutional monarchy in Iran. Since party statutes had clearly defined the party as operating within the constitution, evidence for the accusation was taken mainly from tracts and pamphlets distributed by lower-ranking LMI activists after the arrest of the leaders, for which Bazargan and Taleqani refused to accept responsibility. Throughout most of the proceedings Taleqani remained silent, not recognizing the court's jurisdiction. Bazargan and Ezzatollah Sahabi, however, defended themselves and at times engaged the prosecutors in verbal duels. Profiting from the public nature of the trial, members of the Student Organization recorded the proceedings, smuggled them out of the court, transcribed them, and distrib-

uted mimeographed copies in Teheran. They also tried to hold public meetings in support of the LMI prisoners, while the National Front ignored the trial completely and did not even bother to issue a statement in support of the LMI, an omission of which they would henceforth always be reminded.

The cases were then taken to a court of appeals. Here Bazargan defended himself eloquently, and his defense, not all of it actually delivered in court, was eventually published. He concluded by issuing the prophetic warning that their's would be the last trial in which a political group was persecuted for upholding the constitution.

The court of appeals modified the sentences only slightly. Bazargan and Taleqani were condemned to ten years,¹²⁰ while Yadollah Sahabi, Abbas Sheibani, Ahmad Alibaba'i, Ezzatollah Sahabi, Abolfazl Hakimi, Mehdi Ja'fari, Abbas Radnia, Parviz Edalatmanesh, and Mostafa Mofidi received sentences ranging from two to six years. Ata'i had been freed on account of his precarious health. After 1964 the top leadership of the LMI was in prison, with the exception of Nazih, Ata'i, and Sami'i. Ata'i was too ill to be politically active, Nazih stayed quiet, but Sami'i was arrested when the regime began rounding up the leaders of the constituent groups of the NF(III). Like Hosein Razi, the leader of the PIP, he apparently signed a letter of regret and dropped out of politics. Dariush Foruhar was arrested in September 1964 and jailed. The

¹²⁰ As chairman of the Engineers Association, Abbas Sharif-Emami tried to persuade the Shah to pardon Bazargan, his immediate predecessor (?). The Shah insisted that Bazargan come and ask for forgiveness, which Bazargan refused to do. Secret U.S. Embassy Document, reproduced in the Iran Times, April 1, 1983, p. 15.

Student Organization's leadership's turn came in May 1965, and finally, Maleki and three other socialist leaders were arrested and jailed in August 1965.

In that same year 1965 the regime also arrested and tried four of the LMI's defense lawyers, General Ali-Asghar Mas'udi and Colonels Azizollah Amir-Rahimi, Ali-Akbar Ghaffari, and Dr. Esma'il Elmiyeh, for essentially having done the job they had been assigned by that same regime. The travesty of justice was complete.¹²¹

Under American pressure and against his own inclinations, the Shah offered Iran a liberalization in the period 1960-1963. The Nationalist opposition, however, would accept nothing short of a democratization. There is no reason to believe that by granting a full democratization the Shah would have lost his throne. Few people in the early 1960's contested the institution of the monarchy, and in the country at large the traditional legitimacy of the monarchy was still strong, as could be witnessed when the birth of the Crown Prince in 1961 produced genuine joy in the population. Yet, the Shah chose to govern autocratically rather than reign constitutionally, with the result that in due course the very institution of the monarchy became increasingly delegitimized.

There is no evidence that the Kennedy administration actually pressed the Shah to democratize Iranian politics. The basic fact that his regime, due to it having been imposed on Iran by the CIA, was considered

¹²¹ Excerpts from the proceedings are available in Paul Vieille and Abol-Hassan Banisadr, eds., *Pétrole et Violence* (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1974), pp. 185-277, *passim*.

illegitimate by key sectors of Iranian society, was either unknown or considered irrelevant in Washington. We now know that throughout the period 1960-1963 American embassy officials were in contact with members of the Nationalist opposition (not, however, with the the LMI, whose importance they probably underestimated). The comments of the diplomats are revealing. Nationalists who defended the work of Mosaddeq, explained the aims of the National Movement, and gave their reasons for their opposition against the Shah, were invariably described as "dreamers," "ideologues," and the like; one sees no trace of any empathy for the aspirations of Third World elites.

As the U.S. saw it, the reasons for the instability in Iran were socio-economic, or to use a more analytical language, the crisis in Iran was interpreted as a crisis of distribution, rather than as a crisis of legitimacy. When the Shah promised to carry out wide ranging reforms (the White Revolution) and began undertaking them, all pressure ceased. He even entered Political Science as a "modernizing monarch" whose tragedy was that to develop his country he had to be autocratic so as to neutralize conservative opposition, and thereby aroused the hostility of those strata who stood to gain most from these reforms.¹²²

The year 1963 represents a clear break in recent Iranian history. Until the early 1960's the Shah had enjoyed the support of certain sectors in Iranian society, but with his assault on religion and the landowners he deprived himself of that support, while at the same time forces of progress were antagonized by the regime's increasingly dicta-

¹²² Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 148-191, *passim*.

torial methods and corruption. Symptomatic of this qualitative change is the fate of a famous chaquesh, Tayyeb. He had been one of the leading figures of the August 1953 riots that toppled Mosaddeq. Yet in June 1963 he rioted for Khomeini and was killed. On a more elite level, one can mention the experience of Sardar Fakher Hekmat, Abdollah Entezam, General Yazdanpanah, and Hosein Ala', all elder statesmen of Pahlvai Iran. After the June riots they went to see the Shah and besought him to be less harsh in the repression of the opposition. The Shah dismissed the four angrily and demoted them.¹²³ Also, until 1963 most ministers had been seasoned politicians with some claim to statemanship; after 1963 cabinet ministers tended to be grey bureaucrats or cronies of the Shah: the regime would become increasingly sultanistic and thus make it almost impossible for any independent personality to have a role in it.

More important, perhaps, a quantum jump had occurred in the level of oppression. Let us remember that in May 1961 the death of one teacher had brought down a government. Two years later hundreds, and many believed thousands, were killed and the regime did not budge. A corollary of this increase in the level of repression was the treatment of the press: After 1963 about seventy publications which had generally supported the Shah regime but were not directly controlled by the government were closed down. The severity of the repression put an end to political life in Iran.

¹²³ See Marvin Zonis, Political Elite, pp. 62-66, for an account of this incident.

The explosion of the clerical opposition movement on the political scene of Iran meant that Nationalists lost the capacity to mobilize the masses at critical junctures. As Saleh's reaction to the 1963 riots show, human lives meant far more to the NF leadership than to the militant clergy led by Khomeini, for whom martyrdom was (and is) an essentially positive phenomenon. The many deaths caused by the religiously inspired riots of June 1963 posed a challenge to the Nationalist cause, for compared to the religious opposition they had very few martyrs to show: Hosein Fatemi, Mosaddeq's foreign minister, the three students killed on December 7, 1953 (Azar 16, 1332), perhaps the teacher slain in May 1961, and a few more students killed here and there.

After June 1963 the secular, liberal opposition to the Shah embodied by the National Front, disarmed inside Iran. New methods of opposition had to be found, and these are studied in our next chapter.

Chapter 7

CROSSING THE DESERT: 1963-1977

After the LMI's top leadership went to prison in 1963, lower level activists still tried to keep the movement going. But as the Shah's personal dictatorship became increasingly efficient and authoritarian in the years following his White Revolution,¹ these activities soon fizzled out. Of those LMI members or sympathizers who did not go to jail, some gave up political activity altogether, preferring to wait for better times. Those who did not wish to give up, chose one of three ways of action. One group carried on political action from abroad. Another group came to the conclusion that the level of politico-religious awareness of the people had to be raised before any opposition to the Shah could have a chance of success. The Hoseiniyeh Ershad movement is the embodiment of this political option. Still others, mostly younger people, gave up the idea of political activism, which had become impossible anyway, and resorted to armed struggle. They founded the Mojahedin guerrilla group. As we shall see, the three courses of action sometimes overlapped and there was a considerable amount of interaction between them. All these efforts notwithstanding, the period 1963-1977 witnessed a rise of Islamic traditionalism and fundamentalism rather than modernism. But before we turn our attention to these movements, we have to introduce the main figures of the LMI's second generation.

¹ For an account of these years see Nikki Keddie, Roots of Revolution (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 160-183.

7.1 THE LMI'S SECOND GENERATION

These were and are men who got their first taste of politics and religious activity during the relatively free period 1941-1953, and whose youth coincided with the Shah's dictatorship, a regime seen by all Nationalists as foreign imposed. The main figures are Ali Shariati, the most influential intellectual in recent Iranian history, Ebrahim Yazdi, Mostafa Chamran, Abbas Amir-Entezam, and, to some extent, Sadeq Qotbzadeh.

7.1.1 Ali Shariati

A wide range of political groupings in contemporary Iran vie for association with Shariati's name. His inclusion in a study of the LMI may be objected to. The fact is that during the LMI's first period of open activity Shariati was in Paris, and that, before his death, he did take part in the preliminary discussions concerning a possible revival of the LMI, held in early 1977.

Whatever one may think of the substantive value of his intellectual production, it is an undeniable fact that, next to Khomeini, he is the most influential figure in the Islamic movement that led to the revolution of 1979. His restless life, fiery oratory, iconoclastic style, and early death at the age of 44, have made him a quintessentially romantic hero. It is therefore not surprising that a veritable cult has developed around his name, and his life and action have been the object of an extensive hagiography.²

² See for instance the publisher's preface and the translator's introduction to Ali Shariati, Man and Islam (Houston: Free Islamic Literatures, Inc., 1981), pp. vii-xxi.

Ali Shariati was born on November 23, 1933 (Azar 2, 1312) in Mazinan, a village near the town of Sabzevar, in Iran's north-eastern Khorasan province. As mentioned in chapter 5, he came from a religious and Mossadeghist background. His childhood was spent in Mazinan and Mashad, the provincial capital of Khorasan. The greatest influence on him during his early years was his father. Ali Shariati grew up in a studious environment (his father's library contained 2000 books), and the religious activities of the older Shariati's Center for the Propagation of Islamic Truths provided continued intellectual stimulation. In high school he was not content to follow only the normal curriculum. With his father he studied Arabic and the religious sciences. He also studied French and gained some knowledge of the language before he entered University. Shariati was thus the only major LMI figure to grow up in a bookish, if not an intellectual, environment. This fact may have predisposed him for the humanities rather than engineering, favored by so many other LMI figures. While still in high school, he entered Mashad's Teacher Training College. He taught elementary school in a number of villages outside Mashad, and at the same time studied, first for his high school diploma and then for his degree from the Teacher Training College. In 1956 a Faculty of Letters was founded in Mashad. Shariati, by now a teacher, enrolled for a degree in modern languages. For the next few years he would teach in local schools, lecture at his father's institute, and pursue his studies at the University of Mashad. In 1958 he received his licence (B.A.). Shariati was also active in Nationalist politics and he was the youngest of the NRM activists arrested in 1957.

In these years Shariati published his first books and translations. His first translation, Alexis Carrel's Prayer, came out as early as 1948. Two more important works were published in the 1950's. The first was Maktab-e vaseteh, ("The Median School"), on the philosophy of history. In this book, published in 1955 (Tir 1334), he argued that Islam was a "median school" between communism and capitalism, which combined the advantages of all other schools of thought but had none of their defects. In 1958 (1337) Shariati translated from Arabic and published in Mashad a book entitled Abu Zarr: khoda parast-e sosialist (Abu Dharr: The God-Fearing Socialist). This book, whose title in the Persian translation may reflect Shariati's membership in Nakhshab's movement (q.v.), was the work of the radical Egyptian novelist Abdulhamid Jawdat as-Sahar. It traced the life of one of the Prophet's first followers, Abu Dharr, who had upheld egalitarian values after Muhammad's death, supported Ali, and, as a result, had been exiled to the desert by the third caliph.³ For Shariati, as for left-leaning Muslims in other countries, Abu Dharr is the first Muslim socialist. He considered him to be one of the greatest figures in Islamic history. In 1960, Shariati was finally granted the scholarship that had been his due since he had graduated at the top of his class two years earlier, but that he had been refused on account of his political activities. With it, he went to Paris for graduate studies.

³ The book had been published in Egypt in 1948. Upon careful examination, the ulema of the Al-Azhar University acknowledged Abu Dharr's piety but banned the book, arguing that Islam respects property and sets no limit to the legal accumulation of wealth except in demanding certain religious taxes. Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 158n.

The France that Shariati found in 1960 was rather different from the Third Republic Bazargan had known. The Algerian crisis was at its height, more and more colonies were becoming independent, and Paris was teeming with Third-World intellectuals struggling with identity crises. The West was an uncontested model no more.

Shariati soon made the acquaintance of a large number of Algerians and became an active supporter of Algerian independence. He contributed articles to El Moudjahid, the organ of the FLN, and was on occasion beaten up by French police.⁴

The growing corpus of secondary literature on Shariati has emphasized his contacts with left-leaning intellectuals during this period. The sociologist Georges Gurvitch, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Frantz Fanon are often mentioned. While Shariati was certainly influenced by these figures, his actual personal contacts with them have been vastly exaggerated. With Fanon he corresponded for a short time, and Sartre he met once in a café. He did attend Gurvitch's lectures at the Sorbonne, and he also frequented Jesuits. A widely-held belief has it that he took a Ph.D. in Sociology. His most enthusiastic admirers even claim that in the four years he spent in Paris, he received doctorates in both Sociology and the History of Religions.⁵ The truth is, however, that he only studied for a doctorat d'université (at the time the lowest doctoral degree obtainable in France, it presupposed neither course work nor exams, was

⁴ One time he received such severe head-wounds that he had to spend some time in a hospital.

⁵ Introduction to Man and Islam, p. x. My aim is not to accuse anybody of dishonesty, but only to illustrate the extent of the admiration many Iranians have for him.

reserved for foreigners, and ceased being recognized as a doctorate in Iran sometime in the early 1970's) in 'Letters' at the Sorbonne. His dissertation, written under the direction of the eminent Iranologist Gilbert Lazard and presented in 1963, consisted of an edition and translation of a medieval text, Faza'el ol-Balkh.⁶

In Paris Shariati became the main founder of the external branch of the LMI, as will be related later. He returned to Iran in 1964, and was immediately arrested and jailed for six months. Upon his release, he was made an elementary school teacher outside Mashad, which he resented, given his qualifications. After a few months, however, he received a teaching appointment at Mashad's Ferdowsi University, his alma mater. But soon the style and content of his lectures incurred the displeasure of the authorities, and he was suspended from academia. After a while he came to Teheran, and started his cooperation with the Hoseiniyeh Ershad.⁷

⁶ Ministère de l'éducation nationale - Direction des bibliothèques de France, Catalogue des thèses de doctorat soutenues devant les universités françaises - Année 1963 (Paris: Cercle de la librairie, 1964), p. 381.

⁷ Biographical data for Shariati are taken from Payam-e Mujahid, no. 49, Tir-Mordad 1356 (July 1977); Introduction to On the Sociology of Islam, by Ali Shariati, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979); and Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), p. 144-145; and personal testimonies from Iranians resident in Paris who knew him well (including a former roommate) and who wish to remain anonymous.

7.1.2 Ebrahim Yazdi

Ebrahim Yazdi was born in 1931/32 (1310) to a middle class family in Qazvin, a city about 120 kilometers west of Teheran, on the road to Azerbaijan. When he was six, his family moved to Teheran, where his father would operate a large grocery store. He received his secondary education at the Dar ol-Fonun, where he started his activism by founding the "Amir Kabir Islamic Association," named after the great nineteenth century reformer who had founded the school and who was eventually killed by the then Shah on account of his reformist zeal. In high school he was consistently the best student in his class. After graduating, he entered Teheran University's Pharmaceutical Faculty, where he became a leading member of the Islamic Student Association, to whose various publications he regularly contributed. Early on he had some contacts with the Devotees of Islam and collaborated with them, but after their break with the National Movement he sided with the latter. During the July 1952 (Tir 1331) events, he organized student support for Mosaddeq.

After the 1953 coup he joined the NRM. His activities centered on the NRM's University Committee and the movement's publications. During these years he worked for a trading company in Teheran. It was his employer who finally managed to get him a passport (for his anti-Shah activities he had been barred from leaving the country), and he left Iran in 1960/61 (1339). Yazdi eventually settled in the United States, and pursued his studies in pharmacology, specializing in oncology. He did post-doctoral work at Harvard and then started working in the Veteran Administration Hospital affiliated with Baylor Medical College in Hous-

ton, Texas, where he also received an appointment as assistant professor. The relatively light work load of the VAH allowed him to be politically active. He was thus the main driving force behind the LMI's American branch and the burgeoning network of ISA's in the United States.

Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi is the most controversial leading figure of the LMI. He seems to harbor an almost pathological dislike for secular National Front politicians, and among all LMI leaders, is closest to Khomeini and the religious establishment. As Shariati has become a cult figure in Iran, Yazdi has been the constant target of slander campaigns, which centered on the rumor that during his long stay in the U.S. he had acquired American citizenship.⁸ This, plus his rather subserviant attitude toward Khomeini and dislike for secular elements in Iranian society have made him a convenient scapegoat for many secular liberals and leftists.

7.1.3 Mostafa Chamran

Mostafa Chamran was born on March 8th, 1933 (Esfand 11, 1311) into a devout family in Teheran's South. His father had to work hard to give all his children an education. Young Mostafa attended first the Dar ol-Fonun and then Alborz high school. At the age of fifteen he started frequenting Islamic Student Associations and Taleqani's Hedayat Mosque.

⁸ To counter these rumors, Yazdi asked Khomeini for a formal denial. It may or may not be significant that Khomeini confirmed in his letter that Yazdi was "of Iranian origin and a Muslim."

In 1953 (1332) he entered the Technical Faculty of Teheran University to study electrical engineering. He also became an active member of the NRM and was responsible for the distribution of the movement's organ on the campus of Teheran University. In 1959 Chamran graduated at the top of his class. After that, he spent one year teaching at his alma mater and in 1959, taking advantage of the state scholarships offered to top students, left for the United States to pursue graduate studies. First he took an M.S. at Texas A & M, then went to Berkeley, where he completed a Ph.D. in only three years. In California he founded Islamic Student Associations. Upon graduation Chamran moved to the East Coast to work at Bell Laboratories in New Jersey. His job did not satisfy him, however, and in 1964 he embarked on a trip to the Middle East, never again to resume his scientific career.

In a political movement characterized by its attempts to bring out the rational elements in Islam, Chamran stands out for his mystical tendencies. He was an aref, loved the mystical poetry of Rumi, and was a practitioner of traditional Iranian athletics, a passion which earned him the acquaintance of Gholamreza Takhti, Iran's legendary wrestling champion and member of the National Front's Central Council who was allegedly killed by SAVAK in 1967. His penchant for military organization and his activities in Lebanon with the Amal movement, which he helped establish, have to be seen in this light. After the revolution he returned to Iran and helped reorganize the country's armed forces. Chamran, who must be considered the LMI's foremost military expert, was killed in the Iran-Iraq war on June 21, 1981 (Khordad 31, 1360) under

dubious circumstances.⁹

7.1.4 Abbas Amir-Entezam

Abbas Amir-Entezam was born around 1933 (1312) (?) into a wealthy carpet manufacturing family. He studied at Teheran University, taking his licence (B.S.) in engineering in 1955. As a student he was active in the NRM, and later became a founding member of the LMI. Upon graduation he worked as a consulting engineer in Teheran, until he went to Paris for eleven months in 1963. From 1964 to 1966 he studied at Berkeley, where he received a Master's degree in engineering. Here he became active in the Islamic Student Association founded by Chamran and also in the Confederation of Iranian Students, the Marxist dominated umbrella organization of anti-Shah students abroad. He worked in the United States from 1966 to March 1969, at which point he returned to Teheran as a consulting engineer. In 1971 he set up his own firm, which soon flourished. After his return to Iran, he maintained contacts with Yazdi, and in 1977 became one of the chief interlocutors of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran.

Abbas Amir-Entezam is the most secular among prominent LMI figures. He is also the only one who is currently in prison.¹⁰

⁹ Biographical information on Chamran is adapted from Zendeginameh-ye sardar-e rashid-e eslam shahid doktor Mostafa Chamran (Biography of ... Dr. Chamran) (Teheran: LMI, 1982).

¹⁰ Biographical information on Amir-Entezam has been obtained from vol. 10 of the collected U.S. Embassy Secret Documents, published in Teheran by the "Students Following the Imam's Line."

7.1.5 Sadeq Qotbzadeh

Sadeq Qotbzadeh (d. 1982) was born in 1936/37 (1315) in Isfahan into a wealthy Bazaar family. He attended the Dar ol-Fonun in Teheran, where he became politically active. First a supporter of Ay. Kashani in the early 1950's, he remained loyal to the National Movement after 1953 and was both a high school delegate in the NRM's ruling council and an active member of the ISA.

In 1958 he left Iran for the United States, where he became active in Iranian student politics. After 1954 the Iranian Students Association had been receiving \$ 10,000 per year from the 'American Friends of the Middle East,' the funds coming from the CIA. In 1959 payments were stopped. The Iranian embassy in Washington, under the new and dynamic ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi, a former son-in-law of the Shah's, offered to fill the gap. To ratify this new arrangement, a congress was convened in Ypsilanti, Michigan, in September 1960. At this congress Qotbzadeh attacked the Shah and his system in most virulent terms and was elected to the central council of the association. Zahedi had to retreat, and Qotbzadeh was thus instrumental in ridding the Iranian Students Association from government control. A strong anti-Shah speech delivered in January 1961 (1339) in a Washington hotel, during which he slapped the Iranian ambassador in the face, brought him notoriety as the most famous Iranian student organizer abroad. Always active in student politics, Qotbzadeh never finished any degree requirements.

During these years he was a member of the National Front's Council in the USA. At the end of 1962 (1341) he was expelled from the States, and

in 1964 went to the Middle East, where at one point he acquired Syrian citizenship. He now started organizing ISA's outside Iran, and these associations would become the central focus of his attention after 1969 (1348). In 1966 (1345) he left the Iranian Students Association after National Front sympathizers united with leftists to attack him personally.¹¹

From the mid-1960's onwards Qotbzadeh was constantly on the move, dividing his time between the US, whence he was expelled a few more times, Canada, Europe, where on occasion he would talk in churches, and the Middle East. He was the main contact between the ISA's and various radical Arab States. Once or twice a year he would meet Khomeini in Najaf, and in due course became quite close to him, despite his rather latitudinarian private life. In 1970 he became directly involved with the LMI(a). In 1976 (1355), in Paris, SAVAK hired a small-time criminal to kill Qotbzadeh, but the putative gunman preferred to give himself up to French police, and a minor scandal ensued.¹² Qotbzadeh's links to the LMI-core in Teheran were rather loose, and in 1978 he attempted to found a break-away LMI in Paris, claiming that he had Taleqani's support. In September 1982 he became the first prominent revolutionary figure to be executed by the Islamic Republic.¹³

¹¹ Details of Qotbzadeh's activities among Iranian students are taken from a personal letter, dated October 2, 1967 and written in Washington, D.C., that he wrote to Dr. Schapur Ansari, of Bad Homburg, West Germany, who kindly made it available to me.

¹² For details, see J.-C. Guillepaud, "Les tribulations d'un "tueur" de la Savak," in Le Monde, April 8, 1977, p. 2.

¹³ Biographical information on Qotbzadeh is from Bamdad (Teheran), January 16, 1980 (Dey 26, 1358), p. 12.

As these biographical sketches show, the leading figures of the LMI's external wing were all good students in high school which for many was the Dar ol-Fonun.¹⁴ It may or may not be a coincidence that those who were most deeply committed to Islam had gone abroad on State scholarships which they had had some trouble obtaining. This may very well point to the resentment factor discussed in chapters 1 and 3.

7.2 LMI ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE IRAN

Little has been said so far about Nationalist activities outside Iran. Since these did not begin with the clamp-down of 1963, we have to go back in time three years to chronicle the oppositional role of Iranian Nationalists abroad. But before that, it is useful to throw a cursory glance upon the history of oppositional activities outside Iran in general.

7.2.1 The Opposition in exile prior to 1960

From the end of the nineteenth century, many Iranian intellectuals, faced with the impossibility of being politically and journalistically active in their own country, took advantage of the freedom of speech afforded them in Europe (and to a lesser extent India) to agitate for their ideas from where the arm of the State could not reach them. In the nineteenth century this was the path taken by two of the great reformers Iran has produced, namely Mirza Malkam Khan,¹⁵ and S. Jamaledin

¹⁴ See chapter 4 for the significance of this.

¹⁵ On Malkam Khan, see Hamid Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan: A Study in the History of Iranian Modernism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973).

Asadabadi, "al-Afghani." After the end of the First World War and the beginning of Reza Khan's rule in Iran, many Iranian students came to Europe, some sponsored by the State, others relying on private means. By far the most popular destinations of these Iranians were France and the French speaking areas and universities of Belgium and Switzerland, followed by England and Germany.

Germany, however, became the main center of anti-Pahlavi political action in the interwar period. In keeping with its liberal political culture and constitution, the Weimar Republic had very progressive laws on political asylum, which enabled many an Iranian dissident to live and be active in Germany. The other reason for Germany's prominence is more elusive. It seems that Iranians in France were housed in boarding schools, whereas in Germany Iranian students lived by themselves. Moreover, the Iranian councilor for students abroad, Mer'at, had his residence in Paris. This meant that Iranians in France were under constant surveillance, a circumstance which helps explain the higher degree of student activity in Germany, as opposed to France. These favorable conditions ended in 1932, when chancellor Brüning was persuaded to sacrifice Germany's hospitality towards political dissidents to the country's economic interests: Reza Shah had threatened to place his orders elsewhere.¹⁶ It should be noted that this early foreign-based Iranian opposition was overwhelmingly leftist. Thus, of those members of the 'group of 53' who had received a higher education in Europe, five, including the central figure Taqi Arani, had studied in Berlin, and only one each

¹⁶ Ahmad Mahrad: "Lag Berlin in Persien? Iranische Oppositionelle in der Weimarer Republik," in Kurt Greussing, ed., Revolution in Iran und Afghanistan (Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat, 1980), pp. 77-122.

in Paris, Grenoble, and Moscow.¹⁷

After 1945, many Iranian students went abroad again. There have always been fewer places available in Iranian universities than there are applicants (the ratio of available places to applicants has hovered around one to ten). The reason for this discrepancy lies primarily in the hopelessly academic curriculum of Iranian high schools, which, at least until the mid-1970's, did not prepare students for anything but a university education.¹⁸ Therefore, getting a university education abroad has become an accepted, not at all extravagant option. Given the high status of education in Iran,¹⁹ it was not uncommon for entire families to tighten their belts to allow one son to study in the West. In 1960 there were 15,000 Iranian students abroad, and by 1966 this number had risen to 30,000. Of these, only about one-tenth were State-financed.²⁰

These Iranian students were not distributed evenly among European countries. In 1949 Iranians started flocking to German universities again. They were lured by the relatively low cost of living in post-War Germany and attractive offers from German universities eager to end the international isolation of the Hitler years, to which one can add a

¹⁷ Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 156-161.

¹⁸ A. Reza Arasteh, Education and Social Awakening in Iran 1850-1968, second revised and enlarged edition (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969), pp. 94-96.

¹⁹ See Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 163-164.

²⁰ A. Reza Arasteh, Education, p. 41.

wide-spread Germanophilia²¹ among Iranians.²² By the end of the 1960's Germany had the highest Iranian student population, closely followed by the United States.²³ It is natural, therefore, that Germany became one of the centers of anti-regime activity by Iranian students, especially until the mid-1960's.²⁴

France had always been a popular country with Iranian students too, but not England. An American education was unaffordable for most Iranians in the years immediately following the War, but beginning in the early 1960's, more and more Iranians found the resources to study in the United States, which soon became the country with the highest number of Iranian students.²⁵ All these students constituted a fertile base, sometimes the only one, for the Iranian opposition against the Shah.²⁶

²¹ This Germanophilia is based less on any intrinsic attraction of Germany than on Germany having twice this century fought Russia and Britain, the two powers that have traditionally meddled in Iranian affairs.

²² Issa Chehabi: "Kulturelle Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Iran," Die Horen, 26 (123), Autumn 1981, pp. 163-164.

²³ A. Reza Arasteh, Education, p. 42.

²⁴ The high point came in 1967, when a German student, Benno Ohnesorg, was killed by the police during demonstrations against the Shah's visit. These widespread demonstrations impelled the Shah to forbid Iranians henceforth to study in Germany.

²⁵ Until the revolution Iranians also constituted the largest foreign student group in the States.

²⁶ The political role of Iranian students abroad has not been studied yet systematically. For a preliminary discussion that raises theoretical questions but provides little factual information, see Bassam Tibi: "Die Iranischen Studenten im Ausland als ein gesellschaftliches Veränderungspotential und ihre Stellung im politischen System," in Orient, 20 (3), 1979, pp. 100-109.

After the coup of 1953 oppositional activities in Europe were confined to the Tudeh, whose organ, Mardom ("People"), was widely distributed from East Berlin, where the Tudeh leadership had elected to set up residence. Nationalist sympathizers of the NRM would occasionally reprint and distribute NRM statements, and for a few months they also published their own newspaper called Sobh-e omid ("Morning of Hope"). But serious organizational efforts began only after 1960, when oppositional activities grew inside Iran.

7.2.2 Nationalist Opposition Abroad after 1960

As always, the first to organize were students. The Confederation of Iranian Students, which regrouped Iranian students in Europe, had been dominated by the Tudeh until about 1963, when Nationalist students, who had always been members, with the help of anti-Tudeh Marxists, took it over. Tudeh elements at first put up a fight, but later retreated from this front.²⁷

In the United States, Dr. Nakhshab had a catalyzing influence on the Iranian student movement. In September 1960 he led a small anti-Shah demonstration of seventeen students outside the United Nations in New York, the first of its kind. News of this act was received enthusiastically in Teheran, and although small, it served to crystallize the anti-Shah opposition in the States. A few weeks later at the congress of the Iranian Students Association, Nationalist elements around Nakhshab and

²⁷ Bizhan Jazani, Tarh-e jame'eh shenasi va mabani-ye estratezhiki-ye jonbesh-e engelabi-ye khalq-e Iran -- Tarikh-e si saleh-ye Iran (The Sociology and Strategic Bases of the Revolutionary Movement of the Iranian People -- A Thirty Year History of Iran) (Teheran: Maziar, 1979), pp. 147-148.

Qotbzadeh managed to galvanize the assembly and wrest control of the association from pro-regime elements.

Meanwhile efforts were made to create organizations of the National Front in the USA and in Europe. In the U.S. the presence of Dr. Ali Shayegan (d. 198?), one of Mosaddeq's closest and most able collaborators and frequent cabinet member, facilitated the formation of a National Front organization. Its establishment was announced on February 2, 1962, and it held its first congress in New York City in 1963. At that congress a split occurred between proponents of the unitary line and those who were in favor of political parties inside the Front, as a result of which the National Front in the United States could hold its next congress only in April 1966, again in New York City. Two more congresses were held in 1967 and 1968.

In Europe a preliminary congress had been held in Stuttgart, Germany, in 1961. The Qashqai chieftain Khosrow Khan Qashqai (the Qashqai leadership had been exiled to Europe in 1953) was entrusted with publishing a newspaper, Bakhtar-e emruz ("Today's Evening"),²⁸ which started appearing on April 4, 1961. In May 1962 the establishment of the National Front's European organization was announced. It held its first regular congress in August 1962 in Wiesbaden, Germany. At this congress it was decided that Bakhtar-e emruz would cease publication, and that the organ of the National Front in Europe would henceforth be Iran-e azad ("Free Iran"). Ali Shariati was chosen to be its editor and the first

²⁸ This was a reach back to a widely-read newspaper that had been published by Hosein Fatemi, Mosaddeq's last Foreign Minister, until 1953.

issue came out in November 1962. Shariati had a great part in its writing and often signed his articles Sham' (candle). He did not seek any other position of responsibility in the National Front, arguing that he would only be listened to if he could not be suspected of personal ambition.

Ali Shariati had been active among Nationalist circles in Europe from the very moment of his arrival in Paris. After cooperating with an ephemeral Javanan-e nehzat-e melli-ye Iran - Orupa (Youth of the Iranian National Movement - Europe), he became involved in the attempts to create a National Front organization abroad. In early 1962 he had to go to Iran to see his dying mother. There, he renewed his contacts with his old friends from the NRM, who had now created their own party, the LMI. After his mother's death he returned to Paris, and influenced by the recent examples of Cuba and Algeria, came to the conclusion that violent struggle had to be prepared against the Shah. In February he circulated a letter to other LMI sympathizers in Europe in which he proposed the creation of a 'Special Unit' inside the National Front, which would not have any open links with the NF so as not to jeopardize the parent organization's activities in Iran, but which would be charged with preparing the revolution. He added, that if the NF agreed with this proposal, so much the better. If it did not, LMI sympathizers in the NF had to go it alone.

The National Front established, with himself in charge of its major publication, Shariati decided to pursue the matter. In a letter dated September 24, 1962, which he again circulated among LMI sympathizers, he

proposed for the first time the establishment of an external branch of the LMI. He argued that until that point the constitution of a National Front organization in Europe had had priority. Now that that task had been accomplished, one had to go further. The heritage of the NRM had to be kept safe from the vagaries of everyday politics. The LMI should be established under the umbrella of the National Front, which was a Front, not in opposition to it. The National Front was a coalition of heterogeneous forces formed for a limited purpose. It lacked an ideological underpinning. The spiritual void in the National Front was terrifying, for people who entered a political movement at a moment of excitement would only stay if they were offered spiritual food. Otherwise, once the moment of excitement had passed, they would either become disenchanted or leave politics after the excitement was over. Thousands of Iranian students were going back to Iran every year, and they were going back empty-handed. To these people, the National Front had nothing to offer which could counter the various new ideologies that were appearing every day, as old repressive orders were crumbling around the world. Important questions faced the world: Socialism, the role of religion, the reform of property laws in Islamic countries, national liberation movements. These were all substantive issues that transcended the establishment of the rule of law (a reference to the main programmatic point of the National Front). If they (i.e. Shariati and his friends) did not try to find solutions, others would. LMI sympathizers had loyally helped to build the National Front. Now that that had been done, they could start building up an external organization of the LMI. This organization would have to be totally secret. At the

same time its members should continue their sincere and loyal participation in the NF.

In a letter to the National Front's Executive Committee dated January 16, 1963, Shariati proposed his other plan, namely the establishment of a secret unit within the NF to prepare the revolution in Iran. He may have thought that the recent arrests of top NF and LMI figures in Iran prior to the referendum on the Shah's 'White Revolution' would have convinced the members of the NF's governing organ of the necessity of such a move.

But inside the National Front tensions had appeared. These mirrored the tensions inside Iran between the unitarist-moderates and the pluralist-radicals. Shariati became disenchanted with his work as editor of Iran-e Azad, feeling that he was surrounded by "capricious, untrustworthy, egocentric" people who made life difficult for him. He resigned. Shariati did not participate in the second congress of the National Front, held in 1963 across the river from Wiesbaden in Mainz, and in 1964 he returned to Iran, ending his involvement in the LMI's external wing.²⁹ We will find him again, when we turn to the Hoseiniyeh Ershad.

Before we turn our attention to the LMI(a) proper, a few words are in order about the remainder of National Front activities outside Iran. The organization held its third congress in Lausanne, in 1964. At this congress Abolhasan Banisadr, who had come to Europe in 1963, became the editor of Iran-e azad. Based in Paris, he would henceforth be a major

²⁹ Information on Shariati's involvement in the National Front is taken from Payam-e Mujahid, no. 49, Tir-Mordad 1356 (July 1977), passim.

figure of the Nationalist opposition abroad. Exasperated by leftist stirrings in the National Front, he resigned his editorship after the organization was taken over by leftists in 1966. Around this time the NF in Europe split. Parts of it remained loyal to the Second National Front and its unitarist outlook. Others continued the path of the Third National Front.³⁰ LMI(a) figures did maintain a certain participation in the latter's limited activities. Those elements loyal to the Second National Front were concentrated mainly in Germany. Their activities diminished steadily, until they came to a standstill in the mid-1970's. Iran-e azad ceased publication in 1975. By this time it could do little more than report some of the misdeeds of the Shah regime in its pages. To make matters even more complicated, a group of left-leaning Nationalist seceded in 1970, and, establishing itself in Beirut, started publishing its own organ, named again Bakhtar-e emruz. This journal gave broad coverage to the anti-regime activities of the Fada'iyān (vide infra). The National Front in the United States was the most conservative of all NF groups and ceased any significant activity in the late 1960's.

7.2.3 The LMI (abroad)

The first meetings of the LMI(a) were informal. Shariati was chosen to head its secretariat, but the group did not publicize its activities. After the Third National Front, of which the LMI was a member, was constituted in 1964, the LMI(a) would upon occasion issue statements in its

³⁰ For information on the organizational structure and activities of National Front organizations in the United States and in Europe, see Hassan Mohammadi-Nejad, Elite-Counterelite Conflict and the Development of a Revolutionary Movement: The Case of the Iranian National Front, Ph.D. Dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1970, pp. 143 ff.

own name.

In the spring of 1963 LMI sympathizers abroad, mainly Shariati, Yazdi, and Chamran, decided that armed struggle was the only way to get rid of the Shah regime. But revolutions required technical know-how, which Iranians lacked. Leftists could acquire this know-how in communist countries, and indeed some Iranian leftists did venture to China, and others established contacts with Cuba and Albania. Muslims, on the other hand, had fewer choices: Algeria and Egypt seemed the only options.

Using Shariati's old contacts with El-Moudjahid, a Paris-based LMI member was dispatched to Algiers to try to get FLN help in teaching young Iranian volunteers the use of weapons, techniques of underground organization etc. Although the Algerians seemed accommodating, concrete arrangements were made with Egypt. After initial contacts were made with Egyptian authorities in Europe, the first LMI(a) delegation, consisting of Yazdi, Chamran, and Qotbzadeh went to Cairo in December 1963 (Dey 1342). Shariati, having opposed the choice of Egypt, did not go along. Nasser's representatives promised help and the two sides agreed that the LMI(a) set up its organizational structure there. Chamran, Qotbzadeh, and Yazdi stayed in Egypt for two years. In July 1964 (Tir 1343) they established the Sazeman-e makhsus-e ettehad va amal (acronym: Sama'), "Special Organization for Unity and Action." Sama' maintained links with the imprisoned LMI leadership in Iran and informed them of its plans. These included training young Iranians for guerrilla warfare against the Shah. Given his physical fitness, Chamran was chosen to head the training program. In Teheran a group of three LMI figures, in-

cluding Rahim Ata'i, was formed to supervise contacts with the exiles and to select and send recruits to Egypt.

From early 1962 on, Chamran and Yazdi had started collecting material on guerrilla warfare from around the world.³¹ They translated the materials into Persian and used it as texts in the training program. Many items were smuggled into Iran and handed to the nascent Mojahedin organization (q.v.). Some trainees moved to Iraq and Lebanon after finishing the program in Egypt, but eventually all returned to Iran.

In mid-1966 clouds of discord began overshadowing the hitherto harmonious relations between the government of the 'United Arab Republic' and the LMI(a). Nasser wanted Sama' to start anti-Shah broadcasts over Radio Cairo. The LMI(a), however, preferred quietly to go on preparing the armed uprising against the Shah. Another source of friction was the U.A.R.'s increasingly nationalistic policy vis-a-vis Iran. Having always loyally supported Arab causes (Suez, Algeria, Palestine), LMI members were disappointed and annoyed that Nasser's Arab nationalism turned anti-Iranian. They complained to both the Egyptian government and to the Arab League about the toponymical changes introduced by Arab governments (Arabian Gulf for Persian Gulf, Arabistan for Khuzistan), pointing out that a rift between Arabs and Iranians would only benefit the common enemy. They were politely listened to, but did not achieve much. As a result, in 1966 Sama' left Egypt, and in effect disbanded.

³¹ The Philippines, Cuba, China, Cyprus, Malaysia, Vietnam, Algeria, and the Spanish Civil War.

At the close of the Egyptian episode, LMI(a) leaders gathered and decided to concentrate on the religious education of Iranian students abroad. Young Iranians were seeking foreign educations in ever increasing numbers, and many now came from traditional, less Westernized, middle-class backgrounds and were thus susceptible to be organized along religious lines. New ISA's were to be created and the existing ones expanded. In Germany this was done by Sadeq Tabataba'i,³² in France by Sadeq Qotbzadeh and Hasan Habibi,³³ in the United States by Yazdi and also Nakhshab, who ceased political activity in the mid-1960's and concentrated on missionary work, also among Americans.

By 1977 the ISA's in the United States had about 600 activist members, but it is estimated that about one third of all Iranians studying in the United States sympathized with the network, at least to some degree. The largest 'seminar' organized by Yazdi for the membership of the ISA's was attended by about 5,000 students.³⁴ The majority of ISA members sympathized politically with the LMI(a). In California, however, the ISA's developed a life of their own, and Abolhasan Banisadr had a number of supporters there.

A corollary of the decision to concentrate on religious organizations was the ending of all cooperation with non-religious groups, such as the National Front, or the Confederation of Iranian Students. This added to

³² Tabataba'i had studied at the Technische Hochschule in Aachen, Germany, and then settled in that country as a businessman. He married into the Khomeini family, and went to Iran after the revolution.

³³ Habibi studied in Aix-en-Provence, and was close both to Shariati and to Banisadr. Although religiously oriented, he never joined the LMI.

³⁴ I owe these figures to Mr. Mehdi Noorbakhsh, of Houston, Texas.

the estrangement between the secular and the religious sectors of the National Movement. In light of later, post-revolutionary developments, the situation that obtained in Paris is of great significance. There, one of the most active National Front organizers was Abolhasan Banisadr. Although himself very religious, Banisadr stood for a united National Front, and consistently tried to win the cooperation of Europe-based sympathizers of the LMI and of the Maleki Socialists. He collaborated both with leftists such as Ahmad Salamatian, and with more religiously oriented people like Hasan Habibi. To these National Front activists it appeared that the LMI(a) had given up the fight against the Shah. As Banisadr told me in 1982: "Mr. Yazdi disappeared in 1966, and we didn't see him again until the revolution."³⁵ Qotbzadeh, however, maintained some degree of cooperation with Banisadr. Thus, in 1974, he contributed a piece to a volume co-edited by the latter.³⁶ Qotbzadeh was operating quite independently then, and was reportedly given the cold shoulder by Bazargan, which may explain his behavior after the revolution. A minor incident can, with the benefit of hindsight, be interpreted as indicative of the LMI(a)'s growing closeness with Khomeini, a development which paralleled their estrangement from the National Front. Nationalists in Paris were in the mid and late 1960's preparing and publishing the collected papers, speeches, and letters of Mosaddeq. The volumes were being published by "Mosaddeq Publications." After a few volumes, Qotbzadeh, without telling anybody, changed the publisher's name to "Mo-

³⁵ Sal-e 66 aqa-ye Yazdi gheibesh zad va digar nadidimesh ta hamin en-qelab. Personal interview, Auvers-sur-Oise, July 1982.

³⁶ Paul Vieille and A. Banisadr, eds., Pétrole et violence: Terreur blanche et résistance en Iran (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1974).

darres Publications." Secular Nationalists saw this as a gesture toward Khomeini.

From the LMI's point of view, the relative consolidation of the Shah's regime in the years 1963-1966 meant that change would take time to arrive, and that therefore it was necessary to concentrate on the ideological preparation of Iranian students abroad, to "raise their consciousness," one might say. Hence the new vigor of the ISA's.

In Houston, Yazdi also established a publishing house. As early as 1961 a non-profit organization had been founded in that city to distribute modernist Islamic books that were sent from Iran. After 1974 such books could no longer be printed in Iran, and Yazdi therefore proceeded to found the "Book Distribution Center," which has been reprinting and translating religious texts ever since. In 1977 the Center issued the first translation of a book by Shariati. It also sends books and pamphlets to other Muslim countries and maintains ties with black Muslim groups in the States. Again one can note that the Center caters exclusively to religious tastes. The whole spectrum of Muslim writing is covered: from fundamentalists, like Mowdoodi, to Shariati and Bazargan, and Taleqani. With one or two exceptions, the organization's catalog offers no works by secular Nationalist writers on non-religious subjects. The funds for all these activities were provided by wealthy Bazaaris, who, under the Shah's liberal foreign exchange rules, were free to transfer the necessary sums abroad.

Around 1970-1971, with the beginning of Mojahedin operations in Iran imminent, the LMI(a) came to the conclusion that the groundwork for the

revolutionary uprising had been laid, and that the revolution had now entered in its active phase. The LMI(a) now operated openly as a political group. With the help of such sympathetic academics as Richard Falk, of Princeton, and Richard Cottam, of Pittsburgh, contacts were made with various Human Rights groups (Amnesty International, Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, and others), and the abuses of the Shah regime were thus given wide publicity.

Relations were established with the Mojahedin, and the LMI(a) at long last gave up its own military ambitions. In Houston, Yazdi began publishing a monthly organ of the LMI(a),³⁷ which by agreement with the Mojahedin, he called Payam-e Mujahid ("The Warrior's Message").³⁸ It publicized oppositional activities in Iran, covering the left, the Mojahedin, and fundamentalists. The Shah's regime and its excesses were denounced, Muslims around the world were supported, and every May a leading article commemorated the founding of the LMI in Iran and provided a rare but regular reminder that the LMI(a) traced its lineage to the National Movement. Mosaddeq himself was mentioned, even commemorated, but the National Movement was more often than not presented as a forerunner of the Islamic revival, Mosaddeq himself appearing as a sort of forerunner of the Islamic Movement. While this view is congruent with the self-image of the LMI as a religious and Nationalist group, it does not correspond to reality, where the National Movement and the Islamic Movement have been quite independent of one another, to put it mildly.

³⁷ For reasons of secrecy, the address given on the newspaper for subscribers was in Illinois. Mail would then be forwarded to Texas.

³⁸ The Latin transliteration used was the more Arabic Mujahid, a salute, perhaps, to the organ of the FLN.

By the mid-1970's, Payam-e Mujahid had reached a circulation of up to 6,000. Reprints were sometimes made in Europe.

Meanwhile, in 1970, Chamran moved to Lebanon. Given that country's open society, it was a convenient base for the LMI(a) Middle Eastern operations, such as there were, and a good place to keep contact with the Mojahedin, a task that devolved on Chamran.

Chamran also established close relations with an old acquaintance, Imam Musa Sadr, the new leader of Lebanon's Shi'ites and himself an Iranian, who was beginning to make that community's voice heard in Lebanese politics.³⁹ Chamran took a leading part in the formation of the Shi'ite Harakat al-mahrumin ("Movement of the Deprived"), and his martial proclivities found a new outlet in the militia organization of the Shi'ites, the Amal. He accompanied Imam Musa Sadr on all his foreign trips, but not on his last, to Libya, where he, in the best tradition of Shi'i Imams, disappeared.⁴⁰

³⁹ Traditionally, the Shi'ites, although the most numerous community in Lebanon, occupied the lowest rank in the hierarchy of communities. Concentrated in southern Lebanon, they suffered most from Israeli attacks on Palestinian groups, and later, when Palestinians were able to operate openly from Lebanese territory, also from the arrogant behavior of the Palestinian Fadayeens, who often comported themselves as occupiers. Herein lies the root of later friction between the Shi'ites and the Palestinians, which at times led to momentary Shi'ite connivance with Israel.

It should also be noted that Southern Lebanon is of considerable historical importance to Iran. When the Safavids established Shi'ism as Iran's official creed, the country was predominantly Sunni. There were not enough Shi'ite ulema in Iran, as a result of which the Safavids invited ulema from outside their realm to take up residence there. Many of these came from southern Lebanon, a region also known as Jabal Amel.

⁴⁰ The Libyan government has always maintained that Imam Musa Sadr left Tripoli on a flight to Rome and disappeared in Italy. His followers

In Lebanon Chamran settled on the outskirts of Tyre, the capital of the South. There he became the director of a Technical School destined to provide education to indigent Shi'ites. In addition to vocational training, pupils were also given "ideological training." For this purpose many of Shariati's works were translated into Arabic. It so happened that the school was in the immediate vicinity of a large Palestinian refugee camp. LMI(a) figures had already met Palestinian guerrillas in Egypt, when the nascent Al-Fath was starting its military training program there. In 1970, Al-Fath having expanded its operations in the wake of the 1967 war, relations became closer. The Mojahedin were sending some of their members to PLO camps for training, and Chamran was in contact with them. Soon, however, the LMI(a)'s, relations with the Mojahedin deteriorated somewhat, the cause being the publication by the latter of a book called shenakht ("Cognition"), with whose leftist content the LMI(a) could not agree. It refused to reprint it.

In 1977 Yazdi left for Iraq to become Khomeini's advisor. The last proclamation of the LMI(a), issued in the last issue of Payam-e Mujahid, of December 1978 (Azar 1357) condemned the LMI's not-quite-revolutionary-enough stance vis-a-vis the Shah, and, while maintaining perfect courtesy towards Bazargan, stated that the LMI(a) was firmly following the policies of Khomeini. By this time Payam-e Mujahid had relegated the traditional Iranian solar calendar to second place behind the lunar calendar favored by the clergy and otherwise only used for ritual purposes.

tend to believe that he is alive in a Libyan prison, with the Libyan regime to embarrassed to release him. Many outside observers deem him killed by the Libyans.

7.3 THE HOSEINIYEH ERSHAD INSTITUTE

In Iran a 'Hoseiniyeh' refers to a place where the sufferings and martyrdom of Imam Husein, the third Shi'ite Imam, are related, usually during the lunar month of Muharram. Traditionally these ceremonies have a purely emotional and cathartic purpose.⁴¹ The addition of the word 'Ershad,' which can be translated as 'guidance,' however, meant that the purpose of this particular Hoseiniyeh was not the lacrymose emotional gratification obtained at traditional Hoseiniyehs. The Hoseiniyeh Ershad was to be a place where Iranians were to be guided towards fundamental change in the affairs of society. The choice of a Hoseiniyeh as a center of religious modernism also reflected the fact that traditionally Hoseiniyehs were not directly controlled by the ulema.

7.3.1 The Founding of the Institute

The institution was founded in 1964/65 (1343) and had S. Ali Shahchera-gi, a progressive moballegheh as its first director.⁴² The main driving force was Ay. S. Morteza Motahhari (d. 1979), a cleric who was close to Bazargan and Taleqani without being a member of the LMI, and who is said to have been one of Khomeini's favorite pupils. Administrative tasks and Public Relations were carried out by Dr. Naser Minachi, a lawyer

⁴¹ See chapter 1 for the significance of Imam Husein.

⁴² Unless otherwise indicated, all information on the Hoseiniyeh Ershad is based on an interview with Naser Minachi commemorating the eighth anniversary of the closing of the Hoseiniyeh Ershad, in Mizan (Tehran), November 5, 1980 (Aban 14, 1359); Ahmad Alibaba'i, "Hoseiniyeh ershad ra motejaddedin az moteqaddemin ! bastand," in Keyhan (Tehran), November 15, 1980 (Aban 24, 1359); Ahmad Alibaba'i, "Shariati goft: raftam haram-e Emam Reza dard-e del va da'va ba hazrat," in ibid., June 19, 1980 (Khordad 29, 1359), and interviews with Ahmad Alibaba'i in Cologne, August 23 and 24, 1982.

from Teheran, and Mohammad Hodayun (d. 1978), a prominent Bazaar merchant and wealthy philanthropist who had been a keen supporter of the Monthly Talks Society, in which many LMI figures had participated. At this point the institute had its provisional headquarters near its present location on the outskirts of Qolhak, a northern suburb of Teheran. Hodayun initially offered to buy 1000 square meters of land on which to build a permanent home for the institution, but the unexpectedly high attendance rate that it was drawing persuaded him, after numerous changes in the initial plans, to buy 4000 square meters.⁴³ While Hodayun remained the main financial benefactor of the institute, other merchants, such as Ahmad Alibaba'i, also made commitments to pay Rls. 5000 per month to help meet expenses.

In 1967/68 (1346) the Hoseiniyeh Ershad moved to its new premises. Its location had both a practical purpose and a symbolic value. The mullas' domination in the southern, more traditional parts of the city is such that it would have been very difficult for an innovative religious center to function there. Eschewing Teheran's traditional and more religious South for the city's secular North would also bring Islam to the educated, secularized bourgeoisie which lives in Shemiran, the northern suburbs of Teheran.⁴⁴ For the same reason, perhaps, no expense

⁴³ Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics, p. 143.

⁴⁴ In Teheran, the socio-economic diversity of the population is clearly reflected in the city's geographical lay-out. For a study of the urban geography of Teheran, see Martin Seger, Teheran: eine stadtgeographische Studie (Vienna and New York: Springer, 1978), especially pp. 56-124. See in particular fig. 44 (p. 103), which shows the location of religious edifices in the city. Within Shemiran Qolhak has always been a somewhat less "Godless" section than other parts. The reason is that unlike most of the other neighborhoods, Qolhak developed around an old village core and therefore kept a more diversified

was spared to make it physically attractive: A blue tiled dome, in the manner of the grand mosques of Isfahan, topped a building whose façade was of marble. The only constraint the founders imposed on themselves, was that all materials used be produced in Iran. The institute boasted a library, a mosque, a lecture hall, and, for the first time in Iran, closed-circuit television, to ensure that speakers could be seen from all parts of the complex. (This was primarily done to encourage women to attend the meetings -- in itself an innovation.) In the same year the institution was officially registered as the 'Hoseiniyeh Ershad Research and Educational Institute' (Mo'aseseh-ye Tahqiqati va Ta'limati-ye Hoseiniyeh-ye Ershad) under no. 933 in the register of non-profit organizations. Its board of directors now consisted of Ay. Motahhari, Mohammad-Taqi Ja'fari(?), S. Ali Shahcheraghi, Naser Minachi, and Mohammad Hodayun.

Bazargan and Yadollah Sahabi, who were freed from prison in 1967, never took part openly in the activities of the institute. While they probably wielded some influence behind the scenes, their open participation would have imperilled the functioning of the center, given their stature as leaders of the anti-Shah opposition. Motahhari, on the other hand, until the early 1970's maintained courteous relations with the regime, associating with such luminaries as S. Hosein Nasr, whose "Imperial Philosophical Academy" he joined. Speakers at the Hoseiniyeh included lay figures as Dr. Sami and Dr. Peiman, who had both been active in Nakhshab's movements and then founded JAMA (vide infra), but also some

population. Cf. chapter 1 for the social consequences of the North-South division.

reputedly intellectual ulema such as Dr. Beheshti, Ho. Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ho. S. Javad Bahonar, and Ho. Sadreddin Sadr-Balaghi, a Mosaddeqist cleric with links to Ay. Shariatmadari.

Some organizational and research work had started on a modest scale in 1964/65 (1343), but large scale activities were inaugurated in 1967-68 (1346-47), when long celebrations were held to usher in the fifteenth century of the Muslim calendar, in other words, the fourteen-hundredth lunar anniversary of the hijra. The lectures given at this occasion were collected and published in a book called Mohammad, khatam-e payambaran ("Mohammad, Last of the Prophets").

In April 1970 (Ordibehesht 1349) the Hoseiniyeh Ershad organized a conference to commemorate Muhammad Iqbal, the Indian Muslim modernist thinker. Shariati gave a talk on that occasion, and in his preface to the proceedings he wrote that Iqbal "thought like Bergson, loved like [Rumi], wrote poetry for his faith like Naser Khosrow, fought imperialism like Seyyed Jamal [Asadabadi], endeavored to rid civilization of the evils of the lust for power like Tagore, tried to breathe love and spirituality into the life of contemporary man like Carrel, and wanted to reform his religion like Luther and Calvin." The relevance of these comparisons to Iqbal might not meet with universal agreement; they do, however, tell us something about Shariati's view of himself, as he acknowledges Iqbal as a role model.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Ali Shariati, Ma va Eqbal (We and Iqbal) (Teherean: Hoseiniyeh Ershad, 1978), p. 9.

7.3.2 Shariati Takes Over

Until 1969/70 (1348) the main figure, and most popular speaker, of the institute was Ay. Motahhari. In that year Ali Shariati, who had been invited to come to Teheran by none other than Motahhari (with whom he was related) himself, started collaborating widely with it. Soon his popularity outgrew that of Motahhari: it is said that while Shariati's lectures attracted huge crowds, fewer and fewer people went to Motahhari's. Until the closing of the Hoseiniyeh in 1972 Shariati remained its main driving force.

Shariati's substantive contributions were discussed in chapter 3. His innovations, both in style and in substance, his anti-clericalism and consistent attacks on the clergy, displeased large sectors of the ulema. They were presented by Shariati as the contemporary representatives of Safavi Shi'ism, which was characterized by its connivance with the despotic regime of the Shah.

Motahhari was something of a maverick himself and had on occasion been attacked by the conservative clergy, who had found fault with his supposedly unorthodox views on, to give but two examples, the Islamic veil (as expressed in his book Hejab), or with his opinions concerning the problem of marja'iyat. ⁴⁶ But his credentials as a rowhani were impeccable. In the face of these attacks, Motahhari did not persist in his way and moved towards more and more orthodox positions. In contrast to Motahhari, Shariati had, in formal terms, only had a Western education. Soon frictions arose between him and Motahhari, who was goaded by

⁴⁶ See chapter 6, section 4.

some ulema far more conservative than he himself. Hamid Algar hints that, given Motahhari's relative loss of popularity, jealousy may have been a factor in this friction.⁴⁷ Hosein Dabbagh,⁴⁸ who claims to have had direct contact with Motahhari, relates that

[Motahhari] questioned all the basic concepts that Shariati put forward and introduced into our culture -- his philosophy, the very notion of tawhid, according to his explanation. Aya-tullah Mutahhari thought that Shari'ati was an instrumentalist, in the sense that he used religion as an instrument for his political and social objectives. . . . It was not only Aya-tullah Mutahhari that disagreed with him. There were many others, including Khomeini himself...⁴⁹

Akhavi relates that Motahhari in 1975 confided to him that he thought Shariati had jeopardized the institution by giving too overtly a political coloration to the Hoseiniyeh's activities.⁵⁰ Be it as it may, after Shariati's success became apparent, Motahhari and some other ulema, such as Dr. Beheshti and Ho. Hashemi Rafsanjani (but not Ho. Sadreddin Sadr-Balaghi) left the institute.

Ahmad Alibaba'i notes that Shariati wrote many of his most innovative works in the three or four years that he and Motahhari collaborated in the Hoseiniyeh Ershad. At no point did Motahhari object openly to the content of Shariati's writings. Rather, he preferred to direct his attacks against Naser Minachi, whose management he ostensibly questioned. Minachi was obliquely accused of being authoritarian, even corrupt. The

⁴⁷ The Roots of the Islamic Revolution (London: The Open Press, 1983), p. 88.

⁴⁸ Alias Abdolkarim Soroush, who is, as of this writing, the senior member of the Islamic Republic's Council for Cultural Revolution and the main "modernist" ideologue of the regime.

⁴⁹ Quoted in H. Algar, Roots, p. 90.

⁵⁰ Religion and Politics, p. 144.

Bazaar and other conservative circles did not like what Shariati had to say, but given his popularity, Minachi became the scapegoat.⁵¹

Motahhari's exit meant that the institute was now besieged from two sides. Within the clergy unease grew because of the heterodox innovations in Shariati's teaching. In conservative circles the Hoseiniyeh Ershad was soon called Kaferestan, place of the infidels, and Yazidiyeh, the diametrical opposite of Hoseiniyeh, since Husein was killed during the rule of the caliph Yazid. Shariati was accused of being a Wahhabi, a Sunni (he had approvingly mentioned in some of his writings the fact that the early Muslims had elected their leaders), a communist, a Savaki, and of being against the principle of velayat-e faqih, the cornerstone of Khomeini's ideology which was beginning to be known in those years (Khomeini's book appeared in 1971). Doubts were voiced as to his performing all his daily prayers. His wife was attacked for not wearing the complete Islamic veil. Major ayatollahs, including the maraje' Ay. Khomeini, Ay. Shariatmadari, Ay. Golpayegani, Ay. Mar'ashi Najafi, and Ay. Sadeq Rowhani, wrote opinions (fatwa) in which they branded his writings as unorthodox. In at least a few cases the government had solicited the fatwas.⁵² At the same time the Bazaar, of which it is not unfair to assume that it had little use for Abu Dharrian socialism, also openly turned against him.

⁵¹ Personal interview, Cologne, August 23, 1983.

⁵² Dr. Ali-Asghar Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, personal interview, Paris, June 29, 1983.

The Hoseiniyeh Ershad was the main focus of Ali Shariati's activities. To quote Sh. Akhavi

Shariati was operating in extremely difficult circumstances... Because he was himself an activist, much of what he had to say perforce was in the form of pamphleteering. He wrote to spread a message. He operated under the constraints of a hurried schedule, appointments, lectures, classes, meetings. The urgent quality of his thinking is reflected in the titles of his works: What Is To Be Done? Whence Shall We Begin? Martyrdom. Waiting for the Religion of Protest. These, along with his Community and Imamate, Ali's Shi'ism and Safavid Shi'ism, The Methodology of Understanding Islam comprise his most well-known works.⁵³

His many lectures, articles, and books were also reproduced and distributed outside Iran by the ISA's that were expanding in Europe and North America, as related earlier. Many of his works also found their way to Afghanistan, where Persian is the lingua franca.

In a letter to Homayun and Minachi dated November 25, 1972 (Azar 4, 1351), a few days after the institute's closure, Shariati summarized what it had meant to him:

My revered father: Homayun; my brother, my hope: Minachi ... Even if they raze this building, the empty land, its address, will have their own place in the history of ideas, the Islamic movement, and the awakening of the people. Thus, you were first the builders of a building and have now become the founders of a movement. For me the Hoseiniyeh is not [merely] a place where I lectured and taught. [It] has infused my blood, thought, personality, my faith. The Hoseiniyeh Ershad will become the foundation of a Party, one whose ideology will be Alavi Shi'ism ... The Hoseiniyeh has now become the honor and love of our religion. [I want you to know] that from now on until my death or murder, like Bilal who under torture would repeat one word: ahad! ahad! ahad!, with every torture I will only utter one name: Ershad! Ershad! Ershad!⁵⁴

⁵³ Sh. Akhavi, Religion and Politics, p. 147.

⁵⁴ Quoted in Naser Minachi, "Hoseiniyeh ershad yek sakhteman nist, yek jarayan ast," in Ettela'at (Teheran), December 21, 1980 (Azar 30, 1359).

Ali Shariati had meant the Hoseiniyeh Ershad to become a major institution of learning, research, and teaching. By training Muslims in modern methodologies, he wanted to break the traditional clergy's domination in the howzehs. His projected program of study, which never saw the day, consisted of four broad areas: research, teaching, propagation of Shi'ism, and agencies' activities. His curriculum emphasized research:⁵⁵

⁵⁵ The program is contained in Shariati's Cheh bayad kard (What Is To Be Done), pp. 59-60. I have used Akhavi's account and translation, in Akhavi, Religion and Politics, pp. 155-156.

Program of the Hoseiniyeh Ershad

I. Research Division

- A. Six research groups
 1. Sociology of Islam
 2. History
 3. Islamic culture and science
 4. Social sciences
 5. Islamic countries
 6. Literature and the arts

II. Teaching Division

- A. Five teaching groups
 1. Sociology of Islam
 2. Sociology of the Qoran
 3. Missionary training
 4. Literature and the arts
 5. Arabic and English languages and literatures

III. Propaganda Division

- A. Religious preaching and sermonizing
- B. Scientific conferences
- C. Scientific congresses, seminars, interviews

IV. Agencies

- A. Periodical Publications
- B. Printing press
- C. Translation
- D. Pilgrimage to Mecca, rites, observances
- E. Book center and center for documents and statistics
- F. Major Publications

Shariati's project, with its methodological innovations (he planned an idiomatic translation of the Qoran) and opening to the West, was both ambitious and a major break with the past. Its implementation would have made the clergy's learning unattractive to the youth. Although the

ulema had attempted a minor reform of the curricula of the Qum howzeh, they could not go as far as Shariati had proposed.⁵⁶ His questioning of the age-old ways of organized Shi'ism's educational establishments certainly contributed to the clergy's dislike for him.

7.3.3 The End of the Hoseiniyeh Ershad and Shariati's Last Years

The government, which earlier on had been too busy fighting the Mojahe-din to pay much attention to the Hoseiniyeh Ershad, also became increasingly alarmed. Initially the Shah regime had tolerated the founding of the Hoseiniyeh Ershad because it was thought that the religious modernism it stood for would weaken the clergy. Later, by letting Shariati continue, it also hoped that his activities would sow discord in religious circles. For this purpose, the regime consistently admonished him to understate the sociology and concentrate on aqa'ed (Shi'ite beliefs).⁵⁷

The withdrawal of the clerics meant that the price of repressing the Hoseiniyeh Ershad was considerably lowered. Several attempts were made, by relatively progressive Bazaar merchants both in Teheran and in Mashad, to reconcile Motahhari and bring him back to the institute; but to no avail.⁵⁸ In the autumn of 1972 (1351), during the month of Ramadan,

⁵⁶ On the ulema's efforts in this direction, see Michael M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 78-86.

⁵⁷ Sh. Akhavi, Religion and Politics, p. 147.

⁵⁸ At one such occasion, in 1971, Motahhari mentioned that one way to satisfy his misgivings about the management of the Hoseiniyeh would be to appoint a council of five ulema to oversee it. Pressed to proffer any names, he suggested Sheykh Ali Falsafi, a mere pishnamaz, and, incidently, brother of the notorious Sheikh Mohammad-Taqi Falsafi, the scourge of modernist and Nationalist Muslims!

Ahmad Alibaba'i, apparently with some help from Dr. Beheshti, arguing that if ever some SAVAK instigated mob came to attack the institute, the damage would also affect those members of the clergy's progressive wing (i.e. Motahhari himself) who had at one point collaborated with it, attempted to talk Motahhari into giving at least a few talks at the institute, so as to signify to the government and to public opinion that the Hoseiniyeh still had some support from the clergy. Motahhari refused.

It is alleged that the Shah himself ordered the institute's closure and the punishments of those responsible for it. On October 24 and 25 1972 (Aban 2 and 3, 1351) Shariati gave two parts of a long lecture entitled Shi'eh yek hezb-e tamam ("Shi'ah: a total party"), in which his conceptions of Shi'ite Islam as a political force are spelled out in detail by comparing and contrasting it with other political and social movements. In November 1972 (Aban 1351) the Hoseiniyeh Ershad hosted performances of the modern play Sarbedaran, which is based on an historical episode of religiously inspired Shi'ite resistance to despotism.⁵⁹ At the same time Shariati gave a new lecture on 'The Philosophy of Existentialism, the Historical Philosophy of Islam.' A week later the institute was closed by government order. Towards the end of its life, around 5000 students had been enrolled in its classes. These were typically held on Friday afternoons, after communal prayers at the mosque. After the closure Shariati went into hiding. To get hold of him, the Government arrested his father, whereupon, in 1973, he gave himself

⁵⁹ Cf. John Masson Smith, Jr., The History of the Sarbedar Dynasty 1336-1381 A.D. And its Sources (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1970), especially pp. 104-105.

up.⁶⁰ In 1974 (1353) they were followed by Minachi. Motahhari was also arrested, but freed after two nights in prison.

Attacks against Shariati continued. They reached such proportions, that Motahhari rose to his defense. In a letter dated October 3, 1973 (Mehr 7, 1352), in which he never mentions Shariati by name, he denounced the attacks and stated that differences of opinion were natural among Muslim scholars and the proper way to resolve them was by discussion and debate. If somebody called for unity among various groups of Muslims because they faced the same enemy, that did not mean he was a Sunni.⁶¹

Shariati's works continued being reprinted for another two years. Censorship was avoided by printing the old dates on them. A total of about two million volumes was thus circulated before the revolution. The regime's attempts of implicating more people did not succeed, however, and nobody else was arrested. The correspondence with the various student groups abroad was not decoded.

After the Hoseiniyeh was closed down, some of its activities moved to the nearby Qoba mosque, where Ho. Mofatteh was pishnamaz. The government decided to take over the premises. In prison, Homayun was made to agree to transfer his title to the Organization of Endowments.⁶²

⁶⁰ Dr. S. Jalaleddin Madani, Tarikh-e siyasi-ye mo'aser-e Iran, II (The Political History of Contemporary Iran, vol. II) (Teheran: Daftar-e entesharat-e eslami, 1983/1361), p. 198n.

⁶¹ The letter is reproduced in Payam-e Mujahid, March 1973 (Esfand 1352), pp. 1 and 6.

⁶² Payam-e Mujahid, November 1972 (Aban, 1351), p. 8. The same had been done for the Hedayat Mosque.

At the 1975 OPEC meeting in Algiers, where Algerian diplomacy brought about a reconciliation between Iran and Iraq, the then Algerian foreign minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, intervened on Shariati's behalf and asked for his release. This was ordered by the Shah after he returned to Iran. In early March 1976 Shariati was freed, followed six weeks later by Minachi.

After his release, he learnt that the clergy and the government had prepared a final humiliation for him. His last major work, Ensan, eslam, va maktabha-ye maghreb-zamin (Man, Islam, and Western Schools of Thought) had been serialized in the daily newspaper Keyhan from February 15, 1976 to March 15, 1976 (Esfand 1354). The regime thus wanted to convey the impression that Shariati had collaborated in order to obtain his own release,⁶³ and by the same token exacerbate the rift between the Muslim and Marxist wings of the opposition, which had flared up after the recent split in the Mojahedin organization (vide infra). In Qum, S. Hadi Khosrowshahi, a mulla once associated with the Hoseiniyeh Ershad,⁶⁴ published the work under a new title, Marksism, zedd-e eslam (Marxism, anti-Islam). He had obtained SAVAK approval by blackening out Shariati's name on the cover.⁶⁵

Shariati was not allowed to resume his teaching, however. For a while he went to his native Mazinan. He held a few more secret meetings, in which he discussed works on which he had worked in prison. In

⁶³ Hamid Algar, Introduction to Ali Shariati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, tr. R. Campbell, (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980), p. 13.

⁶⁴ As of this writing Iranian ambassador to the Holy See.

⁶⁵ N. Minachi, "Hoseiniyeh."

the face of harrassment by SAVAK, however, he had to leave Iran and went to London. He hoped to get a teaching appointment in Algeria.

Ali Shariati died on June 19, 1977 (Khordad 29, 1356) in Southampton of an apparent heart attack, after his wife had been prevented in the last moment by SAVAK from joining him in England. The coroner's report did not mention any unnatural causes for his death, but his followers claim that he was assassinated by SAVAK. This claim may be a result of the usual mythopoeic tendencies inherent in all revolutions, but it is not implausible that the reportedly harsh treatment he endured in prison weakened his constitution.

When news of his death reached Teheran, preparations were made for receiving his remains. The government had instructed the Iranian embassy in London to cooperate fully. Many supporters of Shariati hoped to turn the arrival of his body into an anti-regime demonstration, which was conceivable since in the summer of 1977 the first effects of the Shah's new liberalization program were making themselves felt. Twenty-four hours after his death a meeting was held in England, at which the following men attended: Sadeq Qotbzadeh and Abolhasan Banisadr from Paris, Dr. Yazdi from the U.S., Sadeq Tabataba'i from Germany, and Naser Minachi, who happened to be in England at the time. It was decided that the Iranian government would attempt to use the return of Shariati's body to discredit him by giving him full honors. To prevent that, arrangements were made, mainly through Yazdi, for his body to be flown to Damascus. He was buried at the Zeinabiyeh, the tomb of Imam Husein's sister, which is a major Shi'ite shrine. Imam Mussa Sadr officiated at

his burial.⁶⁶

After Shariati's death both the clergy and the government tried to associate themselves with his name. In Shiraz two major ayatollahs actively participated in mourning ceremonies (majles-e tarhim) for him.⁶⁷ The LMI dispatched Sadeq Qotbzadeh to Najaf to get Khomeini to send a message of condolence to Shariati's father, but this Khomeini refused to do. In response to telegrams of condolences sent to him, Khomeini only issued a statement in which he exhorted Iranian youth to lead the people out of the wilderness of autocracy, corruption, and foreign domination.

On the government side, a laudatory article appeared in Keyhan on June 23, 1977 (Tir 2, 1356). Mashad University announced that it too would hold a majles-e tarhim.⁶⁸

For the remainder of its life, the Shah regime did not dare reopen the Hoseiniyeh Ershad. After the revolution it was reopened and sponsored a few lectures and discussions on matters of topical interest. The founders would have liked to start again where they had left off and implement the ambitious program Shariati had outlined, but many of them now had official responsibilities in the Provisional Government and thus lacked the time to dedicate themselves to the Hoseiniyeh. With the fall of the Provisional Government in November 1979 their position became too

⁶⁶ "H.B.", "Mardi keh zendegiyash hameh hadaf bud...," in Iranshahr (Washington D.C.), June 15, 1979 (Khordad 25, 1358), pp. 10-13.

⁶⁷ Shiraz was also the only site where, under the impetus of Ay. Mahalati, attempts had been made to set up a Hoseiniyeh Ershad based on the model of the one in Teheran.

⁶⁸ Sh. Akhavi, Religion and Politics, p. 234n.

insecure to resume widespread activities at the Institute.

7.4 THE MOJAHEDIN

After the leaderships of all Nationalist parties went either to prison or opted to cease overt political activity after 1963, many younger members and sympathizers of these parties came to the conclusion that political struggle, whether open or clandestine, was ineffective in bringing about the end of the Pahlavi dictatorship.

7.4.1 The Guerrilla Option

The success of the recent revolutions in Algeria and Cuba, the flaring up of the war in Vietnam, and the violent repression by the Shah regime of the June 1963 demonstrations led these elements to opt for violent struggle. To quote one of the guerrilla groups that was to emerge:

The bloody massacres of 1963 were a major landmark in Iranian history. Until then, the opposition had tried to fight the regime with street protests, labor strikes, and underground networks. The 1963 bloodbath, however, exposed the bankruptcy of these methods. After 1963, militants -- irrespective of their ideology -- had to ask themselves the question: "What is to be done?" The answer was clear: "guerrilla warfare."⁶⁹

Bizhan Jazani formed a group that would ultimately merge with others and become the Fada'ayan organization, a communist guerrilla movement.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ "Armed Struggle," Mojahed, 2 (November 1974), as quoted in E. Abrahamian, Iran, p. 482.

⁷⁰ On the history of the guerrilla groups in Iran see Ervand Abrahamian, "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-1977," in MERIP Reports, March-April 1980, pp. 3-15; and Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (New York: Penguin, 1979), pp. 235-248. The Fada'ayan recruited primarily from among Tudeh members and secular National Front elements, but such prominent Fada'is as Mas'ud Ahmadzadeh and Amir-Parviz Puyan, both from Mashad, had started their political activities in the LMI. The former had even founded an ISA in his hometown.

Fundamentalist Muslims founded a 'Party of Islamic Peoples' (Hezb-e me-lal-e eslami), which was discovered in the autumn of 1964 and its members arrested.⁷¹ The PIP had at its first (and last) congress in 1962 (1341) rejected some young members' proposal to espouse violent struggle, if need be. In 1964, therefore, some young party members, led by Kazem Sami and Habibollah Peiman, seceded and founded JAMA, which is the Persian acronym for 'Liberation Movement of the People of Iran.' Groups were formed in Teheran, Mashad, and the North, but the nascent network was soon neutralized by the regime and the leaders arrested.⁷² The PIP withered away, never again to reappear on the political scene. Dr. Nakhshab was in New York and Hosein Razi recanted after his arrest in 1963, which meant the end of his career. The younger elements of the LMI, the most vigorous opposition movement to the Shah in the previous three years, were not immune to such stirrings: In 1965 young elements of the now out-lawed LMI founded the Sazeman-e mojahedin-e khalq-e Iran, known in English as the "People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran," or PMOI.

7.4.2 The LMI and the Mojahedin

The six founders of the Mojahedin movement were Mohammad Hanifnezhad, Sa'id Mohsen, Mohammad Asgarizadeh, Rasul Meshkinfam, Ali-Asghar Badi'-zadegan, and Ahmad Reza'i. Hanifnezhad, the oldest, was born in 1938 into a clerical family in Tabriz. After high school he went to Teheran

⁷¹ On this group see B. Jazani, Tarh, pp. 160-165.

⁷² This short history of JAMA is taken from an election pamphlet of JAMA, published in Teheran in 1980. It is interesting that just as the PIP had foreshadowed the LMI, JAMA foreshadowed similar development among some young LMI members.

to study agronomy, and at Teheran University's Faculty of Agriculture he founded an ISA. He then joined the LMI, and as a result of the 1963 riots spent some time in prison, where he met Taleqani and Bazargan. He was influenced by both of them: It is said that he read Bazargan's Rah-e teyy shodeh over and over. After his early release, Hanifnezhad completed his degree and spent one year of military service in Isfahan, devoting much of his time to a study of other countries' revolutionary experiences.

Sa'id Mohsen was born into a clerical family in Zanjan, a city half way between Teheran and Tabriz. He entered the Technical Faculty of Teheran University with a State scholarship, and became an ISA activist. He also joined the LMI and served on its Students Committee. After the party leadership's arrest in January 1963, he was one of the lower-ranking members who tried to keep the LMI going. Like Hanifnezhad he went to prison after the 1963 riots, and thence, upon finishing his degree, to do his military service. Asgarizadeh came from a working-class background and was born in Arak, in central Iran. With a help of a State scholarship he studied Business in Teheran. Moshkinfam, another agricultural engineer, came from a middle class family in Shiraz. Badi'zadegan was a young professor of chemistry in Teheran who came from a middle-class family in Isfahan. Reza'i, finally, came from a Bazaar family in Teheran and was to become the group's chief ideologue. He had joined the LMI while still in high school, and had then met Hanifnezhad while doing his military service.⁷³

⁷³ Biographical data on the founders of the Mojahedin is adapted from E. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 489-490.

Some members went to Jordan to receive guerrilla training from the PLO, while others, in particular Hanifnezhad and Reza'i, stayed behind to work out the group's ideology. They followed the path of the LMI in reinterpreting Islam but came to more radical conclusions. These resemble those of Ali Shariati, but it has to be borne in mind that the main corpus of Mojahedin had already been elaborated by the time Shariati's most prolific period at the Hoseiniyeh Ershad began.

The PMOI started military operations in 1971, in an attempt to disrupt the celebrations of the 2500-year anniversary of the Iranian monarchy. In the repression that struck it as a result of these actions, the Mojahedin lost their entire original leadership, through executions or in street battles with the security forces. After this they turned more and more to the left, until, in 1975, there occurred a split in the organization. In the course of this split, a leftist faction, including Ay. Taleqani's son Mojtaba, discarded Islam altogether and became a purely Marxist-Leninist organization. Another faction kept its Islamic allegiance, although their ideology is heavily tainted by Marxism.⁷⁴

In discussing the Mojahedin's problematic relationship with the LMI, one has to remember that throughout the period under discussion, the LMI did not function as a party and maintained no underground network inside Iran either. What matters, therefore, is the attitude individual LMI leaders took towards their party's offspring.

⁷⁴ A thorough discussion of the Mojahedin is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For an exhaustive study of the group, the reader is referred to the writings of Ervand Abrahamian.

At first, Bazargan and his circle, in their prison isolation, were not aware of the founding of the Mojahedin. Bazargan himself, for reasons that have probably more to do with his temperament than with his assessment of political situations, always remained cool to the idea of armed struggle. This, despite his prophetic warning at his trial in 1963 that theirs would be the last group to be persecuted for their affirmation and defense of the Constitution. By the early 1970's Bazargan was a prosperous businessman in Teheran, and while he never compromised his principles, it is not difficult to see why he should not have been too enthusiastic about the Mojahedin and their leftist leanings.

Nonetheless, until the early 1970's LMI elements did support the Mojahedin financially, and cooperation was even closer with the LMI's external organization, as we have seen. After Bazargan's and Taleqani's release from jail in 1967, it was Taleqani who had more contacts with the Mojahedin leadership, engaging them upon occasion in ideological debates. The guerrilla organization's ideology, with its leftward tilt, was clearly less distasteful to Taleqani, who had a keener appreciation of the problems posed by economic inequality than Bazargan, a man who is above all concerned with justice and freedom. Inside Iran, the other LMI personality to maintain relatively close links with the Mojahedin was Ezzatollah Sahabi. In 1971 both he and Taleqani were arrested for their links with the organization. Taleqani was exiled to inhospitable Zahedan, on the Pakistani border, while the younger Sahabi went back to jail, to be released only in 1978.

Shariati's relation with the Mojahedin is something of a mystery. On the surface their ideologies appear to have a lot in common, and yet there is no clear evidence of close cooperation between the great orator and the militant activists, although it stands to reason that many a Mojahed must have attended Shariati's lectures and learned from them. This lack of a close link perhaps has something to do with the fact that towards the end of his short life Shariati evolved towards more orthodoxy in his religious thought, while the Mojahedin took the opposite route, a development that culminated in the 1975 split.

Since the LMI did not exist as a party when the Mojahedin organization was founded in 1965, this event was not perceived as a split by LMI sympathizers at the time, and the guerrilla organization was seen by many as a metempsychotic continuation of the LMI. While many former LMI leaders and sympathizers would not go so far as to risk their skin for the cause of the Mojahedin, they were also in a certain sense proud of it, to some extent because they had no martyrs of their own to show.⁷⁵ Things changed after the Mojahedin's decimation in 1971. The surviving activists did not have the same attachment to the LMI that had characterized the founders, and the increasing ideological similarities with Marxist groups were surely alarming to what was left of the LMI. Let us not forget that the LMI's roots lay in the Bazaar.

In retrospect, therefore, the founding of the Mojahedin can be seen as a split. By the time the LMI revived as a political grouping, in 1977, the PMOI had developed a life of its own, with only genealogical

⁷⁵ As one former LMI member put it to this writer, "Inha poz-e Mojahedin ra midadand" (They [the LMI] were showing with the Mojahedin).

off

ties to the LMI.⁷⁶

7.5 FROM RELIGIOUS MODERNISM TO THE TRIUMPH OF TRADITIONALISM

The period 1963-1978 is a crucial one in recent Iranian history. At its outset, the most important political party in Iran was one which defined itself as Muslim, Nationalist, Mosaddeqist, and Constitutionalist. Islam was therefore one of four components. Fifteen years later, Ay. Khomeini was the undisputed leader of the Iranian masses and led a revolution in which traditionalism was clearly the major driving force. What had happened in the meantime? Why and how did the first modernist Muslim stirrings on Iran's political scene lead to a triumphant affirmation of traditionalism?

The beginning of politically active religious traditionalism, of widespread clerical involvement in politics, and of the national role of Ruhollah Khomeini can be traced to the riots of June 1963 (Khordad 1342). Dismissed as a mere shindy by the Shah regime, these riots claimed somewhere between one thousand and ten thousand deaths. As we saw in the previous chapter, the religious movement that began in June

⁷⁶ This is how the Mojahedin interpret their split from the LMI: In a short history of their movement it is written that in prison Badi'zadegan, Mohsen, and Hanifnezhad together analyzed the causes for the repeated failures of Nationalist movements in Iran. They came to the conclusion that these movements had failed for six reasons: They had lacked an ideology, they had not had the necessary know-how for struggle, they had been centered around personalities, they had not been professional, they had been parliamentarist, and they had been naive. The Mojahedin endeavored to draw the appropriate lessons from these shortcomings. Tarikhcheh, jarayan-e kudeta va khatt-e mashshye konuni-ye saze-man-e mojahedin-e khalq-e Iran (A Short History, the Affair of the Coup d'Etat, and the Current Line of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran) (n.p., Entesharat-e Abuzarr, n.d.), pp. 1-2.

1963 had its own dynamic and was not organically linked with the Nationalist cause. The secular Nationalists of the National Front did not hide their distaste, but the LMI ended up supporting it, thus implicitly placing itself under Khomeini's umbrella.⁷⁷

It is understandable that Khomeini should have exercised a certain attraction on LMI leaders and sympathizers. For years Bazargan and Taleqani had been complaining about the lack of clerical enthusiasm for the anti-Shah opposition. Now, finally, one of the recently deceased Ay. Borujerdi's putative successors was raising the banner of revolt. Moreover, his agenda of grievances was not a priori reactionary and anti-democratic. To be sure, his opposition to women's suffrage and the waivering of the legal stipulation that voters in the elections to provincial councils had to be Muslims, strikes one committed to universal suffrage as outright reactionary, but there is no reason to assume that the LMI was actually committed to universal suffrage. The whole question was somewhat academic anyway, since it was clear that no free elections would be allowed under the Shah. Therefore Khomeini's opposition to the granting of diplomatic immunity to American military advisors, which was an unacceptable throw-back to the much hated Capitulations of the heydays of European imperialism, weighed more. The sympathy for Khomeini was facilitated by the fact that he was largely unknown to political leaders in Iran. Bazargan and Sahabi had met him only once, in the winter of 1962-63 (1341).

⁷⁷ For details see chapter 6, section 5.

Khomeini's immediate followers were younger mullas like Mohammad Beheshti, S. Ali Khameneh'i, Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Ho. Ali Montazeri, who in the 1960's and 1970's were seen by LMI figures as intellectuals among the clergy (which they were, compared to the rest). They had participated in the reform movement of the early 1960's (q.v.), they had taken part in the activities of the Hoseiniyeh Ershad until 1971, and with the notable exception of Dr. Beheshti, they went in and out of prison. They did not fit the image of the conservative, quietist mulla only concerned with arcane questions of feqh that Bazargan had excoriated in his writings.

After 1971, things changed somewhat. It must now have been clear to Bazargan and his friends that what these "clerical intellectuals" stood for was incompatible with their ideas. In 1971 Khomeini's book on Islamic Government was printed and widely circulated in Iran.⁷⁸ The book is a tightly argued, innovative blue-print for a theocratic government in Iran.⁷⁹ In 1975 S. Ali Khameneh'i translated a book by the ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Seyed Qutb. Khameneh'i prefaced it with a concise text comprising ten points and entitled "The Characteristics of the Islamic Ideology." Point four establishes the need for a

⁷⁸ Two English versions of this book are available. One is subtitled "Khomeini's Mein Kampf" and is based on a State Department translation. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, tr. by Joint Publications Research Service Islamic Government (New York: Manor Books, 1979). The other is a translation by Hamid Algar and can be found in Islam and Revolution, Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), pp. 27-166. For a discussion of the respective merits of both versions, see Michael M.J. Fischer's review in Iranian Studies, 15 (Summer-Autumn 1981), pp. 263-266.

⁷⁹ For references on this book see chapter 1.

single party, and point nine posits that the population owes this party, the "Party of God," hezbollah, full obedience.⁸⁰ There is nothing 'Mossaddeqist' or 'Constitutionalist' about such a program. Did Bazargan and his friends oppose this fundamentalist trend vigorously enough? Whatever the answer to this question, it is clear that common opposition to the Shah primed all other considerations. By the mid-1970's religious modernists à la Bazargan had become a minority component of the growing Islamic movement in Iran. This subordinate position was due less to a lessening of the appeal of modernism than to the growth of fundamentalism and traditionalism.

The causes of this growth are variegated. In the 1960's and 1970's the Pahlavi regime increased its pressure on the clergy. It continued its "nationalization" of religious institutions, took over mosques, shrines, religious schools, and transferred them to the State's Organization of Endowments.⁸¹ As the clergy's freedom of action was more and more restricted, increasing numbers of previously apolitical ulema became hostile to the Shah. This trend was reinforced by the death, in 1971, of Ay. Hakim, the major marja' of Najaf. An Arab, he had been less involved in Iranian politics. This had led the Shah to court him and to treat him as if he had been the sole marja' of the Shi'ites. Upon his death, the Shah sent telegrams of condolence to three major maraje', Ay. Kho'i (Najaf), Ay. Khonsari (Teheran), and Ay. Shariatmadari (Qum). Only the latter warmly replied to the monarch's message, and

⁸⁰ Khameneh'i's text is discussed extensively in Ali Reza Irani, "Grundzüge der islamischen Ideologie im Iran," in Politische Studien, Sonderheft 3/1980, pp. 26-81.

⁸¹ On this, see Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics, pp. 132-143.

thereby damaged his standing considerably. Although Ay. Shariatmadari was then, according to the traditional rules, the senior marja', he lost a lot of support among the lower ranking clergy, who increasingly turned to Khomeini. A major moderate figure was thenceforth neutralized. Taleqani stopped speaking to Ay. Shariatmadari, but Bazargan and Sahabi maintained their contacts with him. Given the perpetual state of tension between Iran and Iraq, Khomeini was free to increase his attacks on the Shah.

Concomittantly with the heightening of Church-State tension, a gradual change took place in the social background of the ulema. The social prestige and market value of a clerical education having dropped considerably, young students at the religious seminaries increasingly came from poorer social strata. If we bear in mind the ostentatious and free-wheeling life styles of Iranian elites in these years, it is not surprising that this new breed of mullas became resentful and socially radicalized.⁸²

The radicalization of the clergy was also helped by two events that shook Mashad in 1975. In that year Ay. Milani, the head of the Mashad howzeh and a major marja' of relatively progressive outlook who had been friendly with the LMI, died. In that same year the Government, represented in the city by the much hated Dr. Valian, razed the madrassahs and buildings surrounding the central Shrine of Imam Reza to create a park. Religious opinion was furious: Many little shop-owners who had owned or rented their premises in the area were not compensated for

⁸² The precarious life of seminarians in the 1970's is vividly described in M.M.J. Fischer, Iran, pp. 76-80.

their loss, and the annular park was seen as symbolically separating the Shrine from the rest of the city. The physical destruction of the madrasahs and the death of Ay. Milani caused an exodus of religious students to Qum and Najaf, which were then more radical than the capital of Khorasan. Whatever moderating influence Mashad had exercised on Iran's religious life was gone.

Parallel to this movement within the clergy, tremendous shifts occurred in the country's demography. The Shah regime unequivocally favored industrial development over agriculture. A growth in the number of jobs available in the cities, mainly Teheran, went hand in hand with an often absolute impoverishment of the countryside. The result was massive migration to the cities, especially Teheran. A city that had had no slums to speak of until the late 1960's suddenly had millions of recently migrated slum-dwellers who lived under more than precarious conditions.⁸³ Among these masses new forms of religious organizations sprang up which were a fertile ground for the spread of traditionalist and fundamentalist ideas. Most of them were founded after 1965 and were associated with the groupings of humbler occupations or of poor city quarters. They met mostly during the holy months of Muharram and Ramadan, but occasionally also at other times. In 1974 there were 12,000 of these associations in Teheran alone, of which 1,800 had formal titles. Some examples of these are: Religious Associations of shoemakers, of workers of public baths, of the guild of fruit-juicers (on street-corners), of tailors, of the natives of Natanz resident in Teheran, of the

⁸³ Farhad Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1980). See especially pp. 91-95.

desperates (bicharehha) of [Imam] Hosein, of the Abjects (zalilha) of [Imam] Musa ibn Ja'far.⁸⁴ The contrast with the associations founded by Bazargan and Taleqani is evident. One must also not forget that while these associations were growing and spreading, all forms of independent political activity were banned. Religion became the only outlet for oppositional leanings in the country.

At the same time, a growing literacy rate among the masses favored the diffusion of traditionalist and fundamentalist ideas. Religious periodicals gained progressively wider circulation and religious books became ever more popular. In the period 1954-1963 religious books had constituted around 10 per cent of the total of published books. By 1975 this percentage had risen to 33.5 per cent, the number having decupled in absolute terms. In 1976 there were 48 publishers of religious books in Teheran. A book like Mafatih al-Jnan (Keys to the Garden [of Heaven]), much maligned by Shariati for representing the most other-worldly aspects of Shi'ism, sold 490,000 copies in 1973 - second only to the Qoran.⁸⁵

The government, meanwhile, was more preoccupied with leftists and the Mojahedin. At Iranian universities, authorities would often look the other way when members of the Islamic Student Associations, by now radicalized, terrorized other students or faculty members of whose behavior or views they did not approve.⁸⁶ In its last phase, the regime of the

⁸⁴ The information on these associations is taken, verbatim, from Said Amir Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran," in Government and Opposition, 16 (1981), p. 312.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 311-312.

Shah favored religious forces over leftist forces in other ways too. Most religious political prisoners were freed in 1976 (1355), many signing statements of repentance for rebelling against the monarchy, while leftist prisoners were only let out of jail in November 1978. That move added to the momentum of the Islamic Movement.

In this groundswell the likes of Bazargan and Shariati were lost. The regime had deprived them of their major forum, the Hoseiniyeh Ershad Institute. Ay. Taleqani spent most of these years in prison or in exile. The books of Bazargan and Shariati were read alongside the traditionalist books, but failed to have any impact of their own. Under the circumstances, the best Bazargan and his friends could hope for, was that by staying within the Islamic movement, they might be able to inflect it in a more modern direction. The lines between the various segments of the Islamic Movement were not sharply drawn. The seminarians in Qum read Bazargan and Shariati alongside their traditional curriculum, and until 1975 even the publications of the Mojahedin (including their handbook on Economics, which is a straight translation of Marx' Critique of Political Economy!).

Bazargan himself seemed more preoccupied with the danger from the left than with the rising tide of fundamentalism and traditionalism. In 1975, the split in the Mojahedin movement prompted him to write Elmi budan-e marksism ("The Scientific Nature of Marxism"), and in 1976, at a meeting in the Qoba Mosque he gave a talk which later became the book Afat-e towhid ("The Bane of Monotheism"), in which he warned against

⁸⁶ Personal communications from students and faculty studying or teaching in Iran at the time.

Muslims' adopting the vocabulary and thought categories of Marxists.⁸⁷ Khomeini, on his part, made their task easier by always being more precise about what he stood against, as opposed to what he stood for. Thus it was hoped that his writings on Islamic Government constituted an ideal rather than an action program. Finally, the fundamentalists, and later even the traditionalists, adopted the rhetoric of social justice and anti-imperialism popularized by Shariati, thus further blurring the lines between them and the modernists.

Thus, Bazargan and the old guard of the LMI looked increasingly like leaders without troops. The Bazaar, their original source of support was dealing more and more with the clergy directly. Inside the modernist camp itself, differences could no longer be ignored. In late 1977 (Azar 13, 1356) Motahhari and Bazargan issued a joint communiqué in which they clarified their position vis-a-vis the teachings of the recently deceased Shariati. While recognizing the relevance of much of Shariati's thought, they faulted him for his insufficient knowledge of Islam.⁸⁸ This communiqué further alienated many young people, mostly students, who had long since abandoned moderates like Bazargan for the more radical circles of the left or the Mojahedin.

⁸⁷ This book was badly received by many LMI figures, who objected that it needlessly exacerbated the rift between the leftist and the religious component of the opposition against the Shah. At least one prominent LMI figure, Ahmad Alibaba'i, broke politically with Bazargan on this occasion. Ali Shariati was dead by now, it is therefore useless to speculate as to what his reaction might have been.

⁸⁸ For the full text see chapter 3.

The situation is different in the case of the LMI(a). Only one month after Khomeini had left Turkey for Iraq in 1964, Yazdi, Qotbzadeh, and Tavassoli had visited him in Najaf. They thus established independent channels of communication with Khomeini, and in 1972 Yazdi became Khomeini's plenipotentiary representative in the United States. Khomeini even authorized him to receive and spend religious taxes. As we saw in an earlier section, the LMI(a) ceased all cooperation with Nationalist groups in 1966 and concentrated on organizing religious groups. The new, purely 'religious' line, is reflected in the content of Payam-e Mujahid. In the organ of the LMI(a) we look in vain for any articles extolling democracy, tolerance, moderation. The emphasis is on revolution, struggle, Islam. Within the Islamic movement, news are covered generously, whether they concern fundamentalists or the Mojahedin. Terrorist groups are eulogized alongside national liberation movements, and the I.R.A. and the Japanese Red Army are celebrated as revolutionaries.⁸⁹ It is clear that one cannot claim to have democratic ideals and at the same time present as heroes people who direct their armed attacks exclusively against those countries that have approximated the democratic ideal. The young Iranian students who became members of the ISA'a in the United States were fed articles and books that had little in common with the original program of the LMI. The LMI(a) did reprint and distribute articles, defense statements, speeches, and books by the leading figures of the LMI, but in the annotations that were added to these it was always stated that the LMI's strict adherence to constitutional methods in the period 1960-1963 had only been a tactical move, only one

⁸⁹ Cf. Payam-e Mujahid, no. 25, December 1974 (Azar, 1353), pp. 1 and 6.

dimension of a tridimensional (military and ideological struggles were the others) guerre à outrance against the Shah and his foreign masters. The LMI(a) thus imputed a measure of Leninist duplicity to Bazargan that was quite incompatible with his legalistic mind frame, not to mention his emphasis on Islamic ethics. Muslim students breaking windows and furniture at Iranian universities were hailed as revolutionary heroes in the pages of the LMI(a)'s organ, but government troops doing the same were decried as barbarians: one notices the disappearance of a belief in universally applicable norms, such an important ingredient of a democratic frame of mind. Also relevant to this discussion is the gradual lessening of the role accorded to Mosaddeq in LMI(a) publications, as analyzed earlier.

No wonder then, that upon their return to Iran many of these Iranian students turned against Bazargan and his friends and joined the camp of the fundamentalists. Unlike the generation of their grandfathers and fathers, who had gone abroad to learn something about the West, these people tended to shut themselves off completely from their Western environments, concentrating on the acquisition of technical skills. Their reading, the publications of the ISA's and newspapers like Payam-e Muja-hid, reinforced their haughty disdain for their host countries, and no attempts were made to understand the West on its own terms. The remarkable intellectual regression that characterizes Iran's post-revolutionary political class can, at least in part, be traced back to this development. Even if we were to assume, for argument's sake,⁹⁰ that the

⁹⁰ Bazargan himself wrote in 1982 that the LMI(a) had contained elements more committed to the world-wide rule of Islam than to the values and traditions of the National Movement. Mehdi Bazargan, "Iran va eslam"

LMI(a)'s commitment to Nationalist and liberal values was genuine, we would still have to conclude that the leaders of the LMI(a), primarily Yazdi, made the crucial mistake of assuming a Mosaddeqist "residual" in the groups they targeted with their publications, while in fact the memory of the golden age of Nationalism was dim for most Iranians studying in Europe and the United States in the 1960's and 1970's: many were even born after 1953.

It can be argued that such a policy was necessary, that in order to strive for revolution, one has to present things in black and white. It is true that only people who are oblivious to the complexities and nuances of political and social matters make good revolutionaries. The trouble is, they are not likely to turn into pluralists the minute the revolution is over.

The LMI(a)'s policy of total subservience to Khomeini and refusal of any cooperation with Nationalist groups contrasted with Bazargan's attitude, who always maintained relations not only with the National Front, but even with Ali Amini, and who never placed himself outside the framework of Iran's 1906 constitution.

Summarizing the momentous shifts in Iran's dominant political culture in the years 1963-1977 we can say that until the early 1960's, Nationalists commanded a majority among the articulate segment of Iranian public opinion.⁹¹ Secularism dominated the National Movement. This does not

(Iran and Islam), in Bazyabi-ye arzeshta (The Recovery of Values), vol. 2 (Teheran, 1982), p. 119n.

mean that all Nationalists were areligious, but one could be a believing Muslim without mixing religion and politics. By 1977 things had changed: increasing numbers of Iranians had joined the ranks of the articulate, but among these leftists and fundamentalists had more appeal than the old Nationalists, be they secular or religious. In 1978, therefore, the Islamic movement in Iran was polarized between the traditionalists and the fundamentalists on the one hand, and the Mojahedin on the other. People like Bazargan and Sahabi were somewhere in the middle. They were politicians from another era, they had great residual prestige, but no troops.

⁹¹ Richard Cottam, Nationalism, p. 274.

PART III

THE LMI AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

From 1961 to 1978 the LMI and its leaders thought of themselves as the link between the National Movement and the religious movement that started in 1963. They were late-comers in the former, and pioneers in the latter. They resented Khomeini's claim that the religious protest movement had started in June 1963.¹ Bazargan and his friends took a leading part in the revival of civil society that began in 1977, as analyzed in chapter 8; they staffed the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic, as examined in chapter 9; and they remained in Iran to lead a loyal opposition after the clerical take-over, an enterprise that constitutes the subject matter of this study's final chapter.

¹ Mehdi Bazargan *Engelab-e eslami dar do harekat* (The Islamic Revolution in Two Movements) (Teheran, 1984), pp. 116-117.

Chapter 8

THE OMI AND THE LIBERALIZATION OF 1977-78

The years 1977-1979 bear a certain resemblance to the period 1960-1963. At the outset we again find a certain deterioration of Iran's economic situation, this time brought about by stagnating oil-income and an economy that overheated after the boom years of the early 1970's.¹ Again, this period of economic troubles coincided with the installation of a new, Democratic, administration in Washington, which, like Kennedy's, was pledged to furthering human rights abroad. Under pressure from the Carter administration, the Shah attempted to improve his human rights record. As in the early 1960's, liberal, Nationalist, reformist, and leftist forces in the country were not able to take effective advantage of the liberalization. Instead, under the leadership of Ay. Khomeini a revolutionary movement grew which in just over a year succeeded to topple the Shah.²

¹ For a full picture of Iran's economic woes at the eve of the revolution, see Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), especially pp. 77-127; M. Fields, ed., Middle East Annual Report (London, 1977), pp. 150-156; and "Iran's Miracle that Was," in The Economist, December 20, 1975.

² The causes of the Iranian revolution will probably be debated for a long time hence and cannot be discussed here. For good discussions of the structural reasons that led to the upheaval see Michael M.J. Fischer, "Supporting the Evolution of Modern Civil Society from a Traditional Base," in Raymond D. Gastil, ed., Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1981 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 261-275 and Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Islamic Revolution," in Theory and Society, 11 (May 1982), pp. 265-292. The comments by others on Skocpol's analysis are also illuminating. See also the special 1980 issue of Iranian Stud-

Bazargan and his circle played an important role in these events, although by no means a determining one. The religious modernists around him had one foot in the Nationalist, liberal opposition to the Shah, the other in the religious camp under the leadership of Khomeini. Bazargan was both the chairman of the Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights and an ally of Khomeini's, hand-picked by him to serve as Prime Minister of the post-revolutionary Provisional Government. However, before we examine LMI elements' role in the liberalization and subsequent revolution, it is meet that we briefly turn our attention to developments in Washington, for their perception by Iranians conditioned the course of events in Iran.

8.1 IRAN IN CARTER'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

Renewed U.S. preoccupation with human rights violations by allies is usually said to have begun under the Carter administration. However, at least in so far as Iran is concerned, the seeds of a more critical attitude towards the Shah were sown earlier. In 1975 and 1976 U.S. government officials discussed the Shah's harsh treatment of political dissidents privately with the Iranian government,³ and at the end of 1976 Congress passed the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act which stipulated that "no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pat-

ies.

³ See the State Department Report on Human Rights in Iran (Pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976) to the House Committee on International Relations of December 31, 1976, in Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, eds., The United States and Iran: A Documentary History (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1980), p 433.

tern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."⁴

Jimmy Carter, announcing his candidacy for the U.S. Presidency on December 12, 1974 in Washington D.C., had expressed his commitment to the "dream" that the U.S. "set a standard within the community of nations of courage, compassion, integrity, and dedication to basic human rights and freedom."⁵

Iran posed serious difficulties for Washington. It was one of only a handful of Third World countries that did not participate in the Non-Aligned Movement but was instead allied to the United States. Its geographic location made it a key factor in the United States' global confrontation with the Soviet Union. As the Secretary of State saw it:

Iran was seen as the major force for stability in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Its military strength ensured Western access to gulf oil and served as a barrier to Soviet expansion... the shah's determination that Iran must assume more responsibility in the gulf coincided with the "Nixon Doctrine" which envisioned key regional states as surrogates for American military power in preserving order and blocking Soviet inroads. In 1972 president Nixon determined that Iran should be permitted to acquire virtually any American conventional weaponry the shah deemed necessary.⁶

In addition, the U.S. maintained highly sophisticated listening posts in Iran close to the Soviet border,⁷ and the purchases of weaponry by Iran

⁴ Relevant parts of this act can be found in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., The Human Rights Reader (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), pp. 297-299.

⁵ Jimmy Carter, "Why Not the Best," in A Government as Good as Its People (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), p. 43.

⁶ Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 314-315.

⁷ For details on the value of these installations to U.S. strategic interests see James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 198-200.

weighed heavily in America's balance of payments, under heavy strain in the early 1970's: In 1974 nearly half of U.S. arms exports went to Iran, making it the single largest armoury of weapons outside America, the Soviet Union, and Europe.⁸

But Iran also had one of the worst human rights records in the Western world,⁹ which made it a natural focus for Carter's new emphasis in foreign policy. Thus on the one hand the Carterites wished the Shah to improve his human rights record, and on the other hand they (rightly!) saw in him the best guarantor for U.S. interests in Iran. This last factor was seen as a sufficient reason to support him. Even after it became clear that the Iranian people overwhelmingly rejected the Shah, be it as dictator or constitutional monarch, the Carter administration remained committed to his continued rule. To put it somewhat cynically, one could say that for the Carter administration the Iranian opposition deserved to be accorded all the rights of oppositions in the West, provided it consented to remain an opposition.¹⁰ Therefore, given the

⁸ On the Shah's arms purchases see Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (New York: Bantam Books, 1978), pp. 271-292; and Barry Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions (New York and London: Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 158-189.

⁹ See Amnesty International, Annual Report for 1974-75 (London: A.I., 1975) and P. Jacobson, "Torture in Iran," in Sunday Times (London), January 19, 1975.

¹⁰ In the memoirs of key figures of the Carter administration one is struck by the absence in the sections dealing with Iran of any reference either to the Iranian people, to Mosaddeq, or to the fact that the Shah owed his power initially to the United States: Human rights apparently did not include the right to have a government of one's own choice. One exception is the last U.S. ambassador to Iran, William H. Sullivan, who has a clear understanding of just how widespread opposition to the Shah really was. See his article "Dateline Iran: The Road Not Taken," in Foreign Policy, 40 (Fall 1980), pp. 176-177.

Shah's unpopularity in Iran, pressuring him to liberalize his regime while supporting his staying in power was a self-contradictory policy. The nature of this contradiction apparently never dawned on Jimmy Carter, as the following two excerpts from his memoirs show:

Because of the heavy emphasis that was placed on Soviet-American competition, a dominant factor in our dealings with foreign countries became whether they espoused an anti-communist line. There were times when right-wing monarchs and military dictators were automatically immune from any criticism of their oppressive actions. Our apparent commitment was to protect them from any internal political movement that might result in the establishment of a more liberal ruling group.¹¹

Three hundred pages later one is surprised to learn that at least one anti-communist right-wing monarch unequivocally deserved to be protected from internal political movement:

Still, there was no question in my mind that he [i.e. the Shah] deserved our unequivocal support. Not only had the Shah been a staunch and dependable ally of the U.S. for many years, but he remained the leader around whom we hoped to see a stable and reformed government organized and maintained in Iran. We knew little about the forces contending against him, but their anti-American slogans and statements were enough in themselves to strengthen our resolve to support the Shah as he struggled for survival.¹²

It would seem that Carter has never assimilated that the opposition's anti-Americanism stemmed precisely from U.S. support for the Shah, for Iranians had no other reasons for being hostile to a country which was thousands of miles away and the global adversary of an expansionist and limitrophe super-power to boot. U.S. support for the Shah and the opposition's anti-Americanism thus fed on each other and created a vicious circle which the moderate opposition in Iran was ultimately unable to

¹¹ Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 142.

¹² Ibid., p. 440.

square.

Whatever the ultimate aims of American foreign policy and its contradictions, the fact remains that the Carter administration did pressure its ally in Iran. In response the Shah attempted to liberalize his regime, and the progress he made obviously satisfied Washington, for whatever he did, he was reassured of American support. Perhaps it should be pointed out here that various policy makers in Washington pursued slightly different policies towards Iran, which have been analyzed elsewhere and cannot be enlarged upon here.¹³

As far as arms exports were concerned, Iran was of course not a recipient of assistance but a customer whose purchases "recycled" petrodollars. Moreover the Carter administration devised tricks which enabled Iran to circumvent the guidelines it had established for arms exports. Thus the Shah received everything he wanted and Iran remained in fact America's most important customer.¹⁴

This went on through the year 1978, as opposition to the Shah mounted and the revolutionary movement grew. In spite of critics' furious charges, there is no indication that the Carterites actually pressed the Shah to democratize his country.¹⁵ The only thing they did not do in his

¹³ See Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, Debacle: The American Failure in Iran (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), pp. 65-80. For a less polemic analysis see Gaddis Smith, "Ideals Under Siege: Carter's Foreign Policy," in The Yale Review, 73 (1984), pp. 354-367.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 84, and Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 317-324.

¹⁵ This fact is borne out by the testimonies of State Department officials before the House Committee on International Relations in late 1976 and late 1977. On both occasions human rights violations in Iran were admitted, but put in the context of the widespread "extre-

support was to urge him to use more force repressing the periodic demonstrations that shook the country after October 1977, demonstrations, it should be emphasized, in which people were almost always unarmed. But even here some members of the president's entourage came close to doing just that: when security forces shot at unarmed demonstrators staging a sit-in in central Teheran and killed over 500 on "Black Friday" (September 8, 1978/Shahrivar 17, 1357), the Shah was commended by Washington:

On September 8, violence erupted in Jaleh Square in Teheran, with troops firing on demonstrators, killing scores. Vance and I agreed that it would be desirable for the president to call the Shah and express verbally our support for him. The conversation between the President and the Shah took place between 7:56 and 8:02 a.m. on Sunday, September 10. The President said he was calling to express his friendship for the Shah and his concern about events.¹⁶

The Shah, incidentally, denies that such a conversation ever took place.¹⁷

It was only by November 1978 that U.S. ambassador William Sullivan came to the conclusion that the Shah had no chance and had to go, but his views were accorded little sympathy in Washington. But to be fair to president Carter it should also be pointed out that when in late December 1978 the Shah asked for the American view on using massive force

mist terrorism" that plagued the country, blithely ignoring the fact that the human rights violations clearly antedated the adoption of violent tactics by parts of the opposition, as we showed in chapter 7, section 4. See Y. Alexander and A. Nanes, United States and Iran, pp. 425-436 and 451-460.

¹⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), p. 361. Cf. also Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, p. 326.

¹⁷ Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The Shah of Iran, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), p. 161. To complicate matters further, no such denial can be found in the book's earlier French version: Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Réponse à l'Histoire (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979).

to restore law and order, Carter refused to give him the green light, against the advice of Brzezinski.¹⁸

Let us now see how American policies were interpreted inside Iran.

8.2 IRANIAN REACTIONS TO CARTER'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES

Carter's statements on human rights had repercussions in Iran both on the government side and on the side of the opposition.

8.2.1 The Shah's Response to Carter's Human Rights Campaign

R.K. Ramazani has written:

The 1976 Democratic presidential campaign deeply worried the Shah. He feared the decline of U.S. support for his regime if the Democratic Party should win the election. He "owed" his throne to the Eisenhower Administration, and had enjoyed a "special relationship" with the Nixon and Ford Administrations. President Nixon regarded him as a "world statesman," President Ford had said he was a "world senior statesman," and Henry Kissinger understood his geopolitics as no one else did. But what would happen to all his massive purchases of arms if the Democratic Party should win the elections? After all President Kennedy had denied him arms aid, and had "imposed" Dr. Amini's "reform government" on him. The Shah, therefore, sent his scouts to the U.S. to study the Carter campaign firsthand and write him reports. He especially asked for estimates of Jimmy Carter's success. Carter's campaign for human rights and for limiting arms sales in particular troubled the Shah.¹⁹

It is difficult to say to what extent the Shah's liberalization of 1977 resulted from his reading of Carter's intentions. For obvious reasons, while he was in power the Shah always claimed that he had planned a democratization of Iranian society anyway, for he could not possibly admit

¹⁸ Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 331-333.

¹⁹ R.K. Ramazani, The United States and Iran: The Pattern of Influence (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 91.

to being responsive to American pressure. And it is true that as early as 1975 he had allowed a delegation of the International Commission of Jurists led by Prof. Georges Levasseur to conduct an indepth study of Iran's judicial system.²⁰ It is also probable that his terminal illness, which he kept secret, and the failure of the Resurgence Party to contribute to an institutionalization of his regime, induced him to open up the political system, so as to bequeath his throne to his son. However, after his fall he did admit that he had been pressured by the United States. Whatever the truth of the matter may be, the fact is that it was around the time Carter received the Democratic nomination that the Shah ordered an end to torture in Iran.²¹

The Shah also launched a campaign to publicize Iranian views on human rights. In the first half of 1977 Rastakhiz party leaders, members of the imperial family, and high government officials were mobilized to give speeches extolling the Shah's lofty views on democracy, human rights, and justice. The contents of these statements were both boastful and defensive, and Princess Ashraf, the Shah's powerful twin sister, at the tenth anniversary meeting of the International Conference of Human Rights which was held in Teheran in June 1977, said that developing countries "[could not] emulate the West in the realization of human

²⁰ The sending of this and other delegations was at least partially due to an initiative of the LMI(a), which later translated the reports into Persian and published them.

²¹ The time is inferred from a statement the Shah made to William J. Butler in May 1977, in which he said that no torture had been practiced for the last ten months. See Testimony of William J. Butler, chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Commission of Jurists, before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, October 26, 1977.

rights."²²

In the spring of 1977 the Iranian government approached the International Commission of Jurists, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Amnesty International, allowed them to visit places of detention in Iran, and asked for proposals as to how the administration of justice could be improved. Some of these proposals were accepted by the government and the necessary laws passed by parliament in early August 1977.

Throughout late 1976 and the first half of 1977 the government released political prisoners, although the number of those freed was swelled by including common criminals. It seems that the vast majority of the freed political prisoners belonged to the fundamentalist opposition.²³ Concomittantly, leftist guerrillas were killed in street battles, jailed, tried, and often executed.²⁴ In July, however, Ay. Talegani was arrested and sentenced to ten years prison. It seemed that the regime attempted to sow confusion in the ranks of the opposition by arresting some and not others, so that those not arrested would be viewed as secret collaborators of the government.

²² R.K. Ramazani, The United States and Iran, p. 93. The author provides other examples as well.

²³ The freed fundamentalists were paraded on television, where they publicly expressed their gratitude to the Shah. One of them, Habibollah Asgar Owladi, would go far in the Islamic Republic.

²⁴ For details see Keesing's, April 21, 1978, p. 28940.

In July of 1977 the Shah began a program of political liberalization. In early August Amir-Abbas Hoveida, who had been Prime Minister for an unprecedented twelve years, was replaced by Jamshid Amuzegar, an able and personally untainted technocrat who had hitherto been in charge of oil. His was the ungrateful task of consolidating Iran's battered economy. According to some sources, Amuzegar made a crucial mistake of cutting government subsidies to the clergy. This would not have affected the militant radical clergy, but could have impelled the rank and file clergy to lend their support to the radicals. At the same time the Shah never hinted at relaxing the monopoly of the Rastakhiz party; all dissent was to be channelled through the single party. This was a big mistake, for until the fall of 1977, as we shall see, the initiative within the opposition belonged to intellectuals and moderates. They were thus deprived of the opportunity of forming political parties, with the result that from late 1977 onwards most of the mass-mobilization was carried out by the clergy, who were angered by the cut-off of their subsidies and helped by the release of fundamentalist political prisoners.

To sum up the liberalization of 1977 one could say that the Shah put an end to the worst excesses in the prisons, tolerated a few manifestations of malcontent by intellectuals, but failed to open up the political system in any way. He had hoped to gain the confidence and cooperation of his opponents by not torturing them anymore.

How did the Shah perceive American reaction to his efforts? His first encounter with Carter was a tearful occasion: During his visit to Washington in November 1977 anti-Shah demonstrators who had come from

all over the States and pro-Shah elements flown in from all over the United States and even from Teheran²⁵ clashed in front of the White House causing police to intervene with tear gas. On that occasion the Shah was assured of American support and encouraged to pursue the liberalization.

In late December 1977 Carter went to Teheran. This is how the Shah remembers the state banquet he offered his guest -- a testimony of what it took to make a favorable impression on him:

My favorable impression of the new American President deepened when he visited Teheran to spend New Year's Eve with us at Niavaran Palace. I have never heard a foreign statesman speak of me in quite such flattering terms as he used that evening. "Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world," Carter said in his prepared remarks at dinner. He went on to say:

Our talks have been priceless, our friendship is irreplaceable, and my own gratitude is to the Shah, who in his wisdom and with his experience has been so helpful to me, a new leader.²⁶

There is no indication in Carter's account of the speech that he did not mean everything he said,²⁷ but at least one person present had her doubts about Carter's sincerity:

²⁵ The Shah had a history of taking hired supporters with him on state visits. In fact, during the 1967 visit to Germany Germans coined the word Jubelperser ("Cheer-Persians") for these elements.

²⁶ M. R. Pahlavi, Answer, p. 152. Again, there is no reference to the visit in the original French version of the Shah's book. One could speculate that the insertion of this praise for Carter was an act of gratitude for the President's humanitarian gesture of admitting him to the States in November 1979.

²⁷ Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 437. The timing of Carter's statement may appear unfortunate, but only with the benefit of hindsight. One could hardly have expected a guest to tell his host at a state banquet that he was in trouble!

As [Carter] spoke, I looked at his pale face. I thought his smile was artificial, his eyes icy -- and I hoped I could trust him. But within that very year [1978] he sent several emissaries to Khomeini, sent a military envoy to Teheran to undermine my brother's army, and hedged his own political bets by abandoning my brother as Iran moved toward revolution.²⁸

These quotes show that Washington's double purpose of supporting the Shah and urging a liberalization on him created a certain confusion in Iran. This was also true of the opposition.

8.2.2 The Opposition and Carter's Human Rights Campaign

As we have already pointed out on numerous occasions, the anti-Shah opposition after 1953 always saw in the Shah an American puppet who could be influenced by American pressure. The election of a President who pledged to work for human rights was therefore greeted with great elation. For some members of the more religiously-minded sectors of the opposition Carter's strong identification with religious values was a further sign of hope. Iranians, living in a world where everyday life is imbued with religion, have always seen the West as the Christian West. How then, the argument went, could a professing Christian knowingly countenance the repression of the Shah?

Iranians were aware of the Shah's apprehensions, and widely believed rumors had it that the Shah had made hefty financial contributions to Nixon's and Ford's presidential campaigns. It was inferred that Carter

²⁸ Ashraf Pahlavi, Faces in a Mirror: Memoirs from Exile (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980), p. 199.

had been irked by this, and according to another widespread rumor he had waited an uncommon four days before answering the Shah's congratulatory message after his election. As late as February 1980 Bazargan would write that "Carter's election made it possible for Iran to breathe again."²⁹

After January 1977 the moderate middle-class opposition essentially tried to test the atmosphere, to get a feeling for how far it could go. The first initiative came from Dr. Ali-Asghar Hajj-Seyyed Javadi. A prominent writer and publicist, he had been editor-in-chief of the organ of the Third Force for a while, then followed Khalil Maleki, and had become interested in Islam in the early 1960's, without however becoming a practicing Muslim. His trajectory thus resembled that of his late friend Jalal Al-e Ahmad. Around the Iranian New Year (March 1977) he wrote an open letter of over 200 pages to the Shah and gave an analysis of what was wrong with the country. Nothing happened to him, which emboldened the opposition.

About the same time, Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi's half-brother, Ahmad Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, who in the LMI was in charge of liaison with the Islamic Student Associations abroad, issued a strongly anti-communist statement and went abroad with a considerable amount of money destined for the ISA's and the Book Distribution Center in Houston. In Paris he apparently contributed nothing for Banisadr's activities, which laid the groundwork for future ill feeling between the LMI and the man who would

²⁹ In a letter to the editor, *Ettela'at*, Bahman 18, 1358/February 7, 1980, quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 500.

be the first President of Iran. Secular Nationalists regarded this trip with suspicion, for at the time it took place they were still barred from leaving the country. These circumstances gave rise to rumors that Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi had gone to the United States to establish preliminary contacts with the U.S. administration and to impress them with the anti-communism of the opposition in Iran.

After Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi's letter the first open manifestations of opposition to the Shah were the work of intellectuals and emanated from the modern segment of society. Professional associations of lawyers, writers, university professors and physicians were created or revived, democratically elected their leadership, and sent more or less open letters to the Shah and the Prime Minister. Most of the prominent leaders of this movement came from the ranks of the secular component of the Nationalist, pre-1964 opposition to the Shah, although a few had had links with the Tudeh. Among the lawyers Hasan Nazih, Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, and Abdolkarim Lahiji stood out; they also became defense lawyers for political prisoners when judicial procedures were opened up in mid-1977. But these associations and their letters and analyses could do little more than publicize the regime's abuses and suggest ways to improve the situation.³⁰

As far as political parties were concerned, however, the situation was less conducive to activism. In early March 1977 former leading figures of the LMI started meeting regularly at their homes to discuss a

³⁰ For a detailed account of this 'intellectual' and 'professional' stage of the early revolutionary movement see E. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 501-504.

possible revival of their party. From the outset the appropriate role of religion became a hotly debated issue at the meetings and pitted a more secular wing consisting of Sami'i, Radnia, Nazih, and Alibaba'i against the advocates of a frankly religious coloration of the party, namely Bazargan, Sahabi, Ahmad Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi and Mohammad-Mehdi Ja'fari. Much precious time was thus lost on preliminaries and the party failed to assert an independent position on the political scene. Sami'i, Radnia, and Nazih soon dropped out of these discussions (Alibaba'i politically broke with Bazargan over the latter's afat talk (vide infra), although they maintained links with it, and the central core of the fledgling LMI became in effect quite homogeneously religious in orientation. But the LMI never did constitute itself as a real political party before the revolution. There was no formal executive committee, nor a central council. The party, such as there was, consisted of a handful of old-time activists who would come together at each others' homes every so often. Even those who became disenchanted with it, such as Radnia and Alibaba'i, would sometimes attend these meetings.

Secular parties also began appearing on the scene. Rahmatollah Moqaddam Maragheh'i, member of a prominent Azerbaijani family³¹ and a lawyer previously unconnected to Mosaddeq founded a reformist, secular party which he called in the Latin European tradition Nehzat-e radikal ("Radical Movement"). Foruhar revived his Party of the Iranian Nation, the Iran Party reconstituted itself with Shapur Bakhtiar as Secretary

³¹ There is a case study of the role of this family in the life of Maragheh. See Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good, "The Changing Status and Composition of an Iranian Provincial Elite," in Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., Continuity and Change in Modern Iran (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), pp. 229-248.

General (Saleh was too old and ailing to be politically active), and one faction of what had been Khalil Maleki's Third Force became the new Society of Iranian Socialists. But none of these parties comprised more than a few old-time leaders, and they had altogether little impact on the country's political life.

Parallel to these attempts at forming political parties efforts were made to create a wider framework for cooperation among the various Nationalist forces, which brought up the eternally divisive question of what the structure of the National Front should be.

In June 1977 Nationalist leaders decided to write an open letter to the Shah. It was drafted by Bazargan and accused the Shah's regime of "despotism in the guise of monarchy"; of creating, by its economic policies, inflation and shortages of food and housing; of squandering Iran's oil resources; of disregarding human rights; and of tolerating flattery and corruption. It called on the government "to observe the principles of the constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, forgo a one-party system, allow freedom of the press and of association, release political prisoners, permit exiles to return and establish a government based on majority representation."³² The secular Mosaddeqists wanted the letter to be signed by party leaders only, whereas Bazargan preferred a larger number of signatures. It appears that the secular party leaders were particularly insensed at Bazargan's insistence on including Eng. Hashem Sabbaghian among the signatories. Sabbaghian was an engineer from Teheran who had left the National Front to join the LMI.

³² Quoted from Keesing's, April 21, 1978, p. 28940.

From 1963 to 1978 he had occupied a civil service post overseeing public housing projects. By 1977 he was a major figure in the circle around Bazargan.³³ No agreement could be reached, and finally Foruhar, Sanjabi, and Bakhtiar decided to convey the document to the Shah with their signatures only. The pattern of 1960 repeated itself, with secular leaders cooperating with Bazargan and separating themselves from him in the last minute.

After this unsavoury incident, five prominent Nationalist leaders, namely Sanjabi, Bazargan, Foruhar, Moqaddam Maragheh'i, and Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi decided to meet regularly once a week to try to find ways to coordinate Nationalist activities. Again, no agreement could be reached. Foruhar and Sanjabi maintained that the National Front existed and consisted of the IP, the PIN, and the LMI. Bazargan and Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, by contrast, argued that the parties existed only on paper, and that the five members of the group should issue a public invitation to other prominent figures and begin public discussions about a new National Front.³⁴

The result was that the secular Mosaddeqists decided to revive the NF without the LMI. On November 22, 1977 (Azar 1, 1356), secular Nationalists met on the occasion of the religious feast of aid-e qorban at the garden of an NF leader at Karavansara-ye Sangi outside Teheran, with \

³³ Biographical information on Sabbaghian is taken from a campaign pamphlet for the 1980 elections.

³⁴ Information on the beginnings of Nationalist political party activism in 1977 was obtained from interviews with Hasan Nazih, Ali-Asghar Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, and Shapur Bakhtiar during interviews in the summers of 1982 and 1983.

about 1000 persons attending. It was broken up by SAVAK and many were beaten up. Nobody from the LMI was present. On Dec. 11, 1977 Dariush Foruhar announced in Teheran that the National Front had reconstituted itself under the name of Union of National Front Forces.³⁵ It included the Iran Party under Dr. Shapur Bakhtiar, the PIN under Dariush Foruhar, who became the NF's spokesman, and the Society of Iranian Socialists. Dr. Karim Sanjabi became the leader of the new National Front. In 1978 relations between the LMI and the NF broke down and there was very little cooperation between the two. The National Front's reluctance (at least till October) to acknowledge the religious character of the revolution may have been a factor, but one should not under-estimate the lingering weight of past discords, as analyzed in chapter 6.

Given the Shah's reluctance to open up the political process to political parties, only unity of purpose combined with rapid and efficient organization could have enabled the Nationalists to become a political force to be reckoned with. Instead sterile and interminable discussions about the forms of political organization and an unwillingness to carry on the type of activities one usually associates with political parties (membership drives, the creation of affiliated groups for the young, women, intellectuals etc., organization in the provinces, the issuing of position papers etc.) frustrated the efforts. In the meantime, taking advantage of the relative relaxation of state power, the fundamentalist

³⁵ He declared that the new body would "fight the dictatorship within the framework of the law" and called for a return to constitutional monarchy and the nationalization of the major private industries, although he emphasized that the Union's ideology was neither capitalist nor communist but "strictly nationalist." Quoted in Keesing's, April 21, 1978, p. 28940.

opposition was busy organizing.

Whatever their disagreements about the forms of political action, all Nationalist leaders did concur on the issue of human rights. Having failed to create a unified structure for the political opposition, they decided to found an association for the defense of human rights. Such an association, it was thought, would be less likely to be repressed by the government, and would also be regarded as less threatening by the U.S. government. Members of the politically active clergy (Hashemi Rafsanjani, Beheshti, etc.) with whom all sectors of the Nationalist opposition were in contact, also approved of the plan.

8.3 THE IRANIAN COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The idea of an association dedicated to the defense of human rights appeared in the autumn of 1977. In due course this association became the reformist opposition's most important grouping, far more visible and active than the political parties or professional associations. After Bazargan became its chairman he would always act publicly in that capacity rather than as leader of the LMI. It therefore deserves to be treated at some length.

8.3.1 Formation of the ICDFHR

In the fall of 1977 at the initiative of Ay. S. Abolfazl Zanjani (brother of the founder of the NRM, Ay. S. Reza Zanjani) and Fathollah Bani-sadr major Nationalist figures were approached about the project. Through the usual channels, i.e. personal contacts, friendship circles etc., a first meeting of thirty prominent politicians was convened in

the house of Dr. Sanjabi sometime in October. Twenty-nine of them became the "founding council" (hei'at-e mo'ases) of the "Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights" (ICDFHR).³⁶

They included eleven religiously oriented figures: M. Bazargan, Dr. Minachi, Ay. S. Abolfazl Zanjani, Ahmad Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, Dr. Tabandeh (the son of Darvish-e Gonabadi), Dr. Yadollah Sahabi, Eng. Hashem Sabbaghian, Khalilollah Reza'i, Dr. Mohammad Maleki, Dr. Kazem Sami, and Dr. Peiman. The last two are leaders of religiously oriented splinter parties, but the other nine were members or sympathizers of the LMI. The secular members included: Rahmatollah Moqaddam Maragheh'i, Dr. Abedi, and Banafti, founders of the Radical Movement; Dr. Sanjabi, Dr. Asadollah Mobasheri, Eng. Hasibi, Dr. Manuchehr Hezarkhani, Admiral Dr. Madani, all leading figures of the National Front; Dr. Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi and two of his political allies, Shams Al-e Ahmad (brother of the late Jalal Al-e Ahmad)³⁷ and Eslam Kazemiyeh; as well as Ebrahim Yunesi, Partow Alavi, Farajollah Naseri, Dr. Abdolkarim Lahiji, and Hasan Nazih, the last two prominent civil rights lawyers who had defended political prisoners.

The composition of this founding council is instructive. Some of the individuals on it were largely unknown to the public, whereas others whom one might have expected to find, like Shapur Bakhtiar or Dariush Foruhar were missing. Most of the secular members were in fact politi-

³⁶ The following information on the ICDFHR was obtained in July 1982 in Paris from interviews with Dr. Lahiji, Dr. Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, and Dr. Matin-Daftari.

³⁷ See chapter 6, section 4, subsection 3.

cally close to Bazargan and the LMI. The composition of the ICDFHR's founding council thus mirrored that of the National Front's Central Council of 1960: just as then the "independent personalities" and the Iran Party had dominated that body, offering only token representation to the religiously oriented people around Bazargan, this time LMI figures and sympathizers offered only token membership to a few leading figures such as Sanjabi and Hasibi. The most surprising absence is that of Ay. Reza Zanjani, who remained closer to the secular National Front than to the LMI.

The first conflict between the two tendencies arose over the wording of the association's Charta. The religious wing wanted explicit references to Islam, e.g. referring to human rights as "Islamic human rights." An effort, perhaps, to make the group's activities palatable to the clerical forces, of whose ascendancy over the popular movement for change they were all too aware. They also seem to have successfully resisted some secular members' wish to include a woman in the Council so that the ICDFHR could become a member of the International Human Rights Federation. This demand was made with particular insistence by Dr. Martin-Daftari, who resigned in protest before the Committee really got off the ground. On the question of the Islamic coloration of the Charca a compromise was reached. Human rights were to be treated in accordance with "Islamic principles" (mavazin-e eslami). This represents a major concession of the secular sector to the preponderance of religion in the movement.

The members of the founding council then proceeded to elect a seven man Executive Council. Elected were Eng. Bazargan, Dr. Minachi, Ahmad Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, Nazih, Dr. Sanjabi, Dr. Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, and Dr. Lahiji. Religious and secular members thus got equal representation, since Nazih, as a secular founder of the LMI, occupied an intermediary position. Both Bazargan and Dr. Sanjabi were candidates for the chairmanship of the Executive Council. In the vote that followed Bazargan received six votes out of seven, Sanjabi the remaining one vote. The secular members of the Council had voted for Bazargan, in deference to his greater part in the resistance against the Shah. However, a secular member, Dr. Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, became vice-chairman, and another secular figure, Lahiji was named spokesman. On December 7, 1977, the formation of the ICDFHR was made public.

8.3.2 Activities of the ICDFHR

The Committee started publicizing the violations of human rights in Iran and receiving guests from abroad. Among the Americans who came and held meetings with the association were Prof. Richard Falk of Princeton University, Prof. Richard Cottam, of the University of Pittsburgh, and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark. Interviews were given to the foreign press.

At the end of the year a letter, drafted by Nazih, was addressed to the UN Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim.³⁸ The letter was delivered to New York City by an LMI member, Fereidun Sahabi, younger son of Dr. Yadollah Sahabi. In this letter the Committee said that for 24 years

³⁸ Le Monde, Jan. 4, 1978, p. 4.

"the ruling oligarchy" had systematically violated Article 21 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (granting everyone "the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives") and had prevented all effective participation of the people in parliamentary elections, that torture had not yet been abolished, and that political trials were still being held in camera by military courts.³⁹ It is worth noting the essentially reformist import of the letter, which in its demands does not go beyond the Nationalist opposition's usual call for the respect of the Constitution.

The contact with Dr. Waldheim created a certain degree of immunity for the members of the Committee. On January 12, 1978, the ICDFHR held its first public press conference in Teheran, with Bazargan, Sanjabi, and Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi in attendance. Sanjabi emphasized that the Committee was not a political organization and had no links with other countries but merely intended to draw the attention of world public opinion to the human rights problem in Iran. This press conference judiciously coincided with a visit by Dr. Waldheim to Teheran. Here, on January 14, 1978 (after he had paid a visit to the Shah), he confirmed that he had received an appeal from the Committee signed by 29 persons.⁴⁰

Despite this relative immunity, the members of the Committee came under increasing pressure from security organizations of the State, and on April 8, 1978, bombs exploded at the homes of Moqaddam Maragheh'i, San-

³⁹ Quoted in Keesing's, April 21, 1978, p. 28940

⁴⁰ Keesing's, April 21, 1978, p. 28940.

jabi, and Bazargan. The three later received notes saying "This is the first sign of the Underground Organization for Vengeance". The same day Dr. Peiman was attacked in the street and beaten up.⁴¹

In May the Committee held extensive meetings with William J. Butler, the visiting American human rights lawyer (vide supra). Shortly before that Sanjabi stopped attending ICDFHR meetings,⁴² and his place on the Executive Committee was taken by Moqaddam Maragheh'i.

The offices of the ICDFHR had been set up in a house next to the Hoseiniyeh Ershad, under the cover of a legal practice for Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi and Mobasher, both lawyers. In the winter and spring the activities of the Committee had still been quite discrete, but in the summer of 1978 it began to manifest itself more openly, and the "legal practice" became its official headquarters. Its financial needs were met by an initial commitment of the founding members to pay rls. 100,000 (roughly \$ 1,400) each. (Some never did!)

Towards the end of the summer, mass mobilization of the populace by the clergy overtook the new dynamism exhibited by civil society exemplified by the ICDFHR. In August the idea came up to stage a big demonstration on International Human Rights Day, Dec. 10. It so happened that in 1978 International Human Rights Day coincided with Tasu'a, the ninth day of Muharram. A joint demonstration was proposed to the cler-

⁴¹ The Times (London), April 10, 1978, p. 7.

⁴² It appears that he resented the fact that Bazargan and his allies were dominating the ICDFHR. Sanjabi himself hinted at such a motive in an interview published in Ettela'at, March 18, 1980 (Esfand 27, 1358), p. 8.

gy, who had made plans of their own but nevertheless accepted. As we will see, this demonstration was a resounding success. However, it would be naive to think that millions of people paraded in Teheran for the respect of human rights. By this time the intellectual, reformist, middle class opposition of which the ICDFHR was the main organization was merely following events.

For the sake of thematic unity we will take a liberty with the chronology of events and mention briefly what became of the Committee after the fall of the Shah.

8.3.3 The ICDFHR in Post-Revolutionary Iran

After the formation of the Provisional Government the Committee's Council met and decided that all those members of the Executive Council who had accepted governmental posts had to resign from it. Their place was taken by Abedi, Reza'i, Banafti, and Tabandeh. Ali-Asghar Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi was chosen as chairman, and Abdolkarim Lahiji became his deputy.

The Committee was now securely in secular hands. Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi and Lahiji, who enjoy an excellent personal rapport, became its moving spirits. Its main task was now to look after the interests of the freed political prisoners of the Shah regime. Money was collected from the Organization of the Red Sun and Lion (then Iran's equivalent of the Red Cross), headed by Kazem Sami, the leader of JAMA and founding member of the ICDFHR; philanthropists; Bazaar merchants; and the National Iranian Oil Company, which was then headed by Hasan Nazih, also a founding member. Under the direct supervision of Nushazar Lahiji, Abdolkarim's

wife, about 800 former political prisoners were cared for, which meant finding them jobs, places to live, and medical care (many had been tortured).

The LMI members were now too occupied with affairs of state to take an active part in the Committee's activities, but relations never broke down. The Provisional Government did not hamper the activities of the ICDFHR, but even after the demise of that government the LMI members, now free from governmental responsibility, did not resume their participation in the Committee, earning the as yet silent reproach that they had tasted power and relished their part in it too much to be bothered with associations like the ICDFHR.

After the fall of the Bazargan government, the rising tide of totalitarianism, eloquently chronicled by Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi in his articles, made it increasingly difficult for the Committee to function. In November 1980 (Aban 1359) the offices of the Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights were occupied and all documents, archives, furniture etc. either destroyed or taken away. Dr. Ali-Asghar Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi had to leave Iran in the fall of 1981; he was followed in the spring of 1982 by Dr. Abdolkarim Lahiji.

8.4 ABORTED TRANSITION AND REVOLUTION

After the initial steps taken by members of the modern segment of society, the revolutionary movement really "took off" somewhere between November 1977 and January 1978. No longer were only lawyers, writers, and other intellectuals involved in the opposition to despotism; in early

1978 the masses entered the scene and gradually the dissident movement became a revolutionary movement. We cannot chronicle here the important stages of the rise of the mass movement; it has been done elsewhere and touches our subject only tangentially.⁴³ After a brief summary of these events which will provide a background, we will turn to Nationalist efforts to bring about a peaceful transition to a new order.

8.4.1 The Religious Mass-Movement of 1978

It is important to note that religiously oriented Nationalists, people associated with the Hoseiniyeh Ershad Institute, the LMI and JAMA, participated in the religious effervescence that began in 1977. They had never lost contact with the "intellectual" members of the clergy, men like Dr. Mohammad Beheshti, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khameneh'i, and the fundamentalist circle around them. In addition, Bazargan also kept in touch with the more traditional clerical leadership in Qum, as represented by Ay. Shariatmadari.

During Ramadan in August 1977 intellectual clerics and lay modernists began organizing meetings at the Qoba Mosque in Qolhak to counter those that the secular, intellectual opposition was organizing at Teheran University. At the first meeting speakers included Eng. Tavassoli, Y. Sahabi, and Bazargan from the LMI, Sami and Peiman from JAMA, and two clerics known for their progressive views, Ho. Javad Hojjati Kermani and Sheikh Ali Tehrani. On this occasion Bazargan gave the first of two lectures on "The Bane of Monotheism," Afat-e towhid. This talk earned

⁴³ See E. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 504-524 and M.M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 184-216.

him a lot of criticism and the defection of at least one prominent LMI figure, Ahmad Alibaba'i. The critics felt that Bazargan was trying to put breaks on the revolutionary movement, which would exacerbate the rift between left and right.⁴⁴ Having spent most of his adult life exhorting the clergy and Muslims in general to step up their social engagement, Bazargan now gave a very theocentric interpretation of the situation. At similar meetings he would again and again warn against too rapid mass-mobilization, arguing that the people's level of understanding had to be raised first. In the highly charged atmosphere of those months Bazargan's pleas for moderation were received with impatience, but his record and prestige as an opponent of the Shah and religious activist enabled him to remain within the movement.

After the timid liberalization of early 1977 the first opportunity for a religio-political mass meeting was provided by the death of Ho. Mostafa Khomeini, the ayatollah's eldest son.⁴⁵ His majles-e tarhim was organized jointly by the clergy and the Nationalists at the Arg Mosque in the Teheran Bazaar on October 30, 1977 (Aban 8, 1356) and attracted a big crowd. The main preacher irked the modernists by claiming in his sermon that the public's enthusiastic response was only the result of its affection for the clergy; the lay religious figures by contrast saw in that response a sign of opposition to the Shah.

⁴⁴ For the argument, see chapter 3.

⁴⁵ Ho. Khomeini had been an opponent of the Shah and as always the opposition claimed that SAVAK was responsible for his death. Khomeini himself, however, has never made such an accusation.

Genuine mass-mobilization by the clergy really began in early 1978, after Teheran's main newspaper, Ettela'at, on January 7 (Dey 17, 1356) published an article that was highly critical of the clergy. The author called them "black reactionaries" and accused them of secretly working with international communists to undo the achievements of the White Revolution. The article also seized on the fact that Khomeini's father had emigrated to Kashmir to claim that Khomeini was a foreigner who in his youth had worked as a British spy and written erotic Sufi poetry.

The diatribe touched off angry demonstrations in Qum, in which a number of demonstrators were shot by security forces. In accordance with religious customs the deaths were commemorated forty days later, which led to new demonstrations and new casualties. A chain reaction thus resulted from these minor kairoi with riots and deaths occurring at regular forty day intervals. The demonstrations were encouraged by Khomeini, who from his exile in Najaf taped incendiary messages, which were sent to Iran and reproduced widely. Outraged by the regime's frontal attack on the religious institutions in Qum, and so as not to be left behind, Ay. Shariatmadari now also entered the picture and began demanding strict adherence to the Constitution.

In response to the demonstrations the government of Jamshid Amuzegar tried to cow the secular opposition into submission by bombing their leaders' houses. The Amuzegar government also made concessions to the Bazaar and slowed down the economy to lower inflation. The government publicly apologized to Ay. Shariatmadari for an earlier attack on his home in Qum, and the Shah made a much publicized pilgrimage to Imam Reza's shrine in Mashad.

Amuzegar's strategy seemed to work for a while: for most of the summer Teheran was calm. But the government's deflationary economic policies caused widespread unemployment and after July strikes of industrial workers broke out all over Iran. In the heated atmosphere they soon acquired political and religious significance.

Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting, began on August 5 that year. Violent demonstrations took place all over the country, and in Isfahan demonstrators took over the city for two days. On August 19 (Mordad 28), 25 years after the coup that brought the Shah to power, the Rex Cinema in Abadan burnt down, killing 400 trapped men, women, and children. Government and opposition each blamed the other for the fire, but the public was more ready to believe the opposition. On August 27 the Shah replaced Jamshid Amuzegar, the technocrat, with Sharif-Emami, the president of the Senate and former prime minister, who, as a son of a cleric, had the reputation of enjoying good relations with the clergy. Sharif-Emami received carte blanche to deal with the crisis. The end of Ramadan was marked with peaceful demonstrations in Teheran. Sharif-Emami had granted the necessary permission in exchange for a promise by opposition leaders to keep the demonstration calm and to refrain from any direct attack on the Shah. In Teheran about 100,000 people took part in the march. But during the next three days demonstrations continued and grew, in spite of government bans and opposition leaders' calls for restraint. On September 7, half a million people demonstrated in Teheran, the biggest crowd so far. The crowd began chanting radical slogans such as "death to the Pahlavis," "Husein is our guide, Khomeini is our leader," and for the first time, "we want an Islamic republic." In response

the government issued warrants for the arrest of the major opposition leaders, but Bazargan avoided arrest by seeking refuge in the house of Ay. Shariatmadari in Qum. The inevitable confrontations took place the next day, which became known as "Black Friday." On Zhaleh Square security forces shot at a crowd staging a sit-in. In the working-class districts of southern Teheran the inhabitants set up barricades, and the government used helicopter gunships to dislodge them, leaving, a "carnage of destruction," as the Le Monde correspondent called it.⁴⁶ Black Friday spelled the end of liberalization in Iran. No opposition politician could afford to enter into any sort of coalition with the government, even if an invitation had been issued. The capital was now under the authority of General Oveisi, who had been called the 'Butcher of Teheran' for his leading role in the suppression of the June 1963 riots.⁴⁷ President Carter's call to the Shah after these events enraged Iranians, who felt betrayed by Carter.⁴⁸ Strikes now appeared all over the coun-

⁴⁶ Jean Gueyras' account of the events of September 8 appeared in the September 11 issue of Le Monde, and an English translation came out in The Guardian Weekly, September 17, 1978. An English translation can also be found Ali-Reza Nobari, Iran Erupts (Stanford: The Iran-America Documentation Group, 1978), pp. 202-207. The book also contains eye-witness accounts and other articles about the events of Black Friday.

⁴⁷ He was assassinated in the streets of Paris in February 1984.

⁴⁸ As the French Catholic newspaper Le Témoignage Chrétien put it:

Jimmy Carter introduced himself to the world as the defender of human rights. He who willingly accepted to preach in his church on Sundays, wanted to inject a little idealism into a politics often found to be too realistic. And there he is encouraging the Iranian sovereign in his politics of repression. His phone call is, in fact, a blessing for the blood bath into which the Shah has plunged Teheran.

Thus is shattered the image of the man who wanted to be Lincoln's successor, a liberal and humanist President of Amer-

try, effectively paralyzing the economy. Bazaar merchants set up soup kitchens to feed striking workers and their families. In October the opposition adopted a new tactic, namely asking the population to climb on roof tops and chant Allah akbar ("God is greatest"), every night. Anti-regime activism now became a quotidian affair for most of the population.

Faced with the mounting pressure, Sharif-Emami persuaded the Iraqi government to expel Khomeini. It was hoped that his absence from a city where he enjoyed easy contact with Iranian pilgrims and clerics might weaken his influence inside Iran. Instead Khomeini went to Paris and became the cynosure of world attention, with easy access to international mass media. In Iran demonstrations continued and after a particularly violent one on November 4 (Aban 13), Sharif-Emami was replaced with General Azhari.

On November 17 (Aban 26) the entire written press began a strike that lasted until January 8, 1979 (Dey 18). During this strike the LMI's publication Akhbar-e jonbesh-e eslami (News of the Islamic Movement) gave regular accounts of the revolution's progress.

On December 2 the holy month of Muharram began. The ICDFHR had proposed that the opposition's joint demonstration on the ninth day of Muharram, Tasu'a, start from the Ministry of Justice, but the ulema insisted on it leaving from the home of Ay. Taleqani at Darvazeh Shemiran instead, to which the recently freed Taleqani consented. The Committee

ica -- the land of liberty.

Translated in Ali-Reza Nobari, Iran Erupts, p. 207.

gave in and Teheran's inhabitants were invited to demonstrate in a joint declaration signed by the following: Ho. Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Ay. Musavi Ardabili for the clergy, A. Eraqi and Habibollah Asgar Owladi for the Bazaar, E. Sahabi for the LMI, and A. Lahiji for the ICDFHR. Chronos and kairos coincided, and as a result millions of Iranian citizens of both sectors of society marched together in Teheran on December 10, 1978 in one of the biggest mass demonstrations in world history.⁴⁹ Henceforth it was only a question of time when the Shah would leave. Two months later Iran was an Islamic republic.

This has been a quick account of the outwardly manifestations of the revolution. The mass demonstrations and government repression thereof were beyond the control of politicians and constituted a serious constraint on their action. Let us now turn to the part played by the LMI in the events and its attempts to bring about a more orderly transition.

8.4.2 The LMI and the Transition to a New Order

Until the late summer of 1978 the Shah regime seemed to have the situation under control. Few people, even within the opposition in Iran, believed that the end of his rule might be near. (The circumstances of his terminal illness were not known.) The Shah made no attempts to diffuse the situation by bringing into the government people from outside the regime: The Sharif-Emami and Azhari governments were essentially attempts to reequilibrate the regime from within. As late as July 1978 the Shah rejected any negotiation with the Nationalists on the grounds

⁴⁹ The Muharram demonstrations of 1978 are briefly discussed in Michael M.J. Fischer, Iran, pp. 204-205.

that they were "even more traitorous than the Tudeh Party."⁵⁰ More and more deputies and senators, all of whom had been 'elected' under the banner of the Rastakhiz Party, abandoned ship and began denouncing the government, SAVAK, and corruption in high places. The government, hoping to funnel some the popular discontent into within-regime channels, had the State- owned radio and television network broadcast all parliamentary debates live, and the population was thus treated to unending streams of anti-government diatribes by this parthenogenetic opposition.

With the advent of the Sharif-Emami and the Azhari governments, and their inability to bring things under control, some individuals on the margins of the regime and in the opposition began thinking about the modalities of a transition. Sharif-Emami had made some concessions to religious sensibilities (he abolished the Shah's Imperial Calendar and closed down gambling casinos), and at least some moderate elements in the opposition were willing to give him a chance. But the declaration of martial law in early September put an end to these hopes.

8.4.2.1 "Bastion by Bastion"

In August 1978 Bazargan directly contacted Khomeini in Najaf by asking a pious Bazaar merchant who planned a pilgrimage to the holy city to take a message to the ayatollah. It seemed to Bazargan that some of Khomeini's declarations were out of touch with the concrete situation in Iran, and he wanted to give Khomeini his own analysis of the situation.⁵¹ The

⁵⁰ Quoted in the Iran Times, July 21, 1978.

⁵¹ Unless otherwise indicated, all information concerning Bazargan's contacts and discussions with Khomeini is taken from a collection of three speeches by Bazargan published together as Showra-ye engalab va

message is a good summary of Bazargan's personal preferences in matters of political tactics and contained seven points:

1. The Iranian constitution, without later amendments and changes, was the only document that could be effectively used to incriminate the Shah; moreover, under present circumstances its application was the best guarantee for the respect of Islamic laws.
2. All attacks should be directed against despotism rather than colonialism [i.e. U.S. hegemony in Iran]. It was not wise to fight on two fronts, and therefore not advisable to provoke America and Europe, which would result in their hostility to the revolution and thus benefit the Shah.
3. All National and Islamic movements that had succeeded in recent Iranian history had started with their acceptance of the regime's offer of free elections. An election campaign would be an appropriate way to spread the opposition's message in the population.
4. The opposition should make use of all concessions made by the government, even if they be insincere, and all personalities who had left the regime should be welcomed to its ranks so as to encourage others to do likewise.
5. The ultimate aim was of course the overthrow of the regime. But this could best be achieved in stages: First the Shah had to leave, then his successors had to be constrained within the limits of existing laws, then one would have to work on people's

dowlat-e movaqqat va sima-ye dowlat-e movaqqat az veladat ta rahlat va name-ye sargoshade-ye mohandes Bazargan be emam (The Council of the Revolution and the Provisional Government The Make-up of the Provisional Government from its Birth to its Death; and Engineer Bazargan's Open Letter to the Imam) (Teheran: LMI, 1983).

minds and mentalities, and only then could the change be made to an Islamic republic.

6. Good and regular contact and counselling with the clergy was essential. For that purpose Khomeini should name a delegation in Teheran whose members could act as regular and trusted intermediaries between him and the opposition.
7. Islamic government had to be the only and ultimate aim of every Muslim. It was appropriate to mention it in the interview with Le Monde.⁵² However, the content of Islamic government was not clear yet, and not enough acceptable work had been done on its ideological, economic, political, and bureaucratic aspects. Also, the monopolistic leadership of the clergy, which had not given good results in the past and lacked experience and technical qualifications, and the concomittant marginalization of non-religious but well-intentioned and competent Nationalist groups was against the interests of the revolution.

On August 28 (Shahrivar 6) the LMI issued a public declaration consistent with Bazargan's message. Entitled "The Way out of the Current Impasse," it identified the Shah as the root of all evil in Iran. It also declared that destruction and insecurity were growing geometrical-

⁵² An allusion to that newspaper's interview with Khomeini, the first he had ever granted a Western newspaper, which was published on May 6, 1978. An English translation was published by The Guardian Weekly in its May 21 issue. That version, somewhat augmented, can be found in Ali-Reza Nobari, Iran Erupts, pp. 9-17. Khomeini had said that his aim was the establishment of an Islamic State that he rejected both the Shah and the monarchy, and that the 1906 constitution was only acceptable if it were amended. Bazargan's apparent approval must be seen as a courteous apophasis in light of his further observations.

ly, and although the government blamed the people for it, it alone was responsible for creating a chaotic situation from which in the end only communism would profit. If the Shah abdicated, ways could be found out of the current impasse. His successors would have learnt a lesson and respect the constitution, and the people would achieve their aims by advancing "bastion by bastion" (sangar beh sangar). ⁵³

In another public declaration, entitled "Where Are We?" and issued on October 9 (Mehr 17), the LMI again pruned an orderly advance of the revolutionary forces, bastion by bastion, and warned against haste and disorderliness. It noted that Sharif-Emami had made some concessions and concluded:

If we commit no mistakes and no treason, don't fall victim to sentimentalism and chaos, and if we are honest, stable, intelligent, and prove that we are capable of governing ourselves and the country, despotism will evacuate its remaining positions and our independence and rights will be respected. The opportunities that have arisen should be used wisely, so that on the one hand we come closer to our main aim, and on the other hand foreign interests, which are an undeniable reality and presence, will not be forced to support and maintain the despotic order. If we advance with the tactic of "bastion by bastion," and if we are intelligent, organized, patient, and constructive, with God's help we can be hopeful about the future.

⁵³ The LMI has collected and reprinted all of its public declarations, and the excerpts here presented are taken directly from these photocopies of the originals.

We can note four points in these two declarations:

1. The Shah is unequivocally asked to abdicate.
2. The monarchy is implicitly accepted, and no mention is made of an Islamic republic.
3. Ay. Khomeini is not mentioned once.
4. U.S. sensibilities are taken account of.

The "bastion by bastion" approach reflected Bazargan's often stated conviction that for something to succeed it had to be done methodically.

It was later misquoted by radicals as "step by step" line and Bazargan was attacked, even within his party, for being too cautious and not having enough confidence in mass action. Bazargan wanted the Islamic movement to take power gradually, to consolidate its gains after each victory. He wanted the opposition to accept the Shah's offer of free elections, as an election campaign would be the best cause for mass mobilization. Khomeini disagreed with this view, as he did not deem the Shah capable of holding free elections. In Bazargan's view, either they would be truly free, in which case the people would vote for the opposition, or they would be rigged, and the Shah's democratization would be unmasked as fraudulent before the whole world. A realist, Bazargan counted on 10-20 opposition figures to enter a Parliament elected under the Shah.⁵⁴ He seems to have had in mind as a precedent Mosaddeq's relative victory in the election to the 16th Majles. Bazargan knew Sharid-Emami from their common days in the Engineers Association, and would have liked to give the Prime Minister time to implement a few reforms.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Bazargan's interview with Hamid Algar, which appeared in the organ of the ISA's in North America, Nasr, February 1, 1981 (Bahman 12, 1359), p. 6.

Bazargan was thus in substantive agreement with Ay. Shariatmadari in Qum, the highest ranking ayatollah within Iran, and a moderate by comparison to Khomeini.⁵⁶ Ay. Shariatmadari, as well as the other two senior maraje' in Qum, Ay. Mar'ashi Najafi and Ay. Golpayegani, had a certain respect for Sharif-Emami and would have liked to give him a chance.⁵⁷ Shariatmadari's "broker" in the Islamic movement was Dr. Minachi, treasurer of the ICDFHR and former director of the Hoseiniyeh Ershad. He and Bazargan cooperated closely, but as one U.S. Embassy dispatch summed up their difference, "whereas Bazargan in the end always gives in to Khomeini, Minachi and the Shariatmadari people try to circumvent him."⁵⁸ Khomeini aborted these efforts at a rapprochement with Sharif-Emami by sending incendiary messages that called the Prime Minister's measures "ruses."

The events of Black Friday must have convinced government and opposition in Iran that no solution to the crisis was possible that did not take into account Ay. Khomeini. Ali Amini, who thought of himself as the Shah's last card, issued a statement to the effect that, if named Prime Minister, he would go and negotiate a truce with Khomeini, whom he had already met once in the early 1960's. The Shah did not name Amini Premier, but Amini still continued his efforts to bring government and Khomeini together. He even went to Paris, but Khomeini would not see

⁵⁵ M. Bazargan, Enqelab-e eslami, p. 31.

⁵⁶ See chapter 7, section 5 for the nature of intra-clerical relations in the 1970's.

⁵⁷ Iran Times, January 28, 1983.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

him. Bazargan was in continuous contact with Amini and it appears that he would have been willing to join an Amini government, provided Khomeini gave his blessing. Ardeshir Zahedi, the Shah's ambassador to Washington, also paid two visits to Paris in the hope of meeting Khomeini, but was also rebuffed. In October it was the turn of the leaders of the National Movement to enter into direct contact with Khomeini. Both Bazargan and Sanjabi went to pay their homage.

8.4.2.2 Neauphle-le-Château

Ebrahim Yazdi, the main political leader of the LMI(a) and Khomeini's representative in the United States, left Houston for Najaf in 1977. It was he who persuaded Khomeini to move to Paris after his expulsion from Iraq rather than to another Muslim country, such as Syria. LMI members hoped that in France, far away from the clerical milieu of Najaf, he would be more amenable to be influenced by them in a moderate direction.

In France Khomeini and his entourage moved to the town of Neauphle-le-Château outside Paris, hitherto known only as the production site of Grand Marnier, where a longtime JAMA activist, Dr. Asgari, put his French wife's house at his disposal.

Khomeini's headquarters in France was managed by three men: Abolhasan Banisadr, who took charge of relations with the press, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, who took care of everyday matters and Khomeini's schedule, and Yazdi, who acted as Khomeini's spokesman on political matters. Banisadr and Qotbzadeh had often cooperated within the NF(III), and the latter and Yazdi were leaders of the LMI(a). Although not a member of the LMI,

Banisadr was a religious modernist who had written widely on Islamic economics. It seemed, therefore, as if Khomeini was solidly harnessed by Nationalists of modernist-religious ideology, and on the surface, Bazargan and the LMI were in a privileged position as far as contacts with Khomeini were concerned. But differences of opinion and personal rivalries separated Khomeini's three advisors, and all of them, albeit to different degrees, from Bazargan.

As Bazargan has put it, the purpose of his trip to Paris was four-fold: to consult with Khomeini, to inform him about the current situation in Iran, to impress him with the need of naming a delegation in Iran which could act on his behalf, and to re-establish contact with the LMI(a). He met Khomeini together with Yazdi on October 30, their first meeting since 1962. Throughout Khomeini was sullen. Bazargan tried to convince him that it was necessary to put some order and method into the revolutionary movement, but Khomeini would have nothing of it. Bazargan got the impression that he had no doubt about his imminent return to Iran, and that his only use for Bazargan was for after that return.

Bazargan's agenda for his talks with Khomeini was the same as his earlier message. When he suggested that the free elections the Shah had finally come to offer would be a good opportunity to penetrate the structures of power and then change the regime legally by means of a constitutional assembly, Khomeini disagreed, arguing that such a course of action would slacken the people's effervescence. Khomeini also refused to take any account of the United States. As he saw it, the Americans would not place any direct obstacles into the path of the revolu-

tion since its cause was right. At this point Bazargan was so baffled by Khomeini's apparent naiveté that he changed the subject.

Khomeini was also not enthusiastic about naming a delegation in Iran. Now we know that by that time a group of clerics loyal to him and consisting of Ay. Musavi Ardabili, Ho. Dr. Beheshti, Ho. Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ho. Bahonar, Ay. Motahhari, and Ay. Mahdavi Kani was already functioning inside Iran, but Bazargan probably did not know this. However, Khomeini did ask Bazargan to prepare him a list of trustworthy and competent Muslims, not only from the LMI, who could form a council to advise him after his return on whom he should endorse as candidates in parliamentary elections and whom he should name to the cabinet.

Two days later Bazargan gave him the following list: Ay. Motahhari, Ay. Abolfazl Zanjani, Dr. Beheshti, Ho. Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Ho. Mahdavi Kani from the clergy (Ays. Montazeri and Taleqani were not included because they were still in prison); Dr. Sahabi, Dr. Sami, Eng. Katira'i, Dr. Minachi, Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, Dr. Yazdi and Bazargan from among religious Nationalists; Ali Nasab and H. Kazem Haji Tarkhani from the Bazaar; and Generals Ali-Asghar Mas'udi (who may be remembered as one of the LMI's defense lawyers in 1964) and Valiollah Qarani from among the officers.⁵⁹ This list already included most of the members of the council secretly functioning in Teheran, and with few changes became the

⁵⁹ This list shows that Bazargan himself excluded all secular politicians from playing any significant role after the revolution. Most striking is the absence on Bazargan's list of Ay. Reza Zanjani. Perhaps Bazargan did not suggest his name and that of his secular allies because he knew that Khomeini would not accept them. In the end not even the more amenable Ay. Abolfazl Zanjani was included in the Council of the Revolution.

Council of the Revolution, whose existence was known but whose composition was at the time shrouded in mystery.

Thus substantive disagreements remained between Bazargan and Khomeini, and Bazargan was not happy with the result of the talks. In Paris the rivalries between the LMI and the NF and within the LMI also came to the fore. Sanjabi proposed that Khomeini, Bazargan, and he himself sign a tripartite declaration, but Bazargan and Yazdi saw no need for that. In the end Sanjabi published a declaration with his and Khomeini's name (Khomeini had cleared the text, but was reportedly angry at Sanjabi for having juxtaposed their two names on one document)⁶⁰ which said that the monarchy did not fulfil the requirements of the law and the shari'a because it was tyrannical, corrupt, incapable of resisting foreign pressure, and systematically violated the Constitution, and called for a referendum to establish a national government based on the principles of Islam, democracy, and national sovereignty. Many in the LMI saw in this declaration an attempt to curry favor with Khomeini, and Sanjabi himself did not seem to attach too much importance to it, for in an interview with Le Monde he said that Iran's future government would be Islamic because a representative government in a country whose population was 90 per cent Muslim would necessarily be Islamic.⁶¹

Bazargan was also unable to heal the rift between Banisadr on the one hand, and Yazdi and Qotbzadeh on the other. What is more, strong differences of opinion appeared between him and Banisadr. The latter felt

⁶⁰ Private communication.

⁶¹ Le Monde, November 1, 1978, p. 3.

that the severance of all links of dependency between Iran and the U.S. should be the first priority of the revolution, whereas Bazargan wanted to concentrate on the struggle against dictatorship. At the time Banisadr found far more common ground with Sanjabi.⁶² Disagreements even surfaced within the LMI. While Bazargan was still in Paris, Qotbzadeh made a statement to the effect that the LMI was finished, that he was forming a new grouping to succeed it, and that he had the support of Eng. Ezzatollah Sahabi and Ay. Taleqani. Both of these were somewhat more radical than Bazargan, as their collaboration with the Mojahedin had shown, but there is no clear evidence that they had given Qotbzadeh a mandate to make the declaration, especially since both had only recently been released from prison. Yazdi himself was also far more beholden to Khomeini than Bazargan was. He suggested that Bazargan issue a statement acknowledging the paramount leadership of Khomeini over the Iranian revolution, which Bazargan refused on the grounds that he would have to consult with his friends in Teheran first.

On November 3 (Aban 12) Bazargan left for Teheran. One day later violence erupted against on the campus of Teheran University, and over fifty students were killed by the police. The next day, perhaps under the influence of these killings but certainly as a result of Bazargan's failure to change Khomeini's mind, the LMI issued an official declaration which differed considerably from previous ones.

⁶² Abolhasan Banisadr, personal interview, Auvers-sur-Oise, July 1982.

Entitled "Is It Not Time the Ruling Establishment Became Realistic?", the statement said that the events of the last year and a half had clearly shown that: 1) The majority of the Iranian people rejected the Shah and his regime and wanted Islamic government, and that 2) the clear majority of the Iranian people had chosen Ay. Khomeini as their leader. And, the statement continued, Ay. Khomeini had constantly repeated that the Shah had to go, that the Pahlavi dynasty had to go, and that the monarchy had to go. The people would not accept anything less than the demands of the clergy. Therefore, the declaration concluded, the Shah should abdicate, if not out of respect for his people then at least out of concern for his personal safety. Foreign governments, especially those who valued stability in Iran, should realize that the Shah's continued presence in Iran was incompatible with stability and order and therefore start dealing with persons who enjoyed the confidence of the Iranian people and its religio-political leadership. It warned the officers of the army not to partake in the repression of the revolutionary movement. The declaration ended with a quote from the Qoran.

It is quite obvious that as a result of his talks with Khomeini Bazargan completely changed his line, and against his better judgment began sounding more intransigent. As noted earlier, his own preferences were far more congruent with those of Ay. Shariatmadari, but realizing Khomeini's charismatic hold on Iranian public emotion, he preferred to remain inside the revolutionary movement and acknowledge Khomeini's leadership. LMI representatives told the American embassy that as a result of fifteen years of dictatorship the party had lost its independent popular base, and could only hope to be effective if it operated soundly

within the revolutionary movement.⁶³ The tone of the quoted declaration reflects all of this, since Khomeini's leadership and the intransigence of the population are related as empirical facts, not as independently derived policies of the LMI. It was only on December 17 (Azar 26), after the resounding success of the Muharram marches, that all political parties and the ICDFHR issued a joint statement demanding the end of the monarchy in Iran.

The events of early November inaugurated a new, and final phase in the breakdown of the Shah regime.⁶⁴ Khomeini was as intransigent as ever. The moderate opposition had swung over to his line. The Shah had tried to make a last stand by naming a military government, which in fact included far more civilians than officers. In spite of that, or as a result of it, since at this stage relations of causality cease to be clear-cut, violence and economic dislocation were growing, and the situation was approaching that of a civil war. The new situation was reflected in the contents of U.S. ambassador Sullivan's reports to Washington. Perhaps as a result of the events of early November, ambassador Sullivan became convinced that the time had come for America to start seriously thinking about dealing with a post-Shah government. The contacts the U.S. embassy maintained with the LMI have been used by its opponents after the revolution to question the party's loyalty to the revolution. Let us therefore go back to the origins of these contacts.

⁶³ See document dated August 21, 1978, reproduced in The Iran Times, April 1, 1983.

⁶⁴ One cannot discount the possibility that the extreme violence of these demonstrations (many buildings were burned) was provoked by the hard-liners in order to bring about a harsh repression by the authorities and render any accommodation impossible.

8.4.2.3 Negotiating the Transition

It is normal for foreign embassies to maintain contacts with opposition groups.⁶⁵ Until the mid-1960's the U.S. embassy had maintained relations with the National Front and oppositional figures not affiliated with it. After the consolidation of the Shah regime these contacts fizzled out. Describing the situation during his tenure as ambassador, Richard Helms (whose previous position was that of director of the CIA) implies that there were no contacts with the opposition because ... there was none:

Coming back to the specific case of Iran, it might be useful to discuss the Tehran Embassy's approach to coverage of the opposition in the years 1973 through 1976. Let us begin by acknowledging that American policy in Iran was to maintain close relations with the Shah and the government of Iran and to support a country it had regarded under eight presidents as an ally and an important political and military factor in the area of the Persian Gulf...

What was the opposition in Iran during the period in question? When the two political parties (Iran Novin and Mardom) were disbanded and a one-party system was set up (Rastakhiz), it was even more difficult to find any grouping which was in opposition to the government. Former members of the National Front, who had not been coopted by the regime, continued to voice quietly views opposed to the Shah's policies, but the most optimistic revolutionary would hardly have regarded these individuals as a threat to stability.⁶⁶

During William Sullivan's briefings in Washington before he left for Iran, one of his predecessors told him that in Iran he had to "push only one button: the Shah." After his arrival in Iran, in the autumn of

⁶⁵ On American diplomatic contacts with oppositions see Martin F. Herz, ed., Contacts With the Opposition: A Symposium (Washington: Georgetown University - Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, 1980).

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 21-22. This text is quite revealing. Notice the surreptitious identification of "Shah" and "country," and of "opposition" and "threat to stability." Because of the first the second became a fact.

1977, various Iranian individuals claiming to represent the opposition began approaching the American embassy in Teheran. Embassy officials found it difficult to ascertain who was actually representing a significant force and who was not, and who could establish a channel to the militant ulema. Outside Iran, Sadeq Qotbzadeh approached George Griffin, who was the Iran specialist at the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, but did not achieve much.⁶⁷ In June 1978 the Secretary of State gave Sullivan the green light to establish communication with low-level members of the opposition,⁶⁸ and consequently embassy officials opened talks with opposition elements. It must be stressed that with the exception of leftists all groups were approached: the National Front, the LMI, the Radical Movement, the circle around Ay. Shariatmadari (represented in the talks by Dr. Minachi), and the militant Khomeinist clergy, represented by Beheshti.

The secular National Front representatives at these talks were "at each other's throats," to quote ambassador Sullivan,⁶⁹ and soon the LMI came to be seen as the most promising avenue. The LMI delegated to these talks Eng. Mohammad Tavassoli (Yazdi's brother-in-law, who called himself Tavakkoli to cover his traces) and Abbas Amir-Entezam, who seems to have been chosen because it was thought his soigné urbanity would impress the American diplomats favorably. Bazargan himself met a number of times with John Stempel, a political secretary at the U.S. embassy who is fluent in Persian. The two were neighbors, which meant that they

⁶⁷ William Sullivan, personal communication.

⁶⁸ Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 325.

⁶⁹ Personal communication.

could meet discreetly without attracting too much attention. In September, after Black Friday, Sullivan held a first meeting with Bazargan. It had been arranged by an American business consultant who had connections in the Bazaar.⁷⁰ The American embassy's talks with oppositional figures greatly annoyed the Shah, who came to the conclusion that the great powers had decided to oust him.⁷¹

In all these talks LMI figures gave their reactions and opinions to whatever developments had taken place since the last meeting, and unfailingly told their interlocutors that the Shah had to go. This insistence was interpreted as dogmatic and ideological.⁷² The aim of the U.S. embassy was to persuade the moderate opposition to join a Shah-sponsored coalition government. As late as October 28 Sullivan sent a telegram to Washington urging firm support for the Shah.⁷³ After the events of early November, however, Sullivan changed his mind. Encouraged by Bazargan and Beheshti, who impressed him with their anti-Soviet sentiments, he began working out a scenario that might assure an orderly transfer of power to a new government in a way that would minimize chaos and safeguard basic, but redefined, American security interests. It is perhaps appropriate to trace the stages of this, to use a French term, prise de

⁷⁰ William H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co, 1981), p. 161.

⁷¹ M.R. Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 165.

⁷² As opposed to "pragmatic" or "political," one assumes. The use of this terminology aptly illustrates American officials' tendency to call other people's principles "ideological," and in this instance reflects their inability to come to terms with the fact that the Shah was not facing problems, but that he was the problem.

⁷³ Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 439.

conscience, since it also offers a candid appraisal of the situation:

In Tehran, our political section was actively in touch with the Liberation Front group under the direction of Bazargan and kept well informed of their attitudes toward the revolution. In due course we also established direct contact with Ayatollah Beheshti.... We found both of these men to be interesting personalities, generally well-disposed toward the United States despite our government's ties with the shah and his regime, which they were pledged to overthrow. They seemed to recognize that the prime threat to the future of Iran came from the Soviet Union and that the United States, despite its close association with the shah, had long been a force for social, economic, and political improvement for the people of Iran. We were never quite certain, however, whether the attitudes they represented to us were reflected in their followers, particularly in those young radical groups that had led so much of the opposition activities in the streets of major Iranian cities.

Faced with all these conflicting tendencies, I tried to make an objective assessment of the situation and determine the proper course of action that the United States government should pursue in order to protect our national interests in Iran. Shortly after General Azhari had taken office as prime minister, I reached the conclusion that this military government, in effect, represented the shah's last chance for survival. If it failed to restore law and order and if it did not succeed in resuming the industrial production in the country, the success of the revolution, I felt, was inevitable and we should face the consequences of that fact. On November 9, 1978, I wrote a cable setting forth some of these fundamental considerations and making recommendations for our future policy.

In that cable, which I entitled "Thinking the Unthinkable," I restated some fundamental cliches about Iran and examined how they were changing. For example, I pointed out the conventional wisdom that stability in Iran rested on two pillars -- the monarchy and the Shi'a religion. I noted that, for the preceding fifteen years, the religious pillar had been largely subordinate to the monarchic. The changes in the vitality of the religious side were manifest, but it was necessary to examine what was happening on the monarchic side.

There, it was clear that the shah's public support had shrunk dramatically. His only real strength came from the military. This change had been so widely noted that it had become commonplace among most observers to refer to the monarchic pillar as the shah -- supported by the military.

However, I went on, even that relationship had changed with the installation of a military government. It had been con-

verted into a situation that reflected the strength of the military -- "which currently supports the Shah." I felt that these altered circumstances required us to examine the relationship, both actual and potential, between the military and the religious.

In this examination, I argued that the relationship would be determined by the success that the Azhari government would have in breaking the religious grip over the economy that was manifested by the strikes and civil-desobedience campaigns they were directing. I felt that, even if the military succeeded, the results would be a continuation of tension and an increase in terrorism.

If, on the other hand, the military failed to dominate the religious, then we should, I thought, examine the consequences for United States interests that might result from an accommodation between the two institutions. My conclusion was that such an accommodation might be "essentially satisfactory" for us, particularly if it worked out peacefully along the lines I then laid out for Washington's consideration.

In these lines, I posited a situation in which not only the shah but most of the senior Iranian military officers would leave the country. Understandings about the nature of a successor regime would be reached between the religious leadership and the new, younger military leadership. In such understandings, Ayatollah Khomeini would have to choose a government headed by moderate figures like Bazargan and Mina-chi, and eschew the "Nasser-Qadhafi" types, which I assumed he would prefer. Arrangements would have to be made for an orderly series of elections to produce a constituent assembly, a new constitution, and eventually a parliament.

My assumption was that the religious leadership, including Khomeini, might accept such an arrangement because it would give them their essential objective, the elimination of the shah, avoid a bloodbath, and endow them with armed forces willing to maintain law and order on behalf of the new regime.

From our point of view, it would be satisfactory because it would avoid chaos, ensure the continued integrity of the country, preclude a radical leadership, and effectively block Soviet domination of the Persian Gulf. In these circumstances, the major losses, as I saw them would be a reduction in the intimacy of our military and security relations, a shift on Iran's part from a pro-Israeli to an anti-Zionist position, and a certain aloofness in our overall dealings.

While this situation would certainly be less appealing than the arrangements we had enjoyed under the shah, it would obviously be better than one in which an inchoate revolution would succeed and the integrity of the armed forces be destroyed. I

therefore suggested we begin to "think the "unthinkable" and prepare for this contingency.⁷⁴

Azhari's government did not manage to bring the situation under control, and the general even suffered a stroke. In December the Shah finally resolved to ask a member of the Nationalist opposition to form government -- a month after they had declared the monarchy illegitimate and had put themselves under Khomeini's umbrella. He held talks with Sanjabi and Sadiqi (who had kept somewhat aloof from the National Front), but both men refused to accept the post of Prime Minister. In the end Shapur Bakhtiar, leader of the Iran Party, accepted, and was sworn in on January 6, 1979 (Dey 16, 1357). This put the Nationalist opposition in an awkward position. One of them had defected to the Shah in the last minute; they had to distance themselves from him unequivocally. Bakhtiar's unclear role in the events of January 1962 was recalled,⁷⁵ and his acceptance of the Premiership was presented as proof that he had been a traitor all along. Both the National Front and the Iran Party expelled him, the latter replaced him with Dr. Abolfazl Qasemi, chief librarian of Teheran University.

Oddly enough, the LMI -- mainly Bazargan -- were less critical. Let us recall that among the secular leaders of the National Front, Bakhtiar's relations with Bazargan had been closest. Despite Bakhtiar's aggressive anti-religiosity Bazargan would sometimes say of him that he was a Muslim without knowing it.⁷⁶ When Bakhtiar decided to accept the

⁷⁴ William H. Sullivan, Mission, pp. 200-203.

⁷⁵ See chapter 6, section 3.

⁷⁶ Shapur Bakhtiar, personal interview, Suresnes, August 12, 1983.

Premiership, he even transferred the management of the company of which he was the director to Bazargan's Yad Company. Throughout his short tenure as Prime Minister Bakhtiar was in constant contact with Bazargan.

Ambassador Sullivan was skeptical about Bakhtiar's chances of success. He was right, for Bakhtiar had no popular support. He had hoped that if he could be the person who engineered the Shah's departure from Iran, the tide would turn in his favor. Islamic propaganda had become too effective, however, and in the climate of mass-mobilization of January and February 1979 he was quickly assimilated by the populace to the Shah regime: the new slogan was "neither Shah nor Shapur." Bakhtiar, however, decided to make a last stand and oppose Khomeini's return to Iran, by force, if necessary. In Washington, Brzezinski had taken over the Iranian policy of the administration, and, against the advice of Vance and Sullivan, came to the conclusion that Bakhtiar had to be supported. Since Sullivan was not trusted anymore, General Huyser, deputy supreme commander of allied forces in Europe, was dispatched to Teheran with the mission to persuade the Iranian army not to attempt a coup and instead support Bakhtiar.

Meanwhile Bazargan, with the approval of the Council of the Revolution and the active participation of Musavi Ardabili, had begun talks with the military leadership in order to obtain their neutrality. The two also met with Sullivan to get his approval, and on that occasion the latter was struck by Bazargan's extremely deferential attitude towards Ay. Musavi. The LMI had sympathizers in the armed forces and through

them knew exactly how things stood in the army.⁷⁷ They promised those major figures who had not fled yet that they could leave Iran and take their wealth with them. A key role was played here by General Qarahbaghi, who would have like to resign and make room for a revolutionary government, but was persuaded by Bakhtiar to stay on. The result was that the army disintegrated. More and more units defected, and some arms depots were taken by the revolutionary masses. Because of Bakhtiar's last stand, the integrity of the army could not be maintained, and what is worse, the masses were armed.

But this is not all, for political negotiations also went on between Bazargan and the Council of the Revolution, on the one hand, and Bakhtiar, on the other. It appears that a deal had been tentatively struck between Bazargan, Beheshti, Bakhtiar, and Paris, that Bakhtiar would go to Paris, see Khomeini, present his resignation, and be re-instituted by him as the head of an interim administration. A similar arrangement had been worked out for the mayor of Teheran, as a result of which municipal services had kept going. It was not possible to ascertain whether Khomeini actually agreed to the plan or if the green light from Paris was given by his entourage. The fact remains that some members of the clerical faction in Teheran did everything to oppose such an arrangement. Sadeq Khalkhali and Ay. Musavi Ardabili spoke to Khomeini over the phone until the early hours of the morning, and the next day Khomeini, circumventing his three advisors, had a Pakistani cleric read a statement declaring that he had no spokesmen, and that he would refuse to see Bakhtiar after all. Thus the efforts of Iranian (Bazargan, Beheshti) and

⁷⁷ William Sullivan, personal communication.

American (Sullivan, Vance) moderates to bring about a last minute orderly transition was brought to naught by the combined efforts of intransigents on both sides -- Brzezinski in Washington, Khomeini in Paris, and Musavi Ardabili and Khalkhali in Teheran. But one must also note that this in itself does not mean that the transition would have worked if the Carter administration had not decided to back Bakhtiar. Khomeini would still have been Khomeini, but at least the Provisional Government would have had an easier task and an intact army.

In the last days of the Shah regime Bazargan carried out another important mission for Khomeini. Winter was approaching, and the oil workers in the South, led by Tudeh organizers, had gone on strike. On December 29 (Dey 8) Khomeini named Bazargan head of a delegation (it included Hashemi Rafsanjani) that headed South to ensure that enough oil would be pumped to heat Iranian homes. Yadollah Sahabi headed a similar group whose task was to organize domestic distribution of fuel. Cooperating with officials of the Shah regime, Bazargan succeeded, but only after meeting stiff resistance from Tudeh activists. This fact increased his suspicions and may have confirmed him in his efforts to reach a negotiated settlement of the crisis.⁷⁸

Khomeini arrived in Teheran on February 1 (Bahman 12) after a fifteen year exile. The millions of people who greeted him were a last reminder that Bakhtiar had no chance whatsoever to remain as Prime Minister. Yet, displaying considerable braggadocio, he clung to his position as "constitutional Prime Minister." On February 4 (Bahman 15) Khomeini

⁷⁸ M. Bazargan, Engelab-e eslami, pp. 66-68.

named Bazargan Prime Minister of the Provisional Government. Fighting broke out on February 9, on February 11 the army declared its neutrality, and soon after Bakhtiar disappeared.⁷⁹ The circumstances of Bazargan's nomination as Prime Minister will be related in our next chapter, here we only want to dwell on the final scene of the last act of the Goetterdaemmerung of Iran's monarchy, a scene not devoid of certain element of tragedy.

For a few days Iran had had two Prime Ministers. Let us pause for a while and consider the situation. Mehdi Bazargan and Shapur Bakhtiar, who over twenty years earlier had driven through the streets of Teheran in the back of a taxi distributing leaflets calling for free elections, now faced each other as rival Prime Ministers. One had been named by an outgoing dictator, the other one by an incoming one. At the dawn of Iran's Islamic era, the cause of liberal democracy had sunk very low indeed.⁸⁰

Like the Shah's previous attempt in the early 1960's, the liberalization of 1977-78 was a failure. In 1963 the Shah reconsolidated his regime, in 1979 he was driven out of the country and lived to witness the end of one of the world's oldest monarchies. The different outcomes of the two

⁷⁹ For a detailed account of the military's role in the last days of the Shah regime see Sepehr Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 11-19.

⁸⁰ It is to the credit of both that in the difficult years since the revolution, when so many personal relationships have suffered, both have refrained from attacking the other in public. When Bakhtiar went underground and could not be found, people said sarcastically that he had probably transited via the main border post at the Irano-Turkish border, a little hamlet called ... Bazargan.

attempted liberalizations illustrate the internal dynamics of regime changes and crises of participation in sultanistic regimes, as analyzed in chapter 2.

In periods of crisis personalities make a lot of difference. In 1960-63 the Shah had enjoyed personal power for a number of years and was in his prime; by 1977 he was terminally ill and no longer able to act decisively and coherently. In the early 1960's the Shah did not have a strong adversary who could unite the opposition behind him, in 1977-79 the charismatic figure of Ay. Khomeini united all the opposition behind him. Secular oppositional forces in Iran had no comparable leader, which partly explains their rapid slide into irrelevance after the revolution.

One level below the leaders, one must compare the differences within the contending forces in 1960-63 as opposed to 1977-79. The Shah regime of the early 1960's was less arbitrary, less sultanistic than fifteen years later. During the first liberalization there had been both a semi-opposition and a pseudo-opposition to fill the space (albeit ineffectively) between the Shah and the Nationalist opposition, and the leader of the semi-opposition, Amini, had afforded the Shah the possibility to ride out the storm by (at least temporarily) satisfying the demands of at least some opposition groups. By 1977 both pseudo-opposition and semi-opposition had disappeared from the scene, and when they raised their heads they were too discredited by their longtime association with the regime to be able to make their presence felt. The sultanism of the Shah's late period is shown by the treatment he reserved

for his longtime Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Hoveida: In return for twelve years of loyal service he had him arrested in November 1978 to "quiet the mob," as he put it. He even instructed the Minister of Justice to draft extraordinary legislation to bring Hoveida to trial as soon as possible.⁸¹

Within the opposition attitudes had changed too. As we said in chapter 2, each failure of the Nationalists brought more radical forces to the fore. The radicals of 1953-63, the NRM/LMI, were the moderates in 1977-79. The self-same people who, in 1957 and 1960, had accused the leader of the National Front, Allahyar Saleh, of maintaining too much contact with the American embassy in Teheran were now the privileged interlocutors of the U.S. ambassador, whom they tried to reassure about American interests. In 1960-63 the National Front had directed all attacks against the Prime Minister while the more radical NRM/LMI identified the Shah as the main source of corruption and despotism. The LMI still maintained this view in 1977-79, but by now this was a moderate attitude, as the radicals (Khomeini, the Mojahedin, and the left) were not content with getting rid of the Shah and demanded a new type of regime. Duverger's notion of sinistrisme applies even more in some non-democratic settings than in the democracies he studied.

At the lowest level of analysis, i.e. the masses who made the revolution, the changes are also notable between the early 1960's and late 1970's. One major difference, of course, is simply size: in 1961 or 1963 the opposition to the Shah could get at most a few tens of thou-

⁸¹ This episode is recounted in Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Fall of the Shah, tr. Roger Liddell, (New York: Wyndham Books, 1980), pp. 172-175.

sands demonstrators out into the streets, but by 1978 millions were marching in Teheran. The difference is remarkable, even if we control for the capital's population growth over the intervening years. Was dissatisfaction so much greater in 1978, after fifteen years of economic growth, than in 1963? Or were appeals to people's religious sensibilities more efficient than the call for free elections and the demand that the Shah reign but not rule? The question has no simple answer. What is clear is that the crowds of 1978 were much better organized and manipulated than those of the early 1960's. During the first liberalization the leaders of the Nationalist opposition tried to avoid street confrontations with the Shah's forces, by 1978 the clergy led by Khomeini was actively organizing them. Finally, the two episodes are distinguished by the different ways the crowds responded to the Muharram kairoi. The Muharram processions that degenerated into the June 1963 riots followed by and large the traditional pattern, while fifteen years later religion, even at the mass level, had become so ideologized, so secularized, that Tasu'a and Ashura were no longer breaks in profane time during which believers reenacted the myth of Husein, but rather emotionally potent occasions to get people out into the streets and have them chant anti-regime slogans self-consciously modelled on the Kerbala paradigm.

The advent of the Carter administration was perceived both by the Shah and the opposition as creating a new flare-up in Iran's long unresolved crisis of sovereignty. This crisis of sovereignty triggered major crises of legitimacy and participation. But unlike the similar complex of crises in 1960-1963, the ones in 1977-78 were accompanied by a

profound crisis of identity. This crisis of identity had been brought about by the deepening of the gap between the two segments of Iranian society as analyzed in chapter 1, and the challenge to Western socio-political models as analyzed in chapters 3 and 7. The conjunction of these four crises (to which one might add a minor crisis of distribution) produced an overload which the Iranian polity could not handle. As a result the liberalization of 1977-78 ended in a revolution that dramatically changed the constellation of forces in Iran. However, the fit between the new situation and the people who were called upon to preside over it was far from perfect, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Chapter 9

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The period from February to November 1979 is of central importance to the LMI. Eighteen years after its founding, its leader, Mehdi Bazargan became Prime Minister of Iran, and formed a government in which men with LMI connections clearly dominated. Provisional governments have not fared well in history, and this one would be no exception.

In the evening of February 3, 1979 (Bahman 14, 1357) Khomeini asked the Council of the Revolution¹ to give him their choice for the post of Prime Minister.² It chose Mehdi Bazargan. The nominee asked to be given one day, so that the statutes of the Council of the Revolution could be written. At ten o'clock on the following morning the CR met in the presence of Khomeini. Here Bazargan stated his conditions for accepting the charge. Since his declaration reflects his understanding of the tasks that lay ahead of him, it is worth quoting:

¹ At this time this body consisted of the following members: Ay. Taleqani, Ay. Motahhari, Bazargan, Dr. Sahabi, Ho. Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ebrahim Yazdi, Ay. Mahdavi Kani, Ay. Musavi Ardabili, Ho. Beheshti, Eng. Katira'i, Ho. Bahonar, Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, and Ho. Khomeini.

² The account of the formation of the PG is taken from a series of articles that appeared in Mizan, 16, 17, and 18 Bahman, 1359 (February 5, 6, and 7, 1981, and a speech delivered by Bazargan on February 11, 1982 (the third anniversary of the revolution) and reprinted as Show-ra-ye enqelab va dowlat-e movaqqat (The Council of the Revolution and the Provisional Government) (Teheran: LMI, 1983).

First, I'd like to express my gratitude and embarrassment for the confidence and honor that the Grand Ayatollah and the members of the CR are bestowing on me.

Second, now that Eng. Katira'i has brought us the final version of the statutes of the CR, I'd like to remind everyone that according to that document the Council of the Revolution replaces Parliament within the context of the existing constitution (minus those aspects that concern the Shah and that were transferred to the Imam). The leader of the revolution chooses the members of the Council and appoints the Prime Minister proposed by the Council. He also defines the main lines of government policy so that the government can carry them out under the supervision of the CR.

Third, all you gentlemen know me well and are well aware of my beliefs, my way of thinking, and my record. You know about my services as professor and chairman of the Technical Faculty, as provisional chairman of the board of the NIOC, and in the Water Organization of Teheran. You know my tastes and my temperament. You know that I am a Muslim and that I believe in order, sound management, liberality, consultation, cooperation, and the gradual implementation of plans. I do not intend to change this way of thinking.

Having said this, I wish to ask the worthy leader and the gentlemen to appoint me to this task if their opinion has not changed since yesterday, and to go and look for somebody else if my conditions and record are not acceptable.

There was a silence and then some whispering, but only S. Ali Khameneh'i seemed to object to Bazargan's conditions.³ After some deliberation the council unanimously approved Bazargan. Upon Khomeini's request Ay. Mohtahari wrote the decree of appointment:

To his excellency, Eng. Mehdi Bazargan:

At the proposal of the Council of the Revolution and considering the religious and political right that has been conferred upon the [revolutionary] movement's leadership by the widespread demonstrations all over the country, and given my confidence in your faith in the holy doctrine of Islam and my knowledge of your record in the religious and national struggles, I appoint you to form the provisional government independently of your connections to a political party or to any

³ As we saw in chapter 7, section 5, Khameneh'i had translated into Persian Sayyid Qutb's famous treatise on Islamic government, which is quite totalitarian in content. In 1981 he became president of Iran.

other group, so that you can arrange for the administration of the country, organize a referendum concerning the establishment of an Islamic Republic, call a constitutional assembly composed of the people's elected representatives to ratify the constitution of the new political system, and organize parliamentary elections based on the new constitution. It is incumbent upon you to choose and name the provisional government's members as soon as possible according to the conditions that I have laid down. Government employees, the Army, and the people will fully cooperate with your provisional government and respect the necessary discipline for the attainment of the holy goals of the revolution and the reestablishment of order in the country. I pray to the Almighty for the success of you and the provisional government in this sensitive stage of history.

Ruhollah Al-Musavi Al-Khomeini

At the time many people believed the CR to have a pluralistic composition reflecting all forces in the anti-Shah coalition, and Bazargan, who knew better, did nothing to dispell this myth. There is an old Persian saying that "lying is a sin, but saying the truth is not obligatory." The mullas and their lay allies on the CR believed themselves to be the "true" representatives of the nation, hence their claim to replace parliament until the elections. The course of events during the first, "moderate" phase of the revolution have been chronicled elsewhere,⁴ we will therefore dispense with a summary of events and analyze the period thematically.

⁴ See Sepehr Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 21-40; and Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 52-87. For a day-to-day account, an indispensable source is Keesing's, July 27, 1979, pp. 29743-29746, and March 21, 1980, pp. 30141-30150.

9.1 COMPOSITION

In choosing his cabinet, Bazargan had a very narrow pool of ministrables to work with. They had to be practicing Muslims, they had to have a record of opposition against the Shah, be of good repute, and have technical competency in their area of responsibility. The cabinet that Bazargan put together in the second half of February consisted essentially of members or sympathizers of the LMI, a few National Front figures, and some Independents. The most prominent NF leader in the PG was Karim Sanjabi, who received the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His brother-in-law, Dr. Ali Ardalan, became Minister of the Economy. The leader of the PIN, Dariush Foruhar, took over the Ministry of Labor. Among prominent secular figures, Ali-Asghar Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi's membership in the PG, proposed by Bazargan, was vetoed by Khomeini, on account of some past anticlerical statements he had made.

Religious modernists dominated the cabinet: among leading LMI figures, Yadollah Sahabi became a Minister for Revolutionary Projects and Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi Minister of the Interior.⁵ Of the LMI's second generation, Abbas Amir-Entezam was made Deputy Prime Minister and Ebrahim Yazdi Deputy Prime Minister for Revolutionary Affairs. The circle around Ay. Shariatmadari was represented by Naser Minachi, the erstwhile director of the Hoseiniyeh Ershad, who took over the Ministry for Information and Tourism, whose name was changed to Ministry of National Guidance. JAMA's Kazem Sami became Minister of Health. Two prominent lay but Islamic revolutionary figures were not included in the cabinet:

⁵ Of the remaining leaders of the LMI, Hasan Nazih took charge of the National Iranian Oil Company, and Abbas Sami'i became Governor of the Central Province, Iran's most important.

Abolhasan Banisadr, whose membership had been rejected by Bazargan (despite Khomeini's urging) because on the basis of past experience Bazargan did not believe Banisadr was capable of working in a team, and Sadeq Qotbzadeh, who was named director of National Iranian Radio and Television. Qotbzadeh lost no time cancelling all "vulgar" NIRT programs and became widely hated in the modern segment of society.

To fill high governmental posts, candidates had to have at the minimum no record of involvement with the Shah regime and preferably a history of resistance against it, they had to have some technical qualification, and they had to be Muslims, or at least friendly towards Islam. These conditions excluded large sectors of the Iranian technocratic elite, who, if they were not hostile to the revolution, were apprehensive about its Islamic dimension. Many intellectuals and leaders of the burgeoning professional associations who had started the oppositional movement in 1977 found themselves marginalized by the new government, as did the various leftist groups who had played a role in the final triumph of the revolution. On the opposite end of the revolutionary spectrum one other very important group found itself excluded: the militant ulema who had organized the big demonstrations, and some of whom had a long history of resistance against the Shah. Partly because of Bazargan's anticlericalism, and partly because nobody (including, at that point, themselves) believed them capable of handling administrative tasks, ambitious men like Hashemi Rafsanjani, Bahonar, and Sadeq Khal-khali (the leader of the revived Devotees of Islam) remained in the background, where they could engage in intrigue, organize themselves, and criticize the PG's efforts without having to shoulder any direct responsibilities.

As a result of these constraints, some groups became disproportionately prominent in the PG and its administration, like the Islamic Association of Engineers. Important posts were often filled by people whose major qualification was their kinship with some prominent PG member.⁶ This, of course, reminded many people of the Shah regime.

The composition of the PG changed frequently during the nine months of its existence. The usual pattern was for ministers to resign after failing to gain full authority over their ministry's area of responsibility as a result of interference from fundamentalist forces. Gradually the coloration of the cabinet changed and it became more religiously oriented. First the secular NF members left and were replaced by LMI figures. On April 16 Sanjabi resigned and was replaced by Yazdi. The Ministry of Defense changed hands three times,⁷ until it wound up in the hands of Mostafa Chamran. The important Ministry of Justice also changed hands when its NF titular resigned on June 20 and was replaced by Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi. Of all NF ministers, only Ali Ardalan kept his Ministry of the Economy until the end. The religious coloration of the cabinet became even more apparent when the PG and the CR decided to interweave. Bazargan proposed this so as to create more solidarity and improve the coordination between the two bodies. Four CR members joined

⁶ Of the sons of Yadollah Sahabi other than Ezzatollah, who was a politician in his own right, Iraj took over the country's most important dairy company, Fereidun became head of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Mansur was appointed director of the Abyek cement works.

⁷ First it was given to the new Chief of Staff, General Qarani, author of the 1958 coup attempt (vide chapter 6), who was assassinated shortly thereafter. Two NF figures followed, General Taqi Riahi, and Admiral Ahmad Madani, who left it to become governor of Iran's oil-rich Khuzistan province.

the PG as deputy ministers with full cabinet rank,⁸ while Bazargan and three of his colleagues (re)joined the CR. The interference of the fundamentalists in government was not stopped, instead the new clerical government officials gained confidence that they were able to run the country, which lessened the indispensability of Bazargan and his lay colleagues.

The effectivity of the PG was lowered by its lack of homogeneity. It included Western educated technocrats who wanted to take over from their pre-revolutionary predecessors, and populists who wanted to do away with the "elitist" trappings of the Shah's governments.⁹ Khomeini on March 7 had chided the government for "showing weakness" and "enjoying luxuries" in various "palaces" from which it was governing, and after that everybody made an effort to faire peuple, as the French say: On visits to Qum cabinet members would stay with friends rather than go to a hotel, and made sure that they be photographed squatting on the carpet drinking tea. The PG fired the servants of the Prime Minister's office and replaced them with a gigantic samovar from which cabinet members had to get their tea themselves. The result: the air became unbreathable in cabinet meetings and half a dozen men were added to the unemployed.

⁸ Hashemi Rafsanjani in the Ministry of the Interior, Khameneh'i in the Ministry of Defense, Bahonar in the Ministry of Education, and Ho. Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani, who was in charge of the revolutionary committees, "komitehs," also in the Ministry of the Interior. Beheshti and Musavi Ardabili were asked to join the Ministry of Justice so as to put the activities of the revolutionary courts within the governmental framework, but they refused.

⁹ Hasan Nazih, who was NIOC director until September, told me how some of his colleagues in the PG faulted him for using all the facilities of the NIOC director's office. Personal interview, July 1983.

In spite of all their difficulties, when the PG resigned in November 1979, most of its members stayed on as caretaker ministers until the new Majles was elected.

Khomeini's admonition that the members of the PG disregard their party affiliation was interpreted as meaning that they should resign from all party positions. Among all PG ministers only those belonging to the LMI took this seriously, and as a result the LMI had almost no independent presence on the political scene. What was left of the LMI apparatus was in the hands of Ezzatollah Sahabi, who joined the cabinet only in September.

9.2 THE TASKS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Bazargan's administration faced a dilemma typical for many provisional governments: on the one hand it was meant as a transitional solution, with no authority to undertake major projects and to take major decisions, and on the other hand it was expected by the revolutionary forces to right all the wrongs of the Shah dictatorship and to deliver instant improvements.

Bazargan and his team enjoyed great popularity at the outset, although this popularity was at least partly derivative. There were big demonstrations in early February, during which Bazargan's name was publicly acclaimed.¹⁰ Bazargan never made a secret of his gradualism, and went so far as telling an enthusiastic meeting at Teheran University on February 8:

¹⁰ See Ettela'at, Bahman 17-19, 1357 (February 6-8, 1979).

Don't expect me to act in the manner of [Khomeini] who...moves like a bulldozer, crushing rocks, roots, and stones in his path. I am a delicate passenger car and must ride on a smooth, asphalted road.¹¹

In the beginning the CR seemed to agree with the PG that the latter's foremost task was to get the country going again.

9.2.1 Getting the Country Going

This proved to be more difficult than anticipated. During the revolution strike committees and neighborhood committees had been formed, and in the last days before Bakhtiar's flight 300,000 arms had been taken by the people. As a result there were a plethora of armed bands and security committees. (The police and gendarmerie were completely disorganized) At first the CR seemed to agree with Bazargan that these outgrowths of the revolution should be disbanded as early as possible, or absorbed into new state organizations, but they had developed a life of their own. Attempts to bring them under control resulted in their consolidation, and in the end the radical clergy on the CR, sensing the mood of the population, and fearing that leftists might be the beneficiaries of the aroused masses' unfulfilled aspirations, threw its weight behind the komitehs, after purging them of undesirable elements.

The second source of irritation for the PG were the revolutionary tribunals that started to convict and shoot real or imagined high officials of the Shah regime (including Amir-Abbas Hoveida, on April 7) and "corrupt" individuals. There is no doubt that many of these executions were very popular in the population, and many political groupings, in-

¹¹ Quoted in Sh. Bakhash, Reign, p. 54.

cluding the left and the fundamentalists, welcomed them enthusiastically. The PG tried to bring the activities of the revolutionary tribunals under the control of the Ministry of Justice, but failed.¹²

Finally, there were the revolutionary guards that were officially established on May 5. Although Chamran and Yazdi at first tried to wield some influence with them, they were soon pushed aside by fundamentalist clerics.¹³

Bazargan and his government never tired complaining about the interference of these parallel organs of de facto authority, whose activities gave new currency to the word ochlocracy. When pressed about human rights abuses in Iran, Bazargan and his ministers would, rightly, deny any direct responsibility, rather like Amini had done during his brief tenure in 1961-62. But these admissions of impotence contributed even more to the image of weakness that the PG projected. Khomeini, to whom the PG appealed for help, did at first seem willing to grant his hand-picked administration the necessary authority. He retired to Qum in late February and closed his office, referring all matters to the government. But soon he changed his mind, and contented himself with urging everybody to cooperate without taking sides.

While the PG's authority was contested by the fundamentalists in political matters, Bazargan and his ministers also came under attack from the radical left. Militants from the Fada'iyan and various groupuscules

¹² A detailed account of the tribunals' activities can be found in Amnesty International, Law and Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran (London: A.I., 1980).

¹³ For details see Sh. Bakhash, Reign, pp. 55-64.

infiltrated both public and private sector enterprises and urged workers to make demands that the PG could not fulfil. The last pre-revolutionary governments had made great concessions to workers in the hope of calming them down, but that had only increased their demands. Unemployment was high, and the PG's policies, aimed at getting production going with the old cadres if necessary, created considerable discontent among the radicals.¹⁴

All sectors of society wanted immediate improvements and more control over their affairs, as in each enterprise or institution councils formed and claimed authority to run things. When a group was not satisfied with its lot, members would stage demonstrations or sit-ins in ministries.

In a post-revolutionary situation, after months of mass-mobilization, it would have been very difficult for any government to bring things under control, since all groups wanted their demands to be satisfied immediately, according to their wishes. There was little patience in the country for Bazargan's gradualist and methodical approach.¹⁵

Khomeini and the fundamentalists organized in the Islamic Republican Party realized the mounting discontent, and jumped on the band wagon. On July 20 1980 (Tir 29, 1359) Khomeini asked the Iranian people for forgiveness for having named a weak government that could not act deci-

¹⁴ For the consequences of this policy, see Joseph Vernoux, L'Iran des mollah - la révolution introuvable (Paris: Anthropos, 1981), pp. 71-84.

¹⁵ For telling details, see Vahe Petrossian, "Dilemmas of the Iranian revolution," in The World Today 36 (1980), pp. 19-25.

sively, that had not been young enough.¹⁶

9.2.2 The PG's Relations with Other Groups

By and large, the members of Bazargan's cabinets were middle class moderates. A few, like Yazdi and Chamran, tried to act like "revolutionaries," and one, Kazem Sami, had been the co-founder of the first Iranian political group to advocate armed struggle.¹⁷ But old conflicts between the NF and the LMI were not forgotten, as the events leading to Sanjabi's resignation demonstrated. While Bazargan and his colleagues in the PG constantly complained about interference from fundamentalists and parallel centers of authority, certain LMI elements who were more closely allied to the fundamentalists did the same to NF members of the cabinet. The first Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic and leader of the NF, Karim Sanjabi, became the target of such activities. Both in the period 1960-63 and in 1977-78 Sanjabi had come in conflict with the LMI, as we saw in earlier chapters. Now a new conflict arose over U.S.-Iranian relations. Bazargan and his friends had been ambassador Sullivan's favorite interlocutors in the months prior to the Shah's departure, and after the Provisional Government was established these contacts were maintained. The Iranian embassy in Washington was taken over by an "Islamic Committee" under Shahriar Rowhani, a graduate student in Physics at Yale University and son-in-law of Ebrahim Yazdi who had been active in the LMI(a) for quite some time.¹⁸ Sanjabi's personal choice

¹⁶ Relevant parts of this speech are reproduced in M. Bazargan, Showra, p. 71.

¹⁷ See chapter 7, section 4.

¹⁸ See Yale Daily News, April 9, 1980, pp. 1 and 5, for an interesting,

for the job, Ha'eri, a reputable Islamic scholar and son of the reviver of the Qum religious establishment,¹⁹ was refused entry to the premises. Yazdi's hostility to the National Front dated from 1966, as was mentioned in chapter 7. Sanjabi could not accept that he, as Foreign Minister, had no control over Iran's relations with the United States and resigned; replacing him with Yazdi was adding insult to injury. Sanjabi may or may not have been an effective Foreign Minister, but as former Dean of the Faculty of Law at Teheran University and Iranian representative at the International Court of Justice during the Oil Crisis of 1952 it is understandable that he could not accept to take any lessons in the conduct of foreign policy from a graduate student in Physics and an oncologist from Texas, whatever their actual expertise in foreign affairs.²⁰

Secular moderate groups like the NF were disappointed that they had to play second fiddle to Bazargan and the LMI in the PG, but they hoped to salvage their own contacts with Khomeini and therefore did not voice their criticism of the fundamentalists' ascendancy too openly. Faced with the parallel centers of authority, they followed Bazargan's line. In the eyes of many LMI leaders, the National Front as an organization did not represent much and consisted of a handful of old men living on the memory of their past association with Mosaddeq. Based on this evaluation and the weight of past disagreements and rivalries, the LMI at-

if somewhat idealized, account of a student's oppositional activity in exile.

¹⁹ See chapter 5, section 1.

²⁰ Sanjabi first revealed the background to his resignation in Ettela'-at, March 18, 1980 (Esfand 27, 1358), p. 8.

tached no great significance to cooperating with the NF.

Matters were different with secular groups that were not represented in the government, like professional associations, or the National Democratic Front that Mosaddeq's grandson, Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, had founded in March 1979 in order to fill the space between the NF and the various Marxist groups. These groups came increasingly under attack by chaquesh elements that would soon start calling themselves hezbollahi, "members of the party of God." Khomeini's prestige as leader of the revolution was still so strong that the secular groups could not identify him as the source of the mounting repression. They therefore complained to the government, which was unable to stop hezbollahi activities. This was then interpreted by the secular forces as an endorsement of repression by the PG. If the PG had explicitly condemned the activities of Islamic militants beyond the routine complaints about the multiplicity of decision making centers and sided with the secular groups, it would have sapped its own legitimacy, given that it was an Islamic government named by none other than Khomeini. The PG's position seemed to be: "give us a chance, be patient, for we are your only hope for containing the Islamic radicals," but of course it could not say so openly. Its task was complicated by the frequent tactical alliances between the moderate secular forces, with whose conceptions of civil rights the PG could agree, and the radical left, whose policy demands were unacceptable.

On the clerical and fundamentalist side, some groups, like the Devotees, were hostile to the Nationalists, both religious and secular,

right from the outset. Their leader, Sadeq Khalkhali, did everything to exacerbate tensions. The role of the fundamentalists in the IRP is more complicated. These men and LMI figures had worked together as early as the 1960's, and knew each other well. As I said in chapter 3, there is an affinity between modernism and fundamentalism, and there is some evidence that in the beginning many fundamentalists sided with the PG and the LMI against the most reactionary traditionalists. But seeing where things were going, they soon switched sides and took over the traditionalist movement. Within the Islamic radical camp competition between fundamentalists and traditionalists has never ceased since those days.

The modernists of the LMI did have allies among the clergy. Ay. Abolfazl Zanjani was probably too identified with Mosaddeqism to have any influence on Khomeini. Ay. Taleqani was a charismatic leader in his own right but never challenged Khomeini's leadership openly. He was close to Bazargan, having been one of the founders of the LMI. After his release from prison, however, he decided not to join the LMI again, preferring to remain above groups. He maintained contacts with more radical groups, like the Mojahedin, who used these contacts to gain religious legitimacy. On March 5, 1979, Iranian Nationalists were for the first time able to commemorate the anniversary of Mosaddeq's death openly. Taleqani gave a speech before hundreds of thousands of people in Ahmadabad, in which he urged secular Nationalists and the religious movement to maintain their unity. But it was a prefiguration of future developments that he and Ay. Zanjani were the only two clerics to attend the meeting.²¹ Although he had reservations about it, Taleqani time and

²¹ Bahram Afrasiabi and Sa'id Dehqan, Taleqani va tarikh (Taleqani and

again reaffirmed his support for the PG, and his early death on September 9 deprived Bazargan's administration of a valuable outside ally. Taleqani's popularity was immense among all groups, and the fundamentalists would have found it more difficult to attack an administration that had his explicit support.

But even Taleqani was quite isolated among the clergy. Bazargan's most valuable potential ally was Ay. Motahhari, who was also very close to Khomeini and who might have become his designated successor instead of Ay. Montazeri. He could have played a mediating role between the PG and the CR and the IRP, but he was assassinated in May.²²

More complicated are the PG's relations with Ay. Shariatmadari and the Muslim People's Republican Party that he had unofficially sponsored. This party seemed to have had a quick and successful start, particularly in Azerbaijan, Shariatmadari's native province, and the Teheran Bazaar, where many merchants are of Azerbaijani origin. The MPRP was a moderate party, whose program and statements bore great resemblance to the moderates in the PG. Indeed, many groups did believe that association with the MPRP could shield them against allegations of opposition to Islam, and groups and personalities like the National Front, Hasan Nazih, and especially Moqaddam Maragheh'i's Radical Movement gravitated increasingly towards it.²³ Superficially it seemed logical to seek the backing of

History) (Teheran: Nilufar, 1981), pp. 412-416.

²² The assassination was carried out by a small terrorist group named Forqan that claimed to be religiously inspired and anticlerical. If that was true, then one has to wonder why they chose as their first clerical target one of the more enlightened members of the ulema.

²³ The cooperation of Nazih and Moqaddam Maragheh'i is explainable by

a grand ayatollah against radical forces that claimed to follow Khomeini. However, the LMI stayed clear of the Shariatmadari option. Although Bazargan had sought the advice of Shariatmadari in the months preceding the revolution, modernists, with their long history of opposition against the Shah, by and large had a low opinion of him and regarded him as a typical representative of the type of clergy they had derided in their anticlerical writings,²⁴ and did not forgive him his alleged close relationship with the Shah regime.²⁵ The tactic paid off in the long run: while the MPRP was crushed in December 1980 and its allies had to go into exile, the LMI is still around.

Summarizing the LMI's relations with other groups and forces during the life of the Provisional Government, one can say that the left united with the secular moderates to fault it for too much subservience to Khomeini and the Islamic radicals, the Islamic radicals joined with the left in denouncing the PG's continuing correct relations with the West and its lack of revolutionary fervor in general, and the religious groups all agreed that the PG was too secular. The LMI had seen itself as a bridge between intellectuals and the clergy, but the gaps between the various actors on the Iranian political scene had become so deep, that the LMI ended up isolated. Trying to please everybody, it had pleased nobody.

their Azerbaijani origin.

²⁴ For more background information see chapter 7, section 5.

²⁵ Much has been made of Shariatmadari's privileged contacts with the Court. In his defense it should be said that he was the highest ranking cleric inside Iran, which meant that his was the task of preserving the religious institutions. His predicament was rather like that of Pius XII.

9.2.3 The Institutional Question

Shortly after his installation as Prime Minister, Bazargan declared that his long-term political future depended on his party's showing in the forthcoming elections. Like all members of his generation who had struggled for the respect of the 1906 constitution, Bazargan's ideal political system was a parliamentary democracy, with or without a crown. But the demand for radical change was such that it was out of the question just to do away with those articles of the 1906 constitution that pertained to the monarchy.

The first draft of a new constitution had been prepared in Paris by Hasan Habibi and presented to Khomeini. After the return of the exiles more experts worked on it, but it was not publicized until after the referendum on a regime change.

On March 30 and 31 Iranians voted to abolish the monarchy. As in all previous referendums in Iran, the citizenry had no genuine choice, as they had to respond to the question whether they wanted to see the monarchy replaced by an Islamic republic or not. At that point the concept of Islamic republic lacked any precision. The government announced a 98.2 per cent vote for an Islamic state; the 140,966 "No" votes all came from Teheran! Needless to say nobody had campaigned for a "No" vote.

The final version of the first draft was published on June 18 (Khor-dad 28). It bore close resemblance to the constitution of the French Fifth Republic, providing for a semi-presidential system.²⁶ Its Islamic

²⁶ For a definition and discussion of semi-presidential systems see Maurice Duverger, Echec au roi (Paris: Albin Michel, 1978).

character consisted in a preamble stating the Islamic principles underlying the document, and in the restriction of basic freedoms and civil rights to within the limits of Islamic tenets, a provision that the 1906 constitution had contained too. But it did not reserve any special authority for the ulema, and in that sense was not theocratic.

The draft was opposed by secularists for being too religious, and by religious forces for not being Islamic enough. Khomeini had urged the PG to arrange for a referendum to ratify the draft, but the Bazargan felt bound by his promise to convene a constitutional assembly. As a compromise solution elections were held to a smaller assembly, in which traditionalist provincial mullas had an overwhelming majority and which they renamed "Assembly of Experts." It did have a handful of secularists, like Moqaddam Maragheh'i, who had been elected in his native Azerbaijan, and two religious modernists topped the list of Teheran deputies: Ay. Taleqani and Abolhasan Banisadr. The LMI members of the PG were not candidates, and the party was thus represented only by Ezzatollah Sahabi, who was not a cabinet member then. The Assembly convened on August 18, and its proceedings were quickly taken over by Beheshti. Taleqani registered his dissatisfaction by squatting on the floor instead of taking his seat in the hemicycle.

The original mandate of this assembly had been to make a few minor changes in the draft and then approve it, but it proceeded to change the draft almost beyond recognition. The most important change was that it incorporated Khomeini's notion of valayat-e faqih (vide chapter 1) into the document, and the constitution in effect became a dyarchy in which

democratic elements (represented by an elected president and an elected parliament) coexisted with a "religious leader" who had ultimate authority and was accountable to nobody. This last change was made only after Taleqani had died, but it is by no means certain that he would have opposed it.

The moderates' and secularists' insistence on proper procedure for the elaboration of the constitution thus yielded the exact opposite of what they had hoped. When they saw what was happening in the assembly, a majority of PG members, including Bazargan, made an attempt to persuade Khomeini to dissolve the body, but Khomeini would not go along. This move was not made public at the time.

The referendum to approve the new constitution was held after the fall of the PG, on December 2-3. Again 98.2 per cent of the electorate voted in favor of the regime. The LMI, the NF, and the MPRP had called for a "Yes" vote in spite of their misgivings, while the left called for a "No" vote or an abstention. Participation in the second referendum was much lower.²⁷

The official results of the two referendums that institutionalized the Islamic Republic were similar to Mosaddeq's and the Shah's referendums and in all cases the result was a foregone conclusion. The two

²⁷ This is only a very brief outline of the institutionalization of the Islamic Republic. For a detailed account see Sh. Bakhash, Reign, pp. 71-88 and Keessing's, March 21, 1980, pp. 30143-30145. For the text of the constitution and a discussion of it see Gisbert H. Flanz, "A Comparative Analysis of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran," in Constitutions of the World: Iran, Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds. (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1980). See also S. Zabih, Iran, pp. 33-40.

referendums of 1979 are different, however, in that the regime would have won a respectable majority even if it had allowed the citizenry a real choice. Bazargan, who has spent a lifetime struggling for free and fair elections, has cast a shadow on his record by always insisting that the outcomes of these referendums legitimize the Islamic Republic and reflect the true preferences of Iranians.

Perhaps it takes a novelist to express the absurd and unnecessary sadness of a government rigging referendums it would have won anyway:

At this point calm descended on Don Fabrizio, who had finally solved the enigma; now he knew who had been killed at Donnafugata, at a hundred other places, in the course of that night of dirty wind: a new-born babe: good faith; just the very child who should have been cared for most, whose strengthening would have justified all the silly vandalisms. Don Ciccio's negative vote, fifty similar votes at Donnafugata, a hundred thousand "noes" in the whole Kingdom, would have had no effect on the result, would in fact have made it, if anything, more significant; and this maiming of souls would have been avoided.²⁸

9.3 POLICY DILEMMAS

Having analyzed the constraints under which the PG had to operate, we can now turn our attention to three areas in which Bazargan and his colleagues had to take difficult decisions that were not uncontested.

²⁸ Giuseppe [Tomasi] di Lampedusa, The Leopard, tr. Archibald Colquhoun, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1960), p. 134.

9.3.1 The Press

From the very outset the PG and more particularly the LMI were handicapped in that they had no press organs to publicize their views and policies and to defend them against attacks from leftist and Islamic radicals. After the long years of censorship under the Shah the written press had developed great dynamism during the liberalization of 1978. In the months following the return of Khomeini the vitality and variety of the Iranian press reached its peak. Journalists and editors took over their publications, as the owners had mostly fled abroad, old periodicals which had been banned under the Shah began to reappear, and new ones sprang up, published by political groups or special interest groups. In the spring of 1979 more than 360 publications came to the newsstands, some even in the long banned local languages like Kurdish and Azerbaijani Turkish.²⁹ The journalists and writers belonged mostly to the modern segment of society, many were leftists, and many others had written for the publications of the Shah regime. This was inevitable, since a journalist had nothing else to write for in the years 1963-1977.

The fundamentalists had been irked by the secular dominance over the press for some time, and gangs of hezbollahis had terrorized editorial offices, newsstands, and bookstores since before Khomeini's return to Iran. The revived press could not take Khomeini to task, because he was still the undisputed leader of the revolution and maintained some pretense of being above the fray. As a result they directed their remonst-

²⁹ Gholam Hoseyn Sa'edi, "Iran under the Party of God," in Index on Censorship, 1, 1984, pp. 17-18.

rances to Bazargan and the PG, "the government." Because of this Bazargan and his colleagues joined the fundamentalists in denouncing critical publications and journalists as SAVAK agents. He did not go so far as to condone the hezbollahi attacks, but he did not condemn them either. Among all Iranian publications, the newspaper Ayandegan had special significance, and its silencing heralded the beginning of repression in Iran.

Ayandegan was a morning newspaper whose editor before the revolution had been Dariush Homa'yun, one of the most hated elements of the Shah regime. During the revolution its editors had taken over and turned it into a pluralist forum for all groups, including clerics. Its general tenor was left-of-center. In May 1979 Khomeini stated publicly that he did not read Ayandegan, obviously thinking that this announcement would be the end of the newspaper. Shortly thereafter Nationalist groups led by the NDF held a meeting to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Mosaddeq's birth. The meeting, which was attacked by hezbollahis, ended with a declaration stating that the participants did read Ayandegan. As a result efforts got underway to silence the newspaper by "legal" means. On August 7 (Mordad 16), the revolutionary prosecutor of Teheran, Ay. Ahmad Azari Qomi, closed down Ayandegan, alleging links with foreign secret services, and arrested most of its staff. The newspaper had been printed on Iran's most modern press, which had also been used for other oppositional publications. By seizing Ayandegan the fundamentalists with one strike deprived all other critical mass-circulation newspapers of a printing press (the leftist groups produced their organs in the underground). On August 8 the PG announced a new press law that severely

regulated the press and that, according to the secular opposition, was a copy of the Shah's press law. The NDF called for mass demonstrations to protest against the curtailment of the freedom of speech, and staged them on August 12-13. Hezbollahis attacked the demonstration, and the NDF leader, Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, became the first Mosaddeqist who had to go underground. On August 14 the International Commission of Jurists denounced the new law as creating a "severe setback for Iranian political life" and introducing the "evil doctrine of guilt by association." One week later, on August 21 it was announced that over twenty newspapers and magazines had to close down: all were secular and leftist publications except one.³⁰

Ayandegan had been the favorite newspaper of the Iranian intelligentsia and the modern segment in general, and its closure confirmed the worst suspicions of those who had never trusted the revolution and disappointed those who had. The Provisional Government had been without a voice on the press scene, but the LMI could spare no one to start a newspaper or expand the party's monthly "political-ideological organ" Payam ("Message").

In a country with an illiteracy rate of about 50 per cent the PG's lack of control over radio and television was perhaps an even greater handicap than the lack of a sympathetic press. Sadeq Qotbzadeh, who had been appointed head of the NIRT, purged that institution, one of the most active centers of artistic creativity in Iran, of all leftists,

³⁰ This was the newspaper of Ho. Mohammad Montazeri, Ay. Montazeri's son, who was Colonel Qaddafi's ally in Iran. Because of Imam Musa Sadr's disappearance in Libya he had many enemies among the Shi'ite clergy.

banned popular entertainment and music from the airwaves, and when fundamentalist criticism of Bazargan mounted he joined in. Khomeini had discovered the virtues of a radio and television network that was independent of the executive branch, and turned a deaf ear to Bazargan's entreaties to let the PG control the electronic media.

9.3.2 Trouble in the Periphery

Shortly after the installation of the PG its spokesman, Amir-Entezam, had answered a foreign reporter's question as to the territorial administration of the new regime by stating that Iran would be a federal state, like the United States. On the whole, post-revolutionary Iran has been just as Jacobin as the Shah regime.

In the chaos that followed the revolutionary take-over of February 1979, autonomist movements sprang up in some peripheral areas of Iran. Fighting broke out in Gorgan province between Turkomans and their Fada'i allies and the Pasdaran, in Khuzistan the energetic governor, Adm. Madari, quickly quelled an Arab revolt aided by Iraq, and most of the areas inhabited by Sunni Kurds were in the hands of Kurdish autonomists.

Kurdistan was shielded from the islamicization attempts of the fundamentalists. This transformed it into a place of refuge for secularists and leftists, who looked upon it as a possible starting base for the future resecularization of Iran. Plans had been made to hold a "Congress of the Peoples of Iran" in late August. The Ayandegan affair, and the expulsion of the Fada'iyans and the Mojahedin from Teheran University that had closely followed it, gave particular importance to the planned

gathering, which many secularists and leftists planned to attend. To crush the momentum of a Kurdistan-based secularist opposition, Pasdaran and military units entered the region, accompanied by Sadeq Khalkhali. Khalkhali started a carnage among Kurdish autonomists and managed to poison relations between Teheran and the Kurds for good. After three weeks Khalkhali was recalled to Teheran and mediation efforts began under the auspices of Taleqani, who had already intervened in March. Negotiations were still going on when the PG fell.

9.3.3 Foreign Relations

At the helm of a country with no effective armed forces, the PG very quickly attempted to reassure other countries that Iran would honor its international agreements. The new Iranian government quickly moved to make up for more than two decades of past alliances with the West. Predictably it broke diplomatic relations with Israel (whose diplomatic mission was turned over to the PLO) and South Africa. Yasir Arafat's triumphant visit elicited a rare smile from Khomeini. Iran became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Foreign Minister Yazdi demonstrated Iran's new self-confidence by addressing the United Nations in Persian without providing simultaneous translation. Iran broke diplomatic relations with Egypt after the Camp David Accords, a mockery of the PG's pledges not to interfere in other countries' affairs. Taleqani told a visiting Cuban delegation that he considered the Cuban revolution to be Islamic.³¹

³¹ B. Afrasiabi and S. Dehqan, Taleqani, p. 511.

Two countries were of particular importance to the PG: Iraq and the United States. Iran had settled its long border dispute with Iraq in 1975; only three years later the Iraqi regime earned the irreconcilable hostility of Khomeini by expelling him from Najaf. After coming to power, Khomeini sent encouraging signals to Iraq's Shi'ites, a majority of the population but politically dominated by Sunnis. Not to be outdone, Iraq began stirring up trouble among the ethnic Arabs in Khuzistan. The Iraqi government even tried to test Iranian defenses by bombing some border villages in March 1979 (Esfand 1357), but the PG difused the crisis by negotiating with the Iraqi government, which agreed to pay compensations.³²

Of greater importance still were Iran's relations with the United States. Certain American foreign policy makers had advocated an intervention in Iran by inducing the army to carry out a coup,³³ and the members of the PG belonged to a generation that still remembered vividly the coup of 1953. The coming to power of moderate opponents of the Shah was only a second best outcome for Washington, and in spite of President Carter's assurances that the United States would not interfere in Iranian affairs, CIA agents were sent in quite important numbers.³⁴ The U.S. government even tried to continue operating its secret listening post at

³² Talash-e dowlat-e movaqqat bara-ye jelowgiri az jang-e tahmili-ye Iraq (The Provisional Government's Efforts to Prevent the War Imposed by Iraq) (Teheran: LMI, n.d.).

³³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 371, 372, and 393.

³⁴ For circumstantial evidence see John Kelly, "CIA in Iran," in Counterspy, 3 (4), April-May 1979, pp. 24-36. See also Christos P. Ioannides, America's Iran: Injury and Catharsis (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 64-68 and 124-128.

Kabkan near the Soviet border without informing the PG about this,³⁵ a clear violation of Iran's sovereignty. When General Qarani, the Chief of Staff, declared over the Iranian radio that Iran would not tolerate foreign listening posts on its territory, the Iranian employees at Kabkan sequestered the U.S. military personnel. The incident was solved peacefully in the end.³⁶

Nevertheless, the PG tried to maintain correct relations with the United States, partly because of its apprehension about an American intervention, and partly because of the growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, where pro-Soviet communists had taken power in a violent coup in April 1978. When leftist elements stormed the American embassy on February 14, Yazdi dislodged them with the help of Islamic irregulars.³⁷ High ranking members of the PG, including Deputy Prime Minister Amir-Entezam, maintained steady and discreet contact with the American embassy and tried to reassure the U.S. diplomats that things would eventually calm down. On the crucial question of American arms sales to Iran, the PG tried to continue buying at least some greatly needed spare parts.

³⁵ James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 200.

³⁶ It is telling of American attitudes and lack of understanding of the Iranian revolution that President Carter in his memoirs mentions this affair as a prelude to the Hostage Taking without noting the illegal nature of that particular American presence in Iran. Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 451.

³⁷ For an eye-witness account, see William H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), pp. 258-266.

U.S. policy towards the PG contributed unwittingly to the growing anti-American sentiment in Iran. Washington considered the PG to be "moderate" and "reasonable," and hoped to strengthen it by cooperating with it. This "kiss of death" policy could only undermine the PG's popularity in Iran. Also, the sudden solicitude of Congress and much of the American media for human rights violations in Iran after the revolution struck most people in Iran, even moderate opponents of the revolutionary tribunals' methods, as hypocritical in view of the relatively little attention the Shah's repression had received in the United States.

William Sullivan left his post in April, but his designated successor, Walter Cutler, was not acceptable to the PG, and the American government, miffed, let it be known that henceforth relations would be handled on the level of chargés d'affaires.

In late October Bazargan left on his first trip abroad, to attend the anniversary celebrations of Algerian independence on November 1, 1979. The Prime Minister was accompanied by Yazdi and Chamran, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, respectively. The three LMI leaders used the occasion to meet with Zbigniew Brzezinski. Given Brzezinski's hostility to the Iranian revolution,³⁸ such a meeting could indeed be viewed with suspicion by people with no confidence in the probity of Bazargan and Yazdi. It appears that news of this meeting was transmitted

³⁸ According to his memoirs the executions of the first generals in March moved him so much that he regretted that the United States had not done more to impose a counterrevolutionary military regime on Iran (Power and Principle, p. 393.) His compassion for these generals contrasts starkly with his contempt for the scores of Iranians who had been killed (or tortured) on their orders.

by Algerian communists within the FLN to their Tudeh comrades in Iran, who relayed the news to the fundamentalists. The latter started a campaign to depict the PG as too beholden to the United States, and Qotbzadeh's radio and television quickly joined in. Around the same time it was announced in the United States that the Shah would be admitted for medical treatment, and this precipitated the attack on the U.S. embassy in Teheran, which led to the downfall of the Provisional Government.³⁹

Or so it seemed. The attack on the U.S. embassy had actually been planned months before by radical Islamic groups, including one that had originated in the modernist camp. On numerous occasions we have already encountered JAMA, the party that was founded in 1964 by Kazem Sami and Habibollah Peiman. As is so frequent with Iranian political parties, the inevitable occurred and the two split. Sami revived JAMA during the liberalization⁴⁰ and remained within the Nationalist camp, participating in the PG. Peiman founded the Jonbesh-e mosalmanan-e mobarez (Movement of Combatant Muslims). On paper this group's ideology was very similar to that of JAMA,⁴¹ but Peiman attached himself to the fundamentalists, and his supporters were prominent in the attack on the American embassy.⁴² In addition to discrediting the PG, the radicals also hoped to

³⁹ The best account of the hostage crisis is Ch. Ioannides, America's Iran.

⁴⁰ While he kept the acronym, he adapted the actual name to the new times by changing it to Jonbesh-e engelabi-ye mellat-e mosalman-e Iran (Revolutionary Movement of the Muslim People of Iran).

⁴¹ Rokhsan Manuchehri, "Small but Strong," in The Iranian (Teheran), February 16, 1980 (Bahman 27, 1358), p. 4.

⁴² Sepehr Zabih, in his book Iran since the Revolution, pp. 43-51, affirms that the JMM was the main force behind the hostage affair. This thesis does not meet with scholars' unanimity.

create a groundswell of enthusiasm in the population that would enable them to crush the moderate MPRP.

The Hostage Affair did not precipitate Bazargan's resignation. Shortly before the events he had tendered his resignation, and Khomeini accepted it in view of the new situation. In his response to Bazargan's letter Khomeini thanked him for his ceaseless and exhausting efforts. The fact that Khomeini did not dismiss Bazargan in disgrace enabled the latter to continue his political activity after the fall of the PG, as we shall see in the next chapter. Before that however, we have to take a look at the LMI qua party in the first phase of the revolution.

9.4 THE LMI IN 1979

On February 6, 1979 (Bahman 17, 1357) the LMI issued a communiqué to the effect that it would redouble its ideological and organizational efforts now that its leader had been named head of the government.

After most LMI figures joined the PG and refrained from party activity, Ezzatollah Sahabi took over what remained of the LMI. Sahabi had been in touch with various more radical groups, such as the Mojahedin, and was himself to the left of the PG. In the first months after the revolution he used his good personal relations with other groups to diffuse conflicts and to better the PG's relations with its more revolutionary critics.

On June 17, 1979 (Khordad 27, 1358) he wrote a lengthy analysis of the situation in the name of the LMI.⁴³ At that point a certain degree

⁴³ Bayaniyeh-ye Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran: Tahlili az sharayet-e emruzi-ye

of disenchantment had already appeared in society, and Sahabi's text was an attempt to define the LMI's position on how things were standing. It began by noting that many of the revolution's problems stemmed from its having been too successful too quickly. The PG had to face five problems: it had no ready programs, it lacked well known revolutionary figures, the country was in a chaos and difficult to revive, revolutionaries and opportunists were not easily distinguishable, and its leaders were devoid of a common ideological outlook.⁴⁴ What follows is a summary of Sahabi's analysis.

The effective forces within the revolutionary movement were Imam Khomeini, the PG, the CR, the ulema, the revolutionary groupings of young people, and the masses of the population. The Islamic revolution was confronted by three forces: the liberal-democratic intellectuals, the Marxists, and the counterrevolution. The most important counterrevolutionaries were the dependent bourgeoisie, which was quietly making a comeback because the revolutionaries lacked the qualified cadres to run things.

The Marxists were only power hungry, had done nothing constructive since the triumph of the revolution, and had stirred up trouble in the provinces and the factories. They were complaining about censorship, yet 85 per cent of all newspapers were in their hands or sympathetic to them.

eng-elab-e eslami-ye Iran va naqd-e niruha-ye darun-e eng-elab (LMI Declaration: An analysis of the conditions of the Iran's Islamic revolution today, and a review of the forces within the revolution).

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

The liberal democrats had to ponder whether their goals and ideas found a favorable echo in the population. The intellectuals were out of tune with the masses, and had to rid themselves of their formal west-struckness if they hoped to have any impact on society. However, the essential demands of these forces were not incompatible with the Islamic revolution, and therefore they should be given a chance to participate in it in recognition of their contribution to the struggle against the Shah.

The PG was weakened not only by the existence of multiples power centers, but also because it was not decisive enough in dealing with problems. It paid too much attention to the antidespotic character of the revolution and not enough to its anti-imperialist dimension. Its outlook was too bureaucratic and it was not willing to mobilize the young. Its gradualism would pave the way for the counterrevolution to return.

The ulema had been very active during the revolution, but should not seek to monopolize power: that would only increase dissatisfaction.

The declaration concluded by arguing that only those members of the original LMI whose outlook on the world had evolved parallel to the growth of the Islamic movement were represented in the new LMI. Concretely, this meant that for Sahabi the LMI was now an unequivocally Islamic party.

This text must be seen as an attempt to disassociate the LMI as a party from the PG, which was coming under attack from revolutionary forces. It created a stir among the LMI members of the PG, who objected to its radicalism and bluntness.

The LMI, personified by E. Sahabi, was on the whole more critical of the secular liberals than of the clergy in 1979. On occasions when liberals approached Sahabi for common action or declarations against hezbollahi abuses, he did not respond. This attitude came to characterize the LMI in later years: while disagreeing with the Islamic hardliners and even criticizing them on occasion, the LMI seemed to claim a monopoly on well-intentioned criticism, and often went so far as to assimilate any criticism stemming from secular forces to the counterrevolution. In the new political culture of Iran, the LMI wanted to maintain its legitimacy by not associating with secular forces, and by criticizing Islamic forces always from an Islamic viewpoint. But by doing so it also contributed to the consolidation of Islamic hegemony in Iran. For example, in the Assembly of Experts Sahabi spoke out against the principle of valayat-e faqih,⁴⁵ but once it had passed, he defended it against secular critics.⁴⁶

Ezzatollah Sahabi had spent most of the liberalization of 1977-79 in prison, and as we shall see in the next chapter, he left the LMI in December 1980. The very limited activity of the LMI during the life of the PG can therefore not really be considered typical for the party and what it has stood for.

⁴⁵ Sh. Bakhsh, Reign, pp. 84-85.

⁴⁶ The Iranian, October 3, 1979 (Mehr 11, 1358), pp. 8-11.

His tenure as Prime Minister was a traumatic experience for Bazargan. Much as he had tried to communicate with Iranians by being accessible and giving "folksy" television chats, he and his style were out of touch with the situation. It must have saddened Bazargan that the young hostage takers were for the most part engineering and science students. When he resigned, Bazargan retreated from public life and remained silent. About one month later he granted an interview to Hamid Algar, in which he articulated his feelings.⁴⁷ Commenting on his own and Khomeini's relationship with the revolution, Bazargan said:

It is astonishing that an eighty year old man should be much better attuned to the youth than I, who grew up among the young, in the university, and in the revolutionary movement... If you read Khomeini's declarations now, they are very different from what he used to say a year ago, even six months ago. Unconsciously he has adopted the tone of the revolutionaries, and thus he has been able to influence them. I really sense an estrangement and a distance between myself and the people within the revolution, i.e. the young, the tollab, the university people, and the [revolutionary] guards. I also consider myself a revolutionary. But what I want is in contradiction with what they want, even though our ultimate aims are perhaps identical.⁴⁸

Commenting on the shift from the early opposition to all superpowers to the later exclusive hostility to the United States, Bazargan said:

⁴⁷ Bazargan was very blunt in this interview, Algar having led him to believe that he wanted only to collect background information for a book on the revolution that would come out at some point in the not immediate future. However, Algar made the interview's text available to Nasr, the publication of the ISA's in the United States and Canada, which printed it in its February 1, 1981 (Bahman 12, 1359) issue. By that time Bazargan was under wide attack in Iran, and the publication of this interview, accompanied by hostile annotations from the journal's editors, was used against Bazargan. If I use this document, it is only because Bazargan has taken act of its publication and publicly responded to the accusations contained in the annotations.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 13-14.

This whole business with the American embassy was probably due to [Khomeini's] influence. It was perhaps four months ago that he began to consider America and Carter as first among our enemies, as ringleaders of this and that, without the slightest proof, just by definition... This had a real effect on the revolutionaries, and they in turn influenced him. He is more of an entraîneur d'hommes ... than Hitler was. Hitler was a genius as an organisateur de foules, and Khomeini has the same qualities. That is how he got where he is now.⁴⁹

The fate of the Provisional Government revived interest in Crane Brinton's book Anatomy of Revolution, and even Bazargan himself ends his own account of the revolutionary movement with a translation of the book's central thesis.⁵⁰ Brinton's summary of the dilemma facing moderates in a revolution also applies to the Provisional Government:

The moderates by definition are not great haters...[They] do not really believe in the big words they have to use. They do not really believe a heavenly perfection is suddenly coming to man on earth. They are all for compromise, common sense, toleration, comfort.⁵¹

Bazargan and most of his colleagues in the LMI did not believe in the big words, and at least Bazargan himself had the honesty not to use them. The demise of the PG coincided with the final, spectacular resolution of Iran's crisis of sovereignty. But after that, unlike Crane Brinton's moderates, Bazargan and his associates did not turn to the conservatives, nor to foreign powers. This is one reason they were able to survive the period of terror that followed soon after their resignation, and lived to become an opposition party in the Islamic Republic.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 15-16. The gallicisms are Bazargan's.

⁵⁰ M. Bazargan, Engelab-e eslami dar do harekat (The Islamic Revolution in Two Movements) (Teheran, 1984), pp. 225-248.

⁵¹ Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 146.

Chapter 10

THE LMI AS LOYAL OPPOSITION

The fall of the PG and the hostage crisis were the beginning of the second, more radical phase of the Iranian revolution. From August 1979, when the NDF was neutralized, until 1983, when the Tudeh was outlawed, the Islamic radicals got rid of other parties one by one, until by late 1983 the LMI was the only remaining legal opposition party in Iran. This chapter does not aim at analyzing political developments in Iran since 1980.¹ Instead, it focuses on the LMI's efforts to constitute a moderate opposition in a revolutionary country.

After the resignation of the Provisional Government there was speculation that the LMI would be revived as a party. In fact, however, precious time was lost as the IRP more and more consolidated itself. In the first few months after the taking of the hostages, Bazargan and his friends did not really act as an oppositional group. It was only after the elections of 1980, when the institutions of the Islamic Republic were put in place and Bazargan and a few of his friends became part of the Majles' minority faction, that the LMI became a loyal opposition to the government, although never to the regime.

¹ For that see Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 90ff.

10.1 THE LMI BETWEEN THE HOSTAGE CRISIS AND BANISADR'S OUSTER

After he resigned as Prime Minister, Bazargan was invited to join the Council of the Revolution, which became the highest organ of the State. He accepted under the condition that he could bring along three of his friends. This was granted and Bazargan chose Hasan Habibi, Ezzatollah Sahabi, and Eng. Katira'i. Other LMI figures stayed on as ministers in the care-taker government, but Yazdi resigned as Foreign Minister and was replaced first by Banisadr, and after one week by Sadeq Qotbzadeh. Although the Provisional Government was no more, its LMI members and sympathizers continued working loyally within the transitional structures of government. Whatever qualms they had in private about the hostage taking, publicly LMI figures did not condemn it, so as not to lag behind popular enthusiasm.² Referring to the act, Yazdi said "in order to rally the masses this kind of thing should continue."³ Bazargan, in the interview with Algar, said "if I disapprove, God knows what would happen, and if I approve, well, it is possible I wouldn't really believe it."⁴

² Even Karim Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front, declared that the action was an understandable reaction to the Shah's entry to the United States, and chided the Provisional Government for not having reacted more firmly to that move. Ettela'at, February 16, 1980 (Bahman 27, 1357), p. 2.

³ The Iranian, December 15, 1979 (Azar 24, 1358), p. 8.

⁴ Nasr, February 1, 1981 (Bahman 12, 1359), p. 12.

10.1.1 Dissention in the LMI

As we saw in the previous chapter, differences of opinion within the party had appeared in the spring and summer of 1978, as reflected in Ezzatollah Sahabi's pamphlet. For Sahabi and the "left wing" of the LMI, "anti-imperialism" came first. This meant that it was dangerous to weaken the Islamic movement in the name of freedom, as Bazargan and Yazdi were doing in E. Sahabi's view. On December 21, 1979 (Azar 30, 1358) he and eleven other members presented their resignation to the party's leadership. However, the elections were approaching, and since the dissidents did not want to add yet another issue to the country's politics, the resignation was kept secret until February 12 (Bahman 23), when the press was informed about it. The most prominent of the twelve figures to leave the LMI were two sons of party founder Yadollah Sahabi, Ezzatollah and Fereidun Sahabi; Mohammad-Mehdi Ja'fari and Mohammad Bas-tehnegar (a son-in-law of the late Ay. Taleqani), both of whom had been defendents in the 1963 trials; and Eng. Hasan Arabzadeh, who had been active in Mashad. Bazargan released a statement to the effect that the move was an internal affair of the LMI affecting only a few younger members and needed not be given press coverage,⁵ and the next day Abbas Radnia attempted to play down the whole matter by pointing out that none of those who had left had been members of the party's founding council, and that therefore their move did not constitute a true split.⁶

⁵ Ettela'at, February 12, 1980 (Bahman 23, 1358), pp. 2 and 3.

⁶ Ettela'at, February 13, 1980 (Bahman 24, 1358), p. 3.

The two sides refrained from any kind of public polemics, and both E. Sahabi and Ja'fari continued collaborating with Mizan, the LMI's unofficial newspaper after September 1980. Bazargan had tried to minimize the split's importance by pointing to the "young age" of the dissenters; the fact was, however, that it was precisely this that mattered. In the years 1963-1977 the LMI had not been able to recruit new blood into the movement; the "youngsters" of the years 1960-63 were now middle-age men. Moreover, they were the only, albeit tenuous, link with the young, revolutionary generation. The defection of Ezzatollah Sahabi, in particular, deprived the party of a widely respected and energetic figure who had good contacts with the Islamic left. Qotbzadeh had gone his own way since the revolution. Among younger men, this left Chamran, Reza Sadr, Yazdi, and Sabbaghian. Chamran was more preoccupied with the armed forces than with politics, and given his past activities in Lebanon the left and Islamic radicals united in denouncing him as a Mossad agent. Sadr had been an effective Minister of Foreign Trade in the PG. Having had a full clerical education, he knew how to deal with meddlesome clerics on their own ground. Yazdi had had his own disagreements with Bazargan⁷ and was quite unpopular as a result of the attacks levelled against him. Finally, Hashem Sabbaghian may be a good organizer but is not an inspiring presence.

⁷ The Iranian, December 15, 1979 (Azar 24, 1358), p. 8.

10.1.2 The LMI and the Elections of 1980

The two referendums of 1979 had set the stage for the elections that would complete the institutionalization of the Islamic Republic. On January 25, 1980 (Bahman 5, 1358) presidential elections were held, while parliament was chosen in the spring.

10.1.2.1 The Presidential Elections

The presidential elections gave the Islamic modernists in Iran one more chance to raise their heads. By a series of blunders the IRP was not able to present a candidate of its own.⁸ Khomeini had indicated that he did not want a mulla to run, which neutralized the IRP's ambitious leader, Dr. Beheshti. The candidacy of the leader of the Mojahedin, Mas'ud Rajavi, had been vetoed because of his conditional acceptance of the constitution, and therefore the field was open to candidates who had begun their political activity before the rise of fundamentalism and traditionalism.

Abolhasan Banisadr had spent 1979 criss-crossing the country, giving speeches in local mosques, schools, and public places. He had severely criticized the PG's lack of revolutionary and anti-imperialist zeal, and was therefore not associated with it. Although Khomeini remained neutral in the presidential campaign, many members of his house-hold, including his son, declared that they would vote for Banisadr.

⁸ See Sh. Bakhash, Reign, p. 90.

The IRP having failed to present an eligible candidate, it threw its support behind Hasan Habibi, the former NF(III) activist from France. Among all the candidates he was closest to the LMI, and a number of Khomeini relatives endorsed him.

Other candidates associated with the Islamic movement were JAMA's Kazem Sami, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, and Sadeq Tabataba'i, who had been the main LMI(a) organizer in Germany, and who had been the administrator of the Prime Minister's office after Bazargan's resignation. A son-in-law of Khomeini's, he was not endorsed by any visible figure.

On the secular side, the most important candidate was the NF's Admiral Madani, who had been Minister of Defense and governor of Khuzistan during the PG. Also running were Dariush Foruhar, leader of the PIN, and Mohammad Mokri, Iranian ambassador in Moscow.

Neither the LMI nor the NF presented a candidate of their own. Bazargan, who would have been the LMI's obvious candidate, was probably still too shaken by his experience as Prime Minister to try his luck at the polls, despite public appeals by some of his followers in the press. According to another explanation the accusations levelled against Amir-Entezam, Bazargan's aide during the PG, by the students in the American embassy convinced Bazargan not to expose himself to a slander campaign.⁹

⁹ Amir-Entezam had continued meeting with American embassy officials, who had a favorable impression of him. In July 1979 he had left Iran to become ambassador to Sweden, but when he was brought to court after the hostage taking, he returned to Iran to defend himself, and was arrested on December 19. During his trial, which began on March 17, 1981, Bazargan obdurately defended his former deputy.

The campaign was relatively calm. The candidates all knew each other and concentrated on their personal merits rather than attacks on the others. The religiously oriented candidates were favored by the endorsements from the Khomeini household, by last minute allegations of the radical students in the American embassy that Madani had had contacts with the old regime, and by the lowering of the voting age to 16. All candidates received equal time on radio and television.

The official results of these elections were as follows:

Abolhasan Banisadr	10,747,345
Ahmad Madani	2,240,160
Hasan Habibi	676,120
Dariussh Foruhar	134,132

The four remaining candidates got less than 1 per cent each. Inevitably, the counting of the ballots was rigged, but the order of the candidates reflected their popularity at the time. Banisadr was relatively young, and had for over a year manipulated revolutionary symbols and rhetoric adroitly. Many people believed Khomeini had promised him the presidency in Paris. Madani was the choice of those members of the modern segment who bothered to vote, and an honest counting of the votes would have probably improved his score without getting him elected. Hasan Habibi was less well known, and perhaps hampered by his association with the PG, in which he had served as minister. Foruhar's constituency was limited to the dwindling numbers of Iranian ethno-nationalists. Qotbzadeh had become very unpopular because of his policies at the helm of the radio and television networks, and those who approved of his policies had more serious candidates in Habibi and Banisadr. The remaining candidates were largely unknown.

The presidential elections were the last hurrray of Mosaddeqism in Iran, as all eight presidential candidates had been young National Front activists before 1963 (and after 1963 outside Iran). Only two years later the winner and the runner-up of that election were opposing the current regime from Europe, one had been executed in Iran, three had become politically inactive, and only two continued their careers in a regime that had now officially thrown anathema on Mohammad Mosaddeq.

10.1.2.2 The Parliamentary Elections

After Banisadr took office, he was appointed head of the CR by Khomeini. Suspicious of political parties, he did not found one. Instead, he and his friends set up an "Office for the Cooperation of the People with the President" with branches all over the country. These groups presented candidates in Teheran and the provinces.

The IRP had become a highly organized force and put up candidates in most constituencies. Various smaller fundamentalist and traditionalist groups joined it in a grand coalition that dominated the campaign, especially in the provinces. Iranian politicians have always neglected the small towns, concentrating their energies either on winning seats in Teheran or in their home towns where their families were known.¹⁰ In the small provincial towns it was almost by default that local and trusted mullas became the best positioned candidates. Many of them were allied to the IRP or got its endorsement.

¹⁰ Cf. the elections to the 20th Majles, as analyzed in chapter 6.

Torn by internal strife, the LMI did not present candidates under its own name. Instead, on February 2 (Bahman 13) it was announced that Bazargan, Y. Sahabi, Ay. Abolfazl Zanjani, and Mohammad-Taqi Shariati had formed a group called Hamnam ("Eponym"), with the aim of introducing candidates to the public. This was only one of many such groups, and most candidates figured on many different groups. Hamnam declared that it would choose its candidates only on the basis of merit, without regard to party affiliation. The same day Hamnam published a list of 25 men as candidates for Teheran, a list that figured veteran LMI leaders such as Bazargan, Y. Sahabi, E. Sahabi, and Yazdi, but also Kazem Sami, Ali-Asghar Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, and Abdolkarim Lahiji. Two of the founders of the IRP, Hos. Hashemi Rafsanjani and Abdolkarim Musavi Ardabili were also included, as were a number of sympathetic non-IRP clerics such as Hos. Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani and Ali Golzadeh Ghafuri.¹¹ After the split in the party, Ja'fari announced that he would seek the seat of Borazjan and Dashtestan (near Bushire, in the South) as an Independent. On March 4 (Esfand 13) the group gave candidates in six provincial districts its investiture, including Ho. Hosein Lahuti from Rasht and Mohammad-Javad Raja'ian (a son-in-law of the Nationalist Bazaar leader H. Mahmud Manian) from Zanjan. Finally, on March 13 (Esfand 22) five more candidates were given Hamnam backing in Teheran, including the future Prime Minister, Mohammad-Ali Raja'i, and the venerable Manian himself.¹²

¹¹ For the full list see Ettela'at, February 2, 1980 (Bahman 13, 1358), p. 12.

¹² For details see Ettela'at, March 4, 1980 (Esfand 13, 1358), p. 3; and March 13, 1980 (Esfand 22), p. 16.

The city of Qazvin was the only district where the LMI and the IRP openly competed against each other. Qazvin is a relatively prosperous city only 120 kilometers from Teheran, has a history of political activism, and had been a safe Nationalist seat under Mosaddeq. In 1980 the religious establishment of the city, led by Ho. Abutorabi, was opposed to the IRP and its methods, and invited two LMI leaders with roots in the city to contest its two seats: Ahmad Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, and Ebrahim Yazdi. The former was a cousin of Ho. Zia'eddin Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, who had represented the city during the 16th and 17th Majles (Mosaddeq's tenure as Prime Minister) and who had sat on the Central Council of the National Front until his death in 1961. He accepted, while Yazdi preferred to run for a seat from Teheran. Reluctantly, Abutorabi himself announced his candidacy for the second seat.¹³

Thus, for the 270 seats at stake, Bazargan and his friends fielded or endorsed at most only 40 candidates. This failure to take advantage of the elections is reminiscent of the National Front's failure to put up candidates nationwide in the elections of 1960 and 1961,¹⁴ and was even more inexcusable, given that the elections were far more open than those for the 20th Majles. In 1980 it was still possible to organize effectively, yet the LMI lost this chance.

The election campaign was marred by widespread violence of hezbollah elements against candidates not fully committed to the Islamic Republic, mainly the Mojahedin. To protest against this state of affairs, two

¹³ Information on the Qazvin elections were obtained from Dr. Ali-Asghar Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi, personal interview, Paris, July 1982.

¹⁴ See chapter 6, section 2.

founding members of the LMI, Abbas Radnia and Ahmad Alibaba'i, took back their candidacy in mid-March, while Hasan Habibi and E. Sahabi warned against the danger of fascism.¹⁵ Bazargan and his friends, however, persevered, and between the two rounds the Hamnam slate of candidates for Teheran even received the endorsement of the IRP-led fundamentalist coalition.

The election law itself did not meet with universal agreement. According to the law devised by the IRP and its allies,

Members of the National Consultative Assembly will be elected by an absolute majority (50% +) of votes. If in the first round in single or multiple [member] districts such a majority is not obtained, there will be a second round. Thus from among those candidates who do not receive an absolute majority twice as many as the number of representatives in each district will run in the second round, in which a relative majority will suffice.¹⁶

This law was unfavorable to smaller groups, and all secular forces, the Mojahedin, President Banisadr and his supporters, and also Hamnam opposed it.¹⁷ Candidates were sponsored by many different groups, which makes it impossible to infer anything about the relative strength of political forces from the elections' results.

In the first round of the elections, Abutorabi and Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi soundly defeated the IRP candidates in Qazvin; Ja'fari, unopposed by the IRP, was returned from Borazjan, Raja'ian won a seat from Zanzan, and Ay. Lahuti won in Rasht. The situation in Teheran was complicated

¹⁵ Ettela'at, February 25, 1980 (Esfand 6, 1358), p. 2.

¹⁶ Quoted in Sepehr Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 65.

¹⁷ Yazdi declared that the group considered it a "trick." Ettela'at, March 4, 1980 (Esfand 13, 1358), p. 3.

by the fact that only 14 of the city's 30 seats had been filled during the first ballot. The irregularities of the first round, about which even Khomeini's older brother Ay. Pasandideh complained publicly in a letter to Banisadr; were such that the second round was postponed until May. The situation improved somewhat, but it was clear that the IRP and its allies had managed to control the counting of the votes in many places.

In the end Bazargan, Yadollah Sahabi, Yazdi, and Sabbaghian won seats in Teheran, as did Ali-Akbar Mo'infar, the PG's Oil Minister who has never formally adhered to the LMI but who has been more loyal to it than many a party member. Ezzatollah Sahabi also entered parliament, and Kazem Sami was the only lucky JAMA candidate. One of Ay. Taleqani's daughters, A'zam Taleqani, leader of a Muslim women's organization, also won a Teheran seat.

The Mojahedin had seemed to win a few provincial seats, but the official results did not reflect this. Mas'ud Rajavi had survived the first round, but did not get elected in the end.¹⁸

Secular Nationalist leaders did not fare well. The MPRP had been disbanded after it had staged a badly organized uprising in the capital of Azerbaijan, Tabriz,¹⁹ and the two secular leaders allied with it, Rahmatollah Moqaddam Maragheh'i and Hasan Nazih, who might have won se-

¹⁸ It is worth noting that Bazargan endorsed his candidacy between the ballots, on the grounds that he represented one wing of enthusiastic young believers and that his presence in the Majles would guarantee the rights of the minorities. Bamdad, May 7, 1980 (Ordibehesht 17, 1359), p. 3.

¹⁹ For details see Sh. Bakhsh, Reign, pp. 89-90.

ats in Azerbaijan, had gone into hiding. The NDF had been driven underground after the Ayandegan affair, and the secular democratic left thus lacked a central force. Among NF figures, Karim Sanjabi had been a candidate in his native Kermanshah but withdrew between the two rounds, alleging irregularities. Ahmad Madani won a landslide victory in his native Kerman. The leader of the Iran Party, Abolfazl Qasemi won in his native Darehghaz. The Qashqa'is voted for their paramount khan, Khosrow Qashqa'i. Some of Banisadr's followers also had been NF activists, but they ran as candidates of the "Office" rather than taking the NF label. The most important successful candidate among these was Ahmad Salamatian, who gained one of the Isfahan seats, and Ahmad Ghazanfarpur, Banisadr's old friend and sometime co-author.²⁰ In the end, the IRP-led coalition won about 130 seats out of 245, moderates claimed a total of over 50, and the rest were Independents most of whom soon gravitated towards the IRP.

10.1.3 The LMI during the Banisadr Presidency

The eighteen months from Banisadr's election to his deposition by Khomeini in June 1981 were characterized by a power struggle between the President and the IRP alliance. Fearing a renewed despotism of the executive branch, the Assembly of Experts had drastically curtailed the powers of the presidency. Before the Majles elections Banisadr tried to use his authority as chairman of the Council of the Revolution to name a Prime Minister, hoping that he would be able to get the new parliament to vote for a Prime Minister who had the confidence of a president who

²⁰ See chapter 2, footnote 51.

had Khomeini's confidence. The scheme did not work out, and the formation of a new government was left to the Majles.

10.1.3.1 Transition to Opposition

Banisadr's followers were a minority in parliament, and he thus in effect became the leader of the opposition. After a long struggle between the President and the IRP, Mohammad-Ali Raja'i finally was sworn in as Prime Minister in August 1980. Raja'i was a self-made man, having risen from driver and car mechanic to high school mathematics teacher. He had started his political activism in the LMI in the early 1960's, but then became radicalized. A protege of Ho. Bahunar, he had been imposed on Bazargan's PG as Minister of Education, and embarrassed the government by announcing the nationalization of all private schools before securing cabinet approval for such a drastic move.²¹ Although Bazargan lists him as an LMI member in his breakdown of the PG's membership,²² Raja'i can best be characterized as an IRP fellow traveller who maintained cordial relations with Bazargan.

In an interview with Mizan, Bazargan defined the LMI's new role as opposition party. He made a distinction between his opposition to the Shah regime and his opposition in the new regime, as the latter enjoyed widespread popular support.²³ Shortly after this, Eng. Tavassoli, the

²¹ For more biographical information on Raja'i see Sh. Bakhsh, Reign, pp. 106-107.

²² M. Bazargan, Showra-ye engelab va dowlat-e movagqat (The Revolutionary Council and the Provisional Government) (Teheran: LMI, 1983), p. 39

²³ Mizan, September 11, 1980 (Shahrivar 20, 1359), p. 2.

last LMI figure in a prominent national position, tendered his resignation as mayor of Teheran, but it was not accepted until December 25 (Dey 4).

In late October 1980 Bazargan wrote a series of four articles in Mizan about the new repression and compared it with that of the Shah. He blamed leftists for having misused the freedom under the PG, as a result of which the IRP had obtained the pretext to oppress everybody. He complained about the climate of fear that was reigning over society, and the regime's meddling in people's private lives. He contrasted the tolerance of the Shi'ite Imams with the repression in the Islamic republic, predicting that if a party misused the sacred realm of religion and the clergy under the pretext that religion and politics were inseparable, oppression would grow. He concluded with the old theme that justice and truth grew better in a climate of freedom, and that no enemy had ever been permanently silenced by repression.²⁴ As the LMI began to define itself as an opposition party in the autumn of 1980, it never attacked or even criticized Khomeini. At the end of the year, on the first anniversary of the constitution, the LMI issued a declaration in which it called itself the first party to accept the leadership of Khomeini, back in 1963.²⁵

Towards the end of 1980 the left started in its analyses to divide the religious movement into "reactionaries" and "liberals." The latter word became a term of opprobrium used against the LMI, even by the fun-

²⁴ Mizan, October 25-30, 1980 (Aban 3-8, 1359).

²⁵ Mizan, December 10, 1980 (Azar 19, 1359), p. 2.

damentalists. In response, Yazdi wrote two articles in Mizan in which he defined the liberalism of the LMI as being reformist rather than of the secularist tradition established by Voltaire.²⁶

In the power struggle between Banisadr and the IRP the LMI increasingly sided with the former, as Banisadr's experience began more and more to resemble that of the PG. But the LMI always remained friendly with Raja'i. When Bazargan fell ill and had to be hospitalized in December 1980, the Prime Minister visited him (along with Iranians from all over the country who came in chartered busses), referred to himself as Bazargan's son and pupil, and prayed for Bazargan's recovery because the country would still need him.²⁷

10.1.3.2 The LMI in Parliament

When the new Majles finally convened in early August, Yadollah Sahabi presided over its inaugural session as chairman by seniority. Bazargan became his deputy. The fact that Sahabi and Bazargan were the two oldest M.P.'s reflects the generational shift that the revolution had brought about. Subsequently Ho. Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected speaker of parliament, a post he still occupied as of 1986.

Very soon the distribution of power within the assembly began to change. The IRP began attracting more and more of the Independents, and thus formed a solid majority. Opposing this majority was a minority made up of men sharing common roots in the National Movement, i.e. LMI

²⁶ Mizan, December 20, 1980 (Azar 29, 1359), p. 2, and December 23, 1980 (Dey 2, 1359), p. 2.

²⁷ Mizan, December 3, 1980 (Azar 12, 1359), p. 1.

members and sympathizers (Mo'infar), Banisadr's personal followers, and isolated M.P.'s like Kazem Sami and Ezzatollah Sahabi; a few erstwhile Shariatmadari supporters who managed to get elected from Azerbaijan; and a few progressive mullas like Ho. Mohammad-Javad Hojjati Kermani, Sheikh Ali Tehrani, and Ho. Golzadeh Ghafuri. The composition of this opposition changed depending on the issues, but at best it could muster about 45 votes.

One of the first acts of the new Majles was to change its name from National Consultative Assembly to Islamic Consultative Assembly. The minority voted against, arguing that the constitution of the Islamic Republic used the former name. This was the first official act deemphasizing Iranian nationhood, and one after the other all institutions that had the word "national" (melli) in them had their names changed, much to the annoyance of the Mosaddeqists and secularists.

Then the credentials of a number of M.P.'s were contested, most of them secular Nationalists. Madani and Qashqa'i refused to appear before the assembly to defend themselves against charges brought against them on the basis of documents found in the American embassy. The former went first into hiding and then into European exile, while the latter joined his tribe and was later caught, tried, and executed on October 1, 1982. Qasemi was arrested, tried for alleged contacts with the United States and involvement in an aborted coup attempt by pro-Bakhtiar officers and condemned to lifelong prison.²⁸ Repression also hit the National Front as an organization: On July 20 (Tir 29) the headquarters of

²⁸ For details see Sh. Bakhash, Reign, pp. 117-120.

both the NF and the IP were attacked, just as Sanjabi was readying himself to give a speech in commemoration of July 21 (Tir 30).²⁹ The credentials of the Jewish delegate were not accepted because of alleged Zionist connections. Mo'infar faced the credentials committee and won a parliamentary vote. Throughout these proceedings the opposition gave cautious encouragement to the NF deputies-elect, and both Y. Sahabi and Ho. Hojjati Kermani wrote to Madani urging him to come to Teheran and face his accusers. But the LMI deputies did not defend them publicly.

When the Raja'i government sought parliament's vote of confidence, the LMI M.P.'s voted with Banisadr's supporters against Raja'i. They specified that they did not question the Prime Minister-designate's good intentions, but since they had doubts about his competence it was their Islamic duty to vote against him.

After that the LMI in fact became an opposition in the Majles, although for a while its members participated fully in all committees. From the start the LMI M.P.'s were attacked, insulted, and ridiculed by radicals in the chamber. Bazargan commented that he was disappointed to see that the Majles was not an assembly of insightful legislators and politicians, but a forum for arousing passions and shouting slogans. He added: "When we are the object of unfounded accusations, we prefer to keep quiet and suffer in silence rather than waste parliament's time with personal matters."³⁰

²⁹ Bamdad, July 21, 1980 (Tir 30, 1359), p. 13.

³⁰ Mizan, September 11, 1980 (Shahrivar 20, 1359), p. 2.

After the first meeting of the Majles, deputies had drawn lots to determine the order in which they could make their first pre-agenda speeches. Nobody was really surprised when Bazargan "drew" one of the last lots, which meant that he got a chance to speak only on February 15, 1981 (Bahman 26, 1359). On that day Bazargan urged Raja'i, Banisadr, and Dr. Beheshti, whom Khomeini had named chief justice, to stop feuding. He commended the president for his services as commander of the army, but chided him for claiming more power than the constitution granted him. He advised him to carry out his task with more dignity and spend less time on polemics and pamphleteering. But he reserved his sharpest criticism for Beheshti, whom he accused of interfering too much with political matters. At the same time he faulted the Raja'i government for its bad management.³¹ He also attacked the IRP for trying to set up a one-party State, and added that in order to prevent such a development the LMI would step up its activities.³²

When the struggle between the President and the IRP came to a head in the spring of 1981, Bazargan and the LMI continued urging both sides to be more moderate and to try to get along. Banisadr's own supporters in the Majles went into hiding in early June; and it was Ali-Akbar Mo'infar who gave a last impassioned speech in defense of the President.

³¹ Mizan, February 16, 1981 (Bahman 27, 1359), p. 10.

³² The Christian Science Monitor, March 3, 1981, p. 8.

10.1.3.3 Party Activities

After the fall of the PG and the split caused by the defection of some younger members it took some time for the LMI to reconstitute itself as a party. Yazdi was the main driving force behind the LMI's revival after the trauma of the hostage crisis. As in its first period, 1961-1963, the LMI did not make any attempts to become a mass party, or actively to recruit members. The War with Iraq had broken out in September 1980, and after that any attempt to mobilize against the government was represented by the regime as an unpatriotic act. Therefore, the LMI continued its old method of trying to influence people's way of thinking, to gain what it calls hamfekar, "fellow thinkers," rather than members.

The LMI held its first congress after the departure of Ezzatollah Sahabi in July 1980 (Tir 1359). The congress, the LMI's third, ended with a resolution that clearly imitated revolutionary rhetoric. It defined the party's program as resting on three principles: Islam, the constitution of the Islamic Republic, and the belief in the unity of all Muslims in the world, which necessitated struggling for the liberation of the world's disinherited.³³

At first the party's activities were mostly low-key, centering on talks and seminars at the party's headquarters on Motahhari Avenue in Teheran's North. On these occasions the leaders would speak to party members and sympathizers. After the shock of the PG's demise was over,

³³ Mavaze'-e nehzat dar kongrehha-ye sevvom, chaharom, panjom (The Movement's positions in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Congresses) (Teheran: LMI, 1983), p. 11. See Appendix B for a partial translation of the full text.

Bazargan began his counter-attack by defending his record as Prime Minister and criticizing the methods and policies of the fundamentalists.

On February 24, 1981 (Esfand 5, 1359) the party staged its first and last public meeting. Held at the Amjadih Stadium, it attracted 40,000 people and was billed as a meeting of "the four Teheran deputies." Bazargan, Y. Sahabi, Yazdi, and Sabbaghian addressed the crowd, renewed their allegiance to Mosaddeq, and firmly criticized the government. Yazdi called the IRP's methods "Stalinist." The authorities cooperated by letting regular police handle security instead of the Pasdaran. The success of this meeting raised the hopes of the religious moderates, and Mizan proclaimed that the "spell had been broken." The next day the four LMI M.P.'s paid a visit to Khomeini, who told them that he suffered from the prevailing lack of unity. Khomeini's older brother, Ay. Pasan-dideh, went farther and sent a supportive telegram.³⁴

On March 5 (Esfand 14) the LMI co-sponsored rallies at Teheran University and in Isfahan to commemorate the anniversary of Mosaddeq's death. Hezbollahis appeared on the scene and started roughing up participants when Banisadr began to speak, but for the first time the President's supporters fought back as Mojahedin activists neutralized the hezbollahis. Later the IRP's party organ criticized the LMI for its participation in the meetings.³⁵ Nevertheless, when Khomeini made a final effort to reconcile Banisadr and the government by setting up a commission on March 15, Bazargan joined it as mediator.

³⁴ Mizan, February 25, 1981 (Esfand 6, 1359), p. 4.

³⁵ Mizan, March 8, 1981 (Esfand 17, 1359), p. 10.

While the LMI tried to counter the growing anti-Mosaddeq trend in the Islamic Republic, it also strove to maintain its Islamic legitimacy by participating in all marches organized by the regime, be it for religious occasions or the war with Iraq. The party's statements increasingly included Qoranic references.

In the spring of 1981 repression began to hit the LMI. On April 6 the editor of Mizan, Reza Sadr, was arrested (vide infra). In early May Bazargan's weekly television program "Return to the Qoran," which he had aired since December 10, 1980, was cancelled.³⁶ When the party planned to celebrate publicly its twentieth anniversary in mid-May 1981 authorities refused to grant the necessary permission; the LMI instead held a private meeting at the tomb of Taleqani on May 14.³⁷ The death of Bazargan's brother a few days later gave the LMI an opportunity to demonstrate popular support for Bazargan by publishing hundreds of messages of condolence, including statements by Khomeini and Beheshti, in successive issues of Mizan.

"Education" has always been a high priority for the LMI, and in May 1981 it announced that it would organize three month afternoon courses at its headquarters for its sympathizers and "fellow thinkers." Classes were held on the following subjects:³⁸

³⁶ Mizan, May 10, 1981 (Ordibehesht 20, 1360), p. 2.

³⁷ Mizan, May 16, 1981 (Ordibehesht 26, 1360), p. 1.

³⁸ Mizan, May 11, 1981 (Ordibehesht 21, 1360), p. 1.

- 1-Lessons from the Qoran
- 2-Readings in the Nahj ul-Balaghah
- 3-History of Early Islam
- 4-The Bases of Iran's Islamic Revolution
- 5-Iranian Social and Political History of the last 200 years.
- 6-Political Ideologies and Terminologies
- 7-History of Revolutions
- 8-Comparative Economics

10.1.3.4 Mizan

The LMI and the PG had always complained about their insufficient access to the press. With the transition and the elections behind them, LMI leaders began publishing their own daily newspaper Mizan, ("balance"),³⁹ on September 7, 1980 (Shahrivar 16, 1359). Its editor was Reza Sadr.

The first editorial claimed that the newspaper was not the organ of the LMI, but that it would be open to all Islamic groups. And Mizan did publish articles by progressive clerics, former LMI figures, and even an occasional communique from the Mojahedin. After only a few issues the paper came under attack from both the fundamentalist press and the Tudeh organ Mardom. The regime at that point tolerated Tudeh activities to a considerable degree, and the party was allowed to print and distribute its organ freely. This tolerance worried the LMI, and anti-Mardom polemics became a recurrent theme in Mizan.

The first violent attacks on Mizan occurred on November 18 (Aban 27) when hezbollahi goons ransacked the editorial offices. It is said that on that occasion Khomeini himself ordered the newspaper to be allowed to

³⁹ The first issue explained that the newspaper wished to be neither left wing nor right wing, but strike a balance. Yet another neither-norism.

reappear."

On April 6 Reza Sadr, the editor of Mizan, was arrested and his newspaper closed down. The official reason was that it had engaged in "disrupting the internal security, slander, and insults," charges that stemmed from a Mizan editorial that had warned about communist infiltration in the radio television network.⁴⁰ One week after this incident Bazargan published an appeal in Engelab-e Eslami, Banisadr's newspaper, asking for donations to help pay for the bail. The President's organ joined the campaign in defense of Mizan, and the public responded enthusiastically. People lined up behind bank counters and contributed five times more than Bazargan had asked for. On April 19 a court ordered the reappearance of Mizan, which began publishing again the next day. However, it ceased publication shortly thereafter, and was officially banned on June 7.

In late spring of 1981 the conflict between Banisadr, now openly supported by the Mojahedin, and the IRP reached its peak. Banisadr was hampered by the heterogeneity of the coalition supporting him: leftists, moderates, intellectuals, conservative ulema, and certain Bazaaris, groups that mistrusted each other. On June 10 the Mojahedin called for

⁴⁰ It is interesting that the first attack on the principal mouthpiece of the modernists took place on Tasu'a, the ninth day of Muharram. The next day, on Ashura, hezbollahis attacked and looted Mohammad-Taqi Shariati's Center for the Propagation of Islamic Truths in Mashad. The modernists had contributed to turning the Muharram kairoi into occasions for political action; barely two years after Muharram demonstrations spelled the end of the Shah regime (cf. chapter 8), the weapon was used against the modernists themselves.

⁴¹ Bill Barker, "Iranian moderates, mullahs clash over Bazargan's paper," in The Christian Science Monitor, April 9, 1981, p. 10.

a mass meeting, which ended in fighting, and on June 15 the National Front made a last stand and called for a demonstration. Shortly before it was scheduled to begin, Khomeini went on the radio, charged the NF with apostasy, and called on the LMI to disassociate itself publicly from the meeting. Bazargan immediately obliged.

The LMI thus turned its back on its secular allies of more than two decades, and chose to remain under Khomeini's umbrella. It acted on the principle, enunciated by Yazdi a year and a half earlier, that only association with the Imam brought legitimacy.⁴² Faced with the last liberal effort to stem the tide of a new dictatorship, the LMI sided with the latter. Whether this choice was right is an open question; it remains a fact that it allowed the party to survive. Shortly after these events the LMI lost one of its most popular figures. On June 21, Mostafa Chamran, who had been organizing anti-Iraqi guerrilla bands in Kurdistan, was killed on the front. There were rumors that he had been killed by the regime because he had acted as liaison between Banisadr and the army. An estimated 200,000 people attended his funeral in Teheran, and it is a sign of the LMI's insufficient sense of publicity that his long-time affiliation with the party went largely unnoticed.

The first elected president of the Islamic Republic was deposed by the Majles on June 21, 1981.⁴³ On June 28, 1981 (Tir 6, 1359) an explosion occurred at the headquarters of the IRP and killed the top leadership of the party, including Beheshti. After Banisadr's ouster Raja'i

⁴² The Iranian, December 15, 1979 (Azar 24, 1358), p. 10.

⁴³ For a detailed account see Sh. Bakhash, Reign, pp. 153-165.

became president in an election in which all the other candidates urged voters to vote for Raja'i. Two months later, on August 30 (Shahrivar 8) a second explosion killed Raja'i and his Prime Minister, Ho. Bahonar. The deaths of Beheshti and Raja'i affected the relationship between the LMI and the regime in a way similar to what the death of the Mojahedin founders had meant for that organization's links with the LMI.⁴⁴ Although political opponents, Bazargan and Beheshti had known each other for a long time. Beheshti's death brought younger fundamentalists to the foreground who had no respect for Bazargan whatsoever, which meant that repression would hit the LMI harder in the years to come.

10.2 THE LMI SINCE 1981

In the summer of 1981 repression intensified in Iran. The Mojahedin and allied leftist groups attempted an armed uprising, and were thoroughly crushed by the regime. Thousands of their militants and sympathizers died at the hands of the security forces in the second half of 1981. In 1982 there was another attempt to oust the regime, this time involving Sadeq Qotbzadeh and perhaps Ay. Shariatmadari. Qotbzadeh was executed; Shariatmadari, in an unprecedented step, was stripped of his title of marja'. The LMI had nothing to do with it, and did not raise its voice in defense of Shariatmadari.

Oppositional activity became even more difficult than in 1980 and early 1981. Moreover, the LMI lost direct contact with Khomeini after they disagreed with the institutionalization of the law of the talion (qesas).

⁴⁴ See chapter 7.

After the rout of Banisadr's forces the moderate minority in the Majles had dwindled to a handful: the five LMI deputies, Mo'infar, and Sami. Hasan Habibi, who had been very close to the LMI until 1980, defected to the radical side (and was rewarded with the ministry of justice in 1984), as did Mohammad-Javad Raja'ian, the M.P. from Zanjan. Ezzatollah Sahabi remained neutral, on the theory that the regime was, if nothing else, anti-imperialist and that it was therefore wrong to weaken it. Every time there were rumors about a reorganization of government, his name came up as an alternative Prime Minister.

The atmosphere in parliament became ever more hostile to Bazargan and his friends. The LMI deputies' speeches were interrupted and booed by hecklers, who went so far as to physically attack the men, including octogenarian Yadollah Sahabi. On October 7 1981 (Mehr 15, 1359) Bazargan condemned the daily killings in a speech in parliament that was broadcast live, declaring that those "acts of revenge by the government [would] turn the country into an ocean of blood."⁴⁵ This speech resulted in efforts to have the "liberals" expelled from the chamber. Perhaps fearing for their safety, they stayed away voluntarily.

In November 1981 the LMI held its fourth congress, in memory of Chamran. The congress' resolution unambiguously accepted Khomeini's leadership of the country,⁴⁶ but on the whole emphasized foreign policy.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ The New York Times, October 8, 1981, p. 14.

⁴⁶ Mavaze', p. 22.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 23-34.

In late 1981 the fundamentalists became so violent, that some relative moderates within the regime began to feel threatened. Sometime in December the speaker of parliament, Rafsanjani, tried to visit his imprisoned son-in-law (a son of Ay. Lahuti, the deputy from Rasht who died in prison a bit later), but was prevented from seeing him. In order to stem the rise of the most radical elements, Rafsanjani proposed an alliance to Bazargan and to Ay. Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani, the overseer of the komitehs and a relative moderate (he is the only high ranking political official who never joined the IRP). Subsequently Bazargan and his colleagues returned to the Majles in early January 1982, and there were no more efforts to expell them.⁴⁸ After their experience in the PG, however, the LMI were suspicious of the political clergy, and nothing came of that alliance. As Rafsanjani gradually brought the most radical elements of the IRP under control, he no longer needed the LMI.

The LMI had no newspaper, its activities in the Majles were largely ignored by the official press, and the party came under constant attack during the friday congregational prayers all over the country. All it could do was to publish pamphlets, books, declarations, and open letters to the various turbaned dignitaries of the regime, and distribute them in the population. Bazargan and others gave talks at party headquarters and at the Islamic Society of Engineers, during which they justified the PG's record, criticized the government from an Islamic viewpoint, and attempted to formulate alternatives. Often these meetings would be interrupted by hezbollahi thugs, after which, in a recurring pattern, the

⁴⁸ Ralph Joseph, "Iranian politicians join ranks to curb fundamentalist power," in The Christian Science Monitor, January 11, p. 3.

LMI would call Ay. Mahdavi Kani who would dispatch komiteh forces to escort the LMI leaders safely out of the premises while arresting none of the assailants. The LMI also held two more congresses, in March 1983 and March 1984.

New legislative elections had to be held in April 1984, and the LMI announced that it would organize a seminar in its headquarters on the topic of free elections on October 28, 1983 (Aban 6, 1362). The authorities having refused permission, the LMI cancelled the seminar. Yet, on that day hezbollahis attacked the party headquarters. The LMI declared that it would boycott the forthcoming elections. In the Majles, Hashemi Rafsanjani refused to let Bazargan give his farewell speech, which had been scheduled for May 24, 1984 (Khordad 3, 1363).

On February 11, 1985 (Bahman 22, 1363) the LMI held a religious celebration at its headquarters. On that occasion, the prosecutor general of Teheran, Mir-Emadi, personally oversaw a hezobollahi attack on the building, during which the attackers destroyed furniture and office equipment, took all the cash they could find, and roughed up those present. To punish the LMI for arousing the ire of "the party of God," authorities closed down the headquarters altogether.⁴⁹

After the legislative elections of April 1984, the mandate of President Khameneh'i came to a close in the summer of 1985. Shortly before that, relative moderates in the regime had obtained that the LMI be al-

⁴⁹ For a good summary of the LMI's role in Iranian politics after the revolution see Jean Gueyras, "Le mouvement de libération de l'Iran demeure la dernière opposition légale au régime," in Le Monde, May 2, 1985, p. 4.

lowed to reopen its headquarters on Motahhari Ave. There were some within the regime who wanted the LMI to present a candidate, perhaps to diffuse mounting dissatisfaction.

There were long discussions within the LMI as to the advisability of a participation in the elections. Yazdi was against, Bazargan for. In the end Bazargan, after some hesitation, deposited his candidacy at the Ministry of the Interior, but the Council of Guardians, which has to approve candidacies, rejected his application. The LMI presented that as proof that freedom did not exist in Iran.

Since the elections of 1984 and 1985 the LMI has expanded its activities considerably. The party can now count on a network of sympathizers in the provinces who reprint and distribute its tracts and pamphlets. Moreover, some NF figures who remained in Iran after the outlawing of their movement (H. Manian, Ali Ardalan, Shamseddin Amir-Ala'i) are now cooperating with the party. Mohammad Bastehnegar, Taleqani's son-in-law, has rejoined the LMI. Ezzatollah Sahabi, whom the regime did not reward with a parliamentary seat for his distancing himself from the LMI, has made some moves towards a rapprochement, although he has not rejoined the party. Outside Iran, some former associates of Banisadr's have discreetly contacted the LMI after the former president broke with the Mojahedin in 1984. In the LMI's most recent statements, there seems to be a deemphasis of religious quotations. If this trend is confirmed, it could mean that the party is taking act of the growing anti-religious sentiment in the population.

All of this has emboldened the LMI, and in a pamphlet called "What is to be done," published in June 1985, it called on the Iranian people to start passive resistance against the regime. The party's other main theme is now the war with Iraq. According to the LMI, after the recapture of all Iraqi-held territories by Iranian troops, the war with Iraq has become an aggressive war and incompatible with Islam.

In spite of all its efforts, the LMI has accomplished next to nothing. In between hezbollahi actions against it, the regime has largely ignored it. This has led to some soul-searching among party members, as they realize that the legalistic approach that has characterized the LMI for so long has failed. As of this writing (January 1986) there is considerable discussion about what to do next.

It is too early to evaluate the role of the LMI as opposition under the Islamic Republic. That regime's constitution does not provide for a one-party State, thus there is legal ground for the existence of an opposition party. As under the Shah, the LMI has tried to exploit every single legal possibility for its benefit, always stressing that it acts within the bounds of the law. This has the advantage that in order to silence it, the regime has to disregard its own legality.

Given the regime's blatant disregard for its own constitution and laws in other domains, why has the LMI been tolerated so far? Probably for a combination of reasons. The leaders of the LMI were, after all, the pioneers of the Islamic revival in Iran, and therefore have a genuine constituency in the population. Also, they have maintained courte-

ous relations with some members of the clergy, including Ay. Mahdavi Kani and, more importantly, Ay. Montazeri, Khomeini's chosen successor. Relations with Khomeini himself have been maintained indirectly through his brother, Ay. Pasandideh, whose son, Eng. Reza Pasandideh cooperates with the LMI. These contacts have created a certain immunity for Bazargan and his friends.

The party's appeal in the population is very difficult to gauge. Being the only legal opposition in Iran after the rout of Banisadr in 1981 and the suppression of the Tudeh in 1983, the party's statements and pamphlets are of course read and distributed widely in Iran. When in 1984 Bazargan wrote his account of the revolution, "The Islamic Revolution in Two Movements,"⁵⁰ the book sold 100,000 copies, and that in a country where the starting edition of a book is at most 5000.

But a key sector of the Iranian population, the demoralized remnants of the modern segment, do not forgive Bazargan for having cooperated with Khomeini at the beginning of the revolution. The LMI was the last party to come under attack, and many Iranians feel that it discovered the essentially repressive character of the Islamic regime very late. As for the left, its various factions opposed Bazargan's gradualist approach under the Shah, and they have nothing good to say about him now. Whether the LMI has been able to woo back at least some of those Islamicly inclined Iranians who are disappointed with the IRP's record is difficult to tell. It is impossible to know to what extent Iran's triumphant traditional segment considers people like Bazargan and Yazdi as

⁵⁰ See chapter 9, footnote 50 for the reference.

belonging to its collective "us" or to the modern, defeated segment,
i.e. "them."

As for the exiled opposition, most of its many factions oppose Bazargan for not having broken with Khomeini. They portray him, not altogether wrongly, as Khomeini's Amini, the final recourse should things ever get too much out of hand. They also accuse the LMI as constituting the regime's democratic fig-leaf, ultimately reinforcing the regime's legitimacy. Any judgment on this matter has to take into account what the exiles themselves have achieved in way of dislodging the Islamic dictatorship. And that is precious little, so far. Bazargan himself, in a letter dated September 18, 1985 (Shahrivar 27, 1364) and written during a short trip to Germany, asked all exiled Iranians to return to Iran, to contribute to the establishment of freedom and democracy.

CONCLUSION

More than any other group, the experience of the LMI exemplifies the gradual displacement of secularism and the rise of religion in the Iranian polity: one only has to read the party's programs of 1961 and 1980 in succession to get a sense of this development (vide Appendices A and B). The leaders of the LMI started this movement, and finally were overtaken by it. People whom some considered religious fanatics in 1953 are now moderates. In 1953-1963 they defended the role of religion in society, while now they warn against religious dogmatism and intolerance.

In a way Bazargan and his friends bear a direct responsibility for the emergence of a theocracy in the last third of the twentieth century. If it had not been for their efforts, perhaps Khomeini would not have been able to adopt a style that could bring very different elements in Iranian society together. But just as Herder cannot be held responsible for the ravages of Nazism, it would be unfair to blame Bazargan and his friends of the LMI for all the calamities that have befallen Iran as a result of the Islamic revolution.

The history of the LMI also illustrates the dilemmas facing moderates in polarized societies. Trying to bridge gaps, they end marginalized. Worse, they may be left without any allies, as each side in the conflict criticizes them for their lack of firmness in facing the opposite side.

The LMI began as a religiously oriented component of the National Movement, but throughout its life disagreements with the secular elements in the NF over the proper place of religion in society and politics hampered the effectivity of the Nationalists. When the LMI leaders were tried in 1963 after the secular Mosaddeqists were freed, the latter did not protest. When the Islamic regime silenced the NF, the LMI did not move.

The LMI's post-1980 position of exonerating Khomeini from all guilt and only blaming his underlings is formally reminiscent of the National Front's position vis-a-vis the Shah before 1963. The major difference, of course, is that Khomeini can count on more intensive, and perhaps even extensive, support in Iran than the Shah could in 1953-1963. Opting for being a loyal opposition in a dictatorship is almost by its very nature an ungrateful choice.

The LMI will reap the rewards of such a policy only if the Islamic republic liberalizes its workings. Allowing a religiously oriented opposition party truly to participate in the country's political life could be a first step towards a further opening. So far the Islamic regime has given no indications that it is going in that direction.

If the Islamic Republic survives under its present form, the LMI will have objectively contributed to that regime's consolidation by always criticizing details rather than essentials. Should non-Islamic groups bring about the fall of the Iranian regime, it is unlikely that the new regime would be very favorably disposed towards the LMI, even if the LMI started claiming that its adherence to the Islamic constitution had been only "tactical." In Iran, it seems that moderation does not pay.

For over three decades Bazargan and his friends have had to endure the base behaviour of chaqukeshs and hezbollahis. They have shown a degree of patience and perseverance of which perhaps only men with faith are capable. Their brand of Islam may not satisfy a modern intellectual's standards of coherence and rigor, but a critical attitude should not degenerate into condescension. Iran is an Islamic country, and any representative government must take this fact into account. Whatever one might think of the LMI's Islamic ideology per se, life under it would be far more congenial for a secular-minded person than life under Khomeini's Islamic Republic.

At the outset of this study we said that any analysis of the politics of a country like Iran had to take into account the meddling of foreign powers. Iran's history in the twentieth century is a constant struggle for emancipation, for the resolution of the crisis of sovereignty. Since 1953 the United States has been the most important outside force in Iran. The lack of comprehension of American policy makers for the Iranian wish to be independent is staggering. Every time an American politician or analyst speaks of the Shah's demise as the "loss of Iran" he or she unwittingly confirms the views of those Iranians who always regarded the Shah as an American puppet. As late as 1983, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his memoirs, came close to formulating a Western "Brezhnev Doctrine" for Iran.

This incomprehension is partly responsible for what has happened in Iran; perhaps it really took a Khomeini to cut the Gordian knot of the country's crisis of sovereignty. The sad thing is that the resolution

led to the fall of an American president who was perhaps less disrespectful of Iranian sensibilities than any president before him. President Carter paid for the mistakes of his Republican predecessors: Eisenhower, who ordered the CIA to help oust Mosaddeq, and Nixon, who made the Shah the American satrap in the Middle East. It is a sad irony that the Iranian revolution, instead of being a lesson for the United States, reinforced interventionism and unilateralism and weakened public resistance against imperialism.

Appendix A

THE PARTY PROGRAM OF THE LMI IN 1961

Teheran, Ordibehesht 25, 1340

With the Help of the Great and Almighty God

VERILY, GOD CHANGES NOT WHAT A PEOPLE HAS
UNTIL THEY CHANGE IT THEMSELVES

1. Considering the need to safeguard the rights of the Iranian people, from which, by the will of God, emanate all powers ruling over it
2. Considering the need to [enjoy] the freedom to found National organizations for the purpose of furthering the principle that the Iranian people are at the source of all correct social evolution, and that until every Iranian does not feel to have personal [dignity], freedom, and social value, that until he does not feel that he has a say in the conduct of his affairs, and that until he is not allowed to engage in social activism, protest, and constructive criticism, national talents will not flower and the nation will not attain happiness
3. Considering the need to establish social justice, which is of vital importance for maintaining domestic order, for preventing foreign meddling, and for maintaining international peace, especially in the Middle East
4. Considering the country's urgent need for a ruling group deriving its powers from the confidence and support of the people and cognizant of the conditions of the world and our time, which must be determined to enact truly national policies and face every kind of aggression and provocation to safeguard the people's rights and especially the sacred principles of the National Movement of Iran
5. And finally considering the self-evident truth that the progress of every movement and the survival of every nation are impossible without action, sacrifice, and piety both of society and of the individual:

In compliance with

1. THE HIGH PRINCIPLES OF ISLAM AND IRAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS,
2. THE INTERNATIONAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
3. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

the Liberation Movement of Iran commences its activities in pursuit of the following goals.

GOALS AND POINTS OF THE PARTY PROGRAM

A- In Domestic Politics

FIRST POINT:

1. To revive the fundamental rights of the Iranian people and install the rule of law and thereby delimit the powers and responsibilities of the different branches of government for the purpose of establishing the rule of the people by the people.
2. To entrust the government to individuals who are worthy of leading the country in today's developed world among its awoken nations.

SECOND POINT:

1. To spread moral, social, and political principles based on the exalted religion of Islam with due attention to the political and cultural conditions of the present age.
2. To encourage honesty and piety and struggle against moral corruption, addictions, and harmful publications.
3. To dispose of the elements of dishonesty and corruption, especially the symbols of foreign dominance, and to discard all those elements which stand in the way of effective, genuine, and quick reforms or which contribute to the weakening of the individual and collective personality of Iranians.
4. To struggle against the enemies of the people's bodily, intellectual, and moral health, that is to say to overcome fear, helplessness, poverty, ignorance, underdevelopment, and disunity.

THIRD POINT:

1. To gradually prepare for their participation in the running of public affairs, for making good use of democracy, and for claiming their social rights.

FOURTH POINT:

1. To achieve economic independence. To create correct financial, commercial, social, cultural, health, agricultural, and industrial orders.
2. To establish just and peaceful relations between workers and employers, and between peasants and landowners.
3. To develop social security and to create insurance for peasants.
4. To allocate the oil the oil revenues and foreign loans to development projects in agriculture, industry, and infrastructure and to remove said revenues and loans from the country's current budget.
5. To create financial and economic security to encourage the repatriation of private capital held in foreign banks.

FIFTH POINT:

1. To gradually reform the nation's laws by means of creating a central organization for the elaboration of law projects.
2. To comply totally with the independence of the judicial branch, to widen the competencies of general jurisdictions and to abolish special jurisdictions.
3. To reform existing security and judicial apparatuses so as to achieve security and gain for them the confidence and goodwill of the people.

SIXTH POINT

1. To utilize the manpower of the entire population as the country's main capital, and to create confidence and strong belief in the principle that "A better life results from more useful activity."
2. To combat unemployment and idleness, egoism, self-indulgence, and privileges resulting from discrimination.

SEVENTH POINT

1. To provide for the country's sound administration by
 - stabilizing offices by respecting the independence of officials and encouraging them to seek more expertise and competence,
 - training managers and strengthening offices of management, statistics, and research in all fields,
 - making use of modern methods of management,
 - and by providing for the material and spiritual welfare of government officials.

B- In Foreign Affairs

EIGHTH POINT:

1. To strive for the transfer of the right to determine the world's fate from the big nations to the United Nations so as to assure the freedom and independence of small nations. International Justice. World Peace.

NINETH POINT:

1. To strive for Iran's neutrality.

TENTH POINT:

1. To base foreign relations on the Charter of the United Nations. To create good understanding between Iran and all nations, especially neighboring countries.

ELEVENTH POINT:

1. To strive for unity among peace-loving and neutral nations which share common historical, geographical, cultural, social, or religious interests and to strive for the unity of all Muslim countries so as to facilitate the attainment of these goals.

TWELFTH POINT:

1. To accept responsibility for and to partake in international efforts aimed at solving world problems peacefully.
2. To support genuine national movements and the independence and freedom of all peoples.

Appendix B

THE LMI PROGRAM OF JULY 1980

FIRST SECTION: Introduction

...

SECOND SECTION: Principles

The program of the LMI is based on the following three principles:

1- The lofty principles of Islam, the only divine religion ... in the largest sense of the word, [representing] tenets that have been transmitted in their most pristine form by the Shi'ite school..., and waiting and preparing for the victory at the end of times as well as the united world government.

2- The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which the majority of the Iranian people approved in a referendum held on Azar 11 and Azar 12, 1358, and which is the only valid document and the only firm basis for unity and government.

3- Belief in the worldwide unity of all Muslims [and] continuing struggle for the realization of the umma, and the liberation of all the disinherited of the world.

THIRD SECTION: Party Program

A- Concerning the preservation of the Islamic Revolution and the prevention of its deviation and destruction:

1- To spread the monotheistic worldview and the Islamic ideology.

2- To accept the leadership of the Imam and to struggle against all acts that might weaken his leadership.

3- To cooperate with the informed, committed, and authentic clergy that [does not wish to monopolize power] and that moves along the path of unity.

4- To identify and expose counter-revolution and to struggle against its various internal and external manifestations.

5- To encourage the population to participate [on all levels] and to struggle against all acts that might result in popular apathy.

6- [To strive for] cultural revolution and to eliminate all traces of despotism, colonialism, and exploitation. (To identify the polytheistic cultural elements of the former order and to struggle against them.)

7- To explain and to establish an Islamic economic order and to cleanse all the country's economic and industrial relationships of the former order's anti-Islamic or non-Islamic values.

8- To struggle for the consolidation of the unity of all strata of the Islamic umma and to combat all actions that might sow discord or lead to the control of a particular group.

B- Concerning the establishment of the Islamic Republic

1- To defend the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2- To strive for the elimination of the constitution's shortcomings by preparing and ratifying a supplement to it.

3- To struggle for the consolidation of the institutions created by the constitution.

4- To support those responsible in the institutions of the Islamic Republic (the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) so long as they act within the bounds of their legal competencies and in the interest of the preservation and continuation of the Islamic revolution.

5- To strive for the strengthening of [Iranian] society's self-reliance in the economic, technical, and scientific realms, and for the severance of the links of dependency with foreign states. To lay the basis of free and independent [foreign] relations that will preserve our people's interests and increase opportunities for the country's resources.

6- To apply the principles enshrined in the constitution precisely and comprehensively so as to build an acceptable Islamic society.

C- Concerning the worldwide spreading of the Islamic revolution

1- To present, both in theory and in practice, the rightness of the monotheistic worldview as the only way to save mankind.

2- To make the experiences and achievements of Iran's Islamic revolution available to the disinherited of the world.

3- To cooperate with and provide material and spiritual help for Islamic and revolutionary movements.

4- To struggle resolutely against all taghuti orders in the world (Western and Eastern colonialism).

Liberation Movement of Iran
Tir 1359

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources in Persian

Individual pamphlets, newsletters, and reprints are not listed here. They are identified in the text.

Bahsi darbarezeh-ye marja'iyat va rowhaniyat. Teheran: Sazeman-e Enteshar, 1962.

Barkhord ba nehzat va pasokhha-ye ma. Teheran: LMI, 1983.

Bayaniyeh-ye Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran: Tahlili az sharayet-e emruzi-ye enqelab-e eslami-ye Iran va naqd-e niruha-ye darun-e enqelab. Teheran: LMI, 1979.

Bazargan, Abdolali. Masa'el va moshkelat-e nakhostin sal-e enqelab. Teheran: LMI, 1983.

Bazargan, Mehdi. Modafe'at dar dadgah-e gheir-e saleh-e tajdid-e nazar-e nezami. n.p.: Entesharat-e Modarres, n.d.

----- Mazhab dar Orupa. Teheran, n.d.

----- Marz-e mian-e din va omur-e ejtema'i. Houston: Book Distribution Center, 1976.

----- Pragmatizm dar Eslam. Houston: Book Distribution Center, 1976.

----- Rah-e teyy shodeh. Houston: Book Distribution Center, 1977.

----- Serr-e aqab-oftadegi-ye melal-e mosalman. Houston: Book Distribution Center, 1977.

----- Afat-e towhid. Houston: Book Distribution Center, 1978.

----- Sazegari-ye Irani. Houston: Book Distribution Center, 1978.

----- Interview given to Hamid Algar. Nasr, February 1, 1981.

----- Bazyabi-ye arzeshha. Teheran: LMI, 1982.

----- Showra-ye enqelab va dowlat-e movaqqat. Teheran: LMI, 1982.

----- Gomrahan. Teheran, 1983.

----- . Engelab-e eslami dar do harekat. Teheran: 1984.

Chegunegi-ye tashkil-e jebhe-ye melli-ye dovvom va naqsh-e nehzat-e moqavemat-e melli-ye Iran. Houston: LMI(a), 1977.

Goftar-e mah dar namayandan-e rah-e rast-e din, 3 volumes. Teheran: Sadduq, n.d.

Hariri, Naser. Mosahebeh ba tarikhsazan-e Iran. Teheran: 1979.

Jarayan-e ta'sis-e Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran. [Springfield, MO]: LMI(a), 1975.

Mavaze'-e nehzat dar kongrehha-ye sevvom, chaharom, panjom. Teheran: LMI, 1983.

Mobarezat-e siasi va mobarezat-e mazhabi. Teheran, 1962, and [Springfield, MO]: LMI(a), 1976.

Mokatebat-e Mosaddeq: talash baray-e tashkil-e jebhe-ye melli-ye sevvom. Paris: Entesharat-e Mosaddeq, 1975.

Na'ini, Mirza Mohammad-Hosein. Tanbih ul-ummah wa tanzih ul-millah: ya hokumat az nazar-e Eslam. Teheran: Sherkat-e Sahami-ye Enteshar, n.d.

Nashriyeh-ye dakheli-ye Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran. Reprints.

Sahabi, Ezzatollah. Modafe'at-e mohandes Ezzatollah Sahabi dar bidadgah-e tajdid-e nazar-e nezami. [Springfield, MO]: LMI(a), 1976.

Shariati, Ali. Niayesh. Mashad, 1948.

----- . Fatemeh Fatemeh ast. Teheran: Shabdiz, 1977.

----- . Ma va Eqbal. Taheran: Hoseiniyeh Ershad, 1978.

----- . Shi'eh. Teheran: Hoseiniyeh Ershad, 1979.

Talash-e dowlat-e movaqqat bara-ye jelowgiri az jang-e tahmili-ye Iraq. Teheran: LMI. n.d.

Tarikhcheh, jarayan-e kudeta, va khatt-e mashshy-e konuni-ye sazeman-e mojahedin-e khalq-e Iran. N.p.: Entesharat-e Abuzarr, n.d.

Yadnameh-ye bistomin salgard-e Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran. Teheran: LMI, 1981.

Zendeginameh-ye sardar-e rashid-e eslam shahid doktor Mostafa Chamran. Teheran: LMI, 1982.

Primary Sources in other Languages

- Al-e Ahmad, Jalal. Gharbzadegi (Weststruckness). Trans. John Green and Ahmad Alizadeh. Lexington, KY: Mazda, 1982.
- Alexander, Yonah, and Nanes, Allan, eds. The United States and Iran: A Documentary History. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1980.
- Alfieri, Vittorio. Of Tyranny. Trans. Julius A. Molinaro and Beatrice Corrigan. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1961.
- Amnesty International. Annual Report for 1974-75. London: A.I., 1975.
- . Law and Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. London: A.I., 1980.
- Arberry, Arthur J. The Koran Interpreted. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Bazargan, Mehdi. "The Causes of the Decline and Decadence of Islamic Nations." The Islamic Review 23 (6), June 1951.
- . Work in Islam. Trans. M. Yasfi and Ali A. Behzadnia. Houston: Free Islamic Literatures, 1979.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983.
- Carrel, Alexis. Man the Unknown. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935.
- . Prayer. Trans. Dulcie de Ste. Croix Wright. New York: Morehouse-Gorham Co., 1949.
- Carter, Jimmy. A Government as Good as Its People. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977.
- . Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.
- The Documents of Vatican II. New York: Guild Press, 1966.
- Donohue, John J., and Esposito, John L., eds. Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Guénon, René. The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times. Trans. Lord Northbourne. London: Luzac & Co, 1953.
- Herz, Martin F., ed. Contacts with the Opposition: A symposium. Washington: Georgetown University - Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, 1980.

- Hoveyda, Fereydoun. The Fall of the Shah. Trans. Roger Liddell. New York: Wyndham Books, 1980.
- Khomeini, Ruhollah. Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. Trans. and annotated Hamid Algar. Berkeley: Mizan, 1981.
- La Mennais, Felicité de. Des progrès de la révolution et de la guerre contre l'Eglise. Paris: 1829.
- . De l'absolutisme et de la liberté et autres essais. Paris: Ramsey, 1878.
- Laqueur, Walter, and Rubin, Barry. The Human Rights Reader. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979.
- Lecomte de Noüy, Pierre. Human Destiny. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947.
- Lenin, V.I. Collected Works. New York: International Publishers, 1967.
- Ministère de l'éducation nationale - Direction des bibliothèques de France. Catalogue des thèses de doctorat soutenues devant les universités françaises - Année 1963. Paris: Cercle de la librairie, 1964.
- Nobari, Ali-Reza, ed. Iran Erupts. Stanford, CA: The Iran-America Documentation Group, 1978.
- Nyerere, Julius K. Ujamaa -- Essays on Socialism. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Pahlavi, Ashraf. Faces in a Mirror: Memoirs from Exile. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980.
- Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza. Mission for My Country. London: Hutchinson, 1960.
- . Réponse a l'Histoire. Paris: Albin Michel, 1979.
- . Answer to History. New York: Stein and Day, 1980.
- Shariati, Ali. On the Sociology of Islam. Trans. Hamid Algar. Berkeley: Mizan, 1979.
- . From Where Shall We Begin. Trans. Fatollah Marjani. Houston: Free Islamic Literatures, 1980.
- . Marxism and Other Western Fallacies. Trans. R. Campbell. Berkeley: Mizan, 1980.
- . Selection and/or Election. Trans. Ali Asghar Ghassemy. Houston: Free Islamic Literatures, 1980.

- . Man and Islam. Trans. Fatollah Marjani. Houston: Free Islamic Literatures, 1981.
- Sullivan, William. "Dateline Iran: The Road Not Taken." Foreign Policy 40 (Fall 1980).
- . Mission to Iran. New York: W.W. Norton, 1981.
- Tabataba'i, Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn. Shi'ite Islam. Intro., trans. and ed. S.H. Nasr. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975.
- Taleqani, Seyyed Mahmood. Islam and Ownership. Trans. Ahmad Jabbari and Farhang Rajaee. Lexington, KY: Mazda, 1983.
- . Society and Economics in Islam: Writings and Declarations of Ayatullah Sayyid Mahmud Taleghani. Intro. and ed. Hamid Algar, trans. R. Campbell. Berkeley, CA: Mizan, 1982.
- Tillich, Paul. The Protestant Era. Trans. J.L. Adams. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.
- Tully, Andrew. CIA: The Inside Story. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1962.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. United States Aid Operations in Iran. 85th Congress, 1st session, 1957. Report No. 10.
- U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations. "Testimony of William J. Butler, chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Committee of Jurists." 95th Congress, October 26, 1977.
- Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.
- Vieille, Paul, and Banisadr, Abol-Hasan, eds. Pétrole et Violence. Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1974.

Secondary Sources in Persian

- Afrasiabi, Bahram, and Dehqan, Sa'id. Taleqani va tarikh. Taheran: Entesharat-e Nilufar, 1981.
- Ashraf, Ahmad. Mavane'-e tarikhi-ye roshd-e sarmayehdari dar Iran: dow-reh-ye Qajariyeh. Teheran: Zamineh, 1980.
- Banisadr, Abolhasan. Vaz'iyat-e Iran va naqsh-e Modarres. Paris: Entesharat-e Modarres, 1977.
- Bastani Parizi, Mohammad-Ebrahim. Talash-e Azadi. Teheran: Novin, 1977.
- Faza'i, Yusef. Tahqiqi dar tarikh va falsafeh-ye Babigari, Baha'igari va Kasravigara'i. Teheran: Mo'aseseh-ye matbu'ati-ye Farrokhi, 1975.
- Jazani, Bizhan. Tarh-e jame'eh shenasi va mabani-ye estratezhi-ye jon-besh-e enqelabi-ye khalq-e Iran -- Tarikh-e si saleh-ye Iran. Teheran: Entesharat-e Maziar, 1979.
- Katouzian, Homa. "Introduction" to Khalil Maleki. Khaterat-e siasi. Teheran: Entesharat-e Ravaq, 1979.
- Khajehnuri, Ebrahim. Bazigaran-e asr-e tala'i: Seyyed Hasan-e Modarres. Teheran: Javidan, 1979.
- Madani, S. Jalaleddin. Tarikh-e siasi-ye mo'aser-e Iran, II. Teheran: Daftar-e entesharat-e eslami, 1983.
- Nuri Ala', Esma'il. Jame'eh shenasi-ye siasi-ye tashayyo'-e esna-ash-ari. Teheran: Qaqnus, 1978.

Secondary Sources in Other Languages

- Abrahamian, Ervand. "'Ali Shari'ati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution." MERIP Reports 12 (January 1982).
- , Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
- Adamec, Ludwig W. Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University Press of California, 1967.
- Akhavi, Shahrough. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980.
- Algar, Hamid. Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.
- , Mirza Malkum Khan: A Study in the History of Iranian Modernism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973.
- , The Roots of the Islamic Revolution. London: The Open Press, 1983.
- Amir Arjomand, Said. "The Ulama's Traditionalist Opposition to Parliamentarism 1907-1909." Middle Eastern Studies 17 (April 1981).
- , "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran." Government and Opposition 16 (1981).
- , "A la recherche de la conscience collective: Durkheim's ideological impact in Turkey and Iran." The American Sociologist 17 (1982).
- , The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginnings to 1890. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984.
- , ed. From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984.
- Amiralai, Chamseddine. Les régimes politiques et le consortium en Iran (1953-1962). Aix-en-Provence: La Pensée Universelle, 1963.
- Amuzegar, Jahangir, and Fekrat, Ali. Iran: Economic Development under Dualistic Conditions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Anderson, Matthew Smith. The Eastern Question 1774-1923. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966.
- Apter, David E. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965.

- . Introduction to Political Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, 1977.
- Arasteh, A. Reza. Man and Society in Iran. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964.
- . Education and Social Awakening in Iran 1850-1968. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969.
- Ashraf, Ahmad. "Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Bourgeoisie in Iran." In M.A. Cook, ed. Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the rise of Islam to the present day. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970, 1978.
- . "The Roots of Emerging Dual Class Structure in Nineteenth-Century Iran." Iranian Studies 14 (Winter-Spring, 1981).
- , and Hekmat, H. "Merchants and Artisans in the Development Processes of Nineteenth-Century Iran." In A.L. Udovitch, ed. The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900: Studies in Economic and Social History. Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1981.
- . "Bazaar and Mosque in Iran's Revolution." Interview given to Ervand Abrahamian. MERIP Reports 13 (March-April 1983).
- Avery, Peter. Modern Iran. New York: Praeger, 1965.
- Bagehot, Walter. The English Constitution. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963.
- Bakhash, Shaul. Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy & Reform under the Qajars: 1858-1896. London: Ithaca Press, 1978.
- . The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution. New York: Basic Books, 1984.
- Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982.
- Banani, Amin. The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961.
- . "Ahmad Kasravi and the "Purification" of Persian: A Study in Nationalist Motivation." In Ivo Banac, John G. Ackerman, and Roman Szporluk, eds. Nation and Ideology. Essays in Honor of Wayne Vucinich. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1981.
- Banisadr, A.-H., et al. "Les elections et leurs fonctions en Iran." Revue francaise de science politique 27 (1), February 1977.
- Barthes, Roland. "Le discours de l'histoire." Social Science Information 6 (4), August 1967.
- . Mythologies. Trans. Annette Lavers. New York: Hill and Wang, 1975.

- Bausani, Alessandro. Persia religiosa da Zaratustra a Baha'ullah. Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1959.
- Bayat, Manol. "A Phoenix too Frequent: The Concept of Historical Continuity in Modern Iranian Thought." Asian and African Studies 12 (1978).
- , Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982.
- Becker, Seymour. Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Benard, Cheryl, and Khalilzad, Zalmay. "The Government of God" -- Iran's Islamic Republic. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.
- Bendix, Reinhard. Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978.
- Bechert, Heinz. Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravada Buddhismus, vol. 1. Frankfurt a/M. : Alfred Metzner, 1966.
- , Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravada Buddhismus, vol 2. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1967.
- Binder, Leonard. Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964.
- Binder, Leonard, et al. Crises and Sequences in Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Borges, Jorge Luis. Other Inquisitions. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1965.
- Brinton, Crane. Anatomy of Revolution. New York: Random House, 1965.
- Browne, Edward. The Persian Revolution 1905-1909. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910.
- Brucker, Gene. Renaissance Florence. New York: John Wiley & Son, 1969.
- Bunnag, Tej. The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892-1915: The Ministry of the Interior and Prince Damrong Rajanubhab. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Canetti, Elias. Crowds and Power. New York: The Viking Press, 1963.
- Carr, Raymond, and Fusi Aizpurua, Juan Pablo. Spain: dictatorship to democracy. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1981.
- Chehabi, Issa. "Kulturelle Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Iran." Die Horen 26 (123), Autumn 1981.

- Chelkowski, Peter, ed. Ta'ziyeh: Ritual and Drama in Iran. New York: New York University Press, 1979. See articles by E. Fulchignoni, and E. Yarshater.
- Chenu, M.-D. La "doctrine sociale" de l'Eglise comme idéologie. Paris: CERF, 1979.
- Chubin, Bahram, and Zabih, Sepehr. The Foreign Relations of Iran. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974.
- Cottam, Richard. Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1978.
- Merad, Ali. "The Ideologization of Islam in the Contemporary Muslim World." In Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds. Islam and Power. London: Croom Helm, 1981.
- Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
- Darwin, John. Britain, Egypt, and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the aftermath of war 1918-1922. London: MacMillan, 1981.
- Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties. Trans. Barbara and Robert North. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959.
- . Echec au roi. Paris: Albin Michel, 1978.
- Eberhard, Elke. Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safaviden im 16. Jahrhundert nach arabischen Handschriften. Freiburg im Breisgau: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970.
- Edwards, Ruth Dudley. Patrick Pearse: The Triumph of Failure. London: Victor Gollancz, 1977.
- Edwards, W. Sterling, and Edwards, Peter D. Alexis Carrel: Visionary Surgeon. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1974.
- Eisenstadt, S.N., ed. Post-Traditional Societies. New York: W.W. Norton, 1974. See chapters by Eisenstadt and S.J. Tambiah.
- Ekbal, Kamran. "Der politische Einfluss des persischen Kaufmannsstandes in der frühen Kadscharenzeit, dargestellt am Beispiel von Haǧǧi Halil Khan Qazwini Maliku't-Tuǧǧar." Der Islam 57 (1980).
- Eliade, Mircea. The Sacred and the Profane. New York: Harcourt, Brace, World, 1959.
- . Myth and Reality. Trans. W. R. Trask. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
- . The Myths of the Modern World: The Encounter between Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Realities. Trans. Ph. Mairet. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.

- . The Myth of the Eternal Return. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Eliash, Joseph. "Misconceptions Regarding the Juridical Status of the Iranian 'Ulama." International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 10 (1979).
- Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982.
- . "Iran: Khomeini's Concept of the Guardianship of the Jurisconsult." In James L. Piscatori, ed. Islam in the Political Process. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1913. Articles on Aristu-talis and Tidjara.
- Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978. Article on Islah.
- Eshraghi, F. "The Immediate Aftermath of Anglo-Soviet Occupation in Iran in August 1941." In Middle Eastern Studies 20 (July 1984).
- Fields, M., ed. Middle East Annual Report. London, 1977.
- Fischer, Michael M.J. "Persian Society: Transformation and Strain." In Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed. Twentieth Century Iran. London: Heinemann, 1977.
- . Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
- . "Becoming Mollah: Reflections on Iranian Clerics in a Revolutionary Age." Iranian Studies 13 (1980).
- . "Supporting the Evolution of Modern Civil Society from a Traditional Base." In Raymond D. Gastil, ed. Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1981. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981.
- Fisher, David Hackett. Historians' Fallacies: Towards a Logic of Historical Thought. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
- Flanz, Gisbert H. "A Comparative Analysis of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran." In Constitutions of the World, Iran. Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1980.
- Floor, Willem M. "The Guilds in Iran: An Overview from the Earliest Beginnings till 1972." Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 125 (1975).
- Frye, Richard N. Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965.

- Gaube, Heinz, and Wirth, Eugen. Der Bazar von Isfahan. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1978.
- Geiger, Theodor. Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1932.
- , On Social Order and Mass Society, Intro. and ed. Renate Mayntz. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969.
- Gibb, H.A.R. Modern Trends in Islam. New York: Octagon Press, 1972.
- Graham, Robert. Iran: The Illusion of Power. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980.
- Gregorian, Vartan. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1969.
- Greussing, Kurt, ed. Revolution in Iran und Afghanistan. Frankfurt a/M.: Syndikat, 1980. See article by Ahmad Mahrads.
- , ed. Religion und Politik im Iran. Frankfurt a/M.: Syndikat, 1981. See article by H.G. Kippenberg.
- Grew, Raymond, ed. Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- Guiraud, Pierre. La Sémiologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971.
- Haim, Sylvia. "Alfieri and al-Kawakibi." Oriente Moderno 34 (1954).
- Hairi, Abdul-Hadi. Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977.
- , "Shaykh Fazl Allah Nuri's Refutation of the Idea of Constitutionalism." Middle Eastern Studies 13 (October 1977).
- Halliday, Fred. Iran: Dictatorship and Development. New York: Penguin, 1979.
- Halpern, Manfred. The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Hanson, Brad. "The 'Westoxication' of Iran: Depiction and Reactions of Behranghi, Al-e Ahmad, and Shariati." International Journal of Middle East Studies 15 (February 1983).
- Hendershot, Clarence. Politics, Polemics, and Pedagogues. New York: Vantage Press, 1975.
- Hintze, Otto. The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. Ed. Felix Gilbert. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Hinz, Walther. Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im fünfzehnten Jahrhundert. Berlin and Leipzig, 1936.
- Hourani, Albert. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- , and Moore, C.H. Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society. New York: Basic Books, 1970.
- Ibn Khaldun. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Intro. and trans. Franz Rosenthal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958.
- Ioannides, Christos P. America's Iran: Injury and Catharsis. Lanham: University Press of America, 1984.
- Irani, Ali Reza. "Grundzüge der islamischen Ideologie im Iran." Politische Studien, Sonderheft 3/1980.
- Irnberger, Harald. SAVAK oder der Folterfreund des Westens. Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1977.
- Jaques, Elliott. The Form of Time. New York: Crane Russak, 1982.
- Jeshurun, Chandran. The Contest for Siam 1889-1902: A Study in Diplomatic History. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Kabangsaan Malaysia, 1977.
- Julien, Charles-Andre. Le Maroc face aux imperialismes. Paris: Editions J.A., 1978.
- Karpat, Kemal H. Turkey's Politics: The Transformation to a Multiparty System. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- Katouzian, Homa. The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979. New York: New York University Press, 1981.
- Kazemi, Farhad. Poverty and Revolution in Iran. New York: New York University Press, 1980.
- Kazemzadeh, Firuz. Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- , "The terror facing the Bahais." The New York Review of Books, May 13, 1982.
- Keddie, Nikki R. Religion and Rebellion in Iran: the Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 London: Frank Cass, 1966.
- , "The origins of the religious-radical alliance in Iran." Past and Present 34 (1966).

- . Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": a political biography. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972.
- , ed. Scholars, Saints, and Sufis. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972. See articles by H. Algar, R.L. Chambers, and G. Thaiss.
- . Roots of Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.
- , and Bonine, Michael E., eds. Continuity and Change in Modern Iran. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981.
- . An Islamic Response to Imperialism: The Political and Religious Writings of Jamal-al-Din "al-Afghani." Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983.
- , ed. Religion and Politics in Iran. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. See articles by M. Hegland, H. Katouzian, and Yann Richard.
- Kedourie, Elie. Afghani and 'Abduh. London: Frank Cass, 1966.
- , and Haim, Sylvia G. Towards a Modern Iran. London: Frank Cass, 1980. See articles by Abrahamian and Bayat.
- Kelly, John. "CIA in Iran." Counterspy 3 (4), April-May 1979.
- Koszinowski, Thomas. "Der Demokratisierungsprozess in Ägypten: Die Politik Mubaraks im Lichte der Parlamentswahlen vom Mai 1984." Orient 3 (1984).
- Lambton, A.K.S. "The Merchant in Medieval Islam." In Percy Lund, ed. A Locust's Leg. London: Humphries & Co, 1962.
- . "A Reconsideration of the Position of the Marja Al-Taqlid and the Religious Institution." Studia Islamica 20 (1964).
- Lampedusa, Giuseppe Tomasi di. The Leopard. Trans. Archibald Colquhoun. New York: Pantheon Books, 1960.
- LaPalombara, Joseph. "Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics." Comparative Politics 1 (October 1968).
- Larrain, Jorge. The Concept of Ideology. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1979.
- Le Bon, Gustave. The Crowd. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.
- Lecomte de Noüy, Marie. The Road to "Human Destiny": A Life of Pierre Lecomte de Noüy. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955.
- Ledeen, Michael, and Lewis, William. Debacle: The American Failure in Iran. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981.

- Lepsius, Rainer. "Zur Strategie des Regimewechsels." In Hans Albert, ed. Sozialtheorie und soziale Praxis. Eduard Baumgarten zum 70. Geburtstag. Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1971.
- Letamendia, Pierre. La démocratie chretienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977.
- Lewy, Guenther. "Historical Data in Comparative Political Analysis." Comparative Politics 1 (October 1968).
- Linz, Juan J. "Opposition in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain." In Robert Dahl, ed. Regimes and Oppositions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.
- . "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes." In Nelson Polsby and Fred Greenstein, eds. Handbook of Political Science. Vol. III. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Press, 1975.
- . "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective." In W. Laqueur, ed. Fascism: A Reader's Guide. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976.
- Lipset, Seymour M., and Rokkan, Stein. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In S.M. Lipset, and S. Rokkan, eds. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Lorwin, V.R. "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies." Comparative Politics 3 (January 1971).
- Mahrad, Ahmad. Iran unter der Herrschaft Reza Schahs. Frankfurt a/M.: Campus, 1977.
- Marques, Alvaro, and Smith, Thomas B. "Referendums in the Third World." Electoral Studies 3 (1984).
- Mazlish, Bruce. The Revolutionary Ascetic: Evolution of a Political Type. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.
- . "The Hidden Khomeini." New York Magazine, December 24, 1979.
- McLean, David. Britain and her Buffer State: The collapse of the Persian empire, 1890-1914. London: Royal Historical Society, 1979.
- Millward, William G. "Aspects of Modernism in Shi'a Islam." Studia Islamica 37 (1973).
- Mozafari, Mehdi. L'Iran. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1978.
- Nashat, Guity. The Origins of Modern Reform in Iran, 1870-1880. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982.

- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. Ideals and Reality of Islam. New York: Praeger, 1967.
- Pakdaman, Homa. Djamal-ed-Din Assad Abadi, dit Afghani. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1969.
- Petrossian, Vahe. "Dilemmas of the Iranian Revolution." The World Today 36 (1980).
- Popper, Karl R. The Poverty of Historicism. New York: Harper, 1964.
- Poullada, Leon B. Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973.
- Rahman, Fazlur. The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi). Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975.
- . Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition. Chicago: The University Press of Chicago.
- Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Iran's Foreign Policy: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975.
- . "The Autonomous Republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan: Their Rise and Fall." In Thomas T. Hammond, ed. The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975.
- . The United States and Iran: The Pattern of Influence. New York: Praeger, 1982.
- Ravasani, Schapour. Sowjetrepublik Gilan. Berlin: Basis Verlag, n.d.
- Reppa, Robert B. Israel and Iran: Bilateral Relationship and Effect on the Indian Ocean Basin. New York: Praeger, 1974.
- Rodinson, Maxime. Islam and Capitalism. Trans. Brian Pearce. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978.
- Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
- Rothblatt, Howard J. "Structural Impediments to Change in the Qazvin Bazaar." Iranian Studies 5 (1972).
- Rubin, Barry. Paved with Good Intentions. London and New York: Penguin Books, 1981.
- Sa'edi, Gholam Hoseyn. "Iran under the Party of God." Index on Censorship 1 (1984).
- Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

- Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad. "The Political Economy of Surplus Transfer: The Middle Strata and Private Sector Accumulation." State, Culture and Society 1 (Fall 1985).
- Sampson, Anthony. The Arms Bazaar. New York: Bantam Books, 1978.
- Sartori, Giovanni. "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics." In The American Political Science Review 64 (December 1970).
- Savory, Roger. Iran under the Safavids. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Scheler, Max. Ressentiment. Ed. and intro. L.A. Coser, trans. W.W. Holdheim. New York: The Free Press, 1961.
- Seger, Martin. Teheran: Eine stadtgeographische Studie. Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1978.
- Shayegan, Daryush. Que'est-ce qu'une révolution religieuse? Paris: Les presses d'aujourd'hui, 1982.
- Le Shi'isme Imamite: Colloque de Strasbourg. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. See article by J. Aubin.
- Skocpol, Theda. "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Islamic Revolution." Theory and Society 11 (May 1982).
- Smith, Gaddis. "Ideals Under Siege: Carter's Foreign Policy." The Yale Review 73 (1984).
- Smith, John Masson. The History of the Sarbedar Dynasty 1336-1381 A.D. And its Sources. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1970.
- Suleiman, Ezra. Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- Terry, Janice J. The Wafd, 1919-1952: cornerstone of Egyptian political power. London: Third World Centre for Research and Publication.
- Thaiss, Gustav. "The Bazaar as a Case Study of Religious and Social Change." In Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed. Iran Faces the Seventies. New York: Praeger, 1971.
- Tibi, Bassam. "Die iranischen Studenten im Ausland als ein gesellschaftliches Veränderungspotential und ihre Stellung im politischen System." Orient 20 (3), 1979.
- Toynbee, Arnold. Civilization on Trial. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948.
- Trgo, Fabijan, ed. Cetrdeset trva: Ustanak naroda Jugoslavije. Belgrade: Nlado pokolenge, 1961.

- Verba, Sidney. "Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research." World Politics 20 (October 1967).
- Vernoux, Joseph. L'Iran des mollahs - la révolution introuvable. Paris: Anthropos, 1981.
- Watt, W.M. Islamic Political Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980.
- Weber, Max. Trans. and ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Economy and Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978.
- Weinstein, Donald. Savonarola and Florence: Prophecy and Patriotism in the Renaissance. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Westwood, Andrew F. "Elections and Politics in Iran." The Middle East Journal 15 (Spring 1961).
- Wirth, Eugen. "Zum Problem des Bazars (suq, čarši) - Versuch einer Begriffsbildung und Theorie des traditionellen Wirtschaftszentrums der orientalisch-islamischen Stadt." Der Islam 51 (1974).
- Young, T. Cuyler. "Iran in Continuing Crisis." Foreign Affairs 15 (1962).
- Zabih, Sepehr. The Communist Movement of Iran. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966.
- . Iran Since the Revolution. London: Croom Helm, 1982.
- Zonis, Marvin. The Political Elite of Iran. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Zuerrer, Werner. Persien zwischen England und Russland, 1918-1925: Grossmächteinflüsse und nationaler Wiederaufstieg am Beispiel des Iran. Bern: Peter Lang, 1978.

Unpublished Manuscripts and Doctoral Dissertations

Dadachpour, Farrokhzad. Les partis politiques et la vie politico-sociale en Iran depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale. Thèse Lettres, Paris, 1964.

Mohammadi-Nejad, Hassan. Elite-Counterelite Conflict and the Development of a Revolutionary Movement: The Case of the Iranian National Front. Ph.D. Dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1970.

Ramazani, R.K. "Intellectual Trends in the Politics of the Musaddiq Era." Charlottesville, VA, 1985.

Stepan, Alfred. "Authoritarianism and Redemocratization." New Haven, n.d.

----- . "Paths Towards Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations." New Haven, 1982.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Bamdad. Teheran.

The Christian Science Monitor. Boston.

Ettela'at. Teheran.

The Iran Times. Washington, D.C.

The Iranian. Teheran.

Iranshahr. Washington, D.C.

Jebhe-ye Azadi. Teheran.

Keesing's. London.

Keyhan. Teheran.

Le Monde. Paris.

Mizan. Teheran.

The New York Times.

Omid-e Iran. Teheran.

Payam-e Mujahid. Houston, TX.

Time. New York.

The Times. London.

U.S. News and World Report. New York.

The World Today. London.

Yale Daily News. New Haven, CT.